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This work develops a means to encourage states to take advantage of  the flexibilities of  
compulsory licensing in the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of  Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS) which promotes access to medicines in a public health 
emergency.  
 
In pursuing this solution, the precautionary approach (PA) and the structure of  risk 
analysis have been adopted as a means to build a workable reading of  TRIPS and to help 
states embody the flexibilities of  intellectual property (IP).  This work argues for a PA 
reading of  TRIPS and that states have the precautionary entitlements to determine an 
appropriate level of  health protection from the perspective of  “State responsibility” in 
international law.  A philosophical review is conducted followed by the examination of  
existing international legal instruments including the WTO Agreement on the 
Application of  Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, the WHO International Health 
Regulations, the Codex Alimentarius, and the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety.  The PA 
has been found to have a pervasive influence on risk regulation in international law, yet 
the application is fraught with fragmentations in different legal regimes.  In order to 
reach a harmonious interpretation and application of  the PA in the WTO, the legal status 
of  PAs of  different WTO instruments have been analysed.  Further, a comparative 
study on PAs in terms of  legal status in the exemptions of  the WTO and TRIPS 
obligations has been proposed.  The political and moral basis for compulsory licencing 
in a public health emergency has been bolstered through the interpretation and the 
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Part 1: Introductions: Setting the scene 
 
I. Introduction 
I.1 Overview  
 
The focus of  this work is to suggest a precautionary approach (PA) taken in the intellectual 
property (IP) regime in order to enhance access to medicines in a public health 
emergency.  This work also seeks to finetune the complementary roles of  the World 
Health Organization (WHO) and the World Trade Organization (WTO), and to promote 
the harmonisation of  the PA in the IP and health worlds.  
 
 
I.2 The need for this thesis  
 




I.2.1 A pragmatic approach – The precautionary approach in 
the health and trade worlds 
 
This work proposes the PA as ethical grounds to legitimate differential treatment of  
pharmaceutical technologies in compulsory licensing in the WTO Agreement on 
Trade-Related Aspects of  Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).1  The PA has been 
widely adopted in international environmental protection2 as well as in the public health 
sector.3 Yet its application has been sporadic and fragmented in the WTO regime due to 
                                                      
1 Compulsory licensing is a mechanism of  limitation on patent right after it is issued, Article 31 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of  Intellectual Property Rights, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing 
the World Trade Organization Annex 1C (TRIPS). See section 1.3.2 
2 See section 2.2.  
3 See chapter 3.  
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the ambiguity in definition4 and legal status.5  
 
There is also existing literature on the PA incorporated into domestic patent law prior to 
the issue of  a patent (pre-grant), explicitly through exclusions to patentable subject 
matter based on five criteria: morality, public policy (or public order), legality, public 
health and environmental harm.6 Yet little has been addressed on the PA adopted on 
issues after a patent is issued (post-grant), specifically related to compulsory licensing.  
In November 2005, Taiwan issued the first precautionary grant of  compulsory licensing 
for a preparedness plan of  a pending birdflu pandemic, following the WHO’s 
recommendation of  stockpiling sufficient antivirals for at least 10% of  its population.7 
Abbott and Reichman noted that this grant appeared to trigger announcements by other 
countries of  plans to issue compulsory licences.8  The legitimacy of  a precautionary 
compulsory licence then attracted international debates. 9   Legally speaking, if  
compulsory licensing could not be given a PA reading, governments will not be able to 
legitimately consider this measure until the actual outbreak of  a pandemic, after a certain 
number of  deaths have been reported.  As stockpiling of  medicines for pandemic 
preparedness usually takes around six months to one year,10 by then it could be too late 
                                                      
4 See section 2.1.1.  
5 See sections 2.1.3.1 and 5.1.1.2.  
6 For example, see: Kolitch, S (2006) “The Environmental and Public Health Impacts of  U.S. Patent Law: 
Making the Case for Incorporating a Precautionary Principle” 36(1) Environmental Law 221-256 (Kolitch 
PP); Murphy, K.A. (2009) “The Precautionary Principle in Patent Law: A View from Canada” 12(6) The 
Journal of  World Intellectual Property 649-689. See section 4.3.2.1 
7 Hille, K, “Taiwan Employs Compulsory Licensing for Tamiflu” FT.com, 25 November 2005, available at: 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/cebeb882-5dcb-11da-be9c-0000779e2340.html  
8 Abbott, F.M. and Reichman, J.H. (2007) “The Doha Round’s Public Health Legacy: Strategies for the 
Production and Diffusion of  Patented Medicines under the Amended TRIPS Provisions” 10 Journal of  
International Economic Law 921 (Abbott/Reichman) fn122 
9 For example, the patent holder of  Tamiflu, Roche expressed that the compulsory licensing was 
unnecessary. See: “Tamiflu Compulsory License not Necessary, Roche Tells Three Asian Nations” 
Thepharmaletter, 5 December 2005. Available at: 
http://www.thepharmaletter.com/file/37733/tamiflu-compulsory-license-not-necessary-roche-tells-three-a
sian-nations.html 
10 In order to building a global monitor network, the WHO has also recommended that countries should 
stockpile appropriate antiviral medication sufficient for 10 percent of  the population or more to contain 
the virus spread from phase 3 of  Pandemic alert period. The stockpiling of  antivirus medication often 
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to contain the disease.  Is the loss of  human life the only trigger for compulsory 
licensing?  Or could compulsory licensing serve as a trigger to prevent death?  It was 
under these circumstances that the legitimacy of  a precautionary compulsory licence 
started to attract my interest in deliberating the optimal application of  PA as a tool to 
temper IP and health in post-grant situations.11   Further, the PA has been an important 
underpinning in risk regulation, it is anticipated that the PA would also have a role to play 
in the limitations of  IP.  
 
Hence, I will propose to redefine the compulsory licensing scheme through the lens of  
precaution12 and also create the legal status of  the PA in compulsory licensing.13 It is 
argued in this work that the PA can serve as a tool to reconcile the discrepancies in the 
WHO and the WTO agendas,14 and to harmonise the domestic policy making of  legal 
preparedness in a public health emergency.  
 
 
I.2.2 Issue based approach: Conflicts between international 
health and international trade 
 
The rise of  non-state actors and their increasing impact on the global public health 
system demonstrate the need for global governance.  In some situations, non-state 
                                                                                                                                                           
requires 6 months to one year, therefore governments need to prepare for sufficient dosage of  drugs 
before the virus outbreak.  See: “WHO Global Influenza Preparedness Plan: the Role of  WHO and 
Recommendations for National Measures before and during Pandemics” (WHO Influenza Preparedness), 
WHO/CDS/CSR/GIP/2005.5, p23. Available at: 
http://www.who.int/crs/disease/avian_influenza/en/index.html. 
11 This is discussed in section 4.3.2.3.2. See also: Hung, P (2010) “The Precautionary Approach under the 
Right to Health Dilemma” 24(1) International Review of  Law, Computers & Technology 71-80; Hung, P (2008) 
“The Mechanism of  National Emergency in the TRIPS Agreement – the Compulsory Licensing on 
Tamiflu in Taiwan” (in Chinese) 4(1) Taiwan International Law Quarterly 159-207; Hung, P (2006) “The 
Validity and Necessity of  Compulsory Licensing of  Tamiflu – Taiwan Experience” in the 16th World 
Conference of  Medical Law Proceeding 877-883; Hung, P (2006) “Examining the ‘National Emergency’ 
Mechanism in the TRIPS Agreement under the WTO Framework – The Compulsory Licensing of  
Tamiflu” (in Chinese) masters dissertation, National Tsinghua University, Taiwan 
12 See sections 5.1.2 and 5.2.  
13 See section 5.2.1.1.  
14 See section 5.3.  
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actors are directly involved in formulating rules that affect public health nationally and 
globally.15 In an era of  globalisation, states can survive in a public health emergency only 
through global collaboration.16 We will focus our discussion on the linkage of  the WHO 
and the WTO which demonstrates the typical tension between international trade and 
international health in a public health emergency of  international concern. 
 
 
Clash of  the WTO and the WHO 
 
The protection of  human health and safety is regarded as the first priority in the WHO 
regime.17 The goal of  the WHO is to ensure the right of  everyone to the enjoyment of  
the highest attainable standard of  physical and mental health (the right to health).18 Yet 
the principles of  the WTO are free trade and non-discrimination19 which stress the value 
of  free movement of  goods and IP protection. On the one hand, the promotion of  free 
trade in order to promote public health is currently stressed by India and Brazil in their 
                                                      
15 Fidler, D.P. (2002) “A Globalized Theory of  Public Health Law”30 Journal of  Law, Medicine and Ethics 150 
(Fidler Globalized Theory). 
16 Sell defines “global governance” in IP and public health as “devising, implementing, and enforcing 
policies in a way that accommodates a broad range of  stakeholders and policies”. She also identifies the 
WHO, the WTO, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and World Bank, and the World Intellectual 
Property Organization (WIPO) as institutions that involve the “intersection between public health, trade, 
and intellectual property, governance in public health”. Sell, S.K. (2004) “The Quest for Global 
Governance in Intellectual Property and Public Health: Structural, Discursive, and Institutional 
Dimensions” 77 Temple Law Review 363 (Sell Governance). See also: Helfer, L.R. (2004) “Regime Shifting: 
The TRIPS Agreement and New Dynamics of  International Intellectual Property Lawmaking” 29 Yale 
Journal of  International Law 1 (Helfer TRIPS); Fidler, D.P. (2002) “A Globalized Theory of  Public Health 
Law” 30 Journal of  Law, Medicine & Ethics 150-161. (Fidler Globalized Theory) There are still other 
non-state actors such as the World Medical Association and Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF) have helped 
to shape public health policies in global governance. Medecins Sans Frontieres, available at: 
http://www.msf.org; World Medical Association, Declaration of  Helsinki: Ethical Principles for Medical Research 
Involving Human Subjects, rev. ed. Edinburgh, 52 World Medical Association General Assembly, October 
2000, available at: http://www.wma.net/e/policy/17-c_e.html. 
17 Tigerstrom, B. (2005) “The Revised International Health Regulations and Restrict of  National Health 
Measures” 13 Health Law Journal 35-76, at 46. 
18 The Member States of  WHO adopted important principles in regard to public health that are enshrined 
in the preamble to its Constitution. Hence, the Constitution establishes as a fundamental international 
principle that enjoyment of  the highest attainable standard of  health is not only a state or condition of  the 
individual, but “… one of  the fundamental rights of  every human being without distinction of  race, 
religion, political belief, economic or social condition…” 
19 See sections 1.2.1.1 and 1.2.1.1.1 for the discussion of  the principle of  non-discrimination in WTO law. 
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recent complaints against the EU and the Netherlands where the complainants argue that 
the seizure of  generic medicines in transit creates unnecessary barriers to free trade.20  
On the other hand, the rule-based character of  the WTO, in certain circumstances, 
would nevertheless, create institutional conflict with the role of  the WHO as the world 
leader for promoting health.21  For example, Lin lamented the marginalised role of  the 
WHO in trade responses to the recent H1N1 Influenza outbreak in 2009.22  It is 
observed that the role of  the WHO is overshadowed by the WTO’s more effective 
dispute settlement mechanism.23  Member States of  these two institutions would prefer 
the WTO procedure in order to resolve health-related disputes.  However, Bloche and 
Jungman expressed the concern that the dependence on the WTO dispute settlement 
procedure in resolving health disputes would significantly limit national regulatory 
authority in health policy-making.24 Moreover, the WTO DSS is not obliged to use 
guidance or advice from the WHO as the basis in determining health-related disputes.  
The WHO’s influence on resolving health disputes in international fora therefore 
remains relatively weak.  
 
The tension between the IP and access to medicines is typically demonstrated in the 
compulsory licensing mechanism in the TRIPS Agreement.25 Specifically, the WHO 
suggest that states should stockpile sufficient medications for an upcoming pandemic 
                                                      
20 European Union and a Member State – Seizure of  Generic Drugs in Transit, Request for Consultations by India 
and Brazil, WT/DS408/1; WT/DS409/1, 19 May 2010.  
21 See section 1.3.3.  
22 Lin, T-Y, (2010) “The Forgotten Role of  WHO/IHR in Trade Responses to 2009 A/H1N1 Influenza 
Outbreak” 44(3) Journal of  World Trade 515-543 
23 See section 1.2.1.1.2 . The WTO’s prevailing influence over other regimes is also observed by Kelly, C.R. 
(2006) “Power, Linkage and Accommodation: the WTO as an International Actor and its Influence on 
Other Actors and Regimes” 24 Berkeley Journal of  International Law 79. 
24 Bloche, G and Jungman, E (2003) Symposium: Emerging Issues in Population Health: National and 
Global Perspective: A Tribute to Gene W. Matthews, Part II: International Trade and Health, 31 Journal of  
Law, Medicine and Ethics 529 
25 Compulsory licensing, see section 1.3.2. 
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from pandemic phase 3 onwards,26 yet is it legitimate to resort to compulsory licensing 
to secure medication stockpiling for pandemic preparedness prior to the actual outbreak 
of  the pandemic?  Further, the trigger for compulsory licensing depends on the 
identification of  a “public health emergency”, yet this phrase appears to be self-defining: 
even after the interpretation of  the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and 
Public Health (Doha Declaration) in 2001,27 developing countries are still deterred from 
using thes flexibilities in TRIPS.28  
 
It is fair to say that the Doha Declaration has reaffirmed the rights29 of  states’ to 
compulsory licensing;30 however, empirical studies show that developing countries still 
hesitate to use this instrument to relieve their disease burden for fear that developed 
countries would resort to trade retaliation.31 Regrettably, this instrument has been mainly 
used as a threatening tool to negotiate drug price reduction instead of  being a fair 
mechanism to redress the imbalance of  health and IP.32 It would be even more 
controversial to grant a compulsory licence of  a patented drug in the preparation for a 
pending pandemic which has not yet taken place.  Is it legitimate for states to take the 
official information and suggestions from the WHO as “scientific evidence or other 
relevant information” to grant a compulsory licence on the grounds of  a public health 
emergency in the TRIPS Agreement?  
 
                                                      
26 The WHO has advised states to “promote vaccination” and “review vaccine use strategies” from phase 
3 of  “Pandemic alert period” onwards.  However, phase 3 of  the Pandemic alert period is only the 
preparatory period of  a public health emergency; it would be difficult to legitimate the grant of  a 
compulsory licence on the grounds of  “national emergency or other circumstances of  extreme urgency” 
during such time. See: WHO Preparedness Plan, n10 . 
27 Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health (Doha Declaration), adopted by the fourth 
Ministerial Conference of  the World Trade Organization in Doha, Qatar, on 14 November 2001. 
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2 of  20 November 2001. See section 4.3.2.2.1.  
28 See section 1.3.3, n1.  
29 Para 4 Doha Declaration.  
30 See section 4.3.2.2.1. 
31 See sections 1.3.2.2.1, 1.3.2.3.2, and 1.3.2.3.3. 
32 See sections 1.3.2.2.1, 1.3.2.3.2, and 1.3.2.3.3. 
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The compulsory licensing mechanism is supposed to be a tool for redressing the 
imbalance of  IP and health; however, due to international political reasons,33 it has been 
serving rather as a threatening tool for drug price reduction than as a systematic and 
objective mechanism for delineating the boundary of  rightholders’ rights and obligations 
and therefore tempering the tension between public and private interests..34 As a WHO 
report points out: “In many cases, the most significant barrier to the use of  compulsory 
licensing is the absence of  simple, straightforward legislative and administrative 
procedures, which establishes clear decision-making process and responsibilities”.35 A 
workable and practical interpretation to trigger the process of  compulsory licensing is 
thus desired to facilitate states’ institution of  a precautionary measure in a public health 
emergency. 
 
Accordingly, through the lens of  precaution, it is worth examining whether the rationale 
of  risk management36 for a public health emergency can be harmonised in the context 
of  WHO and WTO law.  This work therefore aims to bring harmonisation to the legal 
infrastructures of  risk management in the two regimes and seeks to promote access to 
essential medicines.  Furthermore, a PA analysis would bolster the political and moral 
basis for compulsory licensing, 37  which will aim to bring congruence of  risk 
management in WTO law.  
                                                      
33 See section 1.3.3.1 for the discussion of  the power imbalance of  compulsory licensing in an 
international setting.  
34 See section 1.3.3. 
35 The Use of  Flexibilities in TRIPS by Developing Countries: Can They Promote Access to Medicines? WHO 
Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, Innovation and Public Health (CIPIH Report) Study 4C, 
August 2005.  
36 “Risk management” is defined in the Codex Alimentarius Procedural Manual as: “The process, distinct 
from risk assessment, of  weighing policy alternatives, in consultation with all interested parties, considering 
risk assessment and other factors relevant for the health protection of  consumers and for the promotion 
of  fair trade practices, and, if  needed, selecting appropriated prevention and control options”. Codex 
Alimentarius Commission 18th Procedural Manual (Codex Manual), “Definitions for the Purposes of  the 
Codex Alimentarius”, at 42, available at: 
ftp://ftp.fao.org/codex/Publications/ProcManuals/Manual_18e.pdf . 
See section 3.1.3.  




I.3 Parameters, structure and contribution 
 
Based on the existing human-rights arguments to enhance access to medicines,38 this 
work examines the PA in the context of  international trade and international health, 
particularly in the WTO TRIPS and Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) regimes,39 and 
suggests that a safety factor based on the PA can be accommodated into the TRIPS 
Agreement, particular in the compulsory licensing provision, to promote access to health 
technologies and redress the access to medicines dilemma in a public health emergency.40 
(See Figure I Research parameter: Precaution lens)  On the one hand, this work aim to 
promote access to products or technologies which are associatd with the reduction or 
elimination of  risks to human health; on the other hand, this work could also arguably 
serves as grounds to restrict products or technologies which cause risks to human health 
and safety.  Due to the limitation of  this work, I will focus on the first scenario and set 









38 The human-rights dimension is not specifically included in this work; however, it serves as a foundation 
for this work while it argues for a broader use of  the compulsory licensing provision to enhance access to 
medicines. See section 1.1.2.2.1 for relevant discussions on a human-rights approach in access to 
medicines. 
39 Agreement on the Application of  Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement), Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A: Multilateral Agreements on Trade in 
Goods. 
40 See section 5.3.  
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Figure I. Research parameter: Precaution lens     
     
   
     
 
    
It is argued that the pharmaceutical technology associated with the reduction and 
elimination of  significant risks to human life or health should receive a differential 
treatment by adopting the PA in the compulsory licensing41 clause in TRIPS.42 A 
differential treatment in order to promote access to medicines could be justified by the 
harmonisation of  the rationale of  PAs in WTO law.  
 
                                                      
41 Article 31 TRIPS. See sections 1.3.1 and 1.3.2.    








Accordingly, in order to legitimise the differential treatment of  health technologies in 
IP,43 chapter 1 will discuss the current legal and political background for granting a 
compulsory licence.  Chapter 2 will draw into discussion the current application of  the 
PA and the structure of  risk analysis from international environmental law.  A template 
for the PA in the international health framework will consequently be developed by 
means of  the philosophical and legal review of  the literature on the approach and the 
examination of  relevant international instruments.  Chapter 3 will conduct a 
comprehensive study on the PA applied in the existing international legal instruments in 
the context of  health and environment, specifically the Codex Alimentarius,44 the 
International Health Regulations (IHRs),45 and the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety 
(CPB).46 It is concluded that the implementation of  the PA in international law is 
pervasive, but somehow fragmented and is desperately in need of  a clear redefinition in 
the international public health law regime.  In addition to the research of  the PA in the 
health sector, chapter 4 will scrutinise its current application in the international trade 
world, namely the WTO framework.  By means of  comparative studies on the PA 
applied in the exception provisions in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT)47 and the excluding provisions48 in the SPS Agreement,49 this work finds that 
the current implementation of  the PA in the IP regime has been seriously restricted by 
international political setting.  We will also examine the legal status of  the compulsory 
licensing provision in the WTO framework, and reaffirm states’ precautionary 
                                                      
43 See section 5.2.1.2.  
44 Codex Alimentarius, see section 3.1.3. 
45 See section 3.1.2. International Health Regulations (IHRs), Revision of  the International Health 
Regulations, WHA Res. 58.3, World Health Assembly, 58th Assembly, 23 May 2005, available at 
http://www.who.int/csr/IHR/WHA58_3-en.pdf  
46 Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (CPB), see section 3.2.   
47 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). This work will discuss the precautionary approach 
used in the health and security exception provisions in Article XX and Article XXI GATT. See section 4.1.  
48 The distinction between “exception provisions” and “excluding provisions” in the WTO regime will be 
discussed in section 1.2.1.2.   
49 SPS Agreement, see section 4.2 n39.   
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entitlements50 to grant a compulsory licence in a public health emergency.51  Based on 
the above analysis, chapter 5 will suggest that the PA developed in this thesis be 
accommodated into the IP regime to promote access to essential medicines.  It is 
further suggested that the flexibilities in the compulsory licensing clause can be 
embodied by means of  adopting a margin of  safety to provide protection in the situation 
of  scientific uncertainty.  This leads to a suggestion for the introduction of  an 
expedient track to trigger compulsory licensing on pharmaceutical technologies that are 
strongly associated with the reduction/elimination of  risks to human life or health.  We 
will then employ the precautionary template developed in chapter 2 to redefine the 
compulsory licensing mechanism, and also to assess whether this differentiation of  
pharmaceutical technologies in compulsory licensing will be incompliance with WTO 
Members’ (Members’) obligations in WTO law.52 
 
In summary, the contribution of  this work would be able to develop a procedure that 
would boost states’ confidence in adopting the PA in compulsory licensing, and to 
safeguard access to medicines in a public health emergency.53  
 
We will firstly introduce the background of  international health and international trade 
for compulsory licensing in chapter 1. 
                                                      
50 See sections 2.3, 3.1.2.3, 4.3.2.2, and 5.2.1.1.  
51 See section 5.2.1.1.  
52 See section 5.2.1.2.  





1 Worlds Collide under a Public Health Emergency 
 
A new generation of  risks arising from viruses, persistent chemicals, pollution, nuclear 
disarmament, ocean fisheries, biotechnology, and climate change has posed health threats 
to human life and health in the era of  globalisation.54  Particularly, from the late 
twentieth century onwards, several global virus transmissions have challenged the values 
and rights of  states’ in the international legal framework.  The emergence of  these 
newly-discovered infectious diseases exposes the lack of  a mature legal framework in 
international public health to provide prompt, concrete and specific guidance during a 
large-scale emergency.55 
 
For example, the rise of  the Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (HIV/AIDS) 
brought the issue of  access to essential drugs to the international forum in the late 
twentieth century.56 Moreover, the SARS outbreak in 2002 severely damaged society in 
Canada and Asian countries due to the features of  the virus that was too hasty to be 
prevented within current medical and social infrastructure.57  More recently, states’ 
                                                      
54 De Sadeleer, N. (2008) Environmental Principles: From Political Slogans to Legal Rules, Oxford University, New 
York, US, (De Sandeleer) pp150-155. 
55 See section 1.1.2.1.  
56 AIDS was first diagnosed just more than two decades ago in the affluent western world, but within a 
few years it turned to have the severest impacts in African and other resource-poor places such as Thailand. 
Notably, the HIV therapy initiated international debate on “access to medicines”. The cocktail therapy, also 
known as highly active antiretroviral therapy (HAART) has been developed to manage the condition of  
AIDS patients, but the therapy requires huge costs which are far beyond those that resource-poor 
countries can afford due to drug patent protection policy. A global outcry for equitable access to essential 
medicines for the treatment of  HIV/AIDS has resulted in the controversies on the legitimacy of  
pharmaceutical patent protection in the TRIPS Agreement. (See the Brazil case and the Thailand case in 
sections 1.3.2.3.2 and 1.3.2.3.3) 
57 For more details information about SARS, see Kimball, A.M. (2006) Risky Trade: Infectious Disease in the 
Era of  Global Trade, Ashgate Publishing, England, pp44-49. The spread of  SARS virus was identified as 
“on board transmission” on the airplane, and the crisis developed quickly in a matter of  weeks to reach 
two continents including Asia and North America. Other significant features of  SARS are its novelty and 
lack of  effective treatment. It was not until SARS broke out did the researchers set out to identify it. The 
SARS virus evolved and adapted globally before humans’ steps to recognise it. Even though the pathogen, 
a coronavirus was identified after the collaboration of  scientists in one month, there was still no arsenal of  
medical treatments for this new coronavirus. 
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preparation of  sufficient medicines and vaccines for containing the highly virulent strain 
of  avian influenza H5N1 (popularly known as “Bird Flu”) and H1N1 (known as “Swine 
Flu”) also triggers contentions of  the conflicts between the “right to health” and the 
protection of  intellectual property (IP) rights.58  
 
In view of  these conflicts, this work draws the structure of  risk analysis and the rationale 
of  the precautionary approach (PA) as a safety valve into contemporary IP regime to 
argue for the adoption of  a safety factor as a margin of  appreciation in contemporary 
patent protection.59 This chapter will start the discussion of  the tension between 
international health and international trade in a public health emergency, and examine the 
role of  IP in the current legal framework.  We will then use the mechanism of  
compulsory licensing as an instrument to explore the possible applications of  the PA and 
the relevant structure of  risk analysis in the IP regime.  The development of  the PA will 
be addressed in Chapter 2, and the structure of  risk analysis will be elaborated in Chapter 
3 when we discuss the legal mechanism in the Codex Alimentarius.60   
 
Attention will now be turned to the discussion of  a public health emergency from the 
lens of  international public health. 
                                                      
58 From the first H5N1 outbreak in 2003 till now, the WHO is coordinating the global response to human 
cases of  avian influenza and monitoring the corresponding threat of  an influenza pandemic. The World 
Bank has suggested that millions of  people would die and the global economy would shrink by some $800 
billion per year should avian influenza become pandemic in humans. The next bird flu outbreak has 
increasingly become the world’s primary focus in infectious disease surveillance systems in many 
international institutions such as the WHO and the World Bank. World Bank, “Evaluating the Economic 
Consequences of  Avian Influenza”, available at: 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTTOPAVIFLU/Resources/EvaluatingAIeconomics.pdf. WHO, 




59 See section 3.1.3.1 for the structure of  risk analysis and chapter 2.  
60 The Codex Alimentarius Commission was created by the Food and Agriculture Organization of  the 
United Nations (FAO) and WHO to develop food standards, guidelines and related texts under the joint 
FAO/WHO Food Standards Programme. See FAO website:  http://www.fao.org; Codex Alimentarius 
Commission website: http://www.codexalimentarius.net/web/index_en.jsp n36  
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1.1 International health 
 
From a retrospective view, the main focus of  public health in the past was the prevention 
of  the spread of  disease by improving national environmental conditions and personal 
hygiene.  All these public health measures and regulations focused on the prevention of  
infectious diseases domestically. 61  However, traditional approaches for long-term 
prevention in public health facilities are no longer sufficient for coping with the 
imminent threat that emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases pose in a highly 
globalised era.  Thus the rethinking of  our legal system is required in order to cope with 
the fundamental change of  infectious diseases under globalisation.62 
 
As Fidler states,  
 
The processes that characterize globalization -- trade, investment, capital movements, travel, and 
technological advances -- render borders more permeable and increase the volume, nature, scope, 
and complexity of  problems governments face within their territorial boundaries.  Globalization 
represents, therefore, a challenge to the traditional notions of  politics, economics, law, and culture as 
defined by geographical borders.63 
 
Accordingly, public health law must be re-examined from a global perspective to meet 
increasing needs.  Particularly, globalisation has rendered substantial change in the 
                                                      
61 Baggott, R. (2000) Public Health: Policy and Politics, MACMILLAN Press, UK, pp15-36. 
62 The concepts of  “globalisation” and “economic globalisation” in particular, have been commonly used 
to describe the feature of  the post-Cold War era. Joseph Stiglitz, former Chief  Economist of  the World 
Bank and winner of  the Nobel Prize for Economics in 2001, described the concept of  globalisation as: 
The closer integration of  the countries and peoples of  the world which has been brought about by the 
enormous reduction of  costs of  transportation and communication, and the breaking down of  artificial 
barriers to the flow of  goods, services, capital, knowledge, and (to a lesser extent) people across borders. 
Stiglitz, J. (2002) Globalisation and Its Discontents, Penguin, p9.  
63 Fidler, D.P. (2002) “A Globalized Theory of  Public Health Law” 30 Journal of  Law, Medicine and Ethics 
150. n15 
  16
prevalence of  infectious disease: viruses evolve swiftly to adapt to the new world of  
global traffic and trade, and diseases often spread across borders before being identified. 
The surveillance of  infectious diseases requires a sound legal mechanism to meet the 
needs for prompt preparedness in a public health emergency.  
 
 
1.1.1 Public health emergency of  international concern 
 
The response to a public health emergency was traditionally the subject of  concern for a 
national territory,64 yet public health emergency has shifted from the domestic to an 
international plane in the era of  globalisation.  Traditional response to a public health 
emergency is no longer fit for the purpose of  combating international spread of  
emerging or reemerging diseases under globalisation.  Hence the WHO revised the 
International Health Regulations (IHRs) in 2005 to meet the swift evolution of  virus 
spread without borders.65 The term “public health emergency of  international concern” 
(PHEIC) is highlighted in the new IHRs to demonstrate that public health emergencies 
have broken national boundaries under globalisation.66  
 
We will first address how globalisation accelerates the spread of  infectious disease, and 




64 For example, the UK Civil Contingencies Act defines “emergency” as “(a) an event or situation which 
threatens serious damage to human welfare in the United Kingdom or in a Part or region, (b) an event or 
situation which threatens serious damage to the environment of  the United Kingdom or of  a part or 
region, or (c) war, or terrorism, which threatens serious damage to the security of  the United Kingdom”. 
Article 1 &19 UK Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (Chapter 36). “Human welfare” involves loss of  human 
life; human illness or injury; homelessness; damage to property; disruption of  a supply of  money, food, 
water, energy, fuel, communication, transport, and services relating to health. 
65 International Health Regulations (IHRs), see n45. 
66 Article 1 IHRs n4545. See section 3.1.2.1.   
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1.1.1.1 The nexus between globalisation and infectious 
disease 
 
Globalisation accelerates the movement of  people and goods, and thus creates new 
pathways of  transmission.  According to Weinberg, globalisation of  trade and travel 
may be the main reason of  infection transmission, he notes that: 
 
The increased mobility of  populations both in scale and geographical reach is believed to be 
increasing the likelihood that an infectious disease outbreak may involve more than one country. … 
The conditions created by this large-scale movement of  people, other life forms, and traded goods 
around the globe, are also conducive to the movement of  organisms and vectors (often insects) of  
disease.67 
 
The movement of  vectors of  disease is attributed to the large scale of  movement of  
people and traded goods.68 The free movement of  people and commercial goods is a 
global trend of  “trade liberalism”.  When the trade barriers are diminished, the risk to 
human health is inevitably increased.  Health risks caused by globalisation penetrate 
deeply in our daily lives.  Economic and technological globalisation advances free trade 
in a world market, yet free movement of  people and commodity also increases the 
prevalence of  virus transmission.69 However, in the trade regime, given the importance 
                                                      
67 Weinberg, J. (2005) “The Impact of  Globalisation on Emerging Infectious Disease” in Lee, K. and 
Collin, J. (eds) Global Change and Health, London School of  Hygiene & Tropical Medicines, Open University 
Press, pp56-59 (Weinberg Globalisation). 
68 From the late twentieth century, several significant infectious diseases outbreaks have occurred globally. 
Various types of  infectious diseases have emerged and spread without borders since the outbreak of  
Spanish Flu in early twentieth century. The transmission of  Spanish Flu was facilitated by the ending of  
World War I when soldiers on the European Continent discharged to their home towns. The Spanish Flu 
resulted in three waves of  disease, and is estimated to have infected one billion people in the world which 
brought a death toll of  228000 in the UK.  Agence France-Presse, “Mystery of  the Spanish Flu Solved” 
COSMOS, 18 January 2007, Available at: http://www.cosmosmagazine.com/node/978; “1918 Killer Flu 
Secrets Revealed”, BBC News, 5 February 2004.  
69 Fidler, D.P. (2000) International Law and Public Health: Materials on and Analysis of  Global Health Jurisprudence, 
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of  free trade, it appears that the WTO is willing to take acceptable risks to human health 
in order to pursue maximum economic benefit.  We will have further discussion on this 
in Chapter 4 when we address the legal status and the application of  the health exception 
provision in the GATT.70   
 
Globalisation is like a double-ended sword to public health.  On the one hand, 
globalisation brings about the promise of  quality public health infrastructure; on the 
other hand, economic globalisation brings about the deterioration of  environment, such 
as pollution and global warming, which are all relevant to the flourishing of  infectious 
diseases and severely increase the risks to public health.  When states compete to gain a 
comparative advantageous share in the global market, costs of  long term impact on the 
environment would inevitably be compromised under the pursuit of  maximum economic 
interests.  This is particularly common in developing countries which are striving to 
economically keep up with developed countries.71 For example, Kimball describes the 
deterioration of  the environment in Asia as rendering it the origin of  the majority of  
newly reported human infections worldwide.72 It is suggested that the recent economic 
developement via globalisation comes at the price of  an increasing risk of  pandemic 
outbreaks.  Hence, risk management of  a public health emergency has become a 
priority topic in international law.  It must, therefore, be a concern for both 
                                                                                                                                                           
Transnational Publishers Inc. p220. 
70 See sections 4.1.1 and 4.1.1.3.   
71 Kwok-yuan Yuan observes that the economic growth of  many developing countries including China 
and Mexico, known as the world factories, face the problem of  inadequate improvement in biosecurity and 
regulatory measures in public health protection. Therefore people experience bird flu, SARS, and many 
food borne infections, antibiotic resistant bacteria and swine flu in the shadow of  globalisation. See: Yuan, 
K.Y. (2009) “The Public Health and Clinical Perspective of  Emerging Infectious Diseases: from Avian to 
Swine Flu” 41st Asia-Pacific Academic Consortium for Public Health (APACPH) Conference, 3 December 
2009, Taipei, Taiwan. 
72 In addition to the SARS virus, the H5N1 outbreak in 1997 in Hong Kong also originated from the 
Guangdong province. The southeast part of  China has been one of  the most developed areas in China’s 
economy, but it has also been identified as the origin of  most emerging diseases in recent years. It shows 
that the nexus between economic development and environmental degradation has positive relevance, and 
that environment degradation directly results in the flourishing and evolution of  viruses. See: Kimball, A.M. 
(2006) Risky Trade: Infectious Disease in the Era of  Global Trade, Ashgate Publishing, England (Kimball).  
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international public health regimes and international trade regimes.  
 
We will now turn our discussion to the role of  the WHO as the primary non-state actor 
in promoting global health.  
 
 
1.1.2 The WHO 
 
The WHO stands as the primary international organisation for the global governance in 
the threat of  infectious disease.  The WHO Constitution and the United Nations 
Charter vest the WHO to adopt treaties and regulations to which Member States 
subscribe.73 The International Health Regulations (IHRs) were revised in 2005 to protect 
public health by providing a structure for global disease reporting and by enumerating 
the rights and duties of  individual states in controlling the global spread of  disease.74 
State Parties follow the IHRs to adjust their domestic legislation to be consistent with the 










73 Forrest, M. (2000) “Using the Power of  the World Health Organization: The International Health 
Regulations and the Future of  International Health Law” 33 Columbia Journal of  Law and Social 
Problems153. 
74 See section 3.1.2. Revision of  the International Health Regulations, WHA Res. 58.3, World Health 
Assembly, 58th Assembly, 23 May 2005, available at http://www.who.int/csr/IHR/WHA58_3-en.pdf 
75 For instance, the Scottish Executive working with the UK government aims to establish the public 
health legislative changes required to comply with the new Regulations in due process. The Scottish Public 
Health Review Group sets out proposals to strengthen the public health response in Scotland and strides 
to make legislation consistent with current practice. Public Health Legislation in Scotland: A Consultation, 
Scottish Executive, October 2006. http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Resource/Doc/152453/0040999.pdf  
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1.1.2.1 International Health Regulations 
 
The IHRs 1969 have not been significantly changed since they were first issued in 1951.76 
The scope of  the old IHRs only applied to cholera, plague, and yellow fever, and is 
unable to cope with modern health threats such as HIV/AIDS, SARS, and bioterrorism, 
which is severely limiting its effectiveness.77 After the outbreaks of  cholera in Peru, 
plague in India, and Ebola hemorrhagic fever in Zaire, the 1995 World Health Assembly 
(WHA) adopted a resolution on Global health security: epidemic alert and response and to revise 
the IHRs.78 Its aim is to equip the WHO with an effective mechanism to respond to 
current public health threats including new diseases and naturally occurring, accidental 
release or deliberate use of  chemical and biological agents or radionuclear materials that 
affect human health.79  
 
In addition to the revision of  the IHRs in strengthening the global virus surveillance 
network, the WHO also sets out relevant public health programmes to address the 




76 The origins of  the IHRs date back to the first International Sanitary Conference, held in Paris in 1851 
to address the European cholera epidemics. In the latter half  of  the nineteenth century and twentieth 
century, some sanitary conferences and conventions were negotiated, and the international community 
established regional and international institutions to enforce these conventions. After two World Wars, 
the WHO was established by the UN to protect global health. Under the WHO Constitution, WHO 
State Parties adopted the International Sanitary Regulations (ISRs) in 1951, which was later renamed the 
International Health Regulations (IHRs) in 1969. Gostin, L.O. (2005) “World Health Law: Toward A 
New Conception of  Global Health Governance for the 21th Century” 5 Yale Journal of  Health Policy, Law 
& Ethics413. The International Sanitary Convention dealing with cholera was adopted in Venice in 1892, 
followed by another Convention dealing with plague in 1897. In 1903, the International Sanitary 
Convention replaced the conventions of  1892 and 1897. American states set up the International 
Sanitary Bureau (ISB) in 1902, which became the Pan American Sanitary Bureau (PASB). European 
States developed their own multilateral institution in 1907, L’Office International D’Hygiene Publique 
(OIHP). 
77  Gostin, L.O. (2004) “International Infectious Disease Law: Revision of  the World Health 
Organization’s International Health Regulations” 291(21) JAMA 2623. 
78 Fifty-fourth World Health Assembly, World Health Organization, 21 May 2001. Global health security: 
epidemic alert and response. Available at :  
http://www.who.int/inf-pr-2001/en/pr2001WHA-6.html. 
79 See section 3.1.2.  
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1.1.2.2 Access to medicines 
 
As mentioned above, health hazards can move rapidly without borders in the age of  
global travel and commerce.  A WHO report has pointed out the importance of  
international cooperation in response to a pandemic threat,80 yet the asymmetries of  
resources and capacity of  surveillance in developed and developing countries undermine 
the global surveillance collaboration.  Developing nations often shoulder much of  the 
world's surveillance burden, but do not have adequate resources and capacity to prevent 
its spread.81 Meanwhile, developed countries keep on furthering their economic interests 
in global markets through the creation and protection of  IP for pharmaceutical 
companies, making lifesaving vaccines and drugs more inaccessible in developing 
countries.82  
 
In view of  this, a human-rights approach to address this “access to medicines” issue has 
been adopted in the WHO framework.  Access to essential medicines is regarded as 
part of  the progressive fulfillment of  the fundamental right to health in the WHO’s 
medicine policy.83 The WHO has created the “Model List of  Essential Medicines” to 
promote access of  essential drugs and ensure the non-profit use of  life-saving drugs for 
common diseases since 1977.84  
                                                      
80 “Ethical Considerations in Developing a Public Health Response to Pandemic Influenza”, WHO, 
WHO/CDS/EPR/GIP/2007.2, p17. (WHO Influenza Considerations) 
81  “Too Little, Too Late” 13(3) Nature Medicine, March 2007. 
http://www.nature.com/nm/journal/v13/n3/full/nm0307-225.html. 
82 Cornia, G.A. “Globalisation and Health: Results and Options” 79 Bull. 834-841 World Health 
Organization, 2001. 
83 “Access to Essential Medicines: a Global Necessity” 32 Essential Drugs Monitor, 2003, WHO. 
84  WHO Medicines Strategy 2008-2013, Draft 8, 13 June 2008, 
http://www.who.int/medicines/publications/Medicines_Strategy_draft08-13.pdf, p3. For example, ARV 
drugs have been included in the WHO’s model Essential Drugs List (EDL) since April 2002. The model 
Essential Drugs List provides a template for countries seeking to establish their own national lists of  
priority medicines. In the past 30 years of  Medicines Strategy, over 150 countries have their lists of  
essential medicines. In order to improve health by ensuring the quality, efficacy, safety and rational use of  
medicines, WHO has also created Essential Medicines and Pharmaceutical Policies Department (the EMP 




1.1.2.2.1 A human-rights perspective 
 
International legal instruments have recognised the appeal of  access to medicines as a 
fundamental human right.  “The right of  everyone to the enjoyment of  the highest 
attainable standard of  physical and mental health” is recognised by State Parties of  the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)85.  It also 
obliges State Parties to achieve the full realisation of  this right, which includes 
appropriate treatment of  prevalent diseases, and the provision of  essential drugs.86 
 
In 2000, the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), the legal 
body charged in the ICESCR drafted the official interpretations of  and monitoring of  
States Parties compliance with the ICESCR.  General Comment No. 14 is surrounding 
the issue of  the right to health, and it acknowledges a collective right to public health 
through its modernisation of  state obligations under Article 12 of  the ICESCR.87 It 
states that the core obligations of  State Parties should include “to provide essential drugs, 
as from time to time defined under the WHO Action Programme on Essential Drugs” 
and “to adopt and implement a national public health strategy and plan of  action, on the 
basis of  epidemiological evidence, addressing the health concerns of  the whole 
population; the strategy and plan of  action shall be devised, and periodically reviewed, on 
the basis of  a participatory and transparent process…”88  
 
                                                                                                                                                           
established to enhance its policy objectives. 
85 Article 12.1 The International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICRSCR)  
86 Article 12.2. “Access to Essential Medicines as a Human Right” 33 Essential Drugs Monitor, 2003, WHO. 
87 Meier, B.M. “Employing Health Rights for Global Justice: the Promise of  Public Health in Response to 
the Insalubrious Ramifications of  Globalization”, 39 Cornell International Law Journal 711. 
88 UN document E/C. 12/2000/4, 11 August 2000, para 43. 
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As the WHO views “the enjoyment of  the highest attainable standard of  health …[as] 
one of  the fundamental rights of  every human being”;89 it also establishes the “Health 
and Human Rights Team” to integrate a human rights-based approach to health and to 
advance the right to health.90 Further, the department of  “Ethics, Trade, Human Rights 
and Health Law” (ETH) has also been created from 2003 to cooperate with relevant 
international organsiations.  Its focus is to redress the issue that the increasing global 
economic integration and the advancements of  health technologies pose new challenges 
and opportunities for promoting the highest attainable level of  health for all.91 
 
In addition, the programme of  “Globalization, Trade and Health” is also developed to 
address the issues relating to trade and health under globalisation.  It aims at “seeking a 
common ground for trade and health”, and “making trade and trade agreements work 
for health”.92 It attempts to express the view of  international public health from the 
health sector regarding the growing trend of  globalisation.93 It is therefore noteworthy 
that the interface of  globalisation, health and human rights has been acknowledged as a 
                                                      
89 WHO Constitution.  
90 WHO “Health and Human Rights” website, http://www.who.int/hhr/en/ . 
91 See more discussions on human rights and public health: Gostin, L.O. (2001) “Public Health, Ethics, 
and Human Rights: A Tribute to the Late Jonathan Mann” 29 Journal of  Law, Medicine and Ethics 121; Meier, 
B.M. (2007) “Advancing Health Rights in a Globalized World: Responding to Globalization through a 
Collective Human Right to Public Health” 35 Journal of  Law, Medicine and Ethics 545; Meier, B.M. and Mori. 
L.M. (2005) “The Highest Attainable Standard: Advancing A Collective Human Right to Public Health” 37 
Columbia Human Rights Law Review 101; Meier, B. M. (2006) “Employing Health Rights for Global Justice: 
The Promise of  Public Health in Response to the Insalubrious Ramifications of  Globalization” 39 Cornell 
International Law Journal 711; Aginam, O. (2006) “Between Life and Profit: Global Governance and the 
Trilogy of  Human Rights, Public Health and Pharmaceutical Patents” 31 North Carolina Journal of  
International Law and Commercial Regulations 901; Fidler, D.P. (2004) “Constitutional Outlines of  Public 
Health’s ‘New World Order’” 77 Temple Law Review 247; Fidler, D.P. (2004) “Fighting the Axis of  Illness: 
HIV/AIDS, Human Rights, and U.S. Foreign Policy” 17 Harvard Human Rights Journal 99; Gruskin, S. (2004) 
“Is There A Government in the Cockpit: A Passenger’s Perspective on Global Public Health: The Role of  
Human Rights” 77 Temple Law Review 313; Walker, E.M. (2007) “The HIV/AIDS Pandemic and Human 
Rights: A Continuum Approach” 19 Florida Journal of  International Law 335. 
92  WHO Website, Trade, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy and Health, 
http://www.who.int/trade/en/index.html . 
93 For example, the WHO has published International Trade in Health Services and the GATS: Current Issues and 
Debates; Trade and Health: Seeking Common Ground; Draft Legal Review of  the General Agreement on Trade in Services 
(GATS) from a Health Policy Perspective; GATS and Health Related Service; WTO Agreements and Public Health, and 
Global Public Goods for Health. See http://www.who.int/trade/en/index.html . 
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new challenge by the WHO, and a harmonised legal framework is called for to balance 
these conflicting interests.   
 
 
1.1.2.2.2 Public health and intellectual property 
 
The WTO TRIPS Agreement is the first international agreement that provides minimum 
standard protection to pharmaceutical patents.  Members to the WTO are obliged to 
comply with these standards by modifying their domestic legislation.  After the TRIPS 
Agreement came into force, the UN Commissions on Human Rights Resolution called 
upon states to refrain from taking measures which would deny or limit equal access for 
all persons to pharmaceutical products used to treat pandemics such as HIV/AIDS, 
tuberculosis, malaria or other common infections.94 Moreover, the Resolution also urges 
states to safeguard access to pharmaceutical products by adapting national legislation in 
order to make full use of  the flexibilities in the TRIPS Agreement.95  
 
When the emergence of  the HIV/AIDS pandemic in the 1980s, and the discovery of  
effective treatments in the mid-1990s occurred, the future of  patients’ treatment appears 
to be dominated by the pricing and IP protection of  drugs.  Hence the WHO proposed 
the use of  TRIPS safeguards to ensure access to essential drugs.96 The WHO also issued 
                                                      
94 Commission on Human Rights Resolution 2004/26: Access to Medication in the Context of  Pandemics: 
Such as HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria (2004), article 7. 
95 Commission on Human Rights Resolution 2004/26: Access to Medication in the Context of  Pandemics: 
Such as HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria (2004), article 11. 
96 For example, in regard to the possible impending avain flu pandemic, the WHO also calls on countries 
to work out plans to balance the availability of  patented pharmaceuticals and ensure adequate protection 
of  populations. In the access to medicines campaign, the WHO’s role is to provide advice and technical 
assistance to countries to help them implement the full flexibilities in the TRIPS Agreement to address the 
“health implications of  trade and intellectual property devices”. It aims at “promoting the development 
and incorporation of  TRIPS safeguards within the national policy and legal framework”. See: “Access to 
Essential Medicines: a Global Necessity”32 Essential Drugs Monitor, 2003, WHO; “Access to Medicines, 
Intellectual Property Protection: Impact on Public Health”, WHO Drug Information Vol 19, No 3, 2005. 
At the same time, WHO also explored the flexibilities within the TRIPS framework by publishing the 
CIPIH Report n35. See also: Tsang, KWT. (2005) “H5N1 Influenza Pandemic: Contingency Plans” 366 
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the “Globalization and Access to Drugs” report to address the repercussions in the 
pharmaceutical field from the impact of  globalisation on access to drugs and the TRIPS 
Agreement.97 It was argued that “Public health concerns should be highly considered 
when implementing the TRIPS Agreement”, and that it also identified how much 
freedom was left for Member States to enact legislation that complied with TRIPS and 
was consistent with domestic health policy. 
 
In order to address the need, the World Health Assembly (WHA) adopted a resolution 
on ensuring accessibility of  essential medicines in 2002 which called upon the WHO “to 
pursue all diplomatic and political opportunities aimed at overcoming barriers to access 
to essential medicines, collaborating with Member States in order to make these 
medicines accessible and affordable to the people who need them”.98 Several resolutions 
passed by WHO Member States have stressed the importance of  using the flexibilities in 
the TRIPS Agreement.  For example, a resolution of  the World Health Assembly urges 
Members “to encourage that bilateral trade agreement take into account the flexibilities 
contained in the WTO TRIPS Agreement and recognised by the Doha Ministerial 
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health” (Doha Declaration).99 The 
Doha Declaration was adopted by WTO trade ministers to interpret TRIPS to support 
public health and to promote access to medicines in 2001.  We will introduce the Doha 
Declaration in more details in Chapter 4.100  
                                                                                                                                                           
Lancet 553-554. 
97 WHO, Globalization and Access to Drugs (2nd edition) January 1999.  
98 Resolution WHA 55.14. Ensuring accessibility of  essential medicines, in: Fifty-fifth World Health 
Assembly, Geneva, 18 May 2002. Ninth plenary meeting, Geneva, World Health Organization, 2002 
(A55/VR/9). 
99 Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health (Doha Declaration), adopted by the fourth 
Ministerial Conference of  the World Trade Organization in Doha, Qatar, on 14 November 2001. 
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2 of  20 November 2001 n27; Resolution WHA 57.14. Scaling up treatment and care 
within a coordinated and comprehensive response to HIV/AIDS. In: Fifty-seventh World Health Assembly, 
Geneva, 22 May 2004. Eighth plenary meeting, Geneva, World Health Organization, 2004. 
100 See section 4.3.2.2.1.  
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Further to several WHA resolutions,101 the Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, 
Innovation and Public Health (CIPIH) later issued a report of  “Public Health, 
Innovation and Intellectual Property Rights” (CIPIH report) to address the needs of  a 
growing burden of  diseases that disproportionately affect developing countries.102 It 
examines the role of  IP in developing new vaccines, diagnostics and pharmaceuticals in 
developed, developing and under-developed countries.  It recognises that IP rights are 
an important incentive for the development of  new health-care products, however, this 
incentive alone fails to meet the need for the development of  new products where the 
potential paying market is small.  Therefore it encourages trade agreements to take into 
account the flexibilities, such as compulsory licensing 103  and parallel imports 104 
contained in TRIPS recognised by the Doha Declaration.105    
 
In summary, the WHO has been working from a human-rights approach to realise the 
right to health in a public health emergency.  The CIPIH report demonstrates that IP 
should be interpreted and understood through the lens of  global health.  It reflects the 
malfunction of  IP in resource-poor countries, and urges states to take full advantage of  
                                                      
101 WHA52.19, WHA53.14, WHA54.10, and WHA57.14. 
102 For more discussions, see: Elements of  a Global Strategy and Plan of  Action: Progress to Date in the 
Intergovernmental Working Group, Intergovernmental Working Group on Public Health, Innovation and 
Intellectual Property, Agenda item 2.3, A/PHI/IGWG/1/5, 8 December 2006; Sell, S.K.(2004) “The 
Quest for Global Governance in Intellectual Property and Public Health: Structure, Discursive, and 
Institutional Dimensions”, 77 Temple Law Review 363; Sell S.K. (2002) “Post-TRIPS Developments: The 
Tension between Commercial and Social Agendas in the Context of  Intellectual Property” 14 Florida 
Journal of  International Law 193 (Sell Post-TRIPS); Nanda, N. and Lodha, R. (2002) “Making Essential 
Medicines Affordable to the Poor” 20 Wisconsin International Law Journal 581; Mercurio, B. (2006) 
“Resolving the Public Health Crisis in the Developing World: Problems and Barriers of  Access to Essential 
Medicines” 5 Northwestern University Journal of  International Human Rights 1; Love, J. (2007) “Measures to 
Enhance Access to Medical Technologies, and New Methods of  Stimulating Medical R & D” 40 U.C. Davis 
Law Review 679; Opderbeck, D. W. (2005) “Patent, Essential Medicines, and the Innovation Game” 58 
Vanderbilt Law Review 501; Love, J. and Hubbard, T. (2007) “The Big Idea: Prizes to Stimulate R & D for 
New Medicines” 82 Chicago-Kent Law Review 1519. 
103 CIPIH Report, n35, pp117-121. 
104 CIPIH Report, n35, pp123-124. 
105 Fifty-ninth World Health Assembly, Public Health, Innovation, Essential Health Research and Intellectual 
Property Rights: towards a Global Strategy and Plan of  Action, WHA59.24, 27 May 2006. 
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the flexibilities in TRIPS.  
 
However, back to the WTO regime, while “free trade” is regarded as principle, and 
health is deemed as exemption to trade/IP, conflicts often arise between contending 
values of  international trade and international health.  The pursuit of  free trade 
inevitably increases the probability of  virus transmission across borders.  The collision 
of  these two worlds also magnifies the significant role of  the WTO in public health 
concerns. 
 
We now turn our discussion to the principles and exemptions of  the WTO. 
 
 
1.2 International trade 
 
The WTO is the most effective institution in international law which introduces 
minimum standards for patent protection on pharmaceuticals in its TRIPS Agreement.  
With its effective dispute settlement system (DSS) in international law,106 the WTO could 
also work to promote Members’ compliance with health measures between the WTO 
and the IHRs in the WHO.107 Public health has increasingly become a trade concern. 









106 WTO Dispute Settlement System (DSS) or Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), see section 1.2.1.1.5. 
107 Tigerstrom, B. (2005) “The Revised International Health Regulations and Restraint of  National Health 




“Free Trade” is the primary goal of  economic globalisation within the development of  
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) from 1948 to 1994.  The WTO is 
currently the principal advocate of  a globalised market-based economic system after its 
foundation in 1995.  The foundation of  the WTO aims at the utilisation of  world 
resources and promoting the economic fulfillment of  human kind.  The purpose of  the 
GATT/WTO is in raising standards of  living, ensuring full employment and a large and 
steadily growing volume of  real income and effective demand, developing the full use of  
the resources of  the world and expanding the production and exchanging of  goods.108 
Thus, trade liberalism, global market access and the elimination of  tariffs as barriers and 





The basic rules of  the WTO are the principle of  non-discrimination: 
most-favoured-nation treatment and national treatment for promoting free trade.  It is 
also equipped with a number of  key institutional and procedural rules relating to 





Non-discrimination is a key concept in WTO law and policy.  There are two main 
principles of  non-discrimination in WTO law: the most-favoured-nation (MFN) 
                                                      
108 Preamble of  the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) n47, para 2. 
109 Bossche, P. (2008) The Law and Policy of  the World Trade Organization – Text, Cases and Materials (2nd 
edition) Cambridge University Press, New York, US, pp75-316 (Bossche). See section 1.2.1.1.2 for the 
WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB).  
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treatment obligation and the national treatment (NT) obligation.  The MFN treatment 
obligation requires Members to treat all other Members in a non-discriminatory way to 
the same “most-favoured’ standard when dealing with the sale of  “like products”,110 and 
the NT obligation requires Members to treat imported “like products” from other 
Members with the same criteria as is applied in its domestic market.  
 
In other words, if  two products are classified as “like products”, then they should enjoy 
the same treatment in tariffs and in market access.  In brief, the Dispute Settlement 
Body will consider “the characteristics of  the products”; “their end use”; “consumers’ 
tastes and habits” and “tariff  regimes of  other Members” in examining whether the 
various products are “like products”.111 
 
 
1.2.1.1.1.1 Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment 
 
The obligation of  Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment prohibits discrimination between 
like products originating in or destined for different countries.112 “The essence of  the 
non-discrimination obligations is that like products should be treated equally, irrespective 
of  their origin”.113 Any differentiation in tariff  or non-tariff  barriers between imported 
                                                      
110 The classification of  “like product” is addressed in the Spain – Unroasted Coffee case and the Asbestos case. 
See Bossche, P. (2008) The Law and Policy of  the World Trade Organization: Text, Cases, and Materials, (2nd 
edition) Cambridge University Press, New York, US, pp329-331 (Bossche WTO); Bernasconi-Osterwalder, 
N. et al. (2006) (eds) Environment and Trade: A Guild to WTO Jurisprudence, Earthscan, London UK, pp7-17 
(Bernasconi-Osterwalder WTO); GATT Panel Report, Spain – Tariff  Treatment of  Unroasted Coffee (Spain 
Unroasted Coffee) L/5135, adopted 11 June 1981, BISD 28S/102; WTO Appellate Body Report, European 
Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products (EC – Asbestos), WT/DS135/AB/R, 
paras130 and 145.  
111 GATT Panel Report, Spain – Tariff  Treatment of  Unroasted Coffee L/5135, adopted 11 June 1981, BISD 
28S/102; EC – Asbestos, n110, paras130 and 145.  
112 GATT I:1 n47.  
113 In European Communities – Report for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of  Bananas (EC – Bananas III), the 
issue was whether the EC treated bananas imported from Latin America with a standard less favourable 
than bananas from EC countries. WT/DS27/AB/R, adopted 25 September 1997. Under the requirement 
of  MFN treatment, imported products should be treated with the same commercial criteria with domestic 
like products. For example, in Spain – Unroasted Coffee, the Panel considered: the characteristics of  the 
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1.2.1.1.1.2 National Treatment 
 
The obligation of  National Treatment is to avoid protectionism in international trade.114 
Its aim is to ensure that internal measures “not be applied to imported or domestic 
products so as to afford protection to domestic products”.115 Members are obliged to 
offer equal competitive conditions with imported and domestic like products.  It 
prohibits Members from treating imported products less favourably than like domestic 
products once the imported product has entered the domestic market.  
 
 
1.2.1.1.2 Dispute Settlement Body 
 
The most distinctive feature of  WTO law is its enforcement mechanism.  In other 
words, WTO law is binding and enforceable.  The WTO is equipped with the Dispute 
Settlement Body (DSB) to settle disputes among Members.  A WTO Member can file a 
complaint to the DSB when he considers one or more fellow Members to be incompliant 
with the obligations of  the WTO agreements.  Commentators often describe the 
mechanism of  DSB as the “teeth” of  the WTO.  It grants Members the right to 
retaliate if  another party is found inconsistent with his obligations in the WTO 
Agreements.  Hence, the WTO appears to be the most effective international trade 
organisation. 
                                                                                                                                                           
products; their end-use; and the tariff  regimes of  other Members to determine whether the various types 
of  unroasted coffee were “like products”. Appellate Body Report, EC – Bananas III, para 190; GATT Panel 
Report, Spain – Unroasted Coffee, n110.  
114 See GATT III n47. 
115  Appellate Body Report, Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages (Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II), 
WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R, adopted 1 November 1996, para 109.  
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The principles of  the WTO create a rigid framework to enforce free trade; however, 
Members’ autonomy to protect public health has been substantially restrained under the 
scrutiny of  these principles.  Especially under the shadow of  “trade retaliations”, 
developing countries could easily be restrained from asserting their autonomy in 
domestic public health affairs and exercising their legitimate discretion in the flexibilities 
of  TRIPS.116  
 
When trade barriers are eliminated, health risks inevitably spread without borders, and 
the consequences of  free trade bring about more unknown risks to human society. 
Therefore risk regulation has arisen to be one of  the primary tasks in WTO law. 
 
 
1.2.1.2 Exemptions to WTO rules 
 
Apart from the basic rules and principles, the WTO also provides a number of  rules that 
address the conflicts between trade liberalisation and other economic and non-economic 
societal values.  The non-economic values and interests include the protection of  the 
environment, public health, public morals, national treasures and national security.117  
 
These exemptions from the WTO obligations have been placed into two categories: (1) 
provisions that establish an exception to a rule which can be referred to as “exception 
provision”, and (2) provisions that exclude the application of  other provisions which can 
                                                      
116 As Sell notes that “Developing countries sought official confirmation that measures to protect public 
health would not make them subject to dispute settlement procedures in the WTO”. “Sell Post-TRIPS” 
n102. 
117 The most common exception rules in relation to health and security in WTO include general exception 
in GATT XX, and national security exception in GATT XXI n47. Yet the exception rules applied are 
strictly limited in empirical cases. See sections 4.1.1 and 4.1.2.  
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be regarded as “excluding provision”, which is also understood as “conditional rights”118 











118 Conditional rights are also known as excluding provisions, see Grando, M.T. (2006) “Allocating the 
Burden of  Proof  in WTO Disputes: A Critical Analysis”, 9(3) Journal of  International Economic Law 615-656 
(Grando); Charnovitz, S. et al. (2004) “The Appellate Body’s GSP Decision” 3(2) World Trade Review 257 
(Charnovitz). 













The distinctions of  these exemptions have special implications on their legal status. The 
Appellate Body of  the WTO has distinguished the excluded rights as “conditional rights”, 
which enjoy a higher legal status than “exception provision or affirmative defence” in 
WTO law.120 This is often demonstrated by the reversal of  burden of  proof  when cases 
are associated with conditional rights (See Diagram 1.2.1.2.1).121  As Grando notes that, 
“…it implies the existence of  a hierarchy between provisions where exceptions are 
                                                      
120 Charnovitz, S. et al., n118. 














placed at a lower level of  the hierarchical pyramid”.122 Charnovitz et al. note that 
“conditional rights” in WTO law “are essentially provisions that read as exceptions but 
which are given a self-standing status in that the conditional rights carves out the general 
rules so that the general rule and the conditional right apply side by side, in a mutually 
exclusive manner”.123  
 
The distinction between “exception rules” and “excluding rules” is significant due to its 
implication for the legal status of  the provision and designates the allocation of  burden 
of  proof.  The burden of  proof  is reversed for the complainant in an excluding 
provision.  In the case regarding an exception rule, after the complainant’s provision of  
prima facie evidence, the defendant has the burden of  proving that “it has complied with 
the requirements of  the provision establishing an exception to that rule”.  On the 
contrary, the complainant has the burden to prove that “the defendant does not fall 
under the situation or has not complied with the requirements of  a provision that excludes 
the application to the general rule”.124 For example, if  compulsory licensing is deemed as 
an exception in TRIPS, the invoking party needs to prove that the public health 
emergency existed when the compulsory licence was issued in its territory; on the 
contrary, if  compulsory licensing is deemed as an excluding provision, the onus is 
reversed for the complaining party to prove that the public health emergency did not exist 
in the territory of  the invoking party when the grant was issued.  
 
After examining the basic principles and exemptions of  the WTO, we can now proceed 
to discuss the scheme of  compulsory licensing, which can be deemed as the core 
                                                      
122 Grando, n118. 
123 Charnovitz, S. et al. n118 
124 Grando, n118. 
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instrument of  promoting access to medicines in the TRIPS Agreement.125  
 
 
1.3 Intellectual property under a public health emergency 
 
The protection of  IP serves as an incentive for innovation, yet over protection may have 
adverse effects to innovation as well as undermining humans’ right to health.126 The 
mechanism of  compulsory licensing is considered a typical safety-valve of  the exemption 
rule applied in TRIPS which aims to enhance access to medicines in a public health 
emergency.  However, the criteria to invoke a compulsory licence in TRIPS under a 
public health emergency have remained undefined which often gives rise to the 
controversies of  the legitimacy of  the grant.  
 
We will firstly introduce the TRIPS Agreement and its mechanism of  compulsory 
licensing, and followed by some observations on the malfunction of  the current 
provision in international political settings.  
 
 
1.3.1 TRIPS Agreement 
 
The TRIPS Agreement is the most comprehensive multilateral agreement on IP 
protection.  It sets minimum standards of  protection of  patents, copyrights, trademark 
and other forms of  IP based on three core commitments of  the WTO: minimum 
                                                      
125 TRIPS n1.  
126 For more information about patents to innovation, see: WHO Report (2006) Public Health, Innovation 
and Intellectual Property Rights: Report of  the Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, Innovation and Public Health 
(CIPIH) n35; Opderbeck, D.W. (2005) “Patents, Essential Medicines, and the Innovation Game” 58 
Vanderbilt Law Review 501; Love, J. and Hubbard, T. (2007) “The Big Idea: Prizes to Stimulate R&D for 
New Medicines” 82 Chicago-Kent Law Review 1519; Love, J. (2007) “Measures to Enhance Access to Medical 
Technologies, and New Methods of  Stimulating Medical R&D” 40 U.C. Davis Law Review 679 (Love 
Access). 
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standards, national treatment,127 and most-favoured-nation treatment.128 Members are 
left free to determine the appropriate method of  implementing the provisions of  the 
Agreement within their own legal system and practice.  Adherence to TRIPS is a 
prerequisite for membership of  the WTO, and provisions of  the agreement can be 
enforced through the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Understanding Mechanism.129  
 
The inclusion of  pharmaceutical patents in TRIPS is one of  the most controversial 
issues in the TRIPS Agreement.  Patent protection on pharmaceutical products was not 
mandatory prior to the TRIPS regime.  Over protection of  pharmaceutical patents 
would significantly increase obstacles to access to medicines.  Consequently, after the 
TRIPS Agreement entered into force, the WHO called upon Member States to ensure 
access to essential drugs and to explore the flexibilities in the TRIPS Agreement.130 
 
We will discuss the objectives and principles of  TRIPS in the following section. 
 
 
1.3.1.1 Objectives and principles of  TRIPS 
 
Compulsory licensing, which serves as a means to limit IP, is an exemption from TRIPS 
obligations. According to the Vienna Convention on the Law of  Treaties (VCLT),131 a 
treaty needs to be interpreted firstly with a textual approach to search for its natural and 
ordinary meaning; if  it still leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure, then its context, 
                                                      
127 See section 1.2.1.1.1. 
128 See section 1.2.1.1.1. 
129 See section 1.2.1.1.2. 
130 See sections 1.1.2.2 - 1.1.2.4. World Health Assembly, Resolution 52.19, “Revised Drug Strategy” 24 
May 1999. For more information on the discussion on the TRIPS Agreement and pharmaceutical patent 
protection, see: Sell, S.K. (2003) Private Power, Public Law: The Globalization of  Intellectual Property Rights, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Gamharter, K. (2004) Access to Affordable Medicines: Developing 
Responses under the TRIPS Agreement and EC Law, Horn, Austria: Spriner Wien New York.  
131 Article 31 Vienna Convention on the Law of  Treaties (VCLT). 
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subsequent practice, practice of  organisations, preparatory work, can be considered to be 
a supplementary means of  interpretation while applying the principles of  restrictive 
interpretation, effective interpretation, and a teleological approach 132 . Thus the 
interpretation of  compulsory licensing needs to be read along with the objectives133 and 
purposes134 of  the TRIPS Agreement. 
 
The objectives of  TRIPS clearly states that the protection and enforcement of  IP should 
contribute to the mutual advantage of  producers and users of  technological knowledge 
and should be conducive to a balance of  rights and obligations.135  Regarding its 
principles,136 it stipulates that Members may adopt measures necessary to protect public 
health, and to promote public interest in sectors of  vital importance to their 
socio-economic and technological development.  
 
While the TRIPS Agreement aims at the protection of  IP in order to promote 
technological innovation, it also recognises the flexibilities of  the standard of  protection 
in order to balance the rights and obligations of  patent holders.  Notably, in recent years, 
scholars have adopted a view from human rights and competition to promote a balance 
in public and private interests in IP;137 the role of  “public interest” in the public domain 
                                                      
132 Brownlie, I. (2003) Principle of  Public International Law (6th edition) Clarendon Press, Oxford, 
(Brownlie) pp602-607. For more reference on the interpretation of  TRIPS, see: Condon, B.J. (2006) 
Environmental Sovereignty and the WTO: Trade Sanctions and International Law, Transnational Publishers, New 
York, United States (Condon Sovereignty), pp15-48; Mitchell, A.D. (2007) “The Legal Basis for Using 
Principles in WTO Disputes” 10(4) Journal of  International Economic Law 795; Geuze, M. and Wager, H. 
(1999) “WTO Dispute Settlement Practice Relating to the Trips Agreement” 2(2) Journal of  International 
Economic Law 347; Abbott, F. A. (2005) “Toward a New Era of  Objective Assessment in the Field of  
Trips and Variable Geometry for the Preservation of  Multilateralism” 8(1) Journal of  International Economic 
Law 77 (Abbott Multilateralism); Frankel, S. (2005-2006) “WTO Application of  ‘the Customary Rules of  
Interpretation of  Public International Law’ to Intellectual Property” 46 Virginia Journal of  International Law 
365 (Frankel Interpretation).  
133 Article 7 TRIPS n1. 
134 Article 8 TRIPS  
135 Article 7 TRIPS. 
136 Article 8 TRIPS. 
137 See, for example, Maskus, K. E. and Reichman, J. M. (2004) “The Globalisation of  Private Knowledge 
Goods and the Privatisation of  Global Public Goods” 7 (2) Journal of  International Economic Law 279 
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in the IP regime has also been discussed.138 
 
Indeed, the role and function of  IP is not only restricted to trade purposes.  It is 
indicated in the objectives and principles of  TRIPS that the role of  public interest could 
serve as grounds for the legitimate differentiation of  IP.139 For example, if  a given 
product or technology is strongly associated with the reduction or elimination of  certain 
public health risk, it then could receive differential treatment in IP.  IP should be able to 
reflect different dimensions/characteristics of  products and technologies in accordance 
with their implications for society.  Particularly, Abbott notes that the WTO Appellate 
Body adopts a cautious approach against “expansive interpretation of  TRIPS obligation”. 
He argues for a broader perspective on IP by stating that “IPRs are not only trade-related. 
They are also education-related, health-related, nutrition-related, defence-related, 
environment-related, energy-related and so on”.140  
 
In addition, Carvalho notes that “Only public interest justifies the taking of  private rights 
by governments”.141 Gervais further argues that the public interest is considered greater 
with regard to the cases of  “life-saving pharmaceutical products in crisis situations”.142 
Gervais also contends that Articles 7 and 8 serve as a basis for the interpretation of  the 
TRIPS provisions.  Moreover, he argues that Article 7, Article 8 TRIPS and paragraph 
                                                                                                                                                           
(Maskus/Reichman); MacQueen, H.L. “Towards Utopia or Irreconcilable Tensions? Thoughts on 
Intellectual Property, Human Rights and Competition Law” and Brown, A. “The Interface between 
Intellectual Property, Competition and Human Rights: Overview of  Field And Proposed Contribution to 
Knowledge” in Pattanaik, M.K.(ed)(2008) Human Rights and Intellectual Property, The Icfai University Press, 
India. 
138 For a detailed discussion on the role of  the public domain in a contemporary IP regime, see: Waelde, C. 
and MacQueen, H. (eds) (2007) Intellectual Property: The Many Faces of  the Public Domain, Edward Elgar, 
Cheltenham, UK (Waelde/MacQueen). 
139 Articles 7 and 8 TRIPS..  
140 Abbott Multilateralism, n132.  
141 Carvalho, N.P. (2005) The TRIPS Regime of  Patent Rights (2nd edition) Kluwer Law International, The 
Hague, The Netherlands (Carvalho). 
142 Gervais, D. (2003) The TRIPS Agreement: Drafting History and Analysis (2nd edition) Sweet & Maxwell, 
London, UK (Gervais TRIPS Analysis). 
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19 of  the Doha Ministerial Declaration143 have “higher legal status not only for the 
negotiations but in interpreting the Agreement in the context of, e.g., dispute settlement 
procedures”.144 Hence, the interpretation of  compulsory licensing would need to take 
into account the objectives and principles of  TRIPS and the Doha Declaration. 
Compulsory licensing should be examined through the lens of  public health, and be able 
to reflect the different implications of  pharmaceutical products for society.   
 
 
1.3.1.2 Exemptions in TRIPS 
 
In order to balance different social agendas besides individual private rights, TRIPS also 
introduces exemptions from IP protection.  For example, the scheme of  “compulsory 
licensing”145 is considered an exemption from IP which allows states to grant permission 
to suspend the “exclusiveness” of  patent protection under certain circumstances.146 Yet 
the question arises as to the legal status of  compulsory licensing:  Is compulsory 
licensing an excluding provision or an exception provision in TRIPS?147  In other words, 
can compulsory licensing be deemed as a conditional right148 or merely an affirmative 
defence149 in TRIPS?  The legal status of  this provision has a direct impact on the 
definition of  WTO Members’ entitlements to exercise their sovereignty in issues relating 
to compulsory licensing in a public health emergency.150  
 
Hence, we will examine the general conditions and state practice of  compulsory licensing 
                                                      
143 Doha Ministerial Declaration, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 20 November 2001 “In undertaking this work, 
the TRIPS Council shall be guided by the objectives and principles set out in Articles 7 and 8 of  the TRIPS 
Agreement and shall take fully into account the development dimension”.  
144 Gervais TRIPS Analysis n142. Cf: Diagram 1.2.1.2. 
145 Article 31 TRIPS introduces the scheme of  “other use without authorization of  the right holder” n41. 
146 See section 4.3.2.2. 
147 See section 1.2.1.2.  
148 Conditional rights, see n118. 
149 See section 1.2.1.2.  
150 See section 4.3.2.2.1.    
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in the following section.  The legal status of  compulsory licensing will be further 
discussed in Chapters 4 and 5.151  
 
 
1.3.2 Compulsory licensing 
 
Compulsory licensing is a means of  equity to redress the imbalance of  IP protection. 
Confronted by emergent global public health emergencies in recent years, the issue of  
compulsory licences has received attention in international societies in relation to drug 
access in developing countries.  For example, the UK Gowers Review has identified that 
“patent rights are territorial”, and suggested that “a single one-size-fits-all approach is 
inappropriate”.  It suggests that different IP regimes are more appropriate at different 
stages of  development.152 It has also expressed concerns that TRIPS may be too 
restrictive to meet the needs of  developing countries in relation to access to 
pharmaceutical products.  The Gowers Review has further identified the conditions of  
compulsory licensing in TRIPS as a hindrance to the effectiveness of  compulsory 
licensing.  It has concluded that proposals to amend TRIPS may be necessary to address 
public health crises in developing countries.153   
 
TRIPS has identified several conditions to grant a compulsory licence: anti-competitive 
practice, national emergency or other circumstance of  extreme urgency, and public 





151 See sections 4.3.2.2 and 4.3.2.2.1 and 5.2.1.1.   
152 Gowers Review of  Intellectual Property (2006) HMSO, UK, paras 4.56 and 4.57(Gowers Review). 
153 Gowers Review, paras 4.64 -4.66 n152. 
154 Correa, C.M. (2007) Trade Related Aspects of  Intellectual Property Rights: A Commentary on the TRIPS 





The first condition of  compulsory licensing is for “anti-competitive” practice, which is 
the primary application of  compulsory licensing in the US.155 
 
 
1.3.2.1.1 US: March-in rights 
 
The provision of  compulsory licensing in the US is mainly applied for anti-competition 
concerns.  In other fields of  compulsory licensing, the Bayh-Dole Act provides the 
primary legal ground for compulsory licensing while the so-called “march-in rights” can 
intervene where public funding of  an invention is involved.156 
 
Though the “march-in” rights are covered in the Bayh-Dole act for government to 
redress the malfunction of  patent protection through compulsory licensing; however in 
practice, the US takes a relatively hard-line position of  patent protection on medicines.  
Empirical studies show that US Government avoids granting a compulsory licence on 
pharmaceuticals within its march-in rights.157 
                                                      
155 “Love Access” n126. For example, James Love contends that the compulsory licence can be granted 
for anti-competitiveness if  the drug price is unreasonably affordable for most people; if  the patent impede 
the transfer and dissemination of  technology, or constitute an abuse of  IP rights. 
156 35 US Code § 200. On 25 October 2005, the US Congress introduced the “Public Health Medicine 
Act” to provide compulsory licensing of  certain patented inventions relating to health care emergency and 
to ensure that applications under Section 505 of  the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act that are 
submitted pursuant to such licences may be approved.  This Bill gives the Secretary of  Health and 
Human Service discretion to grant compulsory licenses to address public health crises.  The patent holder 
should be paid a reasonable amount of  loyalty as compensation.  The Secretary may also issue 
compulsory licenses without the consent of  the patentee to exercise importation of  patented 
pharmaceuticals to address global public health emergencies. The Secretary also has the discretion to adopt 
measures which fulfil the purpose of  Section 505 under the obligations of  the TRIPS Agreement. This Bill 
was proposed in a previous congress session, however, it did not pass to become law. (The Proposed Act 
of  35 US Code Sec. 158) 
157 For example, on January 29 2004, the nonprofit corporation Essential Inventions (EI) petitioned the 
US Department of  Health and Human Services for compulsory licenses on generic versions of  
latanoprost (Xalatan) and ritonavir (Norvir), which were both developed with federal funding. Essential 
Invention asserted that the government has the “march-in right” under the Bayh-Dole Act, and the patent 




1.3.2.2 National emergency or other circumstances of  
extreme urgency 
 
The condition of  “national emergency or other circumstances of  extreme urgency” is 
also regarded as another legitimate situation to issue a compulsory licence in TRIPS.  
The pandemic outbreak of  HIV/AIDS in South Africa, Brazil and Thailand is deemed 
as typical of  the said condition.  However, interestingly, in recent years, evidence shows 
that states tend to deviate from the “national emergency” track in compulsory licensing, 
and to adopt the third track of  “public use” to issue a compulsory licence.    
 
 
1.3.2.2.1 South Africa 
 
South Africa had faced the pressure of  AIDS prevalence in its population and it decided 
to adopt a law to give the Minister of  Health the authority to limit patent rights through 
compulsory licensing in 1997.  The South African Medicines and Related Substances 
Control Amendment Act158 soon faced pressure from the international pharmaceutical 
industry, especially from the US government and EU officials.  In 1998, many 
multinational pharmaceutical companies in a huge number of  42 applicants, filed suit 
against the South African government.159  The pharmaceutical industry argued that 
many provisions of  the Amendment Act violated its constitutionally protected property 
right, especially Section 15(c) which vests the Minister of  Health the power to limit 
patent rights by granting compulsory licences.  
                                                                                                                                                           
compulsory licence with its march-in right. 
158 South African Medicines and Related Substances Control Amendment Act 1997, Republic of  South 
Africa Government Gazette No 18505, Act No 90, 1997, 12 December 1997. 
159 High Court of  South Africa, Pharmaceutical Manufacturers’ Association of  South Africa et al. v President of  the 
Republic of  South Africa, Case No 4183/98, 1998. 
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After the debates on the Medicine Amendment Act, the South African government 
decided to tackle the bottleneck of  the access to medicines issue with an anti-competitive 
approach, 160  and seemed to successfully bypass the controversies of  “national 
emergency”161 in compulsory licensing in TRIPS.  The approach of  examining the 
exclusive market power of  drug firms may provide another window for states to 
negotiate with the drug firms and to seek to enhance access to medicines.162 
 
 
1.3.2.3 Public non-commercial use 
 
The third condition to issue a compulsory licence is “public non-commercial use”.163 
Despite the AIDS outbreak being a legitimate trigger of  compulsory licensing, in recent 
years, Brazil and Thailand both opted for the condition of  “public non-commercial use” 
for granting a compulsory licence on AIDS drugs in order to avoid the implementation 
of  the licence on the ambiguous criterion of  “national emergency or other circumstances 
of  extreme urgency” in TRIPS.164  
 
Notably in the UK Patent Act, the production or supply of  specific drugs or medicine is 
regarded as “Service of  the Crown” and as such as deemed necessary or expedient by the 
                                                      
160 See section 1.3.2.1.  
161 See section 4.1.2 for discussion of  “security exception” in GATT n47. 
162  In 2002, the Treatment Action Campaign gathered 11 complainants and launched a collective 
complaint with South Africa's Competition Commission against two pharmaceutical companies, 
GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) and Boehringer Ingelheim (BI). The complaint also accused the two companies 
of  dominating the market by an exclusionary act. GSK and BI were found to have contravened the 
Competition Act of  1998. http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/cl/recent-examples.html#South; 
Competition Commission finds pharmaceutical firms in contravention of  the Competition Act,  
16 October 2003, http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/sa/cc10162003.html; Competition Commission 
concludes an agreement with pharmaceutical firms, 10 December 2003, 
http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/sa/cc12102003.html.  
163 “Love Access” n126. James Love proposes that grounds for compulsory licensing on public interests 
includes: improved access to medicines; technological innovation; transfer and dissemination of  technology, 
and social and economic welfare. 
164 See section 4.1.2 for discussion of  “security exception” in GATT n47.  
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Secretary of  State.165 
 
 
1.3.2.3.1 UK: Crown use 
 
In the history of  British Patent Law, a special provision of  compulsory licences on food 
and drug patents was maintained during 1919 to 1977.166 This regime was ended by a 
Monopolies Commission Report which granted the Secretary of  State power to order 
price reduction on the two leading patented tranquillisers.167 The order by the Secretary 
of  State led to the introduction of  a specific procedure for compulsory licensing which 
was later incorporated into the Patents Acts 1977.168  
 
In Patents Acts 1977, the Comptroller has the power to grant compulsory licences on 
certain conditions once the patent has been granted for three years.169 Because UK is a 
Member State of  the WTO, its patent law needs to be in compliance with TRIPS, and 
bears the obligation to offer patent protection to other Member States.  
 
It is noteworthy that Crown use is a legitimate ground to grant compulsory licences for 
                                                      
165 UK Patent Act s 56(2). McQueen, H., Waelde, C., Laurie, G., Brown, A. (2010) Contemporary Intellectual 
Property: Law and Policy (2nd edition) Oxford University Press, New York, US, p475 (MacQueen et al.). This 
includes supply of  anything for foreign defence purposes, production or supply of  specific drugs or 
medicines, and such purposes relating to the production or use of  atomic energy or research. 
166 Cornish, W. and Llewelyn, D. (2007) IP: Patents, Copyright, Trade Marks and Allied Rights (6th edition), 
London Sweet & Maxwell, p295 (Cornish/Llewelyn). 
167 Tranquillisers Report, H.C. 197, 1973.  
168 See PA 1977 ss 48(4), 51, 55-59; Articles 8, 31(k), 40 TRIPS. The Patents Act 1977 differentiates four 
situations where compulsory licenses can be granted. First is the various grounds set out in section 48 and 
further divides “the relevant grounds” into two categories by whether the patentee is a WTO proprietor or 
not. Second follows a report of  the Competition Commission; third is for Crown use and fourth is in 
relation to biotechnology inventions. 
Following Directive 98/44/EC, the Legal protection of  Biotechnological Inventions, UK amended its 
patent law to provide for mandatory compulsory cross-licensed of  certain biotechnology inventions used 
for agriculture. The licence is available to plant breeders who demonstrate a technical advance. However, 
the UK Growers Review on 06 December 2006 noted that the provision is ineffective in the UK. And 
called for an expanded research exception, to permit broader use of  the compulsory licence. 
169 Patents Act 1977, s 48. 
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civil responsibility and is regarded as overriding the private interest of  a patentee.170 
Hence, the Crown’s powers in domestic administration become very wide due to the 
vague definition of  “national security”.171  
 
The above example in the developed world show that compulsory licensing has been 
devised as an instrument to promote the balance of  public and private interests; however 
in the UK, the distinct feature of  food and medicines which relate to national security 
has become blurred.  It is also observed that in the developing world, states tend to 
adopt the “public interest” track instead of  the “public health emergency” track in 
compulsory licensing in order to avoid the controversial interpretation of  “emergency” 
in international law.  
 
 
1.3.2.3.2 Brazil: Public interest 
 
The severe AIDS pandemic is overwhelming to the national public health system in 
Brazil.  Notably, Brazil has the capacity to manufacture generic versions of  AIDS drugs 
through reverse-engineering, and thus the Brazilian government has reached remarkable 
success in its AIDS programme by providing free AIDS drugs to any patients who were 
registered with the public health system from the mid-1990s.172  
 
                                                      
170 PA 1977, s 55 (1).  
171 See: PA 1977 s 59. Special provisions as to Crown use during emergency. Cornish/Llewelyn, n166 p294. 
For example, the House of  Lords held that the Ministry of  Health might authorise an importer to bring in 
drugs not made by the patents for used in the NHS hospital service. Cf: See section 4.1.2 for discussion of  
“security exception” in GATT n47. 
172 The price of  AIDS drugs fell by 82 percent over a five year period as a result of  generic competition. 
The AIDS programme has reduced AIDS-related mortality by more than 50 percent between 1995 and 
1999. The rate of  new infection has been controlled since then. See: Ho’en, E. (2002) “TRIPS, 
Pharmaceutical Patents, and Access to Essential Medicines: a Long way from Seattle to Doha” Chicago 
Journal of  International Law; Hestermeyer, H. (2007) Human Rights and the WTO – the Case of  Patents and Access 
to Medicines, Oxford, p10 (Hestermeyer). 
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Nevertheless, Brazil is a Member of  the WTO, and it is subject to its obligations in 
TRIPS.  In January 2001, the US officially filed a complaint to the WTO Dispute 
Settlement Body against Brazil’s Intellectual Property Law (IPL) Article 68, which allows 
compulsory licences to be issued in situations where the patent holder does not locally 
manufacture the patented product (known as a “local working” provision).173 The US 
argued that this provision was a breach of  Articles 27 and 28 of  TRIPS because it 
discriminated against locally made and imported products.174 However, the US received 
much criticism and was forced to withdraw the case in June.  The two WTO Members 
later resolved their disputes through a bilateral “Consultative Mechanism”.175  
 
On the other hand, in April 2007, the Minister of  Health declared the AIDS drug, 
Efavirenz to be in the “public interest” domain. 176  The Brazilian Government 
consequently issued a compulsory licence on Efavirenz to ensure the supply of  the drug 
for its national AIDS programme after a series of  negotiations with the patent holder, 
Merck, broke down in 2010.177 
 
Like South Africa’s preference for the anti-competitive approach, Brazil also avoided the 
controversial “national emergency” track in compulsory licensing.  They are also 
followed by Thailand’s act of  compulsory licensing on the grounds of  public 
non-commercial use.  
 
                                                      
173 See WTO, Request for the establishment of  a Panel by the United States, Brazil Measures Affecting 
Patent Protection, WT/DS199/3, 9 January 2001. 
174 Brazil – Measures Affecting Patent Protection. Request for the establishment of  a Panel by the United States, 
WT/DS199/1(2001). See section 1.2.1.1.1.  
175 Brazil agreed to notify the US in advance if  the compulsory licence is being issued under Article 68. 
“Examples of  Health-Related Compulsory Licenses”, 
http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/cl/recent-examples.html#Brazil 
176 “Brazilian Government Declares Efavirenz to Be of  Public Interest”, Essentialdrug.Org, 26 April 2007, 
http://www.essentialdrugs.org/edrug/archive/200704/msg00085.php 




1.3.2.3.3 Thailand: Public non-commercial use 
 
Thailand is the first country to test the boundary of  compulsory licensing on the 
medications for chronic diseases.178 Likewise, Thailand claimed that its act to grant a 
compulsory licence on the patented drug for heart disease, Plavix was based on the 
provision of  “public non-commercial use” rather than that of  “national emergency or 
other circumstances of  extreme urgency” in TRIPS in 2007.179  
 
Civil society and NGO have expressed support for Thailand’s move on issuing 
compulsory license for chronic diseases treatment.180 Yet critics have accused Thailand’s 
act of  compulsory licensing on Plavix as overstepping the appropriate application of  
compulsory licencing.  As a consequence, the patent owner of  Plavix, Abbot 
Laboratories announced that it would no longer market its new pharmaceutical products 
in Thailand in March 2007, and it even withdrew registration applications of  new 
pharmaceutical products.181 Moreover, the US placed Thailand on its Special 301 Priority 
Watch List182 which was deemed to be a trade sanction due to the compulsory licence in 
April 2007.183 
                                                      
178 On 25 January, 2007, Thailand granted compulsory licenses on patents for the heart disease drug, 
Plavix (Clopidogrel bisulfate). At: http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/cl/recent-examples.html#Thailand. 
179 Facts and Evidences on the 10 Burning Issues Related to the Government Use of  Patents on Three 
Patented Essential Drugs in Thailand, Document to Support Strengthening of  Social Wisdom on the Issue 
of  Drug Patent, the Ministry of  Public Health & the National health Security Office, Thailand, Feb.2007. 
ISBN 978-974-94591-5-7. 
180 See: Knowledge Ecology International Statement on Thailand Compulsory Licenses, 21 January 2007; 
Joint Statement by 15 NGOs - Thai civil society supports the health ministers of  Thailand and Brazil and calls on 
pharmaceutical companies and lobbyists to stop abusing their power, 10 May 2007. See also, Love, J. (2007) “Recent 
Examples of  the Use of  Compulsory License on Patents” KEI Research Note 2, 8 March 2007.  
181  Abbott Pharmaceuticals in Thailand: Fact Sheet, 13 April 2007, 
http://www.oxfamamerica.org/whatwedo/campaigns/access_to_medicines/news_publications/Abbott%
20in%20Thailand.  
182 The United States Trade Representatives Office publishes annual “Special 301” review as a means to 
enforce IP protection worldwide, available at: http://www.ustr.gov/trade-topics/intellectual-property; 
special 301 report 2010: http://www.ustr.gov/webfm_send/1906.  
183 Savoie, B. (2007) “Thailand’s Test: Compulsory Licensing in an Era of  Epidemiologic Transition” 48 
Virginia Journal of  International Law 211. 
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The future of  compulsory licensing on chronic diseases still remains unclear.  Thailand 
was the first to test the boundaries of  this provision, but it faced the consequence of  
trade retaliation.  Trade sanctions from drug companies would inevitably create chilling 
effects on governments’ acts of  compulsory licensing of  pharmaceuticals.    
 
 
1.3.3 The constraints of  the current mechanism 
 
It can be observed from the above cases that international work to embody the 
flexibilities in TRIPS has been less than satisfying, especially in relation to a public health 
emergency.  In recent years, states have shown preference for the “anti-competitive” 
and “public non-commercial use” tracks instead of  resorting to the condition of  
“national emergency or other circumstances of  extreme urgency” in compulsory 
licensing in order to avoid the undefined and ambiguous characteristics of  “national 
emergency” in WTO law.184 Their deliberation reflects the controversies of  the existing 
mechanism for fear that conflicts may arise over the interpretation of  “national 
emergency”.  We will discuss the application of  “national emergency” in WTO law in 
chapter 4.  Attention will now be turned to some hidden reasons of  the dissatisfactions 










184 See section 4.1.2.  
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1.3.3.1 Power imbalance and political reality in “Access to 
Medicines” 
 
When confronted with a firm pro-IP stance from developed countries which often use 
trade retaliation in response to a compulsory licensing grant,185 developing countries are 
inevitably forced to use compulsory licensing as a defensive bargaining tool.186 Hence, 
the compulsory licensing provision has barely been used in practice, as it is often used as 
a threatening tool to force drug price reductions instead of  being a satisfactory and 
systematic channel to address the “access to medicines” problem.187 Yet, in John 
Jackson’s analysis of  “power-oriented” diplomacy versus “rule-oriented” diplomacy, he 
argues that the move to a rule-oriented approach was normal evolution in human affairs 
as well as democractically justified in the economic sphere.  A rule-based system which 
would bring “stability and predictability of  government activity” requires that behaviour 
be based on prescribed principles – that it should not be based on discretionary 
decision-making or simply on the excise of  power. 188  Therefore, a workable and 
systematic reading of  compulsory licensing for tempering IP and health in a public 
health emergency is desirable with a view to increasing stability and predictability in a 
rule-based institution.  
 
                                                      
185 For example, the US often uses the Office of  the US Trade Representative (USTR) to file complaints 
to the WTO over TRIPS disputes, or alternatively, it often uses the Special 301 apparatus “Priority Watch 
List” to pressure developing countries to alter their IP policy. See: Sell Post-TRIPS n102. After Thailand’s 
grant of  compulsory licences on clopidogrel/Plavix, the US government expressed that the measure 
appeared to fall within WTO rules. Nevertheless, USTR placed Thailand under 2007 Special 301 “Priority 
Watch List” surveillance. See: Abbott/Reichman, n8. 
186 Cameron, E. (2004) “Patents and Public Health: Principle, Politics and Paradox” 1(4) Script-ed.   
187 For example, Brazil and South Africa have threatened granting such licences in order to obtain 
substantial price reductions on HIV/AIDS drugs. See Public Health, Innovation and Intellectual Property Rights, 
WHO Report of  the Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, Innovation and Public Health, n35, 
p117; Abbott/Reichman n8.  
188 Jackson, J. H. (1978) “The Crumbling Institutions of  the Liberal Trade System” 12 Journal of  World 
Trade Law 93:98-101. See also Jackson, J. H. (1979) “Governmental Disputes in International Trade 
Relations: A Proposal in the Context of  the GATT” 13 Journal of  World Trade Law 1:3-4. For a coercive 
narrative of  TRIPS, see also: Gervais, D. “TRIPS and Development” in Gervais, D. (ed) (2007) Intellectual 
Property, Trade and Development: Strategies to Optimize Economic Development in a TRIPS-Plus Era, Oxford 
University Press, New York, US 
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1.3.3.2 Failure to declare a public health emergency of  
international concern 
 
In the domestic context, the declaration of  a public health emergency is a prerequisite to 
empower a state with emergency powers which can invoke relative responses to an 
emergency.  It can then enable government to allocate appropriate resources to combat 
the epidemic.  However, in the TRIPS context, the term “national emergency” appears 
to be vague and self-defining in WTO law,189 thus the core issue is how to define 
“national emergency” in TRIPS?  To what extent can a WTO Member exercise a 
margin of  appreciation in compulsory licensing under the state of  “emergency”?  
Taubman stated that: “A calm reading of  the plain black-letter text of  TRIPS would have 
mostly settled these questions, but the intensity of  the debates created a need for political 
solution to reinforce the legal reality”.190 In Taubman’s words, the Doha Declaration 
consequently articulated what had been implicit in TRIPS and provided a political gloss 
on TRIPS.191  Nevertheless, even after the interpretation of  the Doha Declaration, it is 
still observed that Members appear to have been deliberately bypassing compulsory 
licensing on the grounds of  “national emergency or other circumstances of  extreme 
urgency”.  This work hence aims to bolster the political and moral basis for using this 
measure by providing a workable reading of  the text.  
 
According to the “Paris Minimum Standards of  Human Rights Norms in a State of  
Emergency”192 “public emergency” means an exceptional situation of  crisis or public 
                                                      
189 GATT XXI n47. See section 4.1.2.1. 
190 Taubman, A (2011) A Practical Guide to Working with TRIPS, Oxford University Press, New York, US, 
(Taubman) p48 
191 Taubman pp48-49, n190 ; Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health (Doha Declaration), 
adopted by the fourth Ministerial Conference of  the World Trade Organization in Doha, Qatar, on 14 
November 2001. WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2 of  20 November 2001. See section 4.3.2.2.1. 
192 Article 1 The Paris Minimum Standards of  Human Rights Norms in a State of  Emergency. See report 
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danger, actual or imminent, and an official proclamation of  a public emergency will 
justify the declaration of  a state of  emergency.  Nevertheless, empirical studies suggest 
that states tend to avoid the declaration of  a public health emergency in fear of  possible 
adverse effects.  For example, in the past experience of  HIV/AIDS pandemic in Africa, 
states hesitated to declare a state of  public health emergency regardless of  being urged to 
by the NGOs and the WHO.193 Notably, the outbreak of  SARS in Asia-Pacific countries 
including Canada, Hong Kong, China, Vietnam, Malaysia, Australia, Thailand, and 
Indonesia resulted in huge economic loss from tourism.194 Hence the identification of  a 
public health emergency is frequently made behind closed doors: the granting of  a 
compulsory licence, however, appears to be less transparent and convincing.  Thus a 
compulsory licence granted for pharmaceuticals in an emergency situation has been 
controversial due to the unclear trigger threshold for compulsory licensing.  A clear and 
workable framework for the invocation of  compulsory licensing in a public health 
emergency is desired to be developed within the flexibilities in TRIPS.195 
 
Compulsory licensing could be viewed as an equity basis to redress the imbalance of  IP 
and health.  However, as we have discussed in the previous paragraphs, developing 
countries have been deterred from resorting to this instrument for political reasons, 
                                                                                                                                                           
of  the 61st conference (Paris 1984) of  the ILA Committee of  the Enforcement of  Human Rights Law; 
Chowdhury, S.R. (1989) Rule of  Law in a State of  Emergency: The Paris Minimum Standards of  Human Rights 
Norms in a State of  Emergency, St Martin’s Press, New York, US.    
193 “African Countries Urged to Declare HIV/AIDS A National Emergency” WHO/AFRO Press 
Releases, 24 June 1999; “Mbeki Refuses to Declare Emergency Over Aids” Panafrican News Agency 
(Dakar), 14 March 2001, available at: http://www.aegis.com/news/pana/2001/PA010316.html. 
194 Krauss, C. “The SARS Epidemic: Canada; Toronto Is Stricken from Warning List Issued by WHO” 
The New York Times, 15 March 2003, available at: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/05/15/world/the-sars-epidemic-canada-toronto-is-stricken-from-warning-
list-issued-by-who.html; “Economic Impact of  SARS on Tourism in Seven Selected APEC Member 
Economies”, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), 22nd Tourism Working Group Meeting, June 
2003, 2003/TWG22/016. 
195 CIPIH Report, n35 p19. As the WHO Report indicates that “the most significant barrier to the use of  
compulsory licensing is the absence of  simple, straightforward legislative and administrative procedures to 
put the system into effect”. It also suggests that the possible grounds for the issue of  licences should be 
specified and urges to establish clear decision-making processes in order to avoid ambiguity and uncertainty. 
See section 5.3.  
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specifically on the grounds of  “national emergency”.  In view of  the increasing role of  
the precautionary approach in risk regulation in international law, this work proposes that 
the precautionary approach be accommodated into the identification of  a “national 
emergency”, and serves as a tool to embody the trigger threshold of  “national 
emergency” in compulsory licensing.  In so doing, we would also reconcile the WHO 
and WTO agendas in relation to pandemic preparedness in order to take advantage of  
the TRIPS flexibilities.196 
 
After this background introduction of  compulsory licensing in the international settings, 
we will turn our focus to the development of  the precautionary approach in international 
law in the next chapter. 
 
                                                      
196 See section 5.3.  
  53
 
2 The Development of  the Precautionary Approach in International 
Law 
 
2.1 Introduction to the precautionary approach 
 
The precautionary approach (PA) has been developed from international environmental 
protection policy in the past few decades.197 Its main premise is that where the threat of  
a particular harm is serious and the damage is irreversible, the notion of  precaution 
should take priority over scientific justification.  The background of  the PA will be 
briefly introduced in the following paragraphs. 
 
An evidence-based approach has been central to environmental and public health 
policy-making; however, it has been identified as outdated and unable to cope with 
emerging risks in contemporary society.  The PA is therefore proposed to supplement 
the inadequacy of  the traditional evidence-based approach.  
 
Notably, the Nuffield Council on Bioethics in the UK has highlighted the importance of  
precaution when dealing with threats to public health. 198  It points out that “an 
evidence-based approach to public health policy can be fraught with difficulties”.  It 
also states that even when every step has been taken to ensure the validity of  the 
evidence, “in practice it is often incomplete or ambiguous, and usually will be 
contested”.199 In a public health guidance from the UK National Institute of  Clinical 
Excellence (NICE), it also states: “All evidence requires interpretation as evidence alone 
cannot determine the content of  a recommendation”.200  It has been argued that 
                                                      
197 See section 2.2. 
198 Nuffield Council on Bioethics, Public Health: Ethical Issues (2007) (Nuffield Public Health). 
199 Nuffield Public Health, n198, p33. 
200 National Institute of  Clinical Excellence (NICE) Guidance, Methods for the Development of  NICE Public 
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policy-making dependent only on scientific evidence is no longer fit for modern society. 




Origins of  the precautionary approach 
 
The PA first emerged from international environmental protection prior to its 
application in the protection of  human health and food safety.  Freestone and Hey have 
commented on it as “intrinsic to international environmental policy”.201 Freestone 
further notes the rise of  the approach as “one of  the most remarkable developments of  
the last decade, and arguably one of  the most significant in the emergence of  the new 
discipline of  international environmental law itself ”.202 It has arisen as an applied ethic 
to complement the blind spot of  scientific uncertainty or ignorance in the shadow of  
economic progression,203 and is often applied to redress the vacuum in circumstances of  
insufficient scientific evidence.  
 
More specifically within the health sector, precaution has been argued to be one of  the  
                                                                                                                                                           
Health Guidance (2009)(2nd edition) (NICE Methods) p118, available at: 
http://www.nice.org.uk/media/2FB/53/PHMethodsManual110509.pdf. 
201 Freestone, D. and Hey, E. “Origins and Development of  the Precautionary Principle” in Freestone, D. 
and Hey, E. (eds) (1995)The Precautionary Principle and International Law, The Hague, pp3-15 
(Freestone/Hey). 
202 Freestone, D. “International Fisheries Law since Rio: The Continued Rise of  the Precautionary 
Principle” in Boyle, A. and Freestone, D. (eds) (1999) International Law and Sustainable Development, Oxford, 
pp135-164. 
203 “Uncertainty” refers to a situation under which it is possible to define all possible outcomes, but where 
there is no basis for the confident assigning of  probabilities. 
“Ignorance” refers to a situation under which it is possible neither to assign probabilities nor even to 
define all possible outcomes. From: Glossery in A. Stirling, On Science and Precaution in the Management of  
Technological Risk, Final Report of  a project for the EC Forward Studies Unit under the auspices of  the 
ESTO Network. See also: Gee, D. and Stirling, A. “Late Lessons from Early Warnings: Improving Science 
and Governance Under Uncertainty and Ignorance” in Tickner, J. A. (ed) (2003) Precaution, Environmental 
Science, and Preventive Public Policy, Island Press, Washington DC, US (Tickner Policy).   
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fundamentals of  public health ethics,204 it has been characterised as being: “at the heart 
of  medical and public health theory and practice and is an underpinning to many of  our 
current environmental and public health policies”.205 An Australia Judge has also stated 
that: “the precautionary principle is a statement of  commonsense and has already been 
applied by decision-makers in appropriate circumstances prior to the principle being 
spelled out”.206  
 
On the one hand, the PA has been incorporated widely in environmental protection 
policy in international law and also recognised as a fundamental value in the health 
regime.207 On the other hand, it has been criticised as incoherent and leading to 
paradox. 208  Yet existing formulations of  precaution represent a wide range of  
implications which appear to be confusing and even contradictory.  There is no current 
consensus on using the term “precautionary approach” (PA) or “precautionary principle” 
(PP) in international law.209 The debates of  the function and application of  precaution 
without a focused target thus result in more myths, and adversely undermine the ground 
for communication amongst different stakeholders.  
 
                                                      
204 Weed, D. (2004) “Precaution, Prevention, and Public Health Ethics” 29(3) Journal of  Medicine and 
Philosophy 313-332; Martuzzi, M. (2007) “The Precautionary Principle: in Action for Public Health” 64 
Occupational & Environmental Medicine 569-670. See also: Kopelman, L.M. et al. (2004) “What is the Role of  
the Precautionary Principle in the Philosophy of  Medicine and Bioethics?” 29 (3) Journal of  Medicine and 
Philosophy 255-258. 
205 Tickner, J. and Kriebel, D. (2006) “The Role of  Science and Precaution in Environmental and Public 
Health Policy” in Fisher, E. et al. (eds) Implementing the Precautionary Principle: Perspective and Prospects, Edward 
Elgar Publishing (Fisher PP). Pearce, N. “Public Health and the Precautionary Principle” in Martuzzi, M. 
and Tickner, J. (eds) (2004) The Precautionary Principle: Protecting Public Health, the Environment and the Future of  
Our Children (WHO). 
206 Justice Stein of  the New South Wales (NSW) Land and Environment Court in Leatch v Director-General, 
National Parks and Wildlife Service and Shoalhaven City Council, 23 November 1993, 81 LGERA, 1993, p270, at 
282, cited from Trouwborst, A. (2002) Evolution and Status of  the Precautionary Principle in International Law, 
International Environmental Law and Policy Series, Kluwer Law International, The Hague, p8. 
(Trouwborst Evolution) 
207 See section 2.2. See also chapter 3.  
208 Harris, J, and Holm, S. (2002) “Extending Human Lifespan and the Precautionary Paradox” 17(3) 
Journal of  Medicine and Philosophy 355-368. 
209 See section 2.1.3 for the distinction of  PA and PP.  
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As a WHO report points out: “the problem with the PP definition is not in their 
accuracy, but that the definitions, possibly any synthetic definition, miss the values and 
role of  the PP as an overarching, inspiring principle in environment and health”.210 The 
significance of  the role of  the PA has been blurred after contradictory debates. 
Therefore, a tailor-made definition in the context of  our research is necessary to facilitate 
further discussion and implementation.211 Thus, this chapter aims at shaping the contour 
of  the PA in this work by literature review and comparative studies of  previous works of  
philosophers and lawyers.   
 
In this chapter, we will first introduce typical formulations of  the PA in the literature, and 
examine the PA from the perspective of  “State’s responsibility” in international law.  
The “precautionary approach” will be the preferred term in this work.  We will also 
revisit the more recent evolution of  the PA from international environmental law to 
international public health law, and then turn to the analysis of  philosophical elements of  
precaution in order to identify general features of  the PA defined in this work.  By 
comparing different models proposed by lawyers and philosophers and examining the 
application of  the approach in different realms, this chapter aims to develop a common 
ground for the understanding of  the PA and attempts to redefine it from the 








210 Report of  a WHO Meeting (2005) Dealing with Uncertainty: Setting the Agenda for the 5th Ministerial Conference 
on Environment and Health, 2009, Copenhagen, Denmark, 15-16 December 2005, EUR/06/5067987, at 3 
(WHO Uncertainty Report). 
211 See sections 5.1.2 and 5.2.  
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2.1.1 Formulations of  the precautionary approach 
 
There exist numerous formulations of  the PA in international law.  All of  them are 
related to risk management212 of  the environment and health protection in international 
law.  We will first introduce typical versions from international declarations, treaties, and 
legislations in order to gain an initial impression of  precaution.  Then the term 
“precautionary approach” will be preferred in this work for it represents a degree of  
flexibility and stresses the adaptability in risk management.213 Following the adoption of  
the preferred term, the ambiguity of  legal status of  this approach will also be 
addressed.214 The PA is found to have a pervasive influence on risk regulation in 
international law; however, its application is fraught with fragmentationsin different legal 
regimes.215  
 
Amongst all definitions, Principle 15 of  the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development 
appears to be the most well-known version of  the PA in international law, which reads:  
 
In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely applied by States 
according to their capacities.  Where there are threats of  serious or irreversible damage, lack of  full 
scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent 
environmental degradation. (emphasis added)216  
 
The Rio Declaration involves a “triple-negative” connotation, which may leave ambiguity 
in its implication.  In view of  this, the European Environment Agency (EEA) has 
                                                      
212 See n36 section 3.1.3.  
213 See section 2.1.3. 
214 See section 2.1.3.1. 
215 See sections 2.2.4-2.2.4.3.  
216 The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, UN Doc.A/CONF.151/26, Vol. I, Annex I, 
1992 (Rio Declaration). 
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proposed a more proactive and assertive definition as follows: 
 
The PP provides justification for public policy actions in situations of  scientific complexity, 
uncertainty and ignorance, where there may be a need to act in order to avoid, or reduced, potentially 
serious or irreversible threats to health or the environment, using an appropriate level of  scientific 
evidence, and taking into account the likely pros and cons of  action and inaction (italics added).217 
 
Another frequently-cited version of  the approach, which was developed from the 
Wingspread Conference in the United States, known as the Wingspread Statement reads: 
 
When an activity raises threats of  harm to human health or the environment, precautionary measures 
should be taken even if  some cause and effect relationships are not fully established scientifically. 
(emphasis added)218 
 
With regard to environmental protection in domestic legislations, the Australian 
Government defines the PA in its Intergovernmental Agreement on the Environment (IGAE) as 
follows:  
 
Where there are threats of  serious irreversible environmental damage, lack of  full scientific certainty 
should not be used as a reason for postponing measures to prevent environmental degradation.219 
 
                                                      
217 WHO Uncertainty Report, n210. 
218 Wingspread Statement on the Precautionary Principle was established during a conference of  experts 
in Wingspread, Wisconsin, USA in January 1998. The full text of  the Wingspread Declaration is 
reproduced in Raffensperger, C. and Tickner, J. (eds) (1999), Protecting Public Health and the Environment: 
Implementing the Precautionary Principle, Island Press: Washington DC, US, at pp 353-354.  According to 
Naomi Salmon, the version in the Wingspread Statement is generally adopted by non-governmental 
organisations aiming at a more stringent approach to environmental and health protection. See Salmon, N. 
(2005) “What’s ‘novel’ about it? Substantial equivalence, precaution and consumer protection 1997-2004”, 
7(2) Environmental Law Review 138-149 n70.  
219 The Intergovernmental Agreement on the Environment (IGAE) signed in May 1992 by all heads of  
government in Australia. (s 3.5.1). 
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These formulations lead to different conclusions in their interpretation and application. 
Some may be justification for doing nothing while others might be justification to 
intervene to do something.  This distinction will be further discussed when we 
categorise the PA into the “Argumentative version” or the “Prescriptive version”.220 
 
The PA is perceived by the European Court of  Justice (ECJ) as constituting “an integral 
part of  the decision-making process leading to the adoption of  any measure for the 
protection of  human health”.221 In addition, Kriebel and Tickner note that the PA seeks 
to shift health and environmental policy from a strategy of  “reaction” to a strategy of  
“precaution”,222 which would more aggressively cause significant change to the linkage 
of  science and policy.223  
 
From the view of  regulation, Somsen further argues for “enabling precaution” to be a 
“morally and legally acceptable principle”,224 which substantively enables regulators to 
“channel regulatory tilt towards constraints on new technologies”.225 He maintains that 
“[W]hen under such circumstances uncertainty about the impact of  a technology persists, 
enabling precaution posits that regulators should temporarily prohibit or constrain that 
technology until there is new evidence suggesting no risk or acceptable risk”.226(emphasis 
added)   
                                                      
220 See section 2.3.1. 
221 ECJ Case C–236/01, Monsanto Agricoltura Italia SpA and Others v Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri and 
Others (Monsanto), ECR 2003 I–08105, adopted 9 September 2003, para 133.  
222 Harding, R. and Fisher, E. “Introducing the Precautionary Principle” in Harding, R. & Fisher, E. (1999) 
Perspectives on the Precautionary Principle, The Federation Press, NSW, Australia (Harding/Fisher), ch 1; Tickner, 
J. and Kriebel, D. “The Role of  Science and Precaution in Environmental and Public Health Policy” in 
Fisher PP n205 ch.3 ; Kriebel, D. and Tickner, J. (2001) “Reenergizing Public Health through Precaution” 
91(9) American Journal of  Public Health 1351.  
223 Kriebel, D. et al. (2001) “The Precautionary Principle in Environmental Science” 109(9) Environmental 
Health Perspectives 871. 
224 Somsen, H. “Cloning Trojan Horses” in Brownsword, R. and Yeung, K. (eds) (2008) Regulating 
Technologies: Legal Futures, Regulatory Frames and Technological Fixes (Brownsword Technologies), Portland, 
Oregon US, Hart Publishing (Somsen Cloning).  
225 Somsen Cloning n224 p223. 
226 Somsen Cloning n224 p230. 
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Moreover, Somsen argues from the perspective of  future generations that the costs of  
“irreversible harm” to the environment are to be borne by future generations who are 
not represented in current political and legal process.  Therefore, precaution arises to 
give future generations a voice in legal and political processes.227 This is argued from the 
angle of  inter-generational equity.  Somsen further concludes that precaution is used for 
environmental regulations to help “redress some very clear and serious imbalances that 
ultimately undermine mankind’s chance of  survival”.228 Indeed, Somsen’s argument 
focuses on the adoption of  a “margin of  safety”229 in environmental and health 
policy-making which would provide a buffer zone in the situation of  scientific ignorance 
or uncertainty.  An ample margin of  safety in policy making will still be able to provide 
sufficient protection to human health in extreme or emergency situation, and to ensure 
that the scientific advancement would not come at a cost of  human health.  In order to 
avoid unpredictable or irreversible damage to human kinds and future generations, the 
role of  PA serves as a mechanism of  a safety valve in the regulation of  risk posed by 
modern technologies under globalisation. 
 
 
2.1.2 The precautionary approach from the perspective of  
“State responsibility” 
 
The precautionary approach emphasises that when there is a possibility of  serious or 
irreversible harm to the environment, protective action should be taken in advance of  
scientific proof  of  harm.230 From the perspective of  State responsibility in international 
                                                      
227 Somsen Cloning n224 p225  
228 Somsen Cloning n224 p225 
229 See also section 3.1.3.2. 
230 Harding/Fisher, p3, n222222.  
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law,231 governments may be obliged to act to avoid irreversible damage even under the 
circumstances of  scientific uncertainty.  In view of  this, Trouwborst contends that the 
PA taken by states is embodied as “a right or duty of  states’” in international law when the 
threat to a particular harm crosses the “significant harm” threshold.232 Trouwborst 
divides states’ precautionary actions into a “right” or a “duty” in accordance with the 
degree of  risk.  I wish to adapt Trouwborst’s concept of  “precautionary rights and 
duties”, but this work will not follow his distinction of  a “right” or a “duty” of  a 
precautionary action.  Therefore, the terminology of  states’ “precautionary entitlements” is 
proposed in later discussions.  
 
In addition to the argument in international law, Brownsword proposes a State stewardship 
model in domestic public health regulation, which suggests that a state has a 
responsibility to protect and promote the conditions of  public health, and further 
requires the state to keep its citizens informed about risks to their health and the channel 
of  democratic participation to improve the conditions of  public health.233 Furthering 
this argument, the Nuffield Council on Bioethics also promotes the stewardship model 
of  states to impose states to have responsibilities “to look after important needs of  
people both individually and collectively”.234 This Report distinguishes paternalism and a 
stewardship model by the emphasis on “seeking the least intrusive way of  achieving 
policy goals, taking into account also the criteria of  effectiveness and proportionality”.  
                                                      
231 For more discussion about state responsibility, see, for example: Brownlie n132 p419; Tinker, C. “State 
Responsibility and the Precautionary Principle”, Freestone/Hey n201; Gathii, J.T. (2006) “How Necessity 
May Preclude State Responsibility for Compulsory Licensing under the TRIPS Agreement”, 31 North 
Carolina Journal of  International Law and Commercial Regulation 943. Gathii argues some major health 
pandemics such as HIV/AIDS may provide justification based on the rules of  State responsibility under 
international law to improve affordable access to essential medicines. Crawford, J. (1999) “Revisiting the 
Draft Articles on State Responsibility” 10(2) European Journal of  International Law 436. 
232 Trouwborst, A. (2006) Precautionary Rights and Duties of  States, Martinus Nijhoff  Publishers, Leiden, 
The Netherlands (Trouwborst States). See section 2.2. 
233 Brownsword, R., “So What Does the World Need Now?” in Brownsword technologies n224 p46.  
234 Nuffield Public Health n198. 
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It also identifies five main elements of  the PA: scientific assessment of  risk; fairness and 
consistency; consideration of  costs and benefits; transparency, and proportionality.235  
 
Further, this Nuffield proposal has recently been picked up by the National Institute for 
Clinical Excellence (NICE) in the UK with respect to public health. 236  It has 
acknowledged that the NICE’s advisory committees are encouraged to take 
“non-scientific values” into consideration in “bridging the gaps between the evidence 
and producing a recommendation”. 237  In another NICE report, it stresses the 
significance of  “individual choice and of  respecting individual’ values, cultural attitudes 
and religious views”.238 Yet it also mentions that sometimes individual choice may need 
to be limited for public interests.239 
 
From the above observation, it can also be understood that “precaution” has emerged to 
provide a safety net or a buffer zone between the boundary of  risk and safety in the 
domain of  scientific uncertainty.  Either from the rule of  state responsibility or the 
perspective of  future generations, the PA appears to have a vital role to play in risk 
management240 in modern society.  However, the term of  “precautionary principle” or 
“precautionary approach” have appeared in the literature in a rather random order.  The 





235 Nuffield Public Health, p35 n198. 
236 NICE Methods, n200; see also: Killoran, A. et al. (2009) “NICE Update: NICE Public Health 
Guidance” 31(3) Journal of  Public Health 451-452. 
237 NICE Methods, n200, pp118-119. 
238 NICE Report (2008) Social Value Judgements: Principles for the Development of  NICE Guidance (2nd edition) 
(NICE Judgements), p19, available at: 
http://www.nice.org.uk/aboutnice/howwework/socialvaluejudgements/socialvaluejudgements.jsp.  
239 NICE Judgements, n238, p19. 
240 See n36. 
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2.1.3 Legal status of  the precautionary approach  
 
Precaution appeared in national legislation before it was introduced at the international 
level,241 and most states adopt it at the national level more than at international level.  It 
first emerged from environmental protection in Germany; there is also evidence that it 
had been applied by US courts about health, safety and environmental protection even 
before the appearance of  the concept in Europe.242  
 
At the international level, the legal status of  PA is not yet settled,243 but its widespread 
use has implied that it is recognised as “a legitimate approach in the field of  
environmental protection”.244 The European Council Resolution on the Precautionary Principle 
notes that the PA is “gradually asserting itself  as a principle of  international law in the 
field of  environmental and health protection”.245  
 
Notably in the international economic regime, the Appellate Body suggested that PA has 
been incorporated in the WTO SPS Agreement;246 however, its application and legal 
status appears to be relatively restrictive in WTO law.  The Appellate Body in EC – 
Hormones indicated that PA was not yet accepted principle of  “general” or “customary 
                                                      
241 Sands, P. (2003) Principles of  International Environmental Law (2nd edition) Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, UK (Sands Principles) pp266-279.  
242 Perrez, F.X. (2008) “Risk Regulation, Precaution and Trade” in Wuger, D. and Cottier, T. (eds) (2008) 
Genetic Engineering and the World Trade System: World Trade Forum, New York, Cambridge University Press 
(Perrez Regulation); see also : Ashford, N.A., “Implementing a Precautionary Approach in Decisions 
Affecting Health, Safety, and the Environment: Risk , Technology Alternatives, and Tradeoff-Analysis” in 
Freytag, E. et al. (eds) (2002)The Role of  Precaution in Chemicals Policy, Vienna, Diplomatische Akademie, p128, 
cited from Perrez n23. 
243 See, for example: Boutillon, S. (2002) “The Precautionary Principle: Development of  an International 
Standard” 23 Michigan Journal of  International Law 429;  
244 Barton, C. (1998) “The Status of  the Precautionary Principle in Australia: Its Emergence in Legislation 
and as a Common Law Doctrine” 22 Harvard Environmental Law Review 517. 
245 European Council Resolution on the Precautionary Principle, SN 400/00 ADD 1 20 EN Annex III, adopted 9 
December 2000 (Nice) (EC PP Resolution), para 3. 
246 SPS Agreement, see sections 2.2.2.2 and 4.2 n39.  
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international law” by stating that:247 
 
The status of  the precautionary principle in international law constitutes to be the subject of  debate 
among academic, law practitioners, regulators and judges.  The precautionary principle is regarded 
by some as having crystallized into a general principle of  customary international environmental law. 
Whether it has been widely accepted by Members as a principle of  general or customary 
international law appears less than clear.  We consider, however, that is unnecessary, and probably 
imprudent, for the Appellate Body in this appeal to take a position on this important, but abstract, 
question.  We noted that the Panel itself  did not make any definitive finding with regard to the 
status of  the precautionary principle in international law and that the precautionary principle, at least 
outside the field of  international environmental law, still awaits authoritative formulation.248 
 
While the Appellate Body avoided declaring the legal status of  PA, it did imply that “the 
‘precautionary approach’ or ‘concept’ is ‘an emerging principle of  law’ which may in the 
future crystallize into one of  the ‘general principles of  law recognized by civilized 
nations’ within the meaning of  Article 38(1)(c) of  the Statue of  the International Court of  
Justice”.249 It also mentioned that commentators have noted that there is sufficient state 
practice of  PA, and it can be recognised as an evolving principle in international law.250 
 
The legal status of  the PA has a direct impact on the preference of  the term 
“precautionary approach” rather than “precautionary principle” in this work, which will 





247 WTO Appellate Body Report, EC – Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (EC – Hormones), 
WT/DS26/AB/R, adopted 16 January 1998.  
248 EC – Hormones, para 123. 
249 EC – Hormones, para 122.  
250 EC – Hormones, note 92. 
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2.1.3.1 Precautionary principle or precautionary approach? 
 
The distinction between the terms “precautionary principle” and the “precautionary 
approach” has been a topic of  academic debates.251 Some observe that the Americans 
prefer the word “approach” in order to underline that they do not accept it has yet 
gained the status of  customary international law, while the Europeans prefer “principle” 
to emphasise that they accept it as a concept entailing certain legal implications.252 Birnie 
et al. note that “…European treaties and EC law generally refer to the precautionary 
principle, whereas global agreements more often refer to the precautionary approach or 
precautionary measures”. 253  Few commentators insist on the significance of  
distinguishing the precautionary approach from the precautionary principle;254 however, 
both terms often appear to be interchangeable.  
 
Mascher has concluded that “there is nothing to suggest that the terms ‘precautionary 
principle’ and ‘precautionary approach’ cannot be used interchangeably”.255 Yet Viscuna 
has observed that the term “approach” reflects a hint of  flexibility of  the role of  
precaution in relation to fisheries management: 
 
Since scientific uncertainty is normally the rule in fisheries management a straightforward application 
of  the precautionary principle would have resulted in the impossibility of  proceeding with any 
activity relating to marine fisheries.  It is on these grounds that the concept of  the “precautionary 
approach” surfaced with a view to provide a more flexible tool for the specific needs of  fisheries 
                                                      
251 For example, see Birnie, P., Boyle, A. and Redgwell, C.(2009) International Law and the Environment, 3rd 
edition, Oxford University Press, New York, US. (Birnie/Boyle/Redgwell) pp152-164. 
252 Perrez Regulation, n242. See also: Whiteside, K.H. “Comparing Precaution in the United States and 
Europe” in Precautionary Politics: Principle and Practice in Confronting Environmental Risk (2006) MIT Press, 
Cambridge, Massachusetts, US (Whiteside Precaution). 
253 For example, see Birnie/Boyle/Redgwell, n251. 
254 Birnie/Boyle/Redgwell, n251. 
255 Mascher, S. (1997) “Taking a ‘Precautionary Approach’: Fisheries Management in New Zealand” 14 




It is noteworthy that there is a preference to use the word “approach” rather than 
“principle” in cases of  fisheries management.257 For example, the 1995 Convention on 
Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks preferred the term “precautionary approach” by 
noting “‘approach’ offers greater flexibility and will be less potentially restrictive than the 
‘principle’”.258 Judge Laing had expressed in another Separate Opinion the view that 
“adopting an approach, rather than a principle imports a certain degree of  flexibility and 
tends, though not dispositively, to underscore reticence about making premature 
pronouncements about desirable normative structures”. 259  Judge Treves seems to 
associate the term “principle” with legally binding, customary status, as opposed to the 
alleged more neutral “approach”.260 It is therefore observed that the word “approach” 
receives more acknowledgement than the term “principle” in empirical studies in 
international environmental protection. 
 
Perrez has concluded that “at the practical level, there is no conflict or contradiction 
between the terms ‘principle’ and ‘approach’.  The debate over whether precaution 
should be considered a principle or an approach is therefore more to do with symbols 
and semantics than substance”.261 
 
                                                      
256 Orrega Viscuna, F. (1999) The Changing International Law of  High Seas Fisheries, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, UK.  
257 Southern Bluefin Tuna Case (1999) International Tribunal for the Law of  the Sea (ITLOS) Nos 3&4, 
Separate opinion of  Judge Ad Hoc Shearer. See also: Howarth, W. (2008) “The Interpretation of  
‘Precaution’ in the European Community Common Fisheries Policy” 20 Journal of  Environmental Law 213. 
258 See FAO, The Precautionary Approach to Fisheries with Reference to Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory 
Stocks (1994) UN Doc A/CONF.164/INF/8. 
259 Separate Opinion of  Judge Laing, Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases (New Zealand v Japan; Australia v Japan), 
International Tribunal for the Law of  the Sea, 27 August 1999, para 19, n257. 
260 Separate Opinion of  Judge Treves, Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases (New Zealand v Japan; Australia v Japan), 
International Tribunal for the Law of  the Sea, 27 August 1999, para 9, n257. 
261 Perrez Regulation n242. 
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In addition, the Nuffield Council suggests that “there is not just one, but several 
principles or considerations that need to be considered” by adopting the term 
“precautionary approach” rather than “precautionary principle”. 262  As Laurie and 
Hunter point out, “[T]he Council prefers the term ‘precautionary approach’ and, in so 
doing, reflects the Department of  Health’s framework in suggesting that no one 
principle or consideration should be applied.  The value of  these instruments lies in 
both their procedural and substantive contribution to decision-making process”.263  
 
In empirical studies, the word “approach” appears to be preferable in international legal 
instruments in order to avoid extreme versions of  the precautionary principle that 
demand absolute environmental protection regardless of  the cost.264  An extreme 
version of  the precautionary principle shows little acceptance of  the cost-effectiveness 
arguments, and gives no presumption of  free trade.265  However, in this work, the 
precautionary approach is suggested to be triggered by empirical risk assessment or 
science-based judgement.266  The invocation of  a PA in compulsory licensing will 
depend on scientific judgement or certain forms of  cost-effectivenss evaluation, 
tempered by precaution.   
 
Taking into account the factor of  risk assessment and the reconciliation of  free trade and 
international health, this work avoids extreme interpretations of  the precautionary 
principle, and will settle at the moderate version proposed by the WHO.267 Hence, the 
                                                      
262 Nuffield Public Health, n198, pp35-36.  
263 Laurie, G. and Hunter K. “Mapping, Assessing and Improving Legal Preparedness for Pandemic Flu in 
the United Kingdom” 10(2) Medical Law International 101-137 (Laurie/Hunter). 
264 See section 2.3.3 
265 See Table 2.3.3.3 
266 See sections 3.1.3.1; 5.1.3; 5.1.3.2.  The work of  the Codex Alimentarius Commission defines “risk 
assessment” as a scientifically based process consisting of  the following steps: (i) hazard identification, (ii) 
hazard characterisation, (iii) exposure assessment, and (iv) risk characterisation. 
267 See section 2.3.3.3; Table 2.3.3.3  
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term “approach” would demonstrate the “moderate” and “pragmatic” nature of  this 
work.  
 
The term “approach” suggests a broader and more adaptive method than the term 
“principle” which indicates an absolute implication.  At the time being, considering the 
evolving nature and the unsettled debates on the legal status of  the precautionary 
principle as discussed above,268 and given the political expediency in the international 
setting, it would be more agreeable to adopt the term “approach” to avoid disagreements 
in international fora.  
 
The terminology is the first stepping stone of  communication amongst different 
stakeholders, which aims at facilitating future reconciliation in the application of  the PA 
in a public health emergency.  Considering the political sensitivities which can be 
extreme in different worlds of  trade, health, IP, and human rights, it would be more 
satisfactory to all stakeholders to adopt the term “approach” rather than “principle” 
within the domain of  this work.  
 
Based on the above consideration, with a view to reconciling trade and health, a practical 
and workable reading of  the text is sought by this work.  Though some may argue that 
the two terms are interchangeable, the term “approach” appears to be more apt than 
“principle” in empirical studies in international law.  It is also observed that the slight 
distinction between these two terms is that PP implies a more dogmatic assertion to 
adopt certain measures to shy away from uncertain risks, while PA reflects a hint of  a 
more flexible application of  precaution.  We will choose the term “approach” in this 
                                                      
268 See section 2.1.3. The United States and Canada do not yet accept it as “principle” in international law. 
For example, see WTO Appellate Body Report, EC – Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (EC – 
Hormones), WT/DS26/AB/R, adopted 16 January 1998, para 122.  
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work to underscore the adaptability and flexibility of  risk management269 in a public 
health emergency.  
 
 
2.2 Origins of  the precautionary approach: From international 
environmental protection to human health and food safety 
 
After having an initial impression of  the precautionary approach, we will turn our 
attention to its origins in international environmental law and recent developments in the 
protection of  human health and food safety.  
 
Prior to the emergence of  the PA, the “preventive principle” was documented in the 
literature. 270  Whereas the preventive principle can be traced back to international 
environmental treaties since the 1930s,271 the PA emerged in the context of  marine 
pollution legislation in international law, and “cleaner production” in Europe.272  
 
It is therefore important to distinguish “precaution” from “prevention”. “Precaution” is 
relevant in situations of  scientific uncertainty, while “prevention” relates to situations in 
which the risk of  potential damage can be determined or identified on the basis of  a 
scientific assessment.273 The PA therefore is only involved in the condition that there is 
scientific uncertainty concerning the existence or seriousness of  a risk.  In other words, 
when a risk can be managed with a quantitative risk assessment (QRA),274 it is included 
                                                      
269 See n36.  
270 For example, see: Sands Principles p267 n2411. 
271 Sands Principles p267 n241. 
272 Harding/Fisher n222. See also: De Sadeleer, N. Environmental Principles: From Political Slogans to Legal Rules, 
Oxford University Press, New York, the United States, pp61-90. 
273 Perrez Regulation, n252. 
274 See section 3.1.3.1, n266  
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in the exercise of  prevention rather than precaution;275 on the contrary, if  the risk 
involves scientific uncertainty which cannot be measured by QRA, or the causal 
relationship has not been established under current pertinent scientific justification, the 
PA may be introduced to address the need to prevent further damage to human health 
and safety.276 
 
The PA originated from air pollution legislation in Germany in the phrase 
“Vorsorgeprinzip”.277 Tickner and Kriebel argue for an alternative translation of  this 
word is the “foresight principle” or “forecaring principle” which emphasises an 
anticipatory action: “a proactive idea rather than precaution, which may sounds reactive 
and even negative”.278 Birnie et al. state that its purpose is “to make greater allowance for 
uncertainty in the regulation of  environmental risks and the sustainable use of  natural 
resources”.279  
 
The PA is becoming increasing relevant as an international legal measure to guide 
decision-making in the face of  scientific uncertainty.  It is reflected in a growing body 
of  legal instruments which form part of  developing international customary and treaty 
regimes.280 It has been applied in relation to the adoption of  measures to address ozone 
depletion;281 to protect the marine environment of  the North Sea;282 to prevent the 
causes of  climate change;283 to regulate handling and use of  living modified organisms,284 
                                                      
275 Cameron, J. “The Precautionary Principle: Core Meaning, Constitutional Framework and Procedures 
for Implementation” (Cameron PP) in Harding/Fisher, n222. 
276 Cameron PP, n275.  
277 Harding/Fisher, n222. 
278 Tickner, J. and Kriebel, D. “The Role of  Science and Precaution in Environmental and Public Health 
Policy” in Fisher PP n205. 
279 Birnie/Boyle/Redgwell, n251.  
280 For a detailed review of  the origins and history of  precaution, see Trouwborst Evolution, n206.  
281 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, 1987. 
282 Third North Sea Conference, 1990. 
283 The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, 1992; Framework Convention on Climate Change, 1992. 
284 Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, 2000. 
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and more recently, to the protection of  human health and food safety.285 It is observed 
that after the Rio Declaration,286 the PA soon appeared in many dimensions in different 
legal instruments to meet demands of  various risks under scientific uncertainty.  For 
example, the WTO Agreement on the Application of  Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS 
Agreement),287 the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (Cartagena Protocol” or “CPB),288 the 
WHO International Health Regulations (IHRs),289 and the Codex Alimentarius290 have further 
expanded the application of  precaution from specific environmental protection to the 
protection of  human health.291 This will be further addressed in following Chapters.292 
 
We will now revisit its development within the United Nations, the WTO and the EC 
respectively in order to trace its development and to identify recent trends in the 
protection of  international environment with a special regard to the protection of  
human health and food safety. 
 
 
2.2.1 United Nations 
 
The precautionary approach has been adopted in international law to put states under a 
duty to prevent or mitigate transboundary environmental harm caused by activities in 
                                                      
285 Treaty on European Union (Maastricht Treaty), 1992; Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants 
(POPs), 2001. See European Environmental Agency Report, Late Lessons from Early Warnings: the 
Precautionary Principle 1896-2000, Environmental Issue Report No 22, EEA, Copenhagen 2001. 
286 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, the United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro, 1992 (Rio Declaration), UN Doc.A/CONF.151/26, Vol I, Annex 
I.    
287 SPS Agreement n39.  
288 Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, see section 3.2 n46. 
289 See section 3.1.2. International Health Regulations (IHRs) n45 .  
290 See website of  Codex Alimentarius at: http:www.codexalimentarius.net  n36    
291 WTO SPS Agreement, Art. 5.7 n39; Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity 
(Montreal 2000), Article 10.6 (Cartagena Protocol/CPB)n46 ; WHO International Health Regulations 
(IHRs) Article 43 n45; Codex Alimentarius Procedural Manual (Codex Manual)n36: 
http://www.codexalimentarius.net/web/procedural_manual.jspm.     
292 See Chapters 3 and 4. 
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territory under their jurisdiction or control.  The PA arises to provide regulations on the 
polluters or the one introduces new technology to bear relevant duties in managing 
unknown risks associated with their activities.  
 
Many threatening environmental issues such as ozone depletion,293 climate change,294 
and transboundary waste dumping295 all require international cooperation.  Therefore 
the United Nations has played an important role in the proliferation of  the PA to prevent 
international environmental deterioration.  Though some of  the resolutions of  the 
General Assembly may not be legally-binding as treaties, they are recommended to be 
taken into considerations by the International Court of  Justice (ICJ)296 as a manner in 
which “the development of  international law may be reflected” when disputes arise.297  
 
 
2.2.1.1 Legal instruments 
 
The UN General Assembly has adopted the World Charter for Nature (World Charter) within 
the framework of  the World Conservation Union in 1982, which is also known as “the 
Magna Carta of  ecological environmental policy”.298 Despite the absence of  the term 
“precautionary principle” or “precautionary approach”, Principle 11 of  the Charter 
reflects the basic elements of  the PA by stating that: 
 
Activities which might have an impact on nature shall be controlled and the best available 
                                                      
293 See n281   
294 See n283 
295 See n285 
296  International Court of  Justice (ICJ), see section 2.2.1.1.1, available at: 
http://www.icj-cij.org/homepage/index.php?lang=en  
297 Resolution 29/332, 29 United Nations General Assembly Official Records (UNGAOR), 1974, Supp31, 
cited from Trouwborst Evolution n206, p149. 
298 World Charter for Nature, UN General Assembly Resolution 37/7, Annex B. no 1; Trouwborst Evolution 
n206 pp150-152. 
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technologies that minimize significant risks to nature or other effects shall be used, in particular: 
(a) Activities which are likely to cause irreversible damage to nature shall be avoided; 
(b) Activities which are likely to pose a significant risk to nature shall be preceded by an exhaustive 
examination; their proponents shall demonstrate that expected benefits outweigh potential 
damage to nature, and where potential adverse effects are not fully understood, the activities 
should not proceed; 
(c) Activities which may disturb nature shall be preceded by assessment of  their consequences, and 
environmental impact studies of  development projects shall be conducted sufficiently in 
advance, and if  they are to be undertaken such activities shall be planned and carried out so as 
to minimize potential adverse effects;…(emphasis added)  
 
Principle 11 identifies some major factors in the implementation of  the PA: significant 
risks; irreversible damage; cost-effectiveness, and environmental impact assessment 
(EIA).  The European Commission thus referred the World Charter for Nature as the first 
legal instrument to recognise the PA at the international level, 299  and Hohmann 
concludes that the World Charter for Nature is “certainly one of  the most important UN 
documents in which the precautionary principle has been recognized as the central 
principle of  environmental policy”. 300  Trouwborst further comments that the 
precautionary thinking on the international plane has proliferated after the adoption of  
the World Charter.301 
 
Further to the completion of  the World Charter, the UN General Assembly later approved 
                                                      
299 EC Communication on the Precautionary Principle, Communication COM (2000)1, p11 (EC Communication). 
300 Hohmann, H. (1994), Precautionary Legal Duties and Principles of  Modern International Environmental Law, 
Dordrecht, cited from Trouwborst Evolution, n206 p152. 
301 For example: United Nations Convention on the Law of  the Sea (1982); Convention on Early Notification of  a 
Nuclear Accident (1986); Convention on the Regulation of  Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities (1988); Vienna 
Convention for the Protection of  the Protection of  the Ozone Layer (1985); Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone 
Layer (the Montreal Protocol, 1987), and Basel Convention on the Control of  Transboundary Movements of  Hazardous 
Wastes and their Disposal (1989).  
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Goals and Principles of  Environmental Impact Assessment in 1987 and extended the application 
of  the PA into the problems of  global climate change,302 marine resource and large-scale 
driftnet fishing,303 sustainable development;304 hazardous waste and persistent organic 
pollutants.305 Relevant cases of  Gabcikovo – Nagymaros before the ICJ and Southern Blufin 
Tuna Case in the International Tribunal of  the Law of  the Sea (ITLOS)306 will be 
introduced briefly to highlight the fundamental ingredients of  the PA.  
 
 
2.2.1.1.1 Gabcikovo – Nagymaros Case 
 
The International Court of  Justice (ICJ) is the principal judicial organ of  the United 
Nations.  It was established by the Charter of  the United Nations in 1949 to settle legal 
disputes submitted by states and to give advisory opinions on legal questions.  The 
Gabcikovo – Nagymaros Case307 was heard in the ICJ when Hungary invoked the PA to 
suspend works of  the two barrages for its natural environment in the region affected by 
the Gabcikovo – Nagymaros Project in consideration of  “ecological necessity” in 1989. 
 
Nevertheless, the ICJ found that Hungary did not prove a “real, ‘grave’, and ‘imminent’ 
‘peril’ existed in 1989, and the measures taken by Hungary were the only possible 
                                                      
302 UN General Assembly Resolution 43/53 on Protection of  Global Climate for Present and Future Generations of  
Mankind (1988). 
303 UN Environment Programme Governing Council Decision 15/27 on the Precautionary Approach to Marine 
Pollution, Including Waste-Dumping at Sea (1989); UN General Assembly Resolution 44/225 on Large-Scale Pelagic 
Driftnet Fishing and its Impact on the Living Marine Resources of  the World’s Oceans and Seas (1989); UN General 
Assembly Resolution 46/215 on Large-Scale Pelagic Driftnet Fishing and its Impact on the Living Marine Resources of  
the World’s Oceans and Seas (1991), and UN General Assembly Resolution 59/25 (2004). 
304 UN General Assembly Resolutions S/19-2 (Programme for the Further Implementation of  Agenda 21, 1997). 
305 UN Environment Programme Governing Council Decision SS II/4 on a Comprehensive Approach to Hazardous 
Waste (1990); UN Environment Programme Governing Council Decision 18/32 on Persistent Organic Pollutants 
(1995); UN Environment Programme Governing Council Decision 19/13 C on Persistent Organic Pollutants 
(1997). 
306  International Tribunal of  the Law of  the Sea (ITLOS), see section 2.2.1.1.2. 
http://www.itlos.org/start2_en.html  
307 Gabcikovo – Nagymaros Case (1997) ICJ Report 7, paras 105-114.(Gabcikovo – Nagymaros) 
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response to it”. 308   It was also alleged that an adequate Environmental Impact 
Assessment (EIA) had not been carried out before the project, but the court did not 
address the need for prior EIA.  EIA is “a procedure for evaluating the likely impact of  
a proposed activity on the environment”.309  In particular, the Court required the parties 
to “look afresh” at the environmental impact of  the project, and treated prior EIA and 
subsequent monitoring of  the ongoing risks as a continuing obligation throughout the 
whole project.310 Birnie et al. note that: “If  EIA is a necessary precondition for effective 
notification and consultation with other states, then monitoring may equally be regarded 
as a necessary element of  an effective EIA”.311  It can therefore be suggested that 
monitoring may also be part of  the obligation of  due diligence, and needs to be 
incorporated in a complete EIA through the life of  the project.  
 
The Gabcikove – Nagymaros case may indicate that the triggering threshold of  the PA 
needs to prove a “real, ‘grave’, and ‘imminent’ ‘peril’” exists,312 and the one who carry 
out the project associated with the risk may be obliged to carry out a prior EIA and 
subsequent monitoring of  the ongoing risks.  The ongoing risks need to be constantly 







308 The ICJ found that a state of  necessity was, on an exceptional basis, a ground recognised by customary 
international law for precluding the wrongfulness of  an act not in conformity with an international 
obligation, and relied on the formulation of  draft Article 33 of  the ILC’s draft Articles on State 
Responsibility: (1997) ICJ Report 7 paras 50-2, 54. 
309 1991 Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context, Article 1 (vi). 
310 Birnie/Boyle/Redgwell, pp164-168 n251. 
311 Birnie/Boyle/Redgwell, pp164-168 n251. 
312 See n307. The ICJ found that a state of  necessity was, on an exceptional basis, a ground recognised by 
customary international law for precluding the wrongfulness of  an act not in conformity with an 
international obligation, and relied on the formulation of  draft Article 33 of  the ILC’s draft Articles on 
State Responsibility: (1997) ICJ Report 7 paras 50-2, 54. 
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2.2.1.1.2 Southern Bluefin Tuna Case 
 
The United Nations Convention on the Law of  the Sea (UNCLOS) establishes a 
comprehensive legal framework to regulate ocean space, its uses and resources.  It 
provides for the protection and preservation of  the marine environment in particular. 
The Convention is equipped with several channels for the settlement of  disputes: the 
International Tribunal for the Law of  the Sea (ITLOS),313 the International Court of  
Justice,314 an arbitral tribunal constituted in the Convention.  
 
In the Southern Bluefin Tuna Case, Australia and New Zealand requested the ITLOS to 
order “that the parties act consistently with the precautionary principle in fishing for Southern 
Bluefin Tuna pending a final settlement of  the dispute” (emphasis added).315 The Tribunal 
relied on scientific uncertainty of  the conservation of  tuna stock to justify the grant of  
provisional measures to prevent the stock from further depletion.  It stated that “the 
parties should in the circumstances act with prudence and caution to ensure that effective 
conservation measures are taken to prevent serious harm to the stock of  southern 
bluefin tuna”.316(emphasis added)  
 
“Scientific uncertainty” regarding provisional measures to be taken to conserve the stock 
of  bluefin tuna is acknowledged in the case.317 The Southern Bluefin Tuna case thus 
recognises that the measure to grant a provisional measure can be considered as a 
legitimate precautionary action in international law.318  
                                                      
313 ITLOS, see n306.  
314 ICJ, see n296. 
315 Sands Principles, n241 p275. 
316 Southern Bluefin Tuna Case (1999) International Tribunal for the Law of  the Sea Nos 3&4, para 77. 
(Southern Bluefin Tuna) n257  
317 Southern Bluefin Tuna Case (1999) International Tribunal for the Law of  the Sea Nos 3&4 n257, para 79. 
318 Southern Bluefin Tuna Case (1999) International Tribunal for the Law of  the Sea Nos 3&4 n257, Judge 
Laing at para 17. 
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In conclusion, the above two cases identify three basic elements of  PA which are features 
formed in other operations of  the approach: the triggering threshold of  the approach, 
the duty of  scientific assessment and monitoring, and the adoption of  provisional 
measures.  Furthermore, in the legislation of  the WTO SPS Agreement,319 the adoption 
of  provisional SPS measures320 is also considered typical application of  the PA.  Yet the 
said provisional measure is subject to the accompaniment of  procedural requirements, 





The precautionary approach has been emerging as a guiding norm in international 
environmental law, yet its application is relatively more reserved and restrictive in the 
international economic legal system.322 This is due to the intrinsic limitations of  the 
WTO whose primary goals are the elimination of  any possible restriction to trade and 
the promotion of  a global market.  
 
Interpretations of  the PA in the WTO are accompanied by ongoing rulings of  the 
Dispute Settlement Body323 when any new dispute arises.  It is therefore necessary to 
analyse relevant cases and to sketch the outline of  the approach applied by the WTO.  
 
We will examine the development of  the PA in the WTO first by introducing the 
                                                      
319 WTO SPS Agreement n39, see sections 2.2.2.2 and 4.2.  
320 See section 4.2.2.  
321 The set of  procedural requirements of  the adoption of  a provisional SPS measure is addressed in 
section 2.2.2.2. 
322 See section 5.1.1.  
323 See section 1.2.1.1.2.  
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mechanism of  the SPS Agreement324 and then by reviewing relevant cases in order to 
take a closer look at the approach practised by the WTO.  
 
 
2.2.2.1 Appropriate level of  health protection 
 
The WTO has acknowledged Members’ rights to determine the level of  health 
protection that they consider appropriate in a given situation.  The Appellate Body 
concluded that the SPS Agreement has incorporated precautionary elements,325 and 
noted that the PA is reflected in Article 5.7, in the sixth paragraph of  the Preamble and 
in Article 3.3.326  
 
Specifically, the SPS Preamble recognises Members’ rights to maintain their appropriate 
level of  protection (ALOP)327 of  human, animal or plant life or health”.328 In addition, 
the Appellate Body in EC – Asbestos also stated: “…we note that it is undisputed that 
WTO Members have the right to determine the level of  protection of  health that they 
consider appropriate in a given situation”.329  They are entitled to determine their level 
of  health protection according to scientific and non-scientific factors.  
 
                                                      
324 Agreement on the Application of  Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement) n39, sections 
2.2.2.2 and 4.2.  
325 Birnie/Boyle/Redgwell, n251. See also: Bermann, G.A. and Mavroidis, P.C. (2006) Trade and Human 
Health and Safety, Cambridge University Press: New York (Bermann/Mavroidis); Scott, J. (2009) The WTO 
Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures: A Commentary Oxford University Press: New York (Scott 
SPS); Epps, T. (2008) International Trade and Health Protection: A Critical Assessment of  the WTO’s SPS Agreement, 
Edward Elgar: Cheltenham UK (Epps SPS); Button, C. (2004) The Power to Protect: Trade, Health and 
Uncertainty in the WTO , Hart Publishing: Portland, Oregon, US (Button Power). 
326 EC – Hormones, n247 para 124 “…the precautionary principle indeed finds reflection in Article 5.7 of  
the SPS Agreement. We agree, at the same time, with the European Communities, that there is no need to 
assume that Article 5.7 exhausts the relevance of  a precautionary principle. It is reflected also in the sixth 
paragraph of  the preamble and in Article 3.3…”  
327 States’ “appropriate level of  protection” (ALOP) is also understood as individual Member’s “acceptable 
level of  protection”.  
328 The sixth paragraph of  the preamble, SPS n39.  
329 WTO Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing 
Products (EC – Asbestos), WT/DS135/AB/R, para 168 n110. 
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Regarding the non-scientific factors in the determination of  ALOP, scholars propose 
that risk regulation should include public perception of  risk which consists of  citizens’ 
preferences and domestic demand for regulation.  These are supposed to be determined 
by democratic processes.330   According to Button’s research, non-scientific factors 
represent social and cultural preferences which consist of  the desired level of  protection, 
economic feasibility, popular demands for regulations and the effect of  regulation.331 She 
further distinguishes various societal preferences into cultural traditions and public 
fear.332 Public fear towards different risks varies in different cultures.  Similarly, Sunstein 
also describes people and societies as “selective in their fear”.333  
 
For example, the Europeans are aware of  the residue hormones in beef,334 while the 
Americans are afraid of  Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE). 335  Hence the 
willingness to accept a particular risk varies in different social contexts.  The level of  
unacceptable health protection is supposed to be determined by the community through 
an objective scientific assessment and a subjective process of  public engagement.  
These examples illustrate that scientific findings are not the sole factor in risk regulations, 
civilians’ social and cultural preferences in different contexts have arisen to play an 
important role in the policy-making of  risk management.  Ideally through public 
                                                      
330 See for example: Bohanes, J. (2002) “Risk Regulation in WTO Law: A Procedure-Based Approach to 
the Precautionary Principle” 40 Columbia Journal of  Transnational Law 323 
331 Button Power, n325 pp102-113. 
332 Button Power, n325 pp102-113. 
333 See Sunstein, C. (2005) Laws of  Fear: Beyond the Precautionary Principle, Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press pp13-15(Sunstein PP). 
334 EC – Hormones, n247.    
335 Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) is commonly known as “mad cow disease”, which was first 
identified in the UK in November 1986. Scientists suspect that BSE had been transmitted from sheep to 
cow through contaminated feed. BSE attacks the brain and central nervous system of  the host before 
killing it. The most well-known BSE-related disease that affects people is Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (CJD). 
Researchers conclude that the most likely of  CJD is eating meat infected with BSE. Like BSE in cattle, 
CJD is always fatal to human. See: “‘Mad Cow Disease’ 1980s-2000: How Reassurances Undermined 
Precaution” in Late Lessons from Early Warnings: the Precautionary Principle 1896-2000, European Environment 
Agency, Copenhagen 2001; see also: UK Food Standards Agency Website at: 
http://www.eatwell.gov.uk/healthissues/factsbehindissues/bse/#cat237257; Holer, J. and Elworthy, S. 
“The BSE Crisis: A Study of  the Precautionary Principle and the Politics of  Science in Law” in Reece, H. 
(ed) (1998) Law and Science: Current Legal Issues Volume 1, Oxford University Press, New York. 
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engagement, civilians’ social and cultural preferences would serve as legitimate grounds 
to determine an appropriate level of  health protection, yet in the scenario of  a public 
health emergency, the time constraints would often limit public engagement.  
 
In addition to choosing its preferred level of  health protection, a WTO Member is also 
allowed to act with prudence on the basis of minority opinion.  The Appellate Body 
further expresses its view on minority opinion.336  This demonstrates that the right of  
WTO Members to adopt the level of  health protection they deem appropriate or 
acceptable is respected by the WTO.  It also illustrates that Members are not obliged to 
base their decisions on majority scientific opinion.  Further, in situations when both 
majority opinion and minority opinion are not available or do not exist, the PA comes in 
to play a vital role in decision-making.  In other words, the PA is supposed to be 
activated within the scope of  scientific ignorance or scientific uncertainty. 
 
We will now turn our attention to the WTO SPS Agreement,337 which is the main 
instrument of  the regulation of  health risks in WTO law. 
 
 
2.2.2.2 SPS Agreement 
 
The SPS Agreement is a more elaborate agreement on human health than the health 
exception provision in GATT.338  Originally, health concerns in the GATT only serve as 
a general exception to the rule of  free trade; a Member’s right to protect domestic public 
health was not officially recognised in the traditional GATT framework.  It was not 
                                                      
336 WTO Appellate Body Report, EC – Asbestos, para 178, n110.   
337 SPS Agreement, n39. 
338 See section 4.1.1.   
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until the Uruguay Round of  negotiations that the WTO introduced the SPS Agreement 
for a detailed framework of  health protection in the WTO mechanism.  On the one 
hand, the SPS Agreement grants Members the power to protect domestic human health 
issues and food safety by regulating risks arising from “additives, contaminants, toxins, 
disease-causing organisms in food, beverages or feedstuffs”;339 on the other hand, 
Members are obliged to follow relevant requirements in this agreement to avoid trade 
protectionism.340  
 
Article 2 of  the SPS Agreement affirms a Member’s “right” to take SPS measures 
“necessary for the protection of  human, animal or plant life or health”, but the adopted 
SPS measure needs to meet several requirements:  
 
 They must be applied “only to the extent necessary to protect human, animal or plant 
life or health; 
 They must be “based on scientific principles and …not maintained without sufficient 
scientific evidence”; 
 They must not “arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate between Members where 
identical or similar conditions prevails”, and 
 They must be “applied in a manner which would not constitute a disguised 
restriction on international trade”.  
 
The Preamble of  the SPS Agreement recognises Members’ right to maintain the 
appropriate level of  health protection. 341  The international approved standard is 
                                                      
339 Annex A, Article 1(b) SPS n39. 
340 Article 2 SPS n39. 
341 See section 2.2.2.1.  
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generally recommended,342 but Members could adopt their ALOP343 accompanied by 
scientific justification based on the relevant international standards.344 However, the SPS 
Agreement also provides leeway for a higher level of  protection under scientific 
uncertainty by providing the mechanism of  provisional SPS measures.345 In other words, 
ALOP may be maintained with scientific justification, but provisional SPS measures may 
also be adopted if  certain criteria are met under scientific uncertainty.346  
 
The WTO Appellate Body thus concluded that “These explicitly recognize the right of  
Members to establish their own appropriate level of  sanitary protection, which level may 
be higher (i.e., more cautious) than that implied in existing international standards, guidelines 
and recommendations” (italics added).347 It also noted that in situations where risks are 
irreversible, for example, risks identified as life-terminating or damaging to human health, 
acts from perspectives of  prudence and precaution may be adopted by responsible 
governments.348  In other words, in situations concerning irreversible risks, the standard 
of  application on the PA appears to be more relaxed.  Joanna Scott hence contends that 
when the provisional measure is adopted to protect irreversible or life-threatening 
damage, Members’ obligation to the WTO will be lessened.349 
 
As the interpretations of  the SPS Agreement depend greatly on the rulings of  the 
Appellate Body, it is necessary to examine typical SPS cases in order to interpret the 
                                                      
342 Article 3.1 SPS. “International standards, guidelines or recommendations” are issued by the following 
organisations: the Codex Alimentarius Commission relating to food safety; the International Office of  
Epizootics relating to animal health and zoonoses; the Secretariat of  the International Plant Protection 
Convention relating to plant health, and other relevant international organizations open for membership to 
WTO Members. See Article 3 Annex A SPS Agreement n39.   
343 See section 2.2.2.1 .  
344 Article 3.3 SPS.  
345 Article 5.7 SPS.  
346 Scientific uncertainty can either be insufficiency in scientific evidence or causal relationship. See 
section 2.3.1.2.  
347 EC – Hormones, para 124 n247. 
348 EC – Hormones, para 124 n247. 
349 Scott SPS, Preface to Paperback Edition n325. 
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meanings of  the legislation with respect to the PA.  We will now familiarise ourselves 
with the procedural requirements of  the health mechanism in the SPS Agreement by 
examining the following cases.  
 
 
2.2.2.2.1 Japan – Varietals  
 
In Japan – Measures Affecting Agricultural Products (Japan – Varietals)350, the United States 
filed a complaint against Japan relating to the quarantine requirement imposed by Japan 
for each variety of  certain agricultural products (varietal testing requirements”, “VTR). 
Japanese law provided that the prohibition on imported fruits can be lifted when the 
exporting country uses an alternative quarantine treatment that meets the same level of  
protection as the import ban.  The United States complained that the testing for each 
variety of  apples was lengthy, costly, and caused unjustifiably delay to market US 
products.351 In particular, the United States challenged the requirement that VTR was 
inconsistent with Japan’s obligations under the SPS Agreement.352 
 
The Appellate Body in Japan – Varietals further found that the application of  a 
precautionary SPS measure needs to meet four requirements:  
Pursuant to the first sentence of  Article 5.7, a Member may provisionally adopt an SPS measure if  
this measure is: 
(1) imposed in respect of  a situation where "relevant scientific information is insufficient";  and 
                                                      
350 Japan – Measures Affecting Agricultural Products (Japan – Varietals), WT/DS76/AB/R, 22 February 1999, 
para 89. 
351 Under the legal regime, after extensive testing, Red Delicious apples from the United States were 
approved for import in August 1994; however, separate and different testing for different varieties of  apples 
including Gala, Granny Smith, Jonagold, Fuji and Braeburn apples was still ongoing in 1998 when the 
dispute was being heard in a WTO dispute settlement. Reproduced from Dunoff, J.L. “Lotus Eaters: 
Reflections on the Varietals Dispute, the SPS Agreement and WTO Dispute Resolution” in 
“Trade/Health”, (Dunoff  Varietals). 
352 Dunoff  Varietals, n351. 
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(2) adopted "on the basis of  available pertinent information". 
Pursuant to the second sentence of  Article 5.7, such a provisional measure may not be maintained 
unless the Member which adopted the measure: 
(1) "seek[s] to obtain the additional information necessary for a more objective assessment of  
risk";  and 
(2) "review[s] the … measure accordingly within a reasonable period of  time". 
These four requirements are clearly cumulative in nature and are equally important for the purpose 
of  determining consistency with this provision. Whenever one of  these four requirements is not met, 
the measure at issue is inconsistent with Article 5.7. 353 
 
In addition to general requirements of  a SPS measure such as necessity, scientific justification, 
and non-discrimination in international trade,354 this further set of  requirements in the 
adoption of  a provisional SPS measure is identified in the Varietal case.  This set of  
requirements specifically demand the provisional SPS measure to be applied in situations 
of  insufficiency of  scientific information; based on available pertinent information; the 
adopting state is obliged to have an ongoing duty to gather updated information for 
monitoring and review.355 However, the Apellate Body did not explicitely indicate that 
there should be downstream obligations to change their policy or behaviour if  fresh 
evidence is discovered. 
 
In other words, in emergency situations where adequate risk assessment do not exist due to 
insufficiency of  scientific information, Members can still implement provisional SPS 
measures based on available pertinent information.  But in order to ensure the 
                                                      
353 Japan – Measures Affecting Agricultural Products (Japan – Varietals), WT/DS76/AB/R, 22 February 1999, 
para 89 n350.  
354 See section 2.2.2.2.  
355 See section 2.2.1.1.2 for the requirement of  ongoing monitoring and assessment.  
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provisional measure does not constitute unnecessary restriction to international trade, it 
is noteworthy that after the adoption of  a provisional measure, Members are obliged to 
obtain necessary information for a more objective assessment, and review the measure 
within a reasonable period of  time. This has resonance with the duty to monitor the 
ongoing risks in the Gabcikove – Nagymaros case.356   
 
In Japan – Varietals, the Appellate Body noted that the VTR was not legitimate within the 
scope of  Article 5.7.  In addition, the Appellate Body found that Japan had not sought 
to obtain addition information, or to review the VTR within a reasonable period of  
time.357 The Appellate Body also explained that “what constitutes a ‘reasonable period 
of  time’ has to be established on a case-by-case basis and depends on the specific 
circumstances of  each case, including the difficulty of  obtaining the additional 
information necessary for the review and the characteristics of  the provisional SPS 
measure”.358  
 
The Varietals case indicates that the adopted PA should be accompanied with a set of  
requirements which aims to prevent abuse of  this mechanism.   
 
It can also be implied that the PA needs to remain adaptive to the characteristics of  each 
particular risk, but that the adopting states are obliged not to cause any unnecessary 
interference to international trade.  The set of  requirements indeed serves as an 
objective safeguard to avoid misuse of  the application of  the PA in international trade, 
and it will further be applied in chapter 5 when the PA is argued to be extended to the 
                                                      
356 See section 2.2.1.1.1.  
357 Appellate Body Report, Japan – Varietals n350 para 92. 
358 Appellate Body Report, Japan – Varietals n350 para 93. 
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realm of  IP policy-making.359  
 
 
2.2.2.2.2 EC – Hormones  
 
In EC – Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (EC – Hormones),360 the European 
Community invoked the precautionary approach to justify its ban on beef  imports from 
the United States and Canada with artificial hormones, where the impact on human 
health remains uncertain.  The United States and Canada challenged the EC’s ban on 
the sale and import of  beef  treated with growth hormones as a violation of  the EC’s 
obligation in the SPS Agreement. 
 
Notably, the EC did not invoke the PA contained in Article 5.7.  The Panel and the 
Appellate Body then had to explore if  there could be elements of  the PA in the SPS 
Agreement beyond what is contained in Article 5.7.  They concluded that Article 3.3 
allows Members to introduce a higher level of  health protection than international 
standards.  It is regarded as not only an exception, but as a conditional right or an 
exclusion in WTO law.361 It serves as an exclusion to Article 3.1 which expects Members 
to use international standards.  This is to say that the act to adopt a higher level of  
health protection is a right instead of  an exception in WTO law.  Put more accurately, 
the Appellate Body noted that: 
  
Article 3.1 of  the SPS Agreement simply excludes from its scope of  application the kinds of  
situations covered by Article 3.3 of  that Agreement…Article 3.3 recognizes the autonomous right of  a 
                                                      
359 See section 5.3.  
360 EC – Hormones, paras 120-125 n247. 
361 Exclusions can also be regarded as conditional rights in WTO law, which enjoy a higher level of  legal 
status than exceptions. See section 1.2.1.2 for the discussion of  excluding provisions and conditional rights 
in WTO. 
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Member to establish such higher level of  protection, provided that that Member complies with 
certain requirements in promulgating SPS measures to achieve that level. (emphasis added)362  
 
The Appellate Body suggests that the adoption of  a higher level of  health protection is 
an autonomous right of  Members by excluding the application of  Article 3.3 from Article 
3.1. If  Article 3.3 is treated as an exclusion instead of  an exception to Article 3.1, the 
burden of  proof  would then rest upon the complaining party.  In other words, Canada 
and the United States have to prove that the EC’s ban is inconsistent with its obligations 
in the SPS Agreement. 
 
The Appellate Body also noted that for “…a measure, to be consistent with the 
requirements of  Article 3.3, [it] must comply with, inter alia, the requirements contained 
in Article 5 of  the SPS Agreement”.363 Article 5.1 requires Members to base their SPS 
measures on risk assessment, yet the Panel and Appellate Body both found that the EC 
ban was not based on a risk assessment, thus constituted a violation to the SPS 
Agreement.  The Appellate Body thus recommended that the EC bring its SPS 
measures into conformity with its obligations under the SPS Agreement.364 This case 
demonstrates that the importance of  states need to base their decisions of  a health 







362 WTO Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones, para 104 n247. 
363 Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones, para 253. 
364 Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones, para 255. 
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United States – Continued Suspension of  Obligations in the EC – 
Hormones Disputes (Hormones II)365  
 
After the publication of  the Appellate Body Report in EC – Hormones, the EC has 
initiated 17 scientific studies to assess the risks to human health posed by the hormones 
at issue.366 However, the United States and Canada have already requested that the 
DSB367 to authorise suspension of  the concession in relation to the EC.368 
  
The EC objected to the levels of  suspension of  concessions proposed by the US and 
Canada, but the US and Canada had both obtained authorisation from the DSB to 
suspend concessions.  The EC then notified the DSB of  its adoption of  Directive 
2003/74/EC and relevant reports which considered risk assessments that justified the 
permanent and provisional import prohibitions under the SPS Agreement.  The EC 
then claimed that it had implemented the DSB’s recommendations in the original EC – 
Hormones dispute,369 and considered the suspensions of  concessions by the US and 
Canada as not justified.  However, the US and Canada refused to lift the measure taken 
to suspend concessions or other obligations, thus the EC filed a complaint.370  
 
The Appellate Body noted that at the time of  adoption of  a provisional SPS measure, 
the Member in question needs to identify the insufficiencies in the relevant scientific 
                                                      
365 Appellate Body Repot, United States – Continued Suspension of  Obligations in the EC – Hormones Dispute 
(Hormones II), WT/DS320/AB/R, adopted 16 October 2008.  
366 Appellate Body Repot, United States – Continued Suspension of  Obligations in the EC – Hormones Dispute 
(Hormones II), WT/DS320/AB/R n365, para 10. 
367 See section 1.2.1.1.2. 
368 Article 22.2 of  the DSU (Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of  
Disputes) The WTO Agreement has established the WTO Dispute Settlement Body, which includes 
dispute resolution panels and an Appellate Body, see the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU), Annex 
2 to the WTO Agreement. See section 1.2.1.1.2. 
369 EC – Hormones, n247.  
370 Appellate Body Report, United States – Continued Suspension of  Obligations in the EC – Hormones Dispute 
(Hormones II), WT/DS320/AB/R, paras 8-12 n365. 
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evidence, and the steps it intends to take to obtain the additional information to remedy 
these.371 It also stated that “In emergency situations…a Member will take a provisional 
SPS measure on the basis of  limited information and the steps which it takes to comply 
with this obligation to seek to obtain additional information and review the measure will 
be assessed in the light of  the exigencies of  the emergency”.372  
 
In summary, the Hormones case indicates the importance of  basing a domestic SPS 
measure on decent risk assessment.  The PA is deemed as a right not an exception in the 
SPS Agreement, however, it will not be accepted as legitimate without some sort of  
scientific evidence, and risk assessment is regarded as a neutral measurement of  the 
approach.  In Hormones II, the prerequisites to adopt a provisional SPS measure are 
further interpreted.  In addition to the abovementioned requirements set out in Varietals, 
the Appellate Body mentioned that the adopting state needs to identify the insufficiency 
of  scientific evidence and relevant following actions of  monitoring and review at the 
time of  adoption.  This shows that states’ rights to be precautious link with their duties 
to continue gathering evidence over time.  
 
 
2.2.2.2.3 EC – Biotech373 
 
The controversies on the risks of  genetically modified organisms (GMOs) to human 
health and environment have been reflected in many anti-GMO campaigns.374 The EC 
                                                      
371 Appellate Body Report, Hormones II, para 679. 
372 Appellate Body Report, Hormones II, para 680. 
373 European Communities – Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of  Biotech Products (EC- Biotech) 
WT/DS291/R, WT/DS292/R, WT/DS293/R, adopted 29 February 2006. See also: Covelli, N. and 
Hohots, V. (2003) “The Health Regulation of  Biotech Foods under the WTO Agreements” 6(4) Journal of  
International Economic Law 773-795 (Covelli Biotech). 
374 For example: Greenpeace and Friends of  the Earth have clearly expressed their concerns about GMO 
products. See Greenpeace International, “Say No to Genetic Engineering, at: 
http://www.greenpeace.org/international/campaigns/genetic-engineering ; see also: Friends of  the Earth 
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as a whole and several independent Member States have invoked the PA to adopt a 
general moratorium on approvals of  biotech products imported from Argentina, Canada, 
and the United States between October 1998 and August 2003. The moratorium was 
then challenged by Argentina, Canada and the United States. 
  
The EC has two legal instruments to manage the risks of  GMOs, the first one is EC 
Directive 2001/18,375 which governs “the deliberate release into the environment of  
genetically modified organisms”, and the second is EC Regulation 258/97, which regulates 
“novel foods and novel food ingredients”.  These instruments set out procedures that 
need to be followed in order to obtain market approval for biotech products.  They also 
allow Member States to provisionally restrict or prohibit the sale of  a GMO product 
which they have “justifiable reasons to consider that a product which has been properly 
notified and has received written consent…constitute[s] a risk to human health or the 
environment”.376  
 
However, the US, Canada, and Argentina complained that the EC Member States did not 
adopt the provisional measures with scientific justification.377 They argued that the EC’s 
approval regime was influenced by public opinions instead of  being based on scientific 
assessment.378 It was claimed that the EC Member States had violated Article 5.1 and 2.2 
of  the SPS Agreement, and they applied arbitrary or unjustifiable restrictions on 
international trade.  
 
                                                                                                                                                           
Europe European GMO Campaign, at: http://www.foeeurope.org/GMOs/Index.htm.  
375 The previous EC Directive 90/220 (Directive 90/220). 
376 Article 16, Directive 80/220, Article 23, Directive 2001/18. 
377 Nine safeguard measures were at issue in this case: Australia – T25 maize; Austria – Bt-176 maize; 
Austria – MON810 maize; France – MS1/RF1 oilseed rape (EC-161); France – Topas oilseed rape; 
Germany – Bt176 maize; Greece – Topas oilseed rap; Italy – Bt-11 maize (EC-163), MON 810 maize, 
MON809 maize, T25 maize; and Luxembourg – Bt-176 maize. As cited from Epps SPS, p221 n325. 
378 Epps SPS, p220 n325. 
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It is noteworthy that the Panel did not examine some substantial controversies such as 
whether biotech products are safe or not; whether the biotech products are “like 
products” with conventional products,379 or whether the EC has a right to require the 
“pre-marketing approval of  biotech products”.380 The Panel did address procedural 
issues in relation to Directive 90/220 and 2001/18 being SPS measures within the 
meaning of  the SPS Agreement.381 The Panel also found that the approval procedures 
resulted in undue delay to market.382  
 
The Panel concluded EC’s violations of  the SPS Agreement by applying a general de facto 
moratorium on the approval of  biotech products.  The DSU accordingly presumed the 
EC to have nullified or impaired benefits accruing to the complaining parties, and 
requested the EC to bring the relevant measures into conformity with its obligations 
under the SPS agreement.  
 
In the previous Asbestos case,383 the Appellate Body included a consumer’s view in 
examining the “likeness” of  products.  It was noted that “consumers are, to a greater or 
lesser extent, not willing to use products containing chrysotile asbestos fibres because of  
the health risks associated with them”. (emphasis added)384  However, the Panel of  EC – 
Biotech overlooked the factor of  “consumers’ taste and habits” in selecting GMOs or 
Non-GMOs products.  
 
                                                      
379 See section 1.2.1.1.1 for the discussion on “like-product” analysis n110. 
380 EC – Biotech, para 8.3, n373. 
381 EC – Biotech, para 8.4, n373. 
382 EC – Biotech, para 8.6, n373. 
383 EC – Asbestos, n110.  
384 In particular, in the Asbestos case, the Appellate Body took the view of  consumers into account when 
considering the “likeness” of  products: “consumers are, to a greater or less extent, not willing to use 
products containing chrysotile asbestos fibres because of  the health risks associated with them”. It can be 
implied that products carrying different health risks may not be classified as “like products”. 
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In summary, the Panel avoided to comment on fundamental controversies of  a biotech 
product, but only chose to examine the procedural legitimacy of  the legislation within 
the scope of  the SPS Agreement.  It is a shame that the Panel did not analyse if  the 
GMOs are “like products” with non-GMOs, it only noted that the undue delay to market 
caused by the moratorium is regarded as inconsistent with their obligations in the SPS 
Agreement.  It may be fair to say that the Panel avoided further analysis of  the 
“likeness” of  GMOs and non-GMOs partly due to the insufficiency of  existing scientific 
evidence.  By the same token, the insufficiency of  scientific evidence in such 





Though the WTO has gradually recognised the importance of  the precautionary 
approach in environmental and health protection in recent years;385 its implementation 
appears to be rather ambiguous and rigid, which is narrower than what we see under the 
UN regime due to the inherent constrain of  promoting free trade.  
 
From the above SPS cases, it can be observed that the implementation of  the PA is 
                                                      
385 See for example: Cheyne, I. (2006) “The Precautionary Principle in the EC and WTO Law: Searching 
for a Common Understanding” 8(4) Environmental Law Review 257-277; Cheyne, I. (2006) “Risk and 
Precaution in World Trade Organization Law” 40(5) Journal of  World Trade 837-864; Cheyne, I. (2007) 
“Gateways to the Precautionary Principle in WTO Law” 19 Journal of  Environmental Law 155; Goh, G. 
(2006) “Tipping the Apple Cart: the Limits of  Science and Law in the SPS Agreement after Japan – 
Apples” 40(4) Journal of  World Trade 655-686; Johns, F. (2008) “The Risks of  International Law” 21(4) 
Leiden Journal of  International Law 783-786; Young, M.A. (2007) “The WTO’s Use of  Relevant Rules of  
International Law: An Analysis of  the Biotech Case” 56(4) International & Comparative Law Quarterly 
907-930; Peel, J. (2006) “A GMO by Any Other Name…Might Be an SPS Risk!: Implications of  
Expanding the Scope of  the WTO Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures Agreement” 17(5) European Journal 
of  International Law 1009-1031; Covelli, N. and Hohots, V. (2003) “The Health Regulation of  Biotech Foods 
under the WTO Agreements” 6(4) Journal of  International Economic Law 773-795; Priess, H-J and Pitschas, C. 
(2000) “Protection of  Public Health and the Role of  the Precautionary Principle under WTO Law: A 
Trojan Horse before Geneva’s Wall” 24 Fordham International Law Journal 519; Bohanes, J. (2002) “Risk 
Regulation in WTO Law: A Procedure-Based Approach to the Precautionary Principle” 40 Columbia Journal 
of  Transnational Law 323; Segger, M-C and Gehring, M.W. (2003) “Precaution, Health and the World Trade 
Organization: Moving toward Sustainable Development” 29 Queen’s Law Journal 133. 
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comparatively restricted by a set of  procedural requirements of  the SPS Agreement.  
Fundamental requirements of  the PA are identified in Japan – Varietals;386 the EC – 
Hormones 387  case suggests the importance of  basing Member’s ALOP on a risk 
assessment, and the EC – Biotech388 case indicates that a Member’s domestic provisional 
SPS measure should not result in the said product’s undue delay to market.  
 
In summary, the Appellate Body adopts a cautious approach in the interpretation of  the 
PA.  The PA in the WTO regime appears to be restrained by the tension between health 
and global free trade.  Some features of  the PA in the WTO regime can be identified as 
follows: 
 
 The measure needs to be necessary to protect human life or health; 
 The measure needs to be consistent with the requirements of  non-discrimination in 
international trade, and should not cause any undue delay to market; 
 Provisional measure needs to be adopted in the situation of  insufficiency of  scientific 
evidence; 
 Provisional measure needs to be based on available pertinent information; 
 The adopting state is required to have an on-going duty of  monitoring and review, 
and anticipated steps of  review should be identified at the time of  adoption. 
However, the Apellate Body does not explicitly impose a duty to change approach 
with the discovery of  new evidence.  
 
From the Biotech case, it can be observed that the WTO does not directly tackle the 
health concerns raised by a given product; it only serves as a trade mechanism to regulate 
                                                      
386 Japan – Varietals n350  
387 EC – Hormones n247  
388 EC – Biotech n373 
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the free movement of  health-related commodities.  Under the current framework, 
products with potential concerns of  uncertain impact to human life or health will not be 
banned in the first place without scientific evidence.  In other words, food is assumed 
not harmful to human health unless proven otherwise.389  
 
However, from past experience, many harmful effects with scientific evidence are proved 
in hindsight.  For example, the European Environment Agency has identified twelve 
“late lessons” from early warnings including the regulations regarding X-rays, asbestos, 
Sulphur dioxide, chemical contamination, Tributyltin (TBT), Hormones as 
growth-promoters, mad-cow disease, and so on.390  Scientific justification for regulations 
or banning comes after the product entered the market.  Unfortunately, the damage is 
usually irreversible.  This is where the PA comes to play a vital role to cover the gap of  
scientific uncertainty or scientific ignorance before the scientific justification of  
regulation is completed. 
 
In conclusion, the development of  the PA is limited in WTO law, and its function 
appears to be less than satisfactory in the regulation of  the risks to human health.  The 
WTO is inhibited by its limitation of  being the main endorser of  free trade;391 therefore 
any potential restriction to free trade will be substantially restrained.  On the other hand, 
the development of  the PA is more vivid and prosperous in the European Union (EU).  





389 Baetens, F. (2007) “Safety until Proven Harmful? Risk Regulation in Situations of  Scientific Uncertainty: 
the GMO Case” 66(2) Cambridge Law Journal 276. 
390 See, for example: European Environment Agency, Late Lessons form Early Warnings: the Precautionary 
Principle 1896-2000, Environmental Issue Report, No 22, Copenhagen 2001(Late Lessons). 
391 See section 5.1.1. 
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2.2.3 European Union 
 
The European Union (EU) or the previous European Community (EC) is the main 
endorser of  the precautionary principle.392 The word “principle” instead of  “approach” 
is preferred in order to suggest that the employment of  “precaution” enjoys a stronger 
assertion in the EU domain than in other areas.  We would thus follow the EU’s 
preference of  the term “precautionary principle” (PP) in this section.  
 
The precautionary principle was first developed from environmental protection in Action 
Programmes on the Environment from 1973 to 1992,393 and following the regulations of  new 
chemicals such as pesticides and antibiotics, 394  wild life, 395  pollution, 396  growth 
hormones in cattle, 397  and GMOs. 398  The precautionary principle also received 
recognition in international treaties in environmental protection by the EU.399 The EC 
Communication on the Precautionary Principle (EC Communication)400 and the Court of  First 
Instance (CFI) of  the European Court of  Justice (ECJ) have suggested that precaution 
                                                      
392 See, for example: Christoforou, T. “The Precautionary Principle in European Community Law and 
Science” in Tickner, J.A. (ed) (2003) Precaution, Environmental Science and Preventive Public Policy, Island Press, 
Washington DC, US; Tait, J. (2001) “More Faust than Frankenstein: the European Debate about the 
Precautionary Principle and Risk Regulation for Genetically Modified Crops” 4(2) Journal of  Risk Research 
175-189; Nucara, A. (2003) “Precautionary Principle and GMOs: Protection or Protectionism?” 9(2) 
International Trade Law & Regulation 47-53; Coleman, L.O. (2002) “The European Union: An Appropriate 
Model for a Precautionary Approach?” Winter, 25 Seattle University Law Review 609. 
393 See Trouwborst Evolution n 687 n206. 
394 Directive 67/548 on the Approximation of  the Laws, Regulations, and Administrative Provisions of  the Member 
States Relating to the Classification, Packaging, and Labelling of  Dangerous Substances (1967); Directive 79/831 (1979); 
Council Decision 80/372 Concerning CFCs in the Environment (1980); Directive 80/778; Regulation 2821/98 
forbade the use of  several antibiotics in animal feed. 
395 Directive 79/409 Relative to the Conservation of  Wild Birds (1979); Directive 92/43 Concerning the Conservation 
of  Natural Habitats and Wild Fauna and Flora (1992). 
396 Directive 91/271 Urban Waste Water Directive (1991); Directive 96/61 on Integrated Pollution Prevention and 
Control (IPPC) (1996). 
397 Directive 81/602 (1981); Directive 88/146 (1988); Directive 88/299 (1988). 
398 Directive 90/219 on the Contained Use of  Genetically Modified Micro-Organisms; Directive 90/220 on the 
Deliberate Release into the Environment of  Genetically Modified Organisms; Directive 98/81 on the Contained Use of  
Genetically Modified Micro-Organisms (1998). 
399 Convention for the Protection of  the Ozone Layer (1985); Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (1987); 
the London Amendments to the 1985 Convention for the Protection of  the Ozone Layer and the 1987 Protocol on 
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer; the OSPAR Convention, the Climate Change Convention, the Biodiversity 
Convention, and the Bergen Declaration. Cited from Trouwborst Evolution, p147 n206. 
400 EC Communication n299. See section 2.2.3.2.  
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applies to all EU policies as a “central plank” of  Union policy.401  
 
More recently, since the presentation of  the Green Paper on the General Principles of  Food 
Law in the European Union in 1997 and the Bovine Spongiforme Encephalopathy (BSE) 
crisis, 402  the EU comprehensively adopts the precautionary principle from the 
perspective of  consumer health in the regulation of  food safety.403 Specifically, the Codex 
Committee on General Principles of  the Codex Alimentarius Commission states that the 
precautionary principle might be extended to food safety aspects. 404  Streinz thus 
comments that the precautionary principle has been extended from the law of  public 
security and environmental law to national and European food law.405 In particular, the 
precautionary principle has been established as one of  the basic principles in food law in 
Article 7 of  the Regulation No 178/2002 of  the European Parliament and of  the Council 
(Basic Regulation). Article 7 stipulates that: 
 
In specific circumstances where, following an assessment of  available information, the possibility of  
harmful effects on health is identified but scientific uncertainty persists, provisional risk management 
measures necessary to ensure the high level of  health protection chosen in the Community may be 
adopted, pending further scientific information for a more comprehensive risk assessment. 
                                                      
401 Communication COM (2000) 1, p12 n299; Alpharma Inc. v Council of  the EU (2002), Case T-70/99, 
Judgment of  the Court of  First Instance (Third Chamber), 11 September 2002 (Alpharma v Council), at para 
135. 
402 Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE), n335.  
403 Green Paper on the General Principles of  Food Law in the European Union (1997) and its Communication on 
Consumer Health and Food Safety; Regulation 258/97 of  the European Parliament and the Council on 
novel foods and novel food ingredients (1997); European Parliament Resolution on the Green Paper on the General 
Principles of  Food Law in the European Union (1998); Directive 98/81 on the Contained Use of  Genetically Modified 
Micro-Organisms (1998); Directive 2001/18 on the Deliberate Release into the Environment of  Genetically Modified 
Organisms and Repealing Council Directive 90/220/EC (2001), and Regulation 1829/2003 on Genetically Modified 
Food and Feed (2003). See also: Streinz, R. (1998) “The Precautionary Principle in Food Law” 8 European 
Food Law Review 413. 
404 Codex Alimentarius, n36. Streinz, R. “Risks Decisions in Cases of  Persisting Scientific Uncertainty: the 
Precautionary Principle in European Food Law” in Woodman, G.R. and Klippel, D. (eds) (2009) Risk and 
the Law, Routledge-Cavendish, New York, pp54-55, (Streinz Risk). 
405 Streinz Risk , n404, pp54-55. 
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In paragraph 2 of  Article 7, it identifies some basic factors in determining the application 
of  the precautionary principle by stating: 
 
Measures adopted on the basis of  paragraph 1 shall be proportionate and no more restrictive of  
trade than is required to achieve the high level of  health protection chosen in the Community, regard 
being had to technical and economic feasibility and other factors regarded as legitimate in the matter 
under consideration.  The measures shall be reviewed within a reasonable period of  time, 
depending on the nature of  the risk to life or health identified and the type of  scientific information 
needed to clarify the scientific uncertainty and to conduct a more comprehensive risk assessment. 
 
We can find resemblance between this article and the WTO SPS Agreement406: Members’ 
right to adopt a higher level of  health protection than the international standard is 
respected; Member States enjoy discretion in determining the appropriate level of  health 
protection in customary international law.  They both suggest the precautionary 
principle should be based on available information; it needs to be adopted on a 
provisional basis and needs to be reviewed within a reasonable period of  time; it needs to 
be no more restrictive of  trade than is required to achieve an appropriate level of  health 
protection, and the adopting state is obliged to conduct a “more comprehensive risk 
assessment” after invocation.  Particularly, the former article further identifies the 
element of  “proportionality”, “technical and economic feasibility” and other factors 
regarded as legitimate.  Other legitimate factors are generally referred to as 
non-scientific factors which include different cultural contexts and civilians’ 
preferences.407  
                                                      
406 SPS Agreement, see section 2.2.2.1 n39.  
407 See section 2.2.2.1.  
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We now examine the current practice of  the precautionary principle in the EU and 
relevant cases in order to get a better grasp of  the more active application in the 
protection of  human health and food safety. 
 
 
2.2.3.1 Appropriate level of  health protection 
 
The EU acknowledges that the Union has the right to establish the appropriate level of  
environmental protection.  Specifically, the Consolidated Versions of  the Treaty on 
European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of  the European Union (Treaty on 
the Functioning of  the European Union, TFEU)408 incorporates the precautionary 
approach into a high level of  safety and consumer protection in order to safeguard 
human health and environment under the eclipse of  scientific progression.  For 
example, the TFEU consists of  provisions introduced by the Maastricht Treaty which 
states: 
 
Union policy on the environment shall aim at a high level of  protection taking into account the 
diversity of  situations in the various regions of  the Union.  It shall be based on the precautionary 
principle and on the principles that preventive action should be taken, that environmental damage 
should as a priority be rectified at source and that the polluter should pay…In preparing its policy on 
the environment, the Union shall take account of  available scientific and technical data,…the 
potential benefits and costs of  action or lack of  action…409 
 
                                                      
408 Consolidated Versions of  the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of  the 
European Union (Treaty on the Functioning of  the European Union, TFEU), at: 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2010:083:0047:0200:EN:PDF  
409 Article 191 TFEU.  
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Moreover, with regard to the level of  protection, the TFEU provides that: 
 
The Commission, in its proposals envisaged in paragraph 1 concerning health, safety, environmental 
protection and consumer protection, will take as a base a high level of  protection, taking into account in 
particular of  any new development based on scientific facts. (emphasis added)410  
 
The TFEU acknowledges that “human health” is included in the context of  
environmental protection which shall be based on the precautionary principle and that 
preventive action should be taken to avoid environmental damage.411 Member States of  
the EU are allowed to take provisional environmental measures for non-economic 
environmental reasons.  
 
Scholars have argued for consistency in the regulations of  human health and the 
environment in WTO laws.412 “Human health” has been included as a policy objective in 
environmental protection in the EU legal system.  For example, in the EC Directive 
2001/18, the Commission stipulates that the regulations on genetically modified 
organisms following the precautionary principle should protect “human health and the 
environment”.413 “Environment” in international environmental law is broadly referred 
to as including “air, water, land, flora and fauna, natural ecosystem and sites, human 
health and safety, and climate”. 414  Human health is central to the concerns of  
environmental protection, thus “human health” is intertwined with “environment” and 
                                                      
410 Article 114 TFEU. 
411 Article 191 TFEU. 
412  Green, A. and Epps, T. (2007) “The WTO, Science, and the Environment: Moving Towards 
Consistency” 10(2) Journal of  International Economic Law 285 (Green/Epps). 
413 Directive 2001/18 of  the European Parliament and of  the Council of  12 March 2001 on the deliberate 
release into the environment of  genetically modified organisms and repealing Council Directive 90/220, 
Part A Article 1. 
414 The arbitral tribunal in the 2005 Iron Rhine case between Belgium and the Netherlands, para 58, cited 
from Trouwborst, A. (2006) Precautionary Rights and Duties of  States, Martinus Nijhoff  Publishers, 
Leiden, The Netherlands (Trouwborst States) n232. 
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the two cannot be separated.  It is self-evident that the application factors of  the 
precautionary principle in the protection of  the environment can also have recourse to 
its application in the context of  human health.  
 
 
2.2.3.2 EC Communication on the Precautionary 
Principle 
 
The EC issued a Communication on the Precautionary Principle (EC Communication)in 2000 
to assert its implementation, but like many other legal instruments, avoided defining it.415 
The Communication only describes the precautionary principle as having a role “to protect 
the environment” and it proposes several guidelines for applying the precautionary 
principle, which consist of  the principles of: 
 
 Proportionality; 
 Non-discrimination;  
 Consistency;  
 Cost-benefit analysis;  
 Examination of  scientific developments, and  
 Burden of  proof416  
 
The Council Resolution on the Precautionary Principle was later adopted in Nice, December 
2000.  The Resolution calls on the Commission to “incorporate the precautionary 
principle, where necessary, in drawing up its legislation proposals and in all its actions”, 
and asks Member States to “ensure the precautionary principle is fully recognised in the 
                                                      
415 EC Communication n299. See also: McNelis, N. (2000) “EU Communication on the Precautionary 
Principle” Journal of  International Economic Law 545-551. 
416 EC Communication n299. 
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relevant international health, environment and world trade fora” (emphasis added).417  The 
Resolution stresses that the precautionary principle should be fully implemented in areas 
of  international health and world trade specifically.    
 
Attention will now be turned to two typical EU cases which recognise Member States’ 
precautionary entitlements regarding the regulation on food safety and human health.  
 
 
2.2.3.2.1 Pfizer Animal Health v Council of  the EU418 
 
Antibiotics added to animal feed have been used as growth promoters to improve weight 
gain and prevent certain diseases in animals.  However, scientists have claimed that the 
practice results in a risk of  resistance to the antibiotics in humans through the food chain.  
Thus some antibiotics cannot be used effectively in human medicine for certain 
diseases.419 The WHO has also recommended the immediate or gradual discontinuance 
of  the practice.420 
 
Yet there was no scientific proof  of  the link between the antibiotics concerned and the 
resistance of  those antibiotics in humans when the ban was implemented.  As 
producers of  the said antibiotics, Pfizer Animal Health and Alpharma Inc. brought 
actions for annulment of  the regulation before the Court of  First Instance; they claimed 
that the ban was based on political expediency instead of  objective scientific analysis, and 
                                                      
417 European Council Resolution on the Precautionary Principle, SN 400/00 ADD 1 20 EN Annex III, adopted 9 
December 2000 (Nice) (EC Resolution) n245 paras 24-25. 
418 Pfizer Animal Health v. Council of  the EU (2002), Case T-13/39 and C-329/99, Judgment of  the Court of  
First Instance (Third Chamber), 11 September 2002, paras 135-173 (Pfizer v Council). See also: MacMaolain, 
C. (2003) “Using the Precautionary Principle to Protect Human Health: Pfizer v Council” 28(5) European 
Law Review 723-734; 
419 Press Release No 71/02, Judgments of  the Court of  First Instance in Cases T-13/99 and T-70/99, 
Press and Information Division, the Court of  Justice of  the European Communities, 11 September 2002. 
420  WHO Annual Report of  the Monitoring/Surveillance Network for Resistance to Antibiotics 2003 at: 
http://www.paho.org/English/AD/DPC/CD/amr-lima-2004.htm.  
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the Council had taken an unrealistic approach to pursue “zero risk”.  They argued 
further that the link between the use of  certain antibiotics as feed additives and an 
increase in resistance to those antibiotics in humans remains uncertain.421  
 
The Court stated that in cases relating to food safety (in particular the BSE crisis),422 “it 
is possible to take preventive measures without having to wait until the reality and 
seriousness of  the risks perceived become fully apparent”.  The Court viewed that the 
ban was designed to prevent the risks from the probability of  the negative effects of  the 
practice.  In relation to the procedural requirements, it explained that the adoption of  
the preventive measure should be triggered by a risk assessment, which consists of  a 
scientific component and a political component.  A scientific component is to carry out 
a risk assessment, and a political component is regarded as “risk management”423 in 
which the public authority can get involved in determining the appropriate measure in 
response to the degree of  risk. 
 
In Pfizer Animal Health v. Council of  the EU, the Court noted that the Community 
institutions are entitled to take a preventive measure regarding the use of  antibiotics as 
an additive in feedstuffs according to the precautionary principle enshrined in the EC 
Treaty.424  The Court also referred to the provisional communication from the Codex 
Alimentarius Commission425 of  the Food and Agriculture Organisation of  the United 
Nations and the WHO in relation to identifying the level of  risk that will adversely affect 
the interests of  human health.426  The Court of  First Instance stated that “where there 
                                                      
421 Press Release No 71/02, Judgments of  the Court of  First Instance in Cases T-13/99 and T-70/99, 
Press and Information Division, the Court of  Justice of  the European Communities, 11 September 2002. 
422 BSE, see n335.  
423 Risk management n36.   
424 Pfizer v. Council, para 140 n418. 
425 Codex Alimentarius n36, see section 3.1.3.  
426 Pfizer v. Council, para 147 n418. 
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is scientific uncertainty as to the existence or extent of  risks to human health, the 
Community institutions may, by reason of  the precautionary principle, take protective 
measures without having to wait until the reality and seriousness of  those risks become 
fully apparent”.427  
 
In relation to the implementation of  a risk assessment, it identifies a risk assessment as 
“determining what level of  risk is deemed unacceptable” and as “conducting a scientific 
assessment of  the risks”.428  The Court also stated that a Members’ right in determining 
the appropriate level of  health protection is provided in the WTO SPS Agreement.429  It 
further noted that the Community institutions have the “powers” conferred by the Treaty 
“in defining the political objectives to be pursued”.  The Community institutions are 
obliged to determine the level of  risk (the critical probability threshold of  adverse effect 
on human health) to ensure a high level of  human health protection430  
 
It concludes that “under the precautionary principle the Community institutions are 
entitled, in the interests of  human health to adopt, on the basis of  as yet incomplete 
scientific knowledge, protective measures which may seriously harm legally protected 
positions, and they enjoy a broad discretion in that regard”.431  
 
Relevant cases will also be discussed below with analysis of  elements of  the 




427 Pfizer v. Council, para 139. 
428 Pfizer v. Council, para 149. 
429 Pfizer v. Council, para 150. 
430 Pfizer v. Council, paras 151-152. 
431 Pfizer v. Council, para 170. 
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2.2.3.2.2 Alpharma Inc. v Counil 432 
 
In Alpharma Inc. v Council,433 the Court again stressed that the PP is one of  the principles 
on which Community policy on the protection of  human health and environment is 
based.434  The Court also reaffirmed that the Community Institutions have the “right 
and obligation” to adopt protective measures they deem appropriate to prevent the risks 
to human health.  The Court emphasised that under the PP, the Community institutions 
enjoy a broad discretion in their responsibility for defining public health policy and are 
entitled to adopt protective measures which may seriously harm the interests of  human 
health.435  
 
From the above cases, it can be observed that the European Court of  Justice (“ECJ”) 
examined the PA from the perspective of  Members’ powers/rights and obligations.436  
Its rulings reaffirmed that Members enjoy broad discretion in determining appropriate 
level of  health protection, and Members have the powers/rights and obligations to adopt 
the PA to safeguard public health.  In addition, the Court suggested that the measure 
should be triggered by a risk assessment, which consists of  a scientific component and a 
political component.  
 
However, there is currently no consensus on whether a political component should be 
included in a risk assessment in international law.437  Some argue that the subjective 
element needs to be excluded from a scientific assessment, yet such debates are beyond 
                                                      
432 Alpharma Inc. v Council of  the EU (2002), Case T-70/99, Judgment of  the Court of  First Instance (Third 
Chamber), 11 September 2002 (Alpharma v Council) n401. 
433 Alpharma v Council.  
434 Alpharma Inc. v Council, para 152. 
435 Alpharma Inc. v Council, paras 181 and 318. 
436 See also section 2.1.2.  
437 See for example: Motaal, D.A. (2005) “Is the WTO Anti-Precaution?” 39(3) Journal of  World Trade 
483-501, p486 (Motaal Precaution); Cheyne, I (2006) “Risk and Precaution in World Trade Organization 
Law” 40(5) Journal of  World Trade 837-864.   
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the purpose of  this work.  Besides this debate, its argument of  acting from states’ rights 
and obligations echoes scholars’ arguments for examining the PA from “States’ 
responsibility” in international law.438  From the study in previous sections, Trouwborst, 
Brownsword, and Somsen all contend that the adoption of  the PA should be established 
from the perspective of  States’ responsibility.439  In particular, Trouwborst classifies the 
PA into state’s rights and duties considering the impact of  the feared threat.  If  the 
feared threat is identified as significant, then the state may have the right to adopt the PA; if  
the threat is identified as not only “significant” but also “serious or irreversible”, then the 
state may have the duty to adopt the approach in international law.   
 
In summary, the above cases show that while the causal relationship of  adding antibiotics 
to animal feed and the risks of  resistance of  human antibiotics is not yet established, the 
PA is employed to legitimise the ban of  using several antibiotics as additives in animal 
feed.  In addition, the Court also stressed that the Community Institutions have the 
powers and duties to adopt the PA to protect public health.  The basic elements of  the PA 
can be synthesised as a cumulative list derived from all of  the PA discussions so far: 
 
 The adoption of  the PA in international law should be established from the view of  
“State responsibility”; 
 The measure should be necessary to protect human life or health; 
 The PA is employed within the domain of  scientific uncertainty or scientific ignorance; 
 Non-discrimination to international trade;  
 The PA is suggested to be based on a risk assessment; 
 Provisional measures are considered as a means of  the PA; however, the adoption of  a 
                                                      
438 See section 2.1.2.  
439 See section 2.1.2. 
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provisional measure is suggested to be accompanied with a set of  procedural 
requirements which restrains its use from bringing unnecessary interference to free 
trade and globalisation; 
 The set of  procedural requirements of  a provisional measure is suggested to 
include ongoing duties of  monitoring and review of  the measure; 
 Non-scientific factors such as civilians’ social and cultural preferences and consumers’ tastes 
and habits should also be taken into account.  
 
 
2.2.4 Interim conclusion: Limitations of  the current 
precautionary approach 
 
The PA appears to be common sense to the lay public; however, it is often criticised as 
ill-defined440 with hindrance to scientific progress and international trade.441 In addition 
to the lack of  a clear consensus on its definition, PAs in international legal settings are 
further restricted by trade supremacy and regimes conflict in international law.442  
 
 
2.2.4.1 Trade supremacy in the regulation of  uncertain 
risk 
 
The legal framework for regulating technologies should not be one-size-fits-all, but 
should be able to reflect the ethical differentiation of  technologies in response to their 
individual implications for society.  Legitimate factors to differentiation would include 
public interests, public policy, national emergency, risk management, and deliberative 
democracy.  These factors are supposed to be weighed against legitimate trade 
                                                      
440 Peterson, M. (2006) “The Precautionary Principle Is Incoherent” 26(3) Risk Analysis 595-601. 
441 See section 2.3. 
442 See sections 2.2.4.1 and 3.3.1.  
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objectives on a case by case basis.  Yet the concern of  risks to human health is often 
constrained by the primacy of  international trade, and the value of  free trade surpasses 
health concerns in the WTO regime.  Thus the regulation of  uncertain risks is often 
subordinated to the principles of  non-discrimination:443 products are assumed safe until 
proven otherwise.444 
 
On the one hand, states’ discretion on the regulation of  health issues is restricted by the 
universal employment of  “international standards”, such as the Codex referred to by the 
SPS,445 which greatly relies upon scientific evidence in risk management.  On the other 
hand, the establishment of  international standards is aimed to be globally applicable; thus 
this framework of  risk management needs to avoid rigidity.  It should allow an “ample” 
or “adequate” margin of  safety to be taken by states of  different levels of  
social-economic development.446 An ample margin of  safety to afford the full range of  
diverse risks to human health, as well as taking into account the flexibilities of  individual 
development and various social-economic backgrounds, should be considered in risk 
regulation.  Therefore, the prevention or reduction of uncertain risks to human health 
ought to be taken into consideration in the protection of  public health.  Uncertain risks 
which have the potential to result in significant damage to human health should be 
regarded valid until proven otherwise.  The focus on the significance of  the potential 
damage also helps to ensure a proportionate response with respect to any IP rights which 
might be in play.  
 
For example, the WTO Appellate Body’s ignorance of  uncertain risks to human health in 
                                                      
443 See section 1.2.1.1.1 for the discussion of  the principle of  non-discrimination.  
444 See section 2.2.2.2.3.  
445 See section 3.1.3 for the Codex Alimentarius; section 4.2 for the SPS Agreement. 
446 De Sandeleer, N. (2002) Environmental Principles: From Political Slogan to Legal Rules, Oxford University 
Press, New York, United States, p131 (De Sandeleer), p196 n54. It is noted that several US environmental 
statues require protection with an “adequate” or “ample” margin of  safety. 
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failing to address the like-product447 debate of  GMO and non-GMO products in the 
Biotech case implies that the regulation of  uncertain risk has not been distinguished in the 
trade world. 448  It is therefore argued in this work that technologies or products 
associated with risks to human health do pose unique implications to society, thus they 
should receive differential treatment in order to adopt an ample margin of  safety.  This 
is to say that products associated with significant risks to human life or health should not be 
categorised as “like products” with other products in international trade.  In such case, 
if  the public health risk is derived from harmful products, the IP system may be 
reflective on the risk by the restriction of  the product/technology.  By the same token, 
if  the risk is from natural disasters/epidemics, the IP system needs to be reflective on the 
risk by the promotion of  access to the product/technology. (See Figure I. Research 
parameter: Precaution lens)  
 
Likewise, the IP regime also shows an imbalance of  health and trade protection.  TRIPS 
shows a tendency to stress the intact protection of  private property rights, while the 
status of  exclusions to IP on grounds of  public interests, risks to public health or public 
policy remains relatively vague in state practice.  Yet such legitimate factors which 
reflect the spirit of  public needs would be able to step in to balance rights and 
obligations of  holders and promote the social and economic welfare of  IP.449 
 
In summary, the function of  the PA in the international public health regime should not 
be eclipsed by such limitations.  In order to explore the extent to which the PA should 
play in the IP regime, we will now turn our attention to the identification of  the basic 
elements of  the PA from the analysis of  philosophers and lawyers in the following 
                                                      
447 “Like product” analysis, n110.  
448 EC – Biotech, n373.  





2.3 Philosophical elements of  the precautionary approach 
 
Despite the merit of  providing a margin of  safety of  a PA in public health450 and 
environmental protection,451 its application has been controversial in international trade 
partly due to the ambiguity of  its definition.  Fragmentation exists amongst different 
operations of  PAs in international law; therefore, it would be necessary to revisit PAs 
from philosophical perspectives.  We would be able to delineate the classical contour of  
PAs, and learn different categories and basic features of  PAs in the literature.  This will 
help shape a tailored model of  the PA in this work.  
 
According to Trouwborst, at least sixteen global and regional environmental treaties and 
protocols contain reference to the “precautionary principle”, “precautionary approach”, 
“precautionary measures” or “precaution” without defining the terms.452  There are 
various versions of  the PA developed by scientists, philosophers, policy makers, and the 
lawyers.  For example, Sands describes it as: “to provide guidance in the development 
and application of  international environmental law where there is scientific 
uncertainty”.453  Kriebel et al. identify the PA with four central components: “taking 
preventive action in the face of  uncertainty; shifting the burden of  proof  to the 
proponents of  an activity; exploring a wide range of  alternatives to possibly harmful 
actions; and increasing public participation decision making”.454 Moreover, Freestone 
                                                      
450 See chapter 3.  
451 See section 2.2.  
452 Trouwborst States, n232 p22. 
453 Sands Principles, n241 p267. 
454 Kriebel, D. et al. (2001) The precautionary Principle in Environmental Science, 109(9) Environmental 
Health Perspective. 
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illustrates the essence of  precaution as: 
 
The precautionary approach then is innovative in that it changes the role of  scientific data. It 
requires that once environmental damage is threatened, action should be taken to control or abate 
possible environmental interference even though there may still be scientific uncertainty as to the 
effects of  the activities.455 
 
He further states that “once a risk is identified the lack of  scientific proof  of  cause and 
effect shall not be used as a reason for not taking action to protect the environment”.456 
Perrez further depicts the content of  the PA which reflects the recent development in 
international policy and law as follows:  
 
If  a risk assessment indicates that according to the scientific information available today one cannot 
exclude the possibility that a certain activity or a certain product may involve unacceptable risk to the 
environment or, in a certain policy area, to human health, governments may address this potential 
risk by adopting protecting measures which are intelligible, proportional and coherent with measures 
adopted in similar situations, and which are not distinguished protectionist restrictions to trade.  
Moreover, such precautionary measures should be regularly reviewed, and modified in the light of  
new scientific findings.457  
 
Further, Perrez has identified several key elements and criteria relevant to the application 
of  precaution: lack of  scientific certainty; precaution as part of  risk management; 
scientific assessment; transparency; intelligibility and review; proportionality; no disguised 
                                                      
455 Freestone, D. (1994) “The Road from Rio: Environmental Law after the Earth Submit” 6 Journal of  
Environmental Law 211. 
456 Freestone/Hey n201, at 13. 
457 Perrez Regulation, n252. 
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trade restrictions, and in certain policy areas, application to health.458 He has also noted 
that the recent development of  the application of  precaution has been expanded to the 
protection of  human health, such as policy areas of  chemicals and waste policies in 
particular.459 It is found that the PA has a pervasive influence on health and risk 
regulation, yet the above descriptions and the trigger threshold of  the PA are still in lack 
of  a uniform definition.  
 
There are still numerous definitions of  PAs in different contexts in a wide variety of  
perspectives on risk and sources of  risk.460 Some are simply declaratory while others 
appear to be more aggressive and demanding of  actions.  Currently there is no single 
universal definition of  the approach.  We will develop a tailored model of  the approach 
after the philosophical and legal analysis in the following sections.   
 
 
Models of  precautionary approaches 
 
In order to examine the PA from philosophical and legal foundations, our discussions 
will cover the works of  both philosophers and lawyers.  We will base our following 
discussion on the models developed by Sandin, Sunstein and Trouwborst, and attempt to 
interpret and apply the PA in the real world.   
                                                      
458 Perrez, F.X., “Risk Regulation, Precaution and Trade” in Wuger, D. and Cottier, T. (eds) (2008) Genetic 
Engineering and the World Trade System: World Trade Forum, New York, Cambridge University Press. (Perrez 
Regulation) n252. 
459 Perrez, F.X. (2003) “The World Summit on Sustainable Development: Environment, Precaution and 
Trade – A Potential for Success and/or Failure” 12 Review of  European and International Environmental Law 12, 
pp17-18. (Perrez Sustainable) 
460 For accounts of  more versions of  the precautionary principle, see Wiener, J. and Rogers, M. (2002) 
“Comparing Precaution in the United States and Europe” 5 Journal of  Risk Research 317, 320-321; Morris, J. 
“Defining the Precautionary Principle” in Morris, J. (ed) (2000) Rethinking Risk and the Precautionary Principle 
(Butterworth-Heinemann Oxford); Bohanes, J. (2002) “Risk Regulation in WTO Law: A Procedure-Based 
Approach to the Precautionary Principle” 40 Columbia Journal of  Transnational Law 323, 331.  
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As a philosopher studies the rationale of  the PA, Sandin’s work of  defining the PA has 
been widely discussed and considered amongst lawyers.461  His attempt to generalise the 
formula of  various versions of  the approach can serve as a foundation for further 
interpretation.  He believes that “the core of  the precautionary principle is clearly 
identifiable, and can be used as a starting point for further discussions”.462 Sandin lists 
nineteen versions of  the precautionary principle with an applied-ethics approach 463and 
then proposes the definition of  the PA with a simplified formula.464  
 
From the perspective of  international environmental law, Trouwborst further conducts a 
detailed legal study on the evolution and the definition of  the principle which acts to 
provide complementary underpinning to Sandin’s work.465 He attempts to define the PA 
in the context of  “a state’s rights and duties” and thus proposes a formulation of  the 
“Precautionary Tripod”.  Trouwborst’s definition is based on the theme of  “precautionary 
rights and duties of  states”, and he argues that when there are reasonable grounds for 
concern that significant harm exists, states are deemed to have a customary right to act; 
when the anticipated harm is not only significant but also serious or irreversible, states 
are considered to have an obligation to take action. 
 
Furthermore, Sunstein scrutinises the PA from the perspective of  economic analysis of  
                                                      
461 For example, Sunstein refers to Sandin’s definition in Sunstein, C. (2005) Laws of  Fear: Beyond the 
Precautionary Principle, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press (Sunstein PP) n9, p16 n333; Trouwborst also 
refers Sandin’s work in Trouwborst States p317 n232; see also Peterson, M. (2006) “The Precautionary 
Principle Is Incoherent” 26(3) Risk Analysis 595.    
462 Sandin, P. (2004) Better Safe than Sorry: Applying Philosophical Methods to the Debates on Risk and the 
Precautionary Principle (Sandin Philosophical Methods), Doctoral Thesis in Philosophy, Royal Institute of  
Technology, Stockholm, at 23. 
463 Sandin, P. (1999) “Dimensions of  the Precautionary Principle” 5(5) Human and Ecological Risk Assessment 
889-907 (Sandin Dimensions). 
464 Sandin, P. (2006) “A Paradox out of  Context: Harris and Holm on the Precautionary Principle” 15(2) 
Cambridge Quarterly of  Health Care Ethics 175-183 (Sandin Paradox). 
465 Trouwborst Evolution, n206; Trouwborst States, n232. 
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law and argues that it should be transformed into an “Anti-Catastrophe Principle” which 
emphasises the full range of  risk and other side factors, such as cost-benefit analysis, 
deliberative democracy, and distributive justice.466  He then provides the definition of  
the “Anti-Catastrophe Principle” with a “four-if  formula”.467  By the Anti-Catastrophe 
Principle, he also proposes the “Prohibitory Precautionary Approach” (PPA) which 
favours a flat ban on the product/technology associated with a high probability of  a 
serious harm and the “Information Disclosure Precautionary Approach” (IDPA) which 
emphasises the duty to disclose fresh evidence to the public by the promoter of  a new 
product/technology.468   
 
In order to create a common ground for the definition of  thePA, it is necessary to 
accommodate all the relevant factors relating to the PA in international law, which aim to 
reconcile health, trade, and IP.  Sandin’s definition is classic and general; Trouwborst’s 
work formulates the definition from the international public law perspective, and 
Sunstein’s proposal identifies non-scientific factors of  the PA in a democratic society.  
All their models can be complementary and offer new insight into the implementation of  
the PA in this work.  
 
The definitions of  the PA create several categories: this work will examine the PA by 
major three categories respectively to illustrate some basic characteristics of  the approach: 
the first is “argumentative versions v prescriptive versions” which distinguishes whether 
different versions require a specific precautionary action to redress a particular risk;469 
                                                      
466 Sunstein, C. (2005) Laws of  Fear: Beyond the Precautionary Principle, Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press (Sunstein PP) n333. See also Sunstein, C. (2009) “Trimming”, 122 Harvard Law Review 1049 (Sunstein 
Trimming). 
467 Sandin Dimensions, n463.   
468 See sections 2.3.2 and 2.3.2.2.  
469 The classification of  “argumentative” and “prescriptive” PAs is borrowed from Sandin’s definition. See 
Sandin Dimensions, n463.   
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the second is “prohibitory versions v information disclosure versions” which is 
developed from Sunstein’s Anti-Catastrophe Principle, 470  and the third is “strong 
versions v weak versions” which can either refer to the triggering threshold or the shift 
of  the burden of  proof. 
  
 
2.3.1 Argumentative v Prescriptive 
 
Sandin classifies the PA into two types: one is an argumentative version and the other is a 
prescriptive version.  The argumentative version of  the PA is less problematic than the 
prescriptive type which prescribes that certain actions should be adopted in order to 
avoid or decrease risk.  Principle 15 of  the Rio Declaration471 represents the typical type 
of  the argumentative version which does not demand that certain precautionary action 
should be adopted, and only functions as a declaratory and directive tool.  
 
On the contrary, the prescriptive versions of  the PA focus on the “actions aiming at the 
prevention of  something that is undesirable but not certain to happen”.  This version 
of  the PA prescribes certain actions that would be interpreted as precautionary to the 
uncertain risk, and can be interpreted with the four dimensional “if-clause”.  Sandin 
contends that the PA can be expressed in the if-clause: 
 
If  there is (1) a threat, which is (2) uncertain, then (3) some kind of  action (4) is mandatory.472 
 
He proposes that the prescriptive formulations of  the PA share four common 
                                                      
470 The classification of  “prohibitory” and “information disclosure” PA is borrowed from Sunstein’s work 
on the “Anti-Catastrophe Principle”. See Sunstein PP, n333 p118.  
471 Rio Declaration n286. 
472 Sandin Paradox, n464. 
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elements473: (1) the threat dimension; (2) the uncertainty dimensions; (3) the action 
dimension, and (4) the command dimension.  
 
With the exception of  the argumentative version of  the PA which does not require 
action to respond to a threat,474 he argues that all the other different versions of  the PA 
can be recast into the “four-dimensional if-clause” formula, although each element may 
vary in precision and strength.475 
 
Like Sandin’s approach, Trouwborst also identifies some key elements of  the PA.  He 
refers to the three legs of  the “Precautionary Tripod”: (1) a threat of  harm, (2) 
uncertainty, and (3) action. 476  Specifically, Trouwborst attempts to define the 
precautionary action in the context of  rights and duties of  states in international law.477 
According to his argument, if  the threat of  harm is designated as “serious or 
irreversible”, and where the precautionary action is deemed as a duty and right of  the 
states, the precautionary action is thus identical to Sandin’s formulation as a mandatory 
measure.  Trouwborst designates the precautionary action to be within the domain of  
the “rights and duties of  states” when the threat of  harm is “serious or irreversible” to 
the environment.  On the other hand, if  the threat only crosses the “significant” 
threshold, the precautionary action then only falls within the domain of  “right of  states” 
to adopt measures toward the risk.  
 
Trouwborst’s perspective on the definition of  the PA suggests that the strength of  the 
precautionary action needs to be adaptive according to the extent and seriousness of  the 
                                                      
473 Sandin Dimensions, n463. 
474 Paragraph 15 of  the Rio Declaration is the typical version of  argumentative PA n286. 
475 Sandin Dimensions, n463. “Strength” means degree of  cautiousness. 
476 Trouwborst States, n232 p30. 
477 Trouwborst States, n232. 
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particular risk.  Once the risk is identified as significant, states are entitled to take 
precautionary action in order to safeguard the environment and human health. His 
argument is a more sophisticated tool of  the prescriptive version of  PA in international 
law.  An argumentative version of  the PA, which may only be good for lip service, 
would not be considered in this work due to efficacy concerns.  Therefore, we will 
further adopt Trouwborst’s argument to interpret the entitlements of  states to adopt the PA in 
IP policy-making in a public health emergency in the following chapters.478 Attention will 
be turned to more detailed discussion on the basic elements of  the PA, including threat 




2.3.1.1 Threat of  harm 
 
Versions of  the formulation of  the PA exist which do not set out any minimum standard 
of  the anticipated harm, and thus becomes one of  the main critiques that the PA could 
be used as protectionism in international trade.  For example, some formulations 
regarding the degree of  harm to health and environment only refer to the vague wording 
of  “unacceptable risk” or “unreasonable and otherwise unmanageable risk”,479 which 
may result in arbitrary use of  this approach. 
 
In order to set apart insignificant risks of  harm which consist of  inapplicable conditions 
to invoke the PA, Trouwborst seeks to distinguish “harm that embodies at least some 
                                                      
478 See section 5.3. 
479  Para 111(a) Land-Based Activities Action Programme (1995) applies the precautionary principle to 
radioactive waste storage by outlawing such storage near the coastal and marine environment unless the 
absence of  any “unacceptable risk” is demonstrated. In para104 (b) (i) of  the same document, it suggests 
that priority ought to be given to phasing out chemicals that pose “unreasonable and otherwise 
unmanageable risks”.  
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degree of  significance and harm that does not”.480  It is therefore suggested that the PA 
cannot be assumed to come into play when the “projected harm is insignificant”.481  
 
 
2.3.1.1.1 “Significant” harm as a threshold 
 
Trouwborst suggests that the PA is of  relevance only when the feared harm is identified 
as significant and that this should then be considered as a minimum threshold.482  
“Significant” is defined as “extensive or important enough to merit attention” in the 
dictionary.483  Some commentators explain that the standard of  significance is met when 
harm is not minor, nor trivial.  Some locate it in between “serious” and “minor trouble 
to be tolerated”.484 The International Law Commission (ILC)485 has noted that the harm 
must be “tangible” and “appreciable” but needs not amount to the level of  being 
“substantial”.486 The ILC later describes a threshold of  significant transboundary harm 
as “real” and measurable, but drawn lower than “substantial” or “serious” harm.487 
Trouwborst then concludes that tangible, appreciable and measurable harm instead of  minor 
or trivial harm falls within the context of  precaution.  This work will also opt for 
“significant harm” as the minimum trigger threshold of  the PA in IP in order to avoid 






480 Trouwborst States, p47. 
481 Trouwborst States, p50. 
482 Trouwborst States, p50. 
483 Concise Oxford English Dictionary (11th edition) Oxford University Press, Suffolk, UK, p1341.  
484 Trouwborst States, pp50-51. 
485 International Law Commission (ILC)  
486  The commentary to the 1994 International Law Commission Draft Articles on the Law of  the 
Non-Navigational Uses of  international Watercourses, the commentary to Article 3 paras 13-15 and the 
commentary to Article 4, para 7. 
487 International Law Commission, 2001; commentary to Article 2(a) of  the Draft Articles on Harm 
Prevention, para 4.  
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2.3.1.1.2 “Serious or irreversible” harm as a threshold 
 
One interpretation by the UK government of  Principle 15 of  the Rio Declaration488 states 
that: “it is not acceptable just to say ‘we can’t be sure that serious damage will happen, so 
we’ll do nothing to prevent it’”.489 The UK government declares that the PA “applies 
particularly where there are good grounds for judging either that action taken promptly 
at comparatively low cost may avoid more costly damage later, or that irreversible effects 
may follow if  damage is delayed”.490 It suggests that precautionary action needs to be 
taken when irreversible damage exists.  
 
In the Gabcikovo – Nagymaros case,491 Hungary contended that the impending damage to 
the Hungarian environment due to the hydrological project was “irreparable and 
enormous”.492 Similarly, in the Southern Bluefin Tuna cases,493 Australia and New Zealand 
claimed that the harm which the Japanese experimental fishing programme threatened 
the tuna stock with, caused “serious or irreversible damage to the environment”.494  
 
It is noteworthy that in addition to “significant”, “serious” or “irreversible” harm, the 
ILC also mentions the term “grave” as a standard of  harm higher than “serious”.495 It 
                                                      
488 Rio Declaration n286.  




490 White Paper: “This Common Inheritance: Britain’s Environmental Strategy”, September 1990, cited in 
“Trouwborst States”, p58, n232. See also: Haigh, N. “The Introduction of  the Precautionary Principle into 
the UK”, in O’Riordan, T. and Cameron, J. (eds) (1994) Interpreting the Precautionary Principle, London, 
pp229-251.  
491 Gabcikovo – Nagymaros case, see section 2.2.1.1.1 n307.  
492 Application of  the Republic of  Hungary v The Czech and Slovak Republic on the Diversion of  the Danube River, 
para 31, cited from “Trouwborst Evolution”, p163, n206. See also: Principles of  International Environmental 
Law IIA: Documents in International Environmental Law, Sands, P. et al. (eds) Manchester 1994, pp693-698. 
493 Southern Bluefin Tuna cases, see section 2.2.1.1.2 n257.   
494 Statements of  Claim of  Australia and New Zealand, Southern Bluefin Tuna case, International Tribunal 
for the Law of  the Sea (ITLOS), 15 July1999, paras 63-66, n257. 
495 International Law Commission, Commentary on Article 1 of  the Draft Articles on Harm Prevention, 2001, 
para 2. 
  119
can be further concluded that “‘serious’ is located between ‘significant’ and ‘grave’.”496 
However, the triggering thresholds most required are either “significant” harm or 
“serious or irreversible” harm; “grave” harm is not officially referred in the formulation 
of  the PA.497  
 
In summary, the PA should be triggered when the risk from a particular harm is proved 
to be crossing the “significant” threshold; any risk that is identified as de minimis 498 can 
be disregarded.  Further, if  the risk is objectively identified as “serious or irreversible 
harm”, then the legitimacy to trigger the PA will increase.  In other words, the 
legitimacy of  the precautionary action depends on the extent or the gravity of  the 
potential harm: when the unknown risk is identified as causing “serious or irreversible” 
harm to human health or the environment, states are not only entitled but may also be 
required499 to take precautionary measures to protect their citizens and the environment 
under their responsibility in international law.500 Therefore, this work will recommend 
that “significant harm” as the trigger threshold of  the PA in IP.  If  the harm is 
identified “serious or irreversible”, then the legitimacy of  the precautionary action will 
increase.  
 
A question arises here as to what extent it is left to a state to determine for itself  what   
an unacceptable degree of  risk is, and when, if  ever, a line can be drawn which can be 
stated with relative certainty to be an objectively unacceptable degree of  risk.  The level 
of  unacceptable risk should be established through an objective risk assessment and a 
                                                      
496 Trouwborst States, p64, n232. 
497 However, in the Gabcikovo – Nagymaros Case, the ICJ noted that Hungary did not prove a “real, ‘grave, 
and ‘imminent’ ‘peril’ existed”. See section 2.2.1.1.1. 
498 Sandin, P. (2005) “Naturalness and De Minimis Risk” 27(2) Environmental Ethics 191-200 (Sandin De 
Minimis Risk). 
499 See section 2.3.1    
500 See section 2.1.2.  
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subjective element of  risk communication, which focuses on the public’s right to 
information.  It is embodied in stimulation of  public debates which will be addressed in 
the following section.501 This might arguably also be the place where we draw a line 





In order to trigger the PA, there must be a basic element of  scientific uncertainty.  It is 
of  vital importance to set the triggering threshold of  the PA on an appropriate level of  
risk.  
 
De Sandeleer identifies different levels of  risks by building a hierarchy of  risks:502 
 
 Residual risks: these are hypothetical risks, and can be ignored and do not require 
regulatory measures 
 Uncertain risks: this is under the domain of  the PA  









501 See section 2.3.2. 












The aim of  a precautionary measure is to invoke the PA in situations of  uncertain risks 
(See Figure 2.3.1.2). Residual risks refer to risks that are small in probabilities which can 
be ignored and can not be applied in the precautionary model.503 If  the risks are 
identified as certain, then the prevention principle504 will play a role in risk management.   
 
The European Commission comments on scientific uncertainty as follows:  
 
Scientific uncertainty results usually from five characteristics of  the scientific method: the variable 
chosen, the measurements made, the samples drawn, the models used and the causal relationships 
employed.  Scientific uncertainty may also arise from a controversy on existing data or lack of  some 
relevant data. Uncertainty may relate to qualitative or quantitative elements of  the analysis.505 
 
Commentators have further distinguished epistemological uncertainty from ontological 
                                                      
503 Sandin, P. (2005) “Naturalness and De Minimis Risk” 27(2) Environmental Ethics 191-200 n498. 
504 Cf: See section 2.2 for discussion on prevention v. precaution.  





uncertainty. 506   Epistemological uncertainty refers to uncertainty due to lack of  
information, while ontological uncertainty is related to uncertainty due to complexity and 
variability.  However, there appears to be no indication in legal instruments of  specific 
classifications of  uncertainty.  For example: Principle 15 of  the Rio Declaration507 refers 
to a “lack of  full scientific certainty”.  Similarly, the EC Communication on the Precautionary 
Principle indicates that the precautionary principle is related to situations “where scientific 
information is insufficient, inconclusive, or uncertain”.508 (italics added)  
 
The uncertainty of  the cause and effect relationship is one dimension of  scientific 
uncertainty.  In Pfizer Animal Health v EC509 and Alpharma Inc. v EC,510 it is noted that 
there was no scientific proof  of  any link between the prohibited antibiotics used in 
animal feedstuffs and the resistance of  those antibiotics in humans.  Under the 
circumstance of  no available scientific assessment on the causal relationship, the 
European Council adopted the PA and concluded that the ban was not inappropriated.511 
 
However, the risk of  harm needs to be a real risk and “more than hypothetical or [a] 
remote possibility of  such harm”.512 In the MOX Plant case,513 Ireland challenged the 
legitimacy of  the authorisation by the British government of  a new nuclear fuel 
processing facility at the Sellafield site on the Irish Sea coast.  Ireland claimed that the 
PA imposed the United Kingdom to “apply caution, and take preventive measures even 
                                                      
506 See Trouwborst States, pp73-79, n232. 
507 Rio Declaration n286.  
508 EC Communication, n299. 
509 See section 2.2.3.2.1 n418  
510 See section 2.2.3.2.2 n401  
511 See section 2.1.1.3.3. 
512 Writing Response of  the United Kingdom, para 147, 15 November 2001.International Tribunal for the 
Law of  the Sea (ITLOS) No 10, MOX Plant Case (Request for Provisional Measures) (Ireland v United 
Kingdom). 
513 International Tribunal for the Law of  the Sea (ITLOS) No 10, MOX Plant Case (Request for 
Provisional Measures) (Ireland v United Kingdom) n512. 
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where there is no conclusive evidence” of  a causal relationship between the operation of  
the MOX plant and marine environmental hazards.  The UK contended that it is 
“generally accepted that [the PA] can operate only where there are some reasonable 
grounds for concern”.  It was therefore argued that the Irish allegation did not pass the 
test, and there were “no reasonable grounds for believing” that the MOX plant would 
cause unacceptable changes to the environment of  the Irish Sea due to the risks involved 
being classified as “infinitesimally small”.  
 
The European Court of  Justice (ECJ) also stresses that precautionary measures cannot 
be adopted on “purely hypothetical considerations”, on “mere conjecture”, or be taken 
“solely on the basis of  rumors”.514 The ECJ notes that the Community institutions 
cannot take a hypothetical approach to risk and cannot make their decision on a 
“zero-risk” basis.515 Similar to the implications from the MOX Plant case and the 
abovementioned ECJ cases,516 Motaal states that the precautionary action needs to be 
based on “some sort of  scientific foundation”, and “cannot be based on completely 
unsubstantiated or unresearched fears”.517 In the WTO regime, the Appellate Body has 
confirmed that evaluation of  the risks of  harm can either be expressed quantitatively or 
qualitatively,518 and that the report of  risks is based on the right to act on the basis of  
“minority” scientific evidence.519  
                                                      
514 Alpharma Inc. v Council of  the European Union, Case T-70/99, Judgment of  11 September 2002, paras 
155-156, n401; Monsanto Agricoltura Italia and Others, Case C-236/01, Judgment of  2003, para 106, n221; 
Commission of  the European Communities v Kingdom of  Denmark, Case C-192/01, Judgment of  23 September 
2003, para 49; Commission of  the European Communities v French Republic, Case C-24/00, Judgment of  5 
February 2004, para 56.  
515 Pfizer Animal Health v Council, Case T-13/99, Judgment of  11 September 2002, para 152, n418. Cf: The 
WTO accepts that Members can adopt a level of  protection on a zero-risk basis. See WTO Appellate Body 
Report, Australia – Measures Affecting the Importation of  Salmon (Australia – Salmon), WT/DS18/AB/R, 
adopted 20 October 1998, para 125. 
516 MOX Plant case, n512.  
517 Motaal Precaution, at 488, n437. 
518 WTO Appellate Body Report, Australia – Measures Affecting the Importation of  Salmon (Australia – Salmon), 
WT/DS18/AB/R, adopted 20 October 1998, paras 123-124. 
519 WTO Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones, para 194, n247.  
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In summary, the application of  the PA is suggested to be within the domain of  uncertain 
but nonetheless real risks.  The PA could be triggered in the circumstances of  scientific 


























Scientific uncertainty is a significant factor in the precautionary formulation.  The 
adopting state’s duty to review520 is particularly relevant in updating the situation of  
scientific uncertainty.  If  the risk is proved positively harmful after the discovery of  
ongoing monitoring and review, then the PA should be adapted as a permanent ban; if  
proved otherwise, the approach should be abolished in due course.  
 
In addition to the criteria of  threat of  harm and uncertainty, the element of  “action” is 
                                                      
520 See section 5.3.3.  
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also highlighted as an elementary feature of  a prescriptive PA, which distinguishes itself  





In Sandin’s formulation, precautionary action is mandatory in prescriptive versions. 
Likewise, Trouwborst argues that states should have a customary right to act when there 
are reasonable grounds for concern that significant harm exists, and an obligation to take 
action when the harm is not only significant but also serious or irreversible.  The EU 
Court of  Justice also notes that “a public authority may be required to take action even 
before adverse effects have become apparent” in a situation where the Community 
institutions make the provisional withdrawal of  the authorisations for antibiotics.521 
(italics added) 
 
In addition, from past precedents in international law, precautionary actions are required 
to be effective and proportionate.  Effectiveness ensures that the relevant purpose is 
served. In the Southern Bluefin Tuna522 Order, the ITLOS523 suggested parties “act with 
prudence and caution to ensure that effective conservation measures are taken to prevent 
serious harm to the stock of  southern bluefin tuna.524 Proportionality ensures that the 
means can be well-adjusted to fit the purpose.  For example, the International Chamber 
of  Commerce states that precautionary action must be “proportionally responsive” to 
the environmental concern at issue.525  
 
                                                      
521 Alpharma Inc. v Council, Case T-70/99, Judgment of  11 September 2002, para 355, n401. 
522 Southern Bluefin Tuna, see section 2.2.1.1.2 n257. 
523 ITLOS, n306. 
524 Order of  27 August 1999, para 77, n257. 
525 International Chamber of  Commerce Commission on Environment, A Precautionary Approach: An 
ICC Business Perspective, 1997, as quoted in Trouwborst States, p150, n232. 
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The European Court of  Justice has often emphasised the importance of  proportionality 
in the implementation of  the PA by choosing the least restrictive precautionary 
measure.526 Under the current trend of  globalisation, precautionary measures stipulated 
in international legal instruments are frequently required to be the least restrictive to 
international trade or traffic.527  
 
 
Types of  precautionary actions 
 
There are many forms of  precautionary actions.  Typical precautionary measures 
include precautionary bans, 528  the employment of  safety margins, 529  carrying out 
detailed research on the risk and monitoring,530 reversal of  the burden of  proof  to the 
one who promotes a new technology,531 prior information and consultation, liability and 
compensation rules, the use of  economic instruments like subsidies or taxes, and 
participatory decision-making procedures.532 The range of  measures taken by states in 
response to the PA is very wide; Trouwborst further contends that “essentially every type 
                                                      
526 For example, see para 186 of  Joined Cases T-74/00, T-76/00, T-83/00 to T-85/00, T-132/00, 
T-137/00, NS t-141/00, Judgment of  the EU Court of  First Instance of  26 November 2002. 
527 See also section 5.3.2.2.1. 
528  For example: The Moratorium on commercial whaling adopted by the International Whaling 
Commission (IWC) in 1982; the moratorium on pelagic driftnet fishing agreed by the UN General 
Assembly; the European Union’s de facto precautionary moratorium on the marketing of  genetically 
modified food products from 1998, and the precautionary restrictions imposed on emissions of  
chlorofluorocarbons under the Montreal Protocol in order to prevent further depletion of  the ozone layer. 
529 For example, the application of  ample safety buffers in the setting of  catch levels and fishing effort 
limitations where uncertainty is great; the NAFO Fisheries Commission acknowledges “The more 
uncertain the stock assessment, the greater the buffer zone should be” in its Precautionary Approach 
Framework. The Framework distinguishes between five different states – the safe zone, the overfishing zone, 
the cautionary zone, the danger zone and the collapse zone – and sets out the appropriate precautionary 
management action for each. 
530 For example: the performance of  an environmental impact assessment (EIA) and monitoring is 
required during the period when risk exists. The European Council called on EU member states and the 
Commission to “attach particular importance to the development of  scientific expertise”. WTO Members 
must “seek to obtain the additional information necessary for a more objective assessment of  risk” after 
adopting a provisional SPS measure.    
531 See discussions in section 2.2.3.2. 
532 Trouwborst States, p177-178, n232. 
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of  environmental measure can be a precautionary measure in the scheme of  the 
precautionary principle”.533  
 
 
2.3.2 Prohibitory v Information Disclosure 
 
In addition to the argumentative v prescriptive versions of  the PA, the PA can also be 
classified into prohibitory v information disclosure versions according to the severity of  the 
damage which is derived from Sustein’s Anti-Catastrophe Principle. 
 
 
2.3.2.1 Anti-Catastrophe Principle 
 
Sustein has criticised the traditional precautionary principle as having a tendency to lead 
people to think in terns of  the worst-case scenario and also has the risk of  
over-regulation.534 Alternatively, he proposes the model of  “Anti-Catastrophe Principle” 
by which the prohibitory PA and the information disclosure PA are developed in 
accordance with the severity of  the anticipated harm. 535  A flat ban on the 
product/technology is recommended when it is associated with a high probability of  
serious harm; otherwise, when the risk concerns a relatively lower probability of  less 
serious harm, the promoter of  the new product/technology is obliged to monitor and 






533 Trouwborst States, p179, n232. 
534 Sustein PP, n333 pp64-88.  
535 Sunstein PP, n333. 
536 Sunstein PP p118, n333. 
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2.3.2.2 Trimming exercise 
 
With regard to risk regulation in addition to the Anti-Catastrophe Principle, Sunstein also 
argues for the concept of  “trimming”,537 by which he refers to the seventeen-century 
“Trimmer[s]”, “who tend to reject the extremes and to borrow ideas from both sides in 
intense social controversies”.  It is recorded that “Trimmers believed it important to 
steer between the polar positions and to preserve what is deepest and most sensible in 
competing positions”.538 Sunstein notes that trimming might be defended as “producing 
the best outcomes” and “responding to judges’ lack of  information”, and can serve to 
reduce social exclusion or humiliation.  He focuses on the reasons why judges involved 
in constitutional disputes might choose to trim.  He maintains that being “humble and 
uncertain about the right result”, Justices might steer between the poles to minimise 
possible damages.539  
 
In summary, the core concept of  the “Trimming” and “Anti-Catastrophe Principle” is to 
adopt a margin of  safety to manage unknown risks.  These two concepts are similar to 
the precautionary measure to adopt a “safety margin”540 which provides extra buffer 
zones to minimise the direct impact of  risk to environment or human health.  They 
provide a safety net in the blind spot of  science to safeguard human health and the 
environment. 
 
A duty of  information disclosure is highlighted in the “Anti-Catastrophe” principle 
model.  Under the IDPA, the party who introduces a new technology should bear the 
burden to disclose the risk and uncertainties of  the technology at issue and leaves the 
                                                      
537 Sunstein Trimming, n466. 
538 Sunstein Trimming, n466. 
539 Sunstein Trimming, p1061, n466. 
540 See n529. 
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public to decide the margin of  safety of  the product.  It is suggested that a review of  
the risks and uncertainties can be conducted within a certain period of  time to update 
the relevant scientific information and evaluate its margin of  safety.  Ideally, relevant 
scientific justifications should be clearer in time with the advancement of  scientific 
breakthroughs, and the public will be enabled to decide the appropriate margins of  
safety.    
 
Sunstein’s Anti-Catastrophe principle consists of  four factors of  uncertainty, magnitude 
of  harm, tool, and margin of  safety.  Particularly, the element of  “public engagement” 
plays a vital role in the determination of  an appropriate level of  protection and a margin 
of  safety. 
 
 
2.3.2.3 Public engagement 
 
In the Anti-Catastrophe Principle model, Sunstein highlights the significance of  public 
engagement in a democratic society, which is of  particular relevance in risk 
communication in the structure of  risk analysis. 541  It appears to incorporate the 
subjective element of  risk perception into risk management.542  In this regard, he 
suggests citizens should get involved with the decision-making process of  risk 
management by deliberating their preferences and values.543  
 
“Public engagement” is deemed a fundamental feature of  a democratic society.  It is 
mentioned in some international instruments regarding the implementation of  the PA. 
                                                      
541 See section 3.1.3.1 and figure 3.1.3.1.  
542 Risk management, see n36. 
543 Sunstein PP, p158, n333. 
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The first official legal instrument to recognise public engagement is the Rio 
Declaration. 544  It notes that environmental issues are best handled with public 
participation, and individual’s access to information, access to decision-making and 
access to justice are endorsed.  The detailed action plan for the Rio Declaration, Agenda 
21, also addresses the importance of  access to information.  It highlights that the 
United System should involve the participation of  “Major Groups” which include the 
expertise and views of  non-governmental organisations.545  
 
Further, public participation is developed as the objective of  specific international 
obligations binding upon the EU and its Member States as a result of  the Aarhus 
Convention.546 The Aarhus Convention developed a three-pillar structure in its agenda:  
public access to environmental information; public participation in decision-making and 
public access to justice in environmental matters.  
 
Public participation involves the following three dimensions: public participation in 
decisions on specific activities, public participation concerning plans, programmes and 
policies, and public participation during the preparation of  executive regulations and 
generally applicable legally binding normative instruments.547 It is stressed that Member 
                                                      
544  Principle 10, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, the United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro, 1992 (Rio Declaration) n286. 
545 Section III, Agenda 21, see Chapter 27 in particular.  
546 UNECE Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to 
Justice in Environmental Matters, Arhus, Denmark, 25 June 1998, (Aarhus Convention). Other references 
regarding public participation in international/European environmental law including: Jans, J. (2003) “EU 
Environmental Policy and the Civil Society” in Jans, J. (ed) The European Convention and the Future of  European 
Environmental Law, Europa Law Publishing, 2003, available at: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1112424 ; UNECE Convention on Access to 
Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters 
(1998), available at: http://www.unece.org/env/pp/documents/cep43e.pdf; UNECE Compliance 
Committee Report, Compliance with regard to the European Commission, UN 
doc.ECE/MP.PP/2008/5/Add.10, available at: 
http://www.unece.org/env/documents/2008/pp/mop3/ece_mp_pp_2008_5_add_10_e.pdf 
Council Directive Proposal, Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, COM (2003)624, available at: 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2003/com2003_0624en01.pdf 
547 Article 6, 7 and 8 Aarhus Convention, n546.  
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States are obliged to “promote environmental education and environmental awareness 
among the public, especially on how to obtain access to information, to participate in 
decision-making and to obtain access to justice in environmental matter[s]”.548 The 
public should be allowed to submit any “comments, information, analyses or opinions 
that it considers relevant” during the process of  communication.549 The public is also 
engaged during the preparation of  regulations and other legal binding rules that may 
have a significant effect on the environment.550  
 
Specifically, it is identified in the Aarhus Convention that “the state of  human health and 
safety” and “conditions of  human life” are affected by the environment.551 It is fair to 
say that Member States bear the duty to promote health education and health awareness 
among the public, particularly on how to obtain access to information, to participate in 
decision-making and to obtain access to justice in health and safety matters. 
 
Further, the TFEU stipulates that citizens “have the right to participate in the democratic 
life of  the Union”;552 the EU institutions need to “maintain an open, transparent and 
regular dialogue” with civil society, and citizens’ initiatives of  submission proposals need 
to be recognised.553 Therefore, the public should be encouraged to take part in the 
policy-making of  health policy and make a collective informed decision through risk 
communication on the acceptable level of  health protection. 
 
Similarly, at the international level, the concept of  public awareness and participation is 
                                                      
548 Article 3.3 Aarhus Convention 
549 Article 6.8 Aarhus Convention.  
550 Article 6 and 8 Aarhus Convention.  
551 Article 2.3(c) Aarhus Convention, n546. 
552 Article 10.3 TFEU, n408.  
553 Articles 10.3, 11.2 and 11.4 TFEU, n408. 
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also respected in the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety. 554  The Cartagena Protocol is an 
instrument renowned for its mechanism of  regulation on importing genetically modified 
organisms (GMOs)555.  The PA has been laid down as a foundation of  the mechanism. 
In addition, the Codex Alimentarius 556  also stresses the element of  “risk 
communication”557 in risk regulation, which indicates the exchange of  information 
between relevant important stakeholders. 558  A more elaborate illustration of  the 
mechanism will be addressed in the following chapter.559  
 
In summary, the element of  “margin of  safety” which is associated with the 
determination of  the appropriate level of  protection can be particularly influenced by 
public engagement.   The acceptable level of  risk differs in different communities, thus 
it requires social debates within specific communities to determine the appropriate level 
of  health protection.  The stimulation of  public debate is an on-going process, and thus 
no absolute rules or answers to particular issues exist.560 Constant refining and review 
are necessary to examine the appropriateness and effectiveness of  the adopted approach.  
We will continue to the discussion of  the non-scientific elements of  the PA in Chapter 5.  
 
After the introduction of  the Prescriptive PA and Information Disclosure PA, the last 
common classification of  the PA is also noteworthy: weak versions v. strong versions are 
                                                      
554 Article 23 Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, n46. 
555 Living modified organisms (LMOs) resulting from modern biotechnology are broadly equivalent to 
genetically modified organisms. The difference between an LMO and a GMO is that a LMO is capable of  
growing, and typically refers to agricultural crops. GMOs include both LMOs and organisms which are not 
capable of  growing.  
556 Codex Alimentariu, see section 3.1.3 n36 
557 See section 3.1.3.1 n36 for risk management.  
558  See section 3.1.3.1 n36. The text of  the Codex Alimentarius is available at: 
http://www.codexalimentarius.net; see also Codex Alimentarius Procedural Manual at: 
http://www.codexalimentarius.net/web/procedural_manual.jsp .  
559 See section 3.2.  
560 See: Pellerano, M. B. and Montague, P. “Democratic Tools: Communities and Precaution” in Myers, N.J. 
and Raffensperger, C. (eds) (2006) Precautionary Tools for Reshaping Environmental Policy, The MIT Press, 
Cambridge, Massachusetts, US; Whiteside, K.H. “Precaution and Democratic Deliberation” in Whiteside 
Precaution, n252.  
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divided either in terms of  the trigger threshold or the allocation of  burden of  proof.  
We will then conclude with a moderate PA in this section.   
 
 
2.3.3 Strong v Weak 
 
Commentators have expressed the polarities of  this spectrum in terms of  “strong” and 
“weak” versions in a great variety of  formulations of  the approach.  Tinker expresses 
the view that: 
 
At its strongest, the precautionary principle may be interpreted to prohibit virtually all use of  natural 
resources and all human activities of  any kind in certain ecosystems. Such a moratorium could 
continue indefinitely, until such time as sufficient scientific knowledge develops about the effects of  
such activities or use.  At its weakest, the precautionary principle may be mere hortatory language 
intended to guide states as they adopt national legislation and plans, allowing a permissive approach 
to use of  resources and human activities and a balancing of  interests which may favour development 
or quality of  life choices over conservation of  biodiversity or other preventive action.561 
 
Some commentators avoid using potentially negative connotations associated with the 
terms “weak” and “strong”.  For example, VanderZwaag refers to different strengths of  
formulations as “ecocentric” or “strict”, and “utilitarian” or “permissive” and the like.562 
This work follows a traditional classification and divides the “weak” and “strong” 
versions in terms of  two criteria: the trigger threshold and burden of  proof, and then 
concludes with an alternative version of  the “moderate” PA.  
                                                      
561 Tinker, C. “State Responsibility for Biological Diversity Conservation under International Law” in 
Freestone/Hey, pp53-72, n201. 
562  VanderZwaag, D. (1994) “The Implications of  the Precautionary Principle for the Canadian 




2.3.3.1 Trigger threshold 
 
The standard to distinguish strong and weak versions of  the PA is whether precautionary 
measures are required once a certain risk is identified or only permitted in the absence of  
scientific certainty.563 In the context, a prescriptive version of  the approach is referred to 
a strong one, and an argumentative version is accordingly a weak one.564 The strong PA 
requires mitigating action by those who created the damage or risk;565 the weak PA 
merely prevents lacks of  scientific certainty from postponing mitigating measures.566  
 
Further, a strong version implies that once a certain minimal threshold of  risk is met, “a 
fundamental rethinking of  regulatory policy” is required.567 As Freestone notes: “once a 
risk is identified the lack of  scientific proof  of  cause and effect shall not be used as a 
reason for not taking action to protect the environment”.568 Hence, Ervin and Welsh 
define the strong version of  the PA as: 
 
[S]etting certain thresholds of  scientific uncertainty and hazardous potential, which once met, would 
allow regulators to take appropriate regulatory actions (e.g., impose a ban on the introduction of  a 
new technology), irrespective of  the costs – measured in terms of  benefits forgone.569 
                                                      
563 Kolitch, S. “The Environmental and Public Health Impacts of  US Patent Law: Making the Case for 
Incorporating a Precautionary Principle” 36(1) Environmental Law 221-256. 
564 See the above discussion on prescriptive v argumentative versions of  the approach in section 2.3.1. 
565 For example, the strong precautionary principle is provided in the Treaty on the European Union, as 
amended by the Maastricht Treaty, 07 February 1992, Article 130r. 
566 For example, the embodiment of  the weak precautionary principle articulated in the Preamble of  the 
United Nations Convention on Biology Diversity: “Noting also that where there is a threat of  significant 
reduction or loss of  biological diversity, lack of  full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for 
postponing measure to avoid or minimize such a threat”. 
567 Sunstein PP, p18, n333. 
568 Freestone/Hey, p13, n201. 
569 Perez, O. (2007) “Anomalies at the Precautionary Kingdom: Reflections on the GMO Panel’s Decision”, 
6(2) World Trade Review 265-280. Welsh, R. and Ervin, D.E. “Precaution as an Approach to Technology 
Development: the Case of  Transgenic Crops”, 31(2) Science, Technology and Human Values 153-172. 
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Likewise, the TFEU describes the strong version as:  
 
Union policy on the environment shall aim at a high level of  protection taking into account the 
diversity of  situations in the various regions of  the Union.  It shall be based on the precautionary 
principle and on the principles that preventive action should be taken, that environmental damage 
should as a priority be rectifies at source and that the polluter should pay.570 
 
Sunstein notes that: “The most cautious … weak versions suggest, quite sensibly, that a 
lack of  decisive evidence of  harm should not be a ground for refusing to regulate”. 
Consequently, he refers to the Rio Declaration571 as a weak version of  the PA.  On the 
contrary, a strong version of  the PA is more aggressive than the Rio Declaration because it 
is not limited to threats of  serious or irreversible damage.  For instance, the Wingspread 
Declaration572 does not require the element of  “serious or irreversible damage” as the 
trigger threhsold. 
 
Under international customary law, a weak version or an argumentative version of  the PA 
would not be able to impose a duty on states to be responsible for the protection of  
human health and the environment in its domain, thus the adoption of  a weak version 
would probably only be lip service and a declaratory tool of  policy-making without any 
mechanism of  enforcement.  It is therefore suggested by this work that the 
employment of  the PA would achieve relatively satisfactory efficiency with a strong or a 
prescriptive version of  the approach.  
  
                                                      
570 Article 191.2 TFEU, n408. 
571 Rio Declaration n286.  





2.3.3.2 Burden of  proof 
 
A strong version of  the PA sometimes refers to the reversal of  burden of  proof  on the 
proponents of  a new technology.  As Sands notes the PA would “tend to shift the 
burden of  proof  and require the person who wishes to carry out an activity to prove that 
it will not cause harm to the environment”.573  However, its application is far more 
complicated in court than in theory and is under debate.574 Jones and Bronitt note that: 
“precaution, it has been argued, has the potential to strike at the heart of  this evidential 
problem by modifying the burden of  proof  that objectors must satisfy”.575  Thus the 
reversal of  burden of  proof  is context-dependent and should be considered on a case by 
case basis. 
 
In WTO law, if  the PA is regarded as an exclusion to other Members’ obligations576, then 
the defendant party enjoys the shift of  burden of  proof; if  the PA can be treated as an 
exception to Members’ obligations, then the burden of  proof  still lies with the defendant 
party.  This distinction has been addressed in the previous section where we discussed 
the implication of  the EC – Hormones case.577 In particular, in the EC – Biotech case,578 
the Panel recognised the adoption of  a provisional SPS measure as “a right and not an 
exception from a general obligation” under the SPS Agreement.579 It implies that the 
                                                      
573 Sands Principles, n241 at 273  
574 For more discussions on the burden of  proof  of  the precautionary principle, see Jones, J. and Bronitt, 
S. “The Burden and Standard of  Proof  in Environmental Regulation: the Precautionary Principle in an 
Australian Administrative Context” in Fisher PP, n205. 
575 Jones, J. and Bronitt, S. “The Burden and Standard of  Proof  in Environmental Regulation: the 
Precautionary Principle in an Australian Administrative Context” in Fisher PP, n205 at 139. 
576 See section 1.2.1.2.  
577 See section 2.2.2.2.2. 
578 EC – Biotech, n373 
579 EC – Biotech, n373 paras 7.2969 and 7.2973. 
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burden of  proof  is to be shifted to the complaining party.580 The allocation of  burden 
of  proof  will be further examined in following chapters when we explore the difference 
in legal status between exceptions and exclusions to WTO obligations in WTO law.581   
  
 
2.3.3.3 Moderate PA 
 
It is noteworthy that in addition to the traditional classifications of  weak and strong 
precaution which represent two extremes, the WHO has proposed “Moderate Precaution” 
which consists of  presumptions about interventions being under “weak precaution” but 
which allow flexibility in order to shift the burden on a case by case basis. 582       
Table 2.3.3.3 demonstrates that “Moderate Precaution” appears to hit the balance of  the 
extreme versions of  precaution, while it accommodates the strengths of  weak and strong 
versions by balancing the burden of  proof, and giving considerations of  free trade and 
individual preference.  In the context of  moderate precaution, precautionary action can 
only be adopted as a last resort to prevent misuse or protectionism under globalisation.  
It can be concluded that this version has resonance with the requirement of  
proportionality and will sit well in the trade world.  
                                                      
580 See section 1.2.1.2.  
581 Chapter 4.  
582 WHO The World Health Report 2002 – Reducing Risks, Promoting Healthy Life, WHO, Chapter Six, 
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Now the general features of  the PA will be identified by comparative studies of  the 
abovementioned models.  
 
 
2.3.4 Comparisons of  the precaution formula 
 
We can compare Sunstein’s four factors of  the Anti-Catastrophe Principle583 with 
Sandin’s formulation of  prescriptive versions of  the PA 584  and Trouwborst’s 
                                                      
583 Anti-Catastrophe Principle, see Sunstein PP, n333  
584 Sandin Dimensions, n463 
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Precautionary Tripod.585 They all identify the basic elements of  harm, uncertainty and 
the introduced tool/measure.  There is a slight difference in their construction of  the 
PA where Sunstein puts more weight on the magnitude of  potential harm; likewise, 
Trouwborst focuses on the distinction of  “significant” harm and “serious or irreversible” 
harm, while Sandin et al. ask which type of  hazards should apply in the formula.  
Sunstein further proposes the concept of  “margins of  safety”; Sandin et al. stress 
different types of  measures applied under various conditions, and Trouwborst argues for 
the PA to be established from the perspective of  the rights and duties of  states.  
 
This work focuses on the comparative study of  these three models of  the PA and seeks 
to develop further refinement to fit into the application of  a public health emergency of  
international concern (PHEIC)586.  A normative prescriptive version of  the PA is 
emerging from the above studies in the following outlines:  
 
 The fundamental elements of  the PA consist of  the trigger threshold, scientific 
uncertainty, and the precautionary action; 
 The adoption of  the PA is required to be proportionate and efficient; 
 The PA is more efficient as a prescriptive version than an argumentative one; 
 The PA adopted in international law can be established from the perspective of  a 
state’s rights and duties; 
 The adopting state bears the duty to carry out on-going monitoring and review of  
the measure and the feared risk; 
 Non-scientific factors such as cost-benefit analysis and public engagement can be 
included in the consideration of  the PA. 
                                                      
585 Trouwborst States, n232 
586 Public health emergency of  international concern (PHEIC), see section 3.1.2.1.  
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Based upon these analyses, we will redefine the PA in the IP regime from the aspect of  
public health emergency in Chapter 5.  
 
Sunstein’s proposal appears to fit in modern democratic society, yet the distinction 
between “high probability of  a serious harm” and “low probability of  a less serious 
harm” fails to enclose a full range of  risks.  For example, risks of  “low probability of  a 
serious harm” exist in a risk spectrum which is not yet categorised in his model.  The 
case of  imposing an importing ban on beef  due to the outbreak of  “mad cow disease”587 
in the country of  origin falls within the domain of  “low probability of  a serious harm”.  
 
Sunstein’s incorporation of  the extra factors such as cost-benefit analysis, deliberate 
democracy, and distributive justice provides practical policy guidance on the 
implementation of  the approach in contemporary society.  This category of  the PA 
focuses on people’s right to information and the allocation of  burden of  proof,588 which 
are of  vital importance in a democratic society, yet they still need to be accommodated in 
a given scenario in accordance with the characteristics of  a specific risk.  In the 
circumstance of  a public health emergency, it may not have sufficient time to carry out 
proper public engagement; however, the duty of  review and information disclosure could 
still be imposed on the adopting party after the invocation of  the approach.  
 
In summary, in order to have an effective PA, a prescriptive and information disclosure version 
will be opted in this work.  Further, a moderate PA is preferred with a view to avoid 
extreme versions and also to take concerns of  free trade into account.  
                                                      
587 BSE n335.  





We have introduced the origins and recent development of  the PA.589 It has been 
proliferated in international environmental protection in the past few decades.  
Evidence shows that the implementation of  the PA has also been extended to the scope 
of  human health and food safety in international law.  States are allowed to determine 
their own appropriate level of  health protection to adopt the PA in international 
customary law.590  
 
The PA has a pervasive influence on risk regulation particularly in the fields of  
protection of  the environment, human health, and food safety.  However, it is also 
found that though precautionary thinking is recognised in the WTO, the PA is restrained 
by the tension between global trade and health.  The application of  the PA is required 
to be accompanied by Members’ obligation of  non-discrimination 591  and is 
least-restrictive to trade.  Particularly, WTO Members are bound to follow a set of  
procedural requirements relating to sanitary or phytosanitary measures while the 
adoption of  the PA to prevent possible abuse.592  
 
 
2.4.1 Scholarly approaches taken 
 
We have also reviewed scholars’ proposals on the definition of  the PA. Evidence shows 
that adopting the term “approach” instead of  “principle” will be more practical in an 
international setting for it implies a rather flexible spirit, and would be more adaptive in 
                                                      
589 See section 2.2.  
590 See sections 2.2.2.1 and 2.2.3.1.  
591 See section 1.2.1.1.1.  
592 See sections 2.2.2.2 and 2.2.2.3.  
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the current political setting.593 In order to underscore the adaptability of  the employed 
precaution, the term “precautionary approach” is preferred in this work.  Specifically, 
based upon the abovementioned formulations of  the PA, this work will be developed 
from the foundation of  “States’ precautionary entitlements”, 594  which was based on 
Trouwborst’s theory of  “precautionary rights and duties of  states”595 in international law. 
Trouwborst divides states’ precautionary actions into “rights” or “duties” in accordance 
with the gravity of  the anticipated harm, yet this work considers “significant harm” (to 
human health) as a general reasonable trigger threshold of  the PA.   Whether to follow 
his distinction of  precautionary “rights” or “duties” according to the severity of  the 
harm is not within the domain of  this work.   
 
In the above discussion, a model of  the “prescriptive” and “information disclosure” 
versions 596  of  the PA will be preferred.   However, the element of  “public 
engagement” of  risk management may not be carried out due to the inherent limitations 
of  an emergency, but the burden of  “information disclosure” may still be imposed on 
the adopting party to avoid abuse of  the PA.   Further, the model of  a moderate PA597 
will also be considered, which aims to avoid extreme versions of  the approach and serves 
to reconcile different stakeholders.  It is noteworthy that the invocation of  the PA 
depends greatly upon the adopted measure and the characteristics of  each individual 
threat.  Therefore the elements of  the approach are identified as a general template, and 





593 See section 2.1.3.  
594 See section 2.1.2.  
595 See section 2.1.2 n232.  
596 See sections 2.3.1. 
597 See section 2.3.3.3 n582. 
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2.4.2 Elements of  the moderate precautionary approach 
 
We have also reviewed different definitions of  the PA proposed by philosophers, lawyers, 
and scientists.  Three categories of  the PA have been reviewed; it can be concluded that 
the basic elements of  the PA consist of: (1) threat of  harm; (2) uncertainty; (3) 
precautionary action.  We have also identified other basic elements of  the PA in this 
work, which are supposed to act well in the interplay of  health, trade, and IP.   In 
summary, the adaptive version of  the moderate PA consists of  the following elements: 
 
 A precautionary action is established from the perspective of  a state’s precautionary 
entitlements in international law;598 
 States enjoy a broad margin of  appreciation in exercising their precautionary 
entitlements;599 
 The adoption of  the PA should be necessary to protect human health or safety;600 
 The adoption of  a provisional measure is a means to the approach;601 
 The said PA should be based on a risk assessment;602 
 The adoption of  the PA should take proportionality into account, which needs to be 
employed as a last resort;603  
 The PA should be in compliance with Members’ obligation of  
“Non-discrimination” in WTO.  The approach should not consist of  any disguised 
restriction and should be least restrictive to international trade;604 
 Uncertainty: The PA should be applied within the domain of  scientific uncertainty;605 
                                                      
598 See section 2.1.3.  
599 See sections 2.2.2.1 and 2.2.3.1.  
600 See section 2.2.2.3.  
601 See sections 2.2.1.1.2 and 2.2.2.3.  
602 See sections 2.2.1.1.1 and 2.2.2.3.  
603 See section 2.3.3.3.  
604 See section 2.2.2.3.  
605 See section 2.3.1.2.  
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 Threshold of  harm: The PA may be triggered when the unknown harm crosses the 
threshold of  “significant” level of  harm;606 
 Action: The PA should include an effective precautionary action;607 
 Ongoing duty of  monitoring and review: According to the Information Disclosure 
PA, the adopting state bears the duty to update relevant information on the said 
measure;608 
 Burden of  proof: The PA allows a reversal of  burden of  proof  on a case-by-case 
basis.609 Particularly in an Information Disclosure PA, the onus is often shifted to 
the one promoting a new product/technology, which implies that the party who 
introduces/increases risks to society bears the burden of  proof.  
 Other non-scientific factors such as public participation;610 consumers’ tastes and habits, 
and civilian’s social and cultural preferences could be taken into account on a case-by-case 
basis.611 However, in the situation of  an acute health emergency, the integration of  
public participation may be seriously restricted due to time constraints.  
 
The PA from the perspective of  a public health emergency will be further defined to 
reshape the IP policy through the lens of  precaution in following chapters.  After 
reviewing the development of  the PA, we will assess how the PA has been developed to 
date in the international public health regime in the following chapter.  
 
                                                      
606 See section 2.3.1.1.  
607 See section 2.3.1.3.  
608 See sections 2.2.1.1.1 and 2.2.2.3.  
609 See section 2.3.3.2.  
610 See section 2.3.2.3.  
611 See sections 2.2.2.1 and 2.2.3.   
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Part 2: The current landscape 
 
3 Precautionary Approach in Practice: International Public Health 
 
The purpose of  this chapter is to examine the value and reflect on the current operation 
of  the precautionary approach (PA) in the international public health regime.  These 
comprise the discussions of  the legal mechanisms in the WHO system and one of  the 
most renowned multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) on the PA, the Cartagena 
Protocol on Biosafety. 
 
The current practice of  international health protection has incorporated the essence of  
precaution by adopting particular health measures for an appropriate level of  health 
protection.  Typical examples of  the PA implemented in international health can be 
found in legal instruments such as the International Health Regulations (IHRs)612; Codex 
Alimentarius,613 and the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (CPB)614, which will also be assessed 
against the analysis and template developed in the previous chapter.  We will examine 
the practice of  precaution in each instrument in the following sections.  Relevant 





The WHO stands as the primary international organisation for addressing global health 
concerns.  The WHO is established under the UN system as the highest directing and 
coordinating authority of  the health-related issues for the world’s population.  The goal 
of  the WHO is to ensure the right of  everyone to the enjoyment of  the highest attainable 
                                                      
612 International Health Regulations (IHRs) n45.  
613 Codex Alimentarius n36.   
614 Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (CPB) n46.  
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standard of  physical and mental health (the right to health).615  The protection and 
promotion of  human health and safety is regarded as the first priority in the WHO 
regime, thus the concept of  precaution has been widely promoted in the WHO system. 
 
 
3.1.1 The precautionary approach in the WHO 
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the WHO has proposed the version of  “Moderate 
Precaution”616 by taking into account the requirements of  “free trade” in order to 
reconcile trade and health.  In the fourth Ministerial Conference on Environment and 
Health, it was noted that: 
 
We affirm the importance of  the precautionary principle as a risk management tool, and we 
therefore recommend that it should be applied where the possibility of  serious or irreversible 
damage to health or the environment has been identified and where scientific evaluation, based on 
available data, proves inconclusive for assessing the existence of  risk and its level but is deemed to be 
sufficient to warrant passing from inactivity to policy alternatives.617 
 
It stressed that the guidelines to the implementation of  the PA need to consider the 
element of  cost-benefit analysis, possible legal constraints, and impediment to free 
trade.618 Further, the WHO organised an expert meeting on precautionary policies in 
environment and health in 2005.  The consequent “Dealing with Uncertainty” report 
                                                      
615 The State Parties of  WHO adopted important principles in regard to public health that are enshrined in 
the preamble to its Constitution. Hence, the Constitution establishes as a fundamental international 
principle that enjoyment of  the highest attainable standard of  health is not only a state or condition of  the 
individual, but “… one of  the fundamental rights of  every human being without distinction of  race, 
religion, political belief, economic or social condition…”. 
616 See section 2.3.3.3. 
617 WHO Fourth Ministerial Declaration on Environment and Health, EUR/04/5046267/6, Budapest, Hungary 
23-25 June 2004, para 17a. 
618 WHO Fourth Ministerial Declaration on Environment and Health, EUR/04/5046267/6, Budapest, Hungary 
23-25 June 2004, para 17c. 
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(WHO Uncertainty Report)619 was published to identify major urgent questions about 
uncertainty and precaution in the WHO.  
 
The WHO has acknowledged the PA as a risk management tool, and thus recommended 
that it should be adopted under scientific uncertainty where serious or irreversible 
damage to health has been identified.  The Uncertainty Report discusses some relevant 
tools about the implementation of  the PA such as: risk assessment, cost-benefit analysis, 
uncertainty analysis, alternative assessment, and public participation tools. Its aim is to 
provide guidance as well as to facilitate the implementation of  the PA as a tool to protect 
public health.  It starts with adopting the definition proposed by the European 
Environment Agency (EEA) which is deemed a more proactive definition than other 
versions of  the PA.620 Particularly, compared to the moderate PA developed in the 
previous chapter, the element of  “alternative assessment” is a unique feature which could 
term the version a “constructive” instead of  a “restrictive” PA for it evalutes a whole 
range of  alternatives at the time risks are identified.  This approach would “change the 
current focus from studying the risk to investigating the solutions”.621  
 
The main instruments containing the PA in the WHO regime are the International 
Health Regulations (IHRs)622 and the Codex Alimentarius (Codex)623. The IHRs are 
equipped with the scheme of  “additional health measures” which serves as a tool to 
minimise risks of  virus transmission, and the Codex Alimentarius consists of  the 
                                                      
619 Dealing with Uncertainty: Setting the Agenda for the 5th Ministerial Conference on Environment and Health, 2009, 
Report of  a WHO Meeting, EUR/06/5067987, Copenhagen, Denmark, 15-16 December 2005 (WHO 
Uncertainty Report) n210. 
620 Dealing with Uncertainty: Setting the Agenda for the 5th Ministerial Conference on Environment and Health, 2009, 
Report of  a WHO Meeting, EUR/06/5067987, Copenhagen, Denmark, 15-16 December 2005, p3 (WHO 
Uncertainty Report). See section 2.1.1 n210.  
621 WHO Uncertainty Report, n210, p22. 
622 See section 3.1.2.  
623 See section 3.1.3.  
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structure of  “Risk Analysis” which incorporates the precautionary thinking in the 
regulation of  food safety.  We will first introduce its relevant application in the IHRs in 
the following sections in order to examine the role of  science in the containment of  
global virus transmission.  
 
 
3.1.2 The precautionary approach in the International Health 
Regulations 
 
The WHO Constitution and the United Nations Charter vest WHO to adopt treaties and 
regulations to which State Parties subscribe.624 The International Health Regulations (IHRs) 
are one of  the major United Nations agreements that have attempted to regulate the 
activities of  State Parties as they relate to infectious diseases which have been revised to 
meet the emergence of  newly discovered infectious diseases such as SARS in 2002 and 
the highly virulent strain of  bird flu in 2003.  The IHRs were revised in 2005 to follow 
a precautionary thinking in its legal framework in order to ensure the effectiveness of  
global virus surveillance.625 The purpose of  the IHRs is to ensure maximum security 
against the international spread of  diseases with a minimum interference with world 
traffic.626 
 
Under the WHO mechanism, the IHRs aim at preventing and responding to acute public 
health risks that have the potential to spread rapidly across borders.  The IHRs build an 
international network of  virus surveillance, and oblige State Parties to notify the WHO 
with the occurrences of  notifiable diseases.  
                                                      
624 Forrest, M. (2000) “Using the Power of  the World Health Organization: The International Health 
Regulations and the Future of  International Health Law”, 33 Columbia Journal of  Law and Social Problems 
153. 
625 The IHRs were revised in 2005, and entered into force in 2007 n45. 
626 Article 2 IHRs.  
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In the era of  globalisation, fast-spreading diseases have been aided by international travel 
and trade in foods and services amongst countries and continents.  Efficient disease 
containment greatly depends upon immediate global cooperation.627 In order to build 
global health security, states are granted a margin of  appreciation in determining the 
adoption of  additional public health measures which aims at achieving an appropriate or 
acceptable level of  protection (ALOP).628 States may be more cautious in containing 
virus transmission than international standards require.  Specifically, the concept of  




3.1.2.1 Public health emergency of  international 
concern(PHEIC) 
 
The PA employed in the IHRs acts to provide a safeguard to human health by allowing 
prompt response to managing risks under a public health emergency of  international 
concern (PHEIC).629 We will first discuss the definition of  “public health emergency of  
international concern” before introducing states’ duties and rights630 in the IHRs and the 







627 WHO Report (2007) “Issues Paper – Invest in Health, Build a Safer Future” p16. 
628 “Appropriate level of  protection” is also understood as “acceptable level of  protection”. See sections 
2.2.2.1 and 2.2.3.1. 
629 See section 3.1.2.1.  
630 See section 3.1.2.2.  
631 See section 3.1.2.4.  
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3.1.2.1.1 Definition of  PHEIC 
 
The IHRs are equipped with a reporting structure to oblige State Parties to notify WHO 
of  all events which may constitute a PHEIC within its territory.632 The IHRs define a 
public health emergency as “an extraordinary event which is determined, as provided in 
these Regulations: (i) to constitute a public health threat risk to other States through the 
international spread of  disease [;] and (ii) to potentially require a coordinated 
international response”.633 A “public risk” means “a likelihood of  an event that may 
affect adversely the health of  human populations, with an emphasis on one which may 
spread internationally or may present a serious and direct danger”.634 
 
 
3.1.2.1.2 Scope of  PHEIC 
 
After the revision in 2005, the scope of  IHRs has covered a broader range of  notifiable 
diseases to reduce the rate of  global virus transmission.635 The scope of  notifiable 
diseases encompasses both imminent and potential risks; it also includes a large range of  
newly emerging diseases including natural and artificial threats.  State Parties are 
required to notify the WHO of  all events that may constitute a PHEIC.636 In general, the 
IHRs categorise the notifiable diseases into three classes: (1) known diseases whose 
outbreaks are unexpected and serious, such as a new influenza strain or SARS; (2) known 
diseases with a demonstrated ability to become emergencies, including the plague or 
                                                      
632 See Articles 7- 9, and Annex 2 IHRs. 
633 Article 1 IHRs. 
634 Article 1 IHRs. 
635 Annex II IHRs. 
636 WHO website (2005) “What Has Changed in the International Health Regulations”, available at: 
http://www.who.int/csr/IHRS/revisionchange/en/print.html, The decision instrument identifies a 
limited set of  criteria that will assist State Parties in deciding whether an event is notifiable to WHO.  
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Ebola; and (3) unknown or potential threats or any other kind.637 
 
After receiving the notification of  a potential PHEIC, the WHO will begin an 
investigation and deploy response teams through systems such as the Global Outbreak 
Alert and Response Network (GOARN), 638  which is a technological collaboration of  
existing institutions and networks aiming at rapid identification, confirmation and 
response to a PHEIC.  The Director-General of  the WHO will determine whether an 
event constitutes a PHEIC in accordance with the criteria and procedures set out in these 
Regulations on the basis of  the information received.639  
 
 
3.1.2.1.3 Example of  a PHEIC 
 
A recent declaration of  a PHEIC had been made from a Swine Influenza A (H1N1) 
outbreak reported in Mexico and the United States.  After receiving notification of  a 
PHEIC, the Director-General soon convened a meeting of  the Emergency Committee 
to assess the condition on 25 April 2009.  The Committee decided that the situation 
constituted a PHEIC after reviewing all available relevant information, and the 
Director-General also determined that the event constituted a PHEIC.640 Following the 
WHO’s determination and announcement of  the state of  a PHEIC, public health 
officials in the United States soon declared a national public health emergency in 
preparation for following public health strategies.641  
 
                                                      
637 Annex II IHRs. 
638 http://www.who.int/csr/outbreaknetwork/en/. 
639 Article 12 IHRs. 
640 Statement by WHO Director-General, 25 April 2009, available on WHO Website, Swine Influenza, 
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/statements/2009/h1n1_20090425/en/index.html. 
641 “U.S. Declares Public Health Emergency over Swine Flu”, N.Y. Times, 26 April 2009, available at: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/27/world/27flu.html. 
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The emergency declaration in the United States was to empower the government to 
stockpile sufficient antiviral drugs with public resource reallocation.  Other countries 
have opted for travel bans, plans for quarantine, pig culling, and banning foreign pork 
imports etc.642 States have been vigilant and have made every possible effort towards the 
health threat, yet not every response is deemed legitimate under the rationale of  
international law: some responses are criticised as over-reactive.  For example, Russia’s 
ban on pork imports from Mexico and the United States is regarded as groundless as the 
H1N1 virus cannot be transmitted by pork.  The ban on pork imports therefore may 
violate Article 17(d) of  the IHRs which indicates that any health measure needs to be 
least-restrictive to international trade and traffic.  It will also be regarded as incompliance with 
its obligations under the WTO if  Russia is a Member of  the WTO.643  
 
After a brief  introduction of  a PHEIC, we will now examine State Parties’ rights and 
duties under a PHEIC in the following section. 
 
 
3.1.2.2 The duties and rights of  State Parties  
 
The purpose of  the IHRs is to prevent, protect against, control and provide a public 
health response to the international spread of  disease in ways that are commensurate 
with and restricted to public health risks, and which avoid unnecessary interference with 
international traffic and trade.644 The IHRs establish guidelines on the WHO’s role and 
responsibilities in the event of  a PHEIC, as well as outline the roles and obligations of  
WHO State Parties when addressing such crises.  
                                                      
642  “The World Response to Flu Crisis”, BBC News, 9 May 2009, available at: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/8022516.stm. 
643 Fidler, D. P. (2009) “The Swine Flu Outbreak and International Law”, 13 (5) ASIL Insights, available at: 
http://www.asil.org/insights090427.cfm. 
644 Article 2 IHRs. 
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The IHRs formally grant the WHO authority to issue recommendations for State Parties 
to follow.645 The WHO may make standing recommendations of  appropriate health 
measures for State Parties’ routine or periodic application, and temporary 
recommendation for adopting additional health measures.646 These are established in the 
context of  the defined rights and duties of  State Parties: 
 
 
3.1.2.2.1 Duties of  surveillance and notification 
 
The IHRs impose obligations on the State Parties of  the WHO.  Annex 1 of  the IHRs 
spells out the “core capacity requirements for surveillance and response”, and details 
State Parties’ obligations under the IHRs.  It places duties on State Parties by building a 
streamlined event reporting system and by importing binding aspects of  international law 
into the health regulations.647 The IHRs’ goals include the avoidance of  “unnecessary 
interference with world trade and travel”,648 and appear to give public health higher 
priority over commercial interests.649 
 
Further, the decision instrument in Annex II identifies a limited set of  criteria that will 
assist State Parties in deciding whether an event is notifiable to the WHO.  The criteria 
are:  
 Is the public health impact of  the event serious?  
                                                      
645 Mack, E. (2006) “The World Health Organization’s New International Health Regulations: Incursion 
on State Sovereignty and Ill-fated Response to Global Health Issues” 7 Chicago Journal of  International Law 
365. 
646 Articles 16 and 43 IHRs. 
647 Milano, T.J. (2006) “Understanding And Applying International Infectious Disease Law: U.N. 
Regulations During An H5N1Avian Flu Epidemic” 6 Chi.-Kent Journal of  International &Comparative Law 
26. (Milano Regulations) 
648 Article 2 IHRs. 
649 Milano, T.J. (2006) “Understanding And Applying International Infectious Disease Law: U.N. 
Regulations During An H5N1Avian Flu Epidemic” 6 Chi.-Kent J. Int’l &Comp. L. 26 n647. 
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 Is the event unusual or unexpected?   
 Is there a significant risk of  international spread? 
 Is there a significant risk of  international restriction(s) to travel and trade?650  
 
In other words, once the health impact of  an event is identified as serious; the risk of  
international spread and the risk of  international restriction(s) to travel and trade are 
significant, State Parties are obliged to notify the WHO if  the event is unusual or 
unexpected.  This also suggests that the WHO adopts the PA of  imposing State Parties’ 
duty to notification when the health impact of  an unusual or unexpected event crosses 
the “serious” threshold and the risk is identified as “significant”.651 Albeit this appears to 
be deviated from the example of  Information Disclosure PA, which favours a shift of  
the burden of  proof  to the one who introduces a new product/technology.652 It could 
be understood that the invoking party may be in a better position to collect relevant 
information of  the risk in an emergency.  
 
And like the previous WHO “Moderate Precaution” model, 653  this IHRs decision 
instrument also takes the impact to free trade into account by asking the question: “Is 
there a significant risk of  international restriction(s) to travel and trade?” Through this 
instrument, we can again observe that the WHO aims to reconcile health protection and 
free trade by adopting a moderate approach of  precaution.  We can conclude that the 
deployment of  the PA in international public health law is tailored in order to conform 
to the requirements of  global free trade and travel.  The adopted precautionary measure 
to avoid health risks is expected to be “no more restrictive of  international traffic and 
                                                      
650 Annex II IHRs. 
651 See section 2.3.1.1.  
652 See section 2.3.2.  
653 See section 2.3.3.3.  
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3.1.2.2.2 Rights to quarantine 
 
The IHRs also lay out the rights that State Parties have with respect to the WHO and 
clarify domestic rights relating to public health emergencies.  As indicated in the IHRs, 
“States...have the sovereign rights to legislate and to implement legislation in pursuance 
of  their health policies.  In doing so they should uphold the purpose of  these 
Regulations”.655 The IHRs vest State Parties with the “right to quarantine” which allows 
them to take some action to restrict and protect its population as it sees fit, and the 
WHO is not in a position to uniformly constrain quarantine policy.  
 
The 2003 SARS outbreak in Singapore illustrates State Parties’ right to quarantine 
clearly.656 Possible patients were required to report to treatment centres; carry out 
quarantine with electric tagging, and destroy contaminated property.  All of  these 
abovementioned measures are adaptive to circumstances in individual states and are  
deemed acceptable under the IHRs.  However, every procedure to enforce quarantine 
will inevitably brings compromise of  civilians’ human rights protection to a certain 
extent.  It is therefore required that the health measures need to be “not more intrusive 
to persons than reasonably available alternatives that would achieve the appropriate level 
                                                      
654 Article 17 (d) IHRs. 
655 Article 3.4 IHRs. 
656 In April 2003, Singapore amended its Infectious Disease Act to “require persons with [possible 
SARS] to report to designated treatment centres, …enforce home quarantine with electronic tagging and 
forced detention, and allow the quarantine and destruction of  SARS-contaminated property”. “Milano 
Regulations, n 28; See also: Sapsin, J.W. et al. (2004) “SARS, Public Health, and Global Governance” 77 
Temple Law Review155, 159-161.  
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of  health protection”.657 
 
 
3.1.2.3 Precautionary entitlements to achieve a higher 
level of  health protection 
 
A state’s right to determine its appropriate level of  health protection has been paid due 
respect in international law.658 Under the IHRs, State Parties may also enjoy the right to 
choose its appropriate level of  health protection; they are free to choose the same or 
greater level of  health protection than WHO recommendations.659 There are two tracks in 
determining an appropriate level of  health protection: Member States may either choose 
to follow the WHO’s recommendations to adopt a general public health measure; or to 
adopt an additional health measure to achieve a greater level of  health protection. (Table 
3.1.2.4)   The application of  additional health measures can be deemed as another face 
of  the PA in international health, which will be introduced in the following paragraphs. 
 
 
3.1.2.4 Additional health measures 
 
As mentioned above, the IHRs attempt to balance a State Party’s right and duty in 
international law while implementing the PA in global disease surveillance networks.  A 
State Party may still choose to adopt additional health measures for an appropriate level 
of  health protection under scientific uncertainty.660 The imposition of  additional public 
                                                      
657 Article 17(d) IHRs. 
658 See sections 2.2.2.1 and 2.2.3.1.For example, the WTO recognised Members’ right to pursue a higher 
level of  health protection in EC - Hormones, Appellate Body Report, para 124. Article 95.3 of  the EC Treaty 
also provides that: “The Commission, in its proposals envisaged in paragraph 1 concerning health, safety, 
environmental protection and consumer protection, will take as a base a high level of  protection, taking 
into account in particular any new development based on scientific facts”.  
659 Article 43.1 (a) IHRs.  
660 Article 43.2 IHRs. 
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health measures represents the respect of  State Parties’ autonomy and sovereignty under 
a PHEIC for it further embodies the precautionary thinking in the IHRs.  Even in the 
situation of  insufficient scientific evidence, when the public health risk cannot be 
scientifically assessed or quantified, additional health measures can still be imposed but 
subject to timeous review upon available information from the WHO or other 
convincing organisations.  The adoption of  such additional health measures is considered 
the application of  the PA.  This version of  PA could be considered a prescriptive and 
moderate verion in light of  our discussion in the previoud chapter,661 which requires a 
precautionary action and minimum interference to international trade, albeit that the 
onus appears to remain on the invoking party.662  
 
An additional health measure can be adopted even under insufficiency of  scientific 
evidence of  a public health threat. However, in order to prevent the public health 
measures being applied arbitrarily, the imposition of  such measures needs to be based 
upon scientific principles or scientific evidence, available information from the WHO or 
other relevant convincing organisations663 Moreover, a state which implements this 
additional public health measure bear the duty to review the measure within three 
months to make sure that the public health measure is consistent with the advice of  the 
WHO and the criteria set in Article 43.2.664  
 
Further, the issue of  a temporary recommendation needs to avoid unnecessary 
interference with international traffic.665 Additional health measures can be implemented 
under WHO’s temporary recommendations in response to specific health risks or a 
                                                      
661 See sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.3.3.  
662 See section 3.3.1.  
663 Article 43.2 IHRs.  
664 Article 43.6 IHRs. 
665 Article 15.2 IHRs. 
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PHEIC.666 A higher level of  health protection may be also accepted on the condition of  
the health measures not be more restrictive of  international traffic and not more invasive 
or intrusive to individuals than reasonable alternative that would achieve appropriate level 
of  protection.667 In determine whether to adopt additional public health measures; State 
Parties need to consider scientific principles, available scientific evidence of  a risk to 
human health, the available information, and specific guidance of  advice from the 
WHO.668 In other words, State Party can still adopt a temporary health measure based on 
available pertinent information if  scientific evidence is insufficient.  Scientific evidence 
is not necessary required in the employment of  an additional health measure. 
 
In addition, in order to avoid misuse of  this provision, if  an additional public health 
measure adopted significantly interferes with international traffic,669 the implementing 
state bears the duty to provide the WHO with the public health rationale and relevant 
scientific information within 48 hours.670 State implements the additional public health 
measure is also obliged to review the measure within three months to make sure the 
public health measure consistent with the advice of  the WHO and the criteria set in 
Article 43.2.671  
                                                      
666 Article 43.1 IHRs. 
667 Article 43.1 IHRs 
668 Article 43.2 IHRs. 
669 Significant interference generally means refusal of  entry or departure of  international travelers, baggage, 
cargo, containers, conveyances, goods, and the like, or their delay, for more than 24 hours. Article 43.3 
IHRs. 
670 Article 43.5 IHRs. “Significant interference with international trade” means the conditions of  refusal 
of  entry or departure of  international travelers, baggage, cargo, containers, conveyances, goods, and the 
like, or their delay for more than 24 hours. 
671 The criteria set in Article 43.2 means: (a) scientific principles; (b) available scientific evidence of  a risk 
to human health, or where such evidence is insufficient, the available information including from WHO 
and other relevant intergovernmental organisations and international bodies; and (3) any available specific 
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3.1.2.5 Elements of  the precautionary approach in the 
IHRs 
 
The surveillance network and the mechanism of  additional health measures both 
demonstrate the significance of  precaution in the IHRs.  On the one hand, State Parties 
enjoy their sovereignty upon the implementation of  public health policies in adopting the 
PA; on the other hand, they are required to act according to the principle of  the IHRs, 
which aims to minimise the interference of  international traffic and trade as well as 
retaining the full respect for the dignity, human rights and fundamental freedom of  
individuals.672 
 
In summary, in order to achieve a greater level of  health protection than the WHO’s 
recommendations, the State Parties are entitled to adopt the PA under prescribed 
conditions.  The elements of  the PA in the IHRs include: 
 
 Uncertainty: the PA is applied when there is insufficient scientific evidence in virus 
surveillance and notification, which is based on scientific principles; available 
scientific evidence of  a risk to human health, or where such evidence is insufficient, 
available information from the WHO and other organisations, WHO guidance;673  
 Harm: Significant risk of  serious harm to human health;674  
 Action: the adoption of  additional health measures;675 
 Duty to review: The adopting Party should provide health rationale and review the 
said measure within 3 months;676 
 Burden of  proof: the adopting State Party should provide public health rationale 
                                                      
672 Article 3.1 IHRs. 
673 Article 43.2 IHRs. 
674 See section 3.1.2.2.1, Annex II IHRs.  
675 Article 43 IHRs.  
676 Article 43.6 IHRs.  
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and relevant scientific information;677 
 No more restrictive of  international trade and no more invasive or intrusive to 
persons than reasonably available alternatives that would achieve the appropriate 
level of  health protection.678 
 
Being compared with the PA model in the previous chapter, the PA in the IHRs shares 
the similarities of  a prescriptive and a moderate version of  the PA, which demands that 
the precautionary action is triggered at the “significant risk of  serious harm” threshold as 
well as causing minimum interference to international trade.  However, it is also 
noteworthy that the IHRs version appears to deviate from the typical Information 
Disclosure PA, and that the onus remains on the party invoking the precautionary 
measure.  
 
After the introduction of  the PA in the IHRs, it is also noteworthy to discuss the 
employment of  the approach in the regulation of  food safety in the WHO regime. 
  
 
3.1.3 The precautionary approach in the Codex Alimentarius  
 
The Codex Alimentarius Commission is set up by the WHO and Food and Agriculture 
Organization of  the UN (FAO)679 to develop food standards, guidelines and related texts 
under the Joint FAO/WHO Food Standard Programme.  It establishes the structure of  
“Risk Analysis”680 for application in the framework of  the Codex Alimentarius.  States 
are not forced to follow the Codex guidelines and standards for they appear to be 
                                                      
677 Article 43.5 IHRs.  
678 Article 43.1 IHRs.  
679 Food and Agriculture Organization of  the United Nations (FAO), http://www.fao.org/ . 
680 See section 3.1.3.1.  
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voluntary in international law; however, under the requirements of  the WTO SPS 
Agreement, the Codex guidelines are mandated to harmonise states’ national law into 
Codex.681 This is to say that under the international economic settings and the pressure 
of  WTO DSB mechanism,682 countries are often left with no option but to be in 
compliance with the standards of  the Codex Alimentarius.  Therefore the Codex 
Alimentarius has emerged as the official international standard in food safety after the 
WTO SPS agreement coming into force in 1995.683  
 
The PA is not officially introduced in the Codex Alimentarius system; yet the term 
“precaution” is identified as an “inherent element” of  risk analysis in the Codex 
Alimentarius Commission Procedure Manual (Codex Manual).684 In situations where health 
risks exist but scientific data are insufficient; the Codex Alimentatius Commission will 
not provide a “standard” but a related “text” which is based on available scientific 
information.685  
 
Further, the adoption of  a “Safety factor” is deemed as a form of  precautionary 
measures in international law.  In other words, the PA appears in the guise of  the 
“Safety factor” when scientific uncertainty abounds; specifically, the structure of  “Risk 
Analysis” implies that the precautionary thinking is at the stage of  risk management.686 
This will be addressed below. 
                                                      
681 Article 3.1 SPS Agreement requires states to base their sanitary and phytosanitary measures on 
international standards. Article 3 in Annex A SPS Agreement identifies the Codex Alimentarius 
Commission as the international standards for food safety. See also: Verkerk, R. (2009) “Codex 
Alimentarius: Focus on True Threats, not Disinformation” 77 Caduceus 24 (Verkerk Codex).  
682 See section 1.2.1.1.2.  
683 See section 2.2.2.2.  
684 Codex Alimentarius Commission Procedural Manual (18th edition) Joint FAO/WHO Food Standards 
Programme, FAO, Rome, 2008 (Codex Manual) n36. 
685 Codex Manual, n36 p77. 
686 Codex Alimentarius Commission Procedural Manual (18th edition) Joint FAO/WHO Food Standards 




3.1.3.1 Risk Analysis 
 
The Codex Alimentarius defines the structure of  risk analysis, which is comprised of  risk 
assessment, risk management and risk communication.687 Each is defined by the FAO in 
the following paragraphs (Figure 3.1.3.1): 
 
 Risk assessment 688  consists of  four steps: hazard identification; hazard 
characterisation; exposure assessment, and risk characterisation.  Risk assessment 
includes quantitative assessment and qualitative expressions of  risk. 
 Risk management689 is the process of  “weighing policy alternatives to accept, 
minimize or reduce risks and to select and implement appropriate options”. 
 Risk communication690 is a process of  exchanging information and opinion on risk 
among various stakeholders. 691  This can also be understood as “public 
engagement”692 in the context of  deliberate democracy. 
 
                                                      
687 Report of  the Joint FAO/WHO Expert Consultation, Application of  Risk Analysis to Food Standards Issues, 
Geneva, Switzerland, 13-17 March 1995, WHO/FNU/FOS/95.3 (Food Standard) p6; Codex Manual n36 
p68.  
688 Report of  the Joint FAO/WHO Expert Consultation, Application of  Risk Analysis to Food Standards Issues, 
Geneva, Switzerland, 13-17 March 1995, WHO/FNU/FOS/95.3 (Food Standard) p6; Codex Manual n36 
pp69-70. 
689 Report of  the Joint FAO/WHO Expert Consultation, Application of  Risk Analysis to Food Standards Issues, 
Geneva, Switzerland, 13-17 March 1995, WHO/FNU/FOS/95.3 (Food Standard) p6; Codex Manual n36 
pp70-72. 
690 Report of  the Joint FAO/WHO Expert Consultation, Application of  Risk Analysis to Food Standards Issues, 
Geneva, Switzerland, 13-17 March 1995, WHO/FNU/FOS/95.3 (Food Standard) p6; Codex Manual n36 
p72. 
691 Report of  the Joint FAO/WHO Expert Consultation, Application of  Risk Analysis to Food Standards Issues, 
Geneva, Switzerland, 13-17 March 1995, WHO/FNU/FOS/95.3.  





Notably, the EU also recognises that the PA should be considered in the structure of  risk 
analysis which is comprised of  three elements including risk assessment, risk 
management and risk communication.693 The EC’s Communication from the Commission on 
the Precautionary Principle identifies four stages of  risk assessment which should be 
performed before a precautionary action is taken: “hazard identification, hazard 
characterisation, appraisal of  exposure, and risk characterisation”.694 The PA is deemed 
particularly relevant to risk management for adopting public health measures after a 
scientific evaluation of  a potential public health risk (See Figure 3.1.3.1).  Specifically, 
the embodiment of  the PA in the Codex Almentarius is the adoption of  a “Safety factor” 
in establishing a health standard at the stage of  risk management.  Therefore the PA in 
the Codex could also be deemed as a prescriptive PA which requires a precautionary 
action to be employed.  
 
                                                      
693 Communication from the Commission on the Precautionary Principle, Commission of  the European 
Communities (CEC), Brussels, 2 February 2000, n299.  
694 Annex III Communication from the Commission on the Precautionary Principle, Commission of  the 















3.1.3.2 The adoption of  the “Safety factor” and 
“Additional safety factor” 
 
The employment of  safety margins is deemed as a typical precautionary action in 
international environmental protection.695 Based on the same concept, in the process of  
risk management, the Joint Expert Committee on Food Additives (JECFA) of  The 
Codex Alimentarius Committee uses the “Safety Factor” as a margin of  safety in 
establishing the standard of  an Acceptable Daily Intake (ADI).  The ADI is estimated 
by JECFA on “the amount of  a food additive, expressed on a body weight basis, which 
can be ingested daily over a lifetime without appreciable health risk”.696  
 
In the determination of  the standard of  an ADI, the “Safety factor” can be used in three 
folds: first, to choose a low “no toxic effect” level as the “no-observed-effect level”;697 
second, an additional safety factor is often used by assuming humans are ten times more 
sensitive than experimental animals, which introduces a 10-fold variation in sensitivity in 
the human population.698  Third, it is also noted in a report of  the Codex Alimentarius 
that a “temporary ADI” which takes into account relevant public health risks and food 
technological aspects often uses an additional safety factor.699 A “temporary ADI” is defined 
by JECFA if  the use of  the substance is safe over a short period of  time, but the safety 
data are insufficient to conclude that use of  the substance is safe over a lifetime.  In this 
                                                      
695 See section 2.3.1.3.1 for the discussion of  different types of  precautionary actions. Trouwborst States, 
pp177-179 n232. 
696 WHO Environmental Health Criteria document No 70, Principles for the Safety Assessment of  Food Additives 
and Containments in Food, Geneva, 1987. 
697 If  a toxic effect is found at the 2 % level and a “no toxic effect” at 1% level, the 1% level will be the 
“no-observed-effect level”. In this case, the no-observed-effect level lies between 1% and 2% levels, if  no 
toxicological evaluations are done at intermediary levels, the choice of  the 1% level as the 
no-observed-effect level introduces a safety factor. See Codex Alimentarius Document, Guidelines for Simple 
Evaluation of  Food Additive Intake, CAC/GL 03-1989, p3 (Codex Guidelines). 
698 Codex Alimentarius Document, Guidelines for Simple Evaluation of  Food Additive Intake, CAC/GL 03-1989, 
p3.  
699 Codex Alimentarius Document, Glossary of  Terms and Definitions (Residues of  Veterinary Drugs in 
Foods), CAC/MISC 5-1993, amended 2003, pp2-3 (Codex Glossary). 
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case, a “higher-than-normal safety factor” is used in establishing a temporary ADI.700 
 
Hence, the spirit of  precaution, particularly a prescriptive version of  the PA, has been 
reflected in the Codex system. We can therefore identify the relevant features of  the PA 
in the Codex Almentarius in the following section.  
 
 
3.1.3.3 Elements of  Risk Analysis 
 
The Codex identifies the basic features of  a risk analysis as follows:701 
 
 The adoption of  a “Safety factor” of  an ADI and an “additional safety factor” of  a 
temporary ADI is a form of  a prescriptive PA in the Codex Alimentarius;702 
 The standards or guidelines need to be evaluated and reviewed “in the light of  
newly generated scientific data”. 703  This requirement is consistent with the 
requirements of  an “Information Disclosure” PA, which demands that the 
precautionary measure is continually monitored.  
 These guidelines and standards are based on principles of  scientific analysis and 
evidence;704 
 Health and safety aspects decisions should be based on risk assessment;705 
 Legitimate factors relevant for the health protection of  consumers and fair trade 
                                                      
700 Codex Alimentarius Document, Glossary of  Terms and Definitions (Residues of  Veterinary Drugs in 
Foods), CAC/MISC 5-1993, amended 2003, p3. 
701 Statement of  Principle Concerning the Role of  Science in the Codex Decision-Making Process and the Extent to which 
other Factors are Taken into Account , Decision of  the 21st Session of  the Commission, 1995, and the Statement 
of  Principle Relating to the Role of  Food Safety Risk Assessment, Decision of  the 22nd Session of  the Commission, 
1997. See Appendix: General Decisions of  the Commission in Codex Manual, n36.  
702 Codex Glossary n699 pp2-3. 
703 Codex Manual, n36, p68. 
704 Statement of  Principle Concerning the Role of  Science in the Codex Decision-Making Process and the Extent to which 
other Factors are Taken into Account , Decision of  the 21st Session of  the Commission, 1995, See Appendix: 
General Decisions of  the Commission in Codex Manual, n36 p171. 
705 Statement of  Principle Relating to the Role of  Food Safety Risk Assessment, Decision of  the 22nd Session of  the 
Commission, 1997. See Appendix: General Decisions of  the Commission in Codex Manual, n36 p 173. 
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need to be considered;706 
 Legitimate concerns of  governments when establishing domestic legislation need to 
be considered;707 
 Health measures should not create unjustified barriers to trade;708   
 Health measures should be applied consistently, openly, transparently and be 
documented;709  
 Recognising a “functional separation of  risk assessment and risk management”;710 
 Considering the function of  “food labelling” and constrains of  the production or 
processing methods in developing countries.711 
 
In summary, the Codex Alimentarius recognises that the PA is applied in scientific 
uncertainty and is to be triggered by risk assessment.  The Codex also favours a 
prescriptive PA which introduces a precautionary health measure; the duty of  constant 
monitoring from an Information Disclosure PA and the duty of  minimising unjustified 
barriers to trade from a moderate PA are recognised.  However, in terms of  allocation 
of  the burden of  proof, the Codex does not explicitly address whether a shift of  the 
burden of  proof  is allowed.  This may be referred back to the WTO SPS Agreement 
when disputes arise. 
 
When scientific uncertainty persists, the Codex Alimentarius will not provide specific 
                                                      
706 Codex Manual, n36 p71. 
707 Statement of  Principle Concerning the Role of  Science in the Codex Decision-Making Process and the Extent to which 
other Factors are Taken into Account Decision of  the 21st Session of  the Commission, 1995, See Appendix: 
General Decisions of  the Commission in Codex Manual, n36 p171. 
708 Codex Manual, n36 p71. 
709 Codex Manual, n36, p68. 
710 Codex Manual, n36, p69. 
711 Statement of  Principle Concerning the Role of  Science in the Codex Decision-Making Process and the Extent to which 
other Factors are Taken into Account , Decision of  the 21st Session of  the Commission, 1995, See Appendix: 
General Decisions of  the Commission in Codex Manual, n36 p172. 
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guidelines or standards but only relevant text based on available information.712 The 
structure of  risk analysis indicates that the PA is particularly relevant to the stage of  risk 
management.  Though the PA is not officially written into the Codex Alimentarius, the 
requirements of  its application appear to be more elaborate than the previous instrument 
in the IHRs.  Common factors of  the PA identified by the Codex Alimentarius and the 
IHRs include: the basis of  scientific assessment or scientific information;713 considering 
updated data by review and evaluation;714 taking globalisation into account by demanding 
the precautionary action does not create an unjustified barrier to trade.715 It also requires 
that the approach should be consistent, open and transparent.716  
 
In addition, it is also noteworthy that the Codex Alimentarius recognises the function of  
“food labelling”717 which may act to address the controversies of  unknown risks to 
human health, such as food labelling on GMO products.718  When scientific evidence is 
insufficient or incomplete, food labelling may serve as a means to inform consumers to 
distinguish potential health risks associated with a specific product.719 
 
After the discussion of  the WHO’s regulation on food safety, we will visit another 
important multilateral environmental agreement (MEA) regarding the regulation of  the 
trans-boundary movement of  biotechnology products.  Attention will be turned to the 
Cartagena Protocol of  which the PA is identified as playing a profound role in regulating 
                                                      
712 Codex Manual, n36 p69. 
713 Statement of  Principle Relating to the Role of  Food Safety Risk Assessment, Decision of  the 22nd Session of  the 
Commission, 1997. See Appendix: General Decisions of  the Commission in Codex Manual, n36 p 173; 
Article 43.2 IHRs n45.  
714 Codex Manual, p68; Article 43 IHRs . 
715 Codex Manual, p71; Article 43.1 IHRs. 
716 Codex Manual, p69; Article 42 IHRs.  
717 Codex Manual, p138. 
718 See section 2.2.2.2.3. 
719 See relevant discussion in Cheyne, I. (2009) “Proportionality, Proximity and Environmental Labelling in 
WTO Law” 12 Journal of  International Environmental Law 927. 
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health risks arising from biotechnology products. 
 
 
3.2 Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety 
 
In addition to the WHO system, many multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) 
also incorporate the PA in their mechanisms to regulate risks to health and the 
environment.720 The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (CPB) is the first international 
instrument which provides a regulatory framework relevant to the PA to reconcile free 
trade and environmental protection.721 The use and release of  genetically modified 
organisms (GMOs) in contemporary biotechnology has been aggressively expanding, 
however, the extent to which GMOs pose risks of  adverse effects on human health still 
remains uncertain.722 Therefore trade conflicts have arisen over the regulation and 
labelling of  GMOs products.  It is in this context that the Cartagena Protocol arises to 
provide a regulatory framework for the international trading of  biotechnology products. 
The objective of  the Cartagena Protocol is: 
 
to contribute to ensuring an adequate level of  protection in the field of  the safe transfer, handling 
and use of  living modified organisms resulting from modern biotechnology that may have adverse 
effects on the conservation and sustainable use of  biological diversity, taking also into account risks 
to human health.723 
 
                                                      
720 For example: 1992 Convention on Biodiversity (CBD), the 1992 Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, the 1989 Basel Convention on the Control of  Transboundary Movements of  Hazardous Wastes 
and Hazardous Substances, the 1996 Protocol to the Convention on the Prevention of  Marine Pollution by 
Dumping of  Wastes and other Matter. See also section 2.2; Bernasconi-Osterwalder, N. et al. (2006) (eds) 
Environment and Trade: A Guild to WTO Jurisprudence, Earthscan, London UK, pp266-267 
(Bernasconi-Osterwalder WTO) 
721 Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (CPB). It was adopted at the Conference of  the Parties to the 
Convention on Biodiversity on 29 January 2000, and entered into force on 11 September 2003 n46. 
722 See section 2.2.2.2.3. 
723 Article 1 CPB. 
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The CPB seeks to protect biological diversity from the potential risks posed by living 
modified organisms (LMOs) resulting from modern biotechnology.724 An LMO is 
defined in the Protocol as “any living organism that possesses a novel combination of  
genetic material obtained through the use of  modern technology”. 725  Modern 
technology means the application of  in vitro nucleic acid techniques and cell fusion that 
overcome natural physiological reproductive or recombination barriers.  Techniques 
used in traditional breeding and selection are excluded from the definition.726  
 
 
3.2.1 The Advanced Informed Agreement (AIA) procedure 
 
The Protocol devises the Advance Informed Agreement (AIA) procedure as a new 
information sharing mechanism under the Biosafety Clearing-House; this avails the 
contracting parties to conduct a risk assessment of  imported LMOs.727 The handling, 
use, or trans-boundary movements of  LMOs that may have an adverse effect on the 
conservation and sustainable use of  biological diversity can be regulated according to the 
PA.728  
 
Under the AIA rules, the exporter is required to send written notification of  the intended 
export to the importer.729 The notification must contain specific information including a 
risk assessment730 about the potential adverse effects of  the imported LMOs.731 The 
importer is obliged to acknowledge receipt of  the notification and to take a decision of  
                                                      
724 See n555. 
725 Article 3(g) CPB. 
726 Article 3(i) CPB. 
727 The AIA procedure is set out in Articles 7-10, and Article 12 of  the Cartagena Protocol, which forms 
the core of  the Protocol.  
728 Article 1 CPB. 
729 Article 8 CPB. 
730 Article 5, Annex I (k), and Annex II(j) CPB.  
731 Annex I, para (k) CPB.  
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whether to allow import within 270 days.732 The importer can either: (1) approve the 
import and any subsequent imports; (2) prohibit the proposed import; (3) request 
additional information, or (4) extend the period for decision making.733 The importer has 
to set out the reasons for its decision unless the consent to import is unconditional.734 
 
The mechanism of  the AIA procedure still leaves a fair degree of  flexibility for the 
importing state, for example, Parties my proceed according to the domestic regulatory 
framework, 735  adopt simplified procedures, 736  or enter into bilateral and regional 
agreements as long as these are consistent with the objective of  the Protocol.737 
 
 
3.2.2 Precaution in the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety 
 
The AIA procedure requires that an import decision must be based on a risk assessment. 
A decision to ban or restrict the import of  an LMO under the AIA procedure needs to 
be based on a “risk assessment carried out in a scientifically sound manner”.738 Due to 
the lack of  a clear consensus on the precise requirements for a risk assessment, the 
Protocol also sets out general principles, methodology, and points to a proper risk 
management.739 It allows parties to take precautionary measures by stipulating: 
 
Lack of  scientific certainty due to insufficient relevant scientific information and knowledge 
regarding the extent of  the potential adverse effects of  a living modified organism…shall not 
                                                      
732 Article 10.3 CPB. 
733 Article 10.3 CPB. 
734 Article 10.4 CPB. 
735 Article 9.2(c) CPB. 
736 Article 13.1(b) CPB. 
737 Article 14.1 CPB. 
738 Article 10.1, Article 15, and Annex III CPB.  
739 Annex III CPB. 
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prevent that Party from taking a decision, as appropriate, with regard to the import of  the living 
modified organism…in order to avoid or minimize such potential adverse effects.740 
 
The Protocol is considered the most elaborate agreement on the PA in international law. 
It aims for the development of  LMOs to be based on the PA to safeguard public health 
concerns from unknown risks of  a novel technology.741 The notion of  precaution has a 
pervasive influence on the CPB. Elements of  the PA are reflected in several provisions 
of  the Protocol, such as: 
 
 The preamble, reaffirming "the precautionary approach contained in Principle 15 of  
the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development742"; 
 Article 1, indicating that the objective of  the Protocol is "in accordance with the 
precautionary approach contained in Principle 15 of  the Rio Declaration on 
Environment and Development"; 
 Article 10.6 and 11.8, which states "Lack of  scientific certainty due to insufficient 
relevant scientific information and knowledge regarding the extent of  the potential 
adverse effects of  an LMO on biodiversity, taking into account risks to human 
health, shall not prevent a Party of  import from taking a decision, as appropriate, 
with regard to the import of  the LMO in question, in order to avoid or minimize 
such potential adverse effects."; and 
 Annex III on risk assessment, which notes that "Lack of  scientific knowledge or 
scientific consensus should not necessarily be interpreted as indicating a particular 
level of  risk, an absence of  risk, or an acceptable risk". 
                                                      
740 Article 10.6 and 11.8 CPB. 
741 Winham, G. (2003) “International Regime Conflict in Trade and Environment: the Biosafety Protocol 
and the WTO” 2(2) Word Trade Review 131. 
742 The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, UN Doc.A/CONF.151/26, Vol I, Annex I, 
1992, (Rio Declaration). See n286. 
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Notably, the PA invoked in the CPB as an operational device to protect human health 
appears to have significant flexibility.  The CPB follows the Rio Declaration on 
Environment and Development using the phrase “precautionary approach” to describe the 
adoption of  a precautionary concept on environmental and health protection. 743 
However, the Cartagena Protocol appears to be a stronger version744 than the Rio 
Declaration since it does not have the threshold requirement of  “threats of  serious or 
irreversible damage” and “cost-effective measures”.745  
 
The PA is adopted in the CPB as legitimate grounds to take a precautionary measure and 
is further limited by two conditions: the obligation of  the importer to review the decision 
with new scientific information,746 and the need for the measure to be only imposed to 
the extent necessary to prevent adverse effects within the territory of  the importer.747 It 
is noteworthy that “social-economic considerations” also have a role to play in reaching 
an import decision regarding the value of  conservation and sustainable use of  biological 
diversity in the CPB.  In addition, the parties are also “encouraged to cooperate on 
research on any social-economic impacts of  LMOs, especially on indigenous and local 
communities”.748  
 
The implementation of  a precautionary measure is required to be in accordance with a 
risk assessment, but the importer’s obligation to review does not have a specific time 
                                                      
743 The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, UN Doc.A/CONF.151/26, Vol I, Annex I, 
1992, (Rio Declaration). See n286.  
744 The distinction of  “Strong or Weak versions” of  the precautionary approach is addressed in section 
2.3.3. 
745 Mackenzie, R. and Eggers, B. (2000) “The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety”, Journal of  International 
Economic Law 525-543 (Mackenzie/Eggers).  
746 Articles 12 CPB. 
747 Article 16(2) CPB. 
748 Article 26 CPB. Covelli Biotech, n373   
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limit.  In other words, the importer is not burdened with an ongoing obligation to keep 
the measure under review unless requested by the exporter to do so.   
 
In summary, the features of  the PA in the Cartagena Protocol comprise of  the following 
considerations:  
 The trade decision is made under scientific uncertainty due to insufficient relevant 
scientific information and knowledge regarding the extent of  the potential adverse 
effects of  an LMO; 
 Risks of  an LMO to human health; 
 The import decision is based on a risk assessment;749 
 The risk assessment of  the importing product can be expected to be carried out by 
the exporter.750 In other words, the burden of  proof  appears to be laid on the 
exporter; 
 Importer’s duty to review the decision;751 
 Trade measures need to be imposed only to the extent necessary;752 
 Other “social-economic considerations”, especially on indigenous and local 
communities.753 
 
These features indicate that the PA in the CPB is also a prescriptive one by which the 
import decision is triggered by risk assessment.  It appears to be a relatively strong 
version of  the PA; however, it also states that a trade measure can only be imposed to the 
extent necessary to prevent potentially adverse effects on biological diversity.  It may be 
fair to say that this version is more akin to the Information Disclosure PA with an 
                                                      
749 Article 5 CPB.  
750 Annex I (k), and Annex II(j) CPB. 
751 Article 12 CPB. 
752 Article 16(2) CPB. 
753 Article 26 CPB.  
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emphasis on the duty to review as well as a shift of  burden of  proof.  
 
 
3.3 Conclusion  
3.3.1 Regimes conflict and precautionary approaches 
 
It is observed that the discrepancies of  PAs exist not only between national and 
international planes; regimes conflict754 also appears in individual legal instruments in 
international law.755 Research shows that domestic health or environmental regulations 
often allow a comprehensive employment of  a PA to safeguard human health;756 
however, at the international level, when global trade interests are involved, and the risks 
are often undervalued, the application of  a PA in the protection of  public health thus 
appears sporadically.  
 
 
    3.3.1.1 IHRs v SPS Agreement  
 
The features of  PAs in the IHRs757 are similar to those in the WTO SPS Agreement.758 
These are both prescriptive and moderate version of  the PA; the need of  information 
disclosure is also recognised in both instruments.  Some common elements of  scientific 
uncertainty have been identified; risks to human health; based on available information; 
the adoption of  a specific health measure for a higher level of  health protection, the 
adopting party is obliged to review the measure within three months, and the measure 
                                                      
754 Helfer, L.R. (2004) “Regime Shifting: The TRIPS Agreement and New Dynamics of  International 
Intellectual Property Lawmaking” 29 Yale Journal of  International Law 1 (Helfer TRIPS) n16.  
755 See section 3.3.2.  
756 De Sadeleer, p196; Sunstein, C.R. (2010) “Irreversibility” Law, Probability and Risk, 4 July 2010 
(Sunstein Irreversibility). 
757 IHRs, n45.  
758 SPS agreement, n39.  
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should not be more restrictive to international trade.759 However, there are three major 
differences between these two instruments:  
 The burden of  proof  appears to remain on the invoking state in the IHRs. 
 Regarding the enforcement mechanism, the IHRs are only equipped with 
consultation between states,760 while the WTO Members can resort to its Dispute 
Settlement Body,761 which is regarded as binding and effective in international 
dispute settlements.  State Parties of  both organisations may choose the WTO 
DSB for an efficient resolution.  The WTO enforcement mechanism plays an 
important role in ensuring states take measures in compliance with the IHRs.762 
 
 
    3.3.1.2 Catagena Protocol v SPS Agreement  
 
The most prominent regimes conflict appears in the Cartagena Protocol763 and the 
WTO SPS Agreement.  The Cartagena Protocol has potential inconsistency with the 
SPS Agreement in the banning regulation of  importing GMOs.  The PA invoked in the 
Cartagena Protocol is an operational device with more flexibility to safeguard human 
health.  Specifically, the procedural requirements of  GMO importation are more 
stringent in the AIA procedure764 in the Cartagena Protocol than those in the SPS 
Agreement.  The burden of  proof  under the Cartagena Protocol appears to be 
allocated on the exporting party since the Protocol allows the importing party to require 
a risk assessment from the exporting party.765 The importing party may also require the 
                                                      
759 See sections 3.1.2.5 and 4.2.3.  
760 Article 43.4 IHRs. 
761 DSB, see section 1.2.1.1.2.  
762 Tigerstrom, B. (2005) “The Revised International Health Regulations and Restraint of  National Health 
Measures, 13 Health Law Journal 35 
763 CPB, see section 3.2 n46. 
764 See section 3.2.1.  
765 Article 15.2 CPB.  
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cost of  risk assessment to be borne by the exporting party.766 State Party of  both legal 
instruments may find conflicts in prescribing relevant national laws.767 
 
Further, the implementation of  a precautionary measure is not necessarily based on 
scientific justification; the obligation of  the importer to review does not have a specific 
time frame in the Cartagena Protocol; while in the SPS Agreement, any provisional 
measure is obliged to be reviewed within a reasonable period of  time.768 According to the 
Cartagena Protocol, the importer does not have an ongoing obligation to keep the 
measure under review unless requested to do so by the exporter.769 For example, the EC 
was challenged by the US, Canada, and Argentina in the recent WTO EC – Biotech case770 
on its regulations of  GMOs imports.  The EC claimed that its import suspension of  
GMOs was consistent with its obligations in the CPB, while the US, Canada and 
Argentina accused its “undue delay” as a violation of  the requirements in Article 8 and 
Annex C (1)(a) of  the SPS Agreement. 
 
In order to avoid inconsistency with other international agreements, the Preamble of  the 
Cartagena Protocol suggests that trade and environmental agreements should be 
mutually supported, and the interpretation of  the Protocol should not lead to a change in 
the rights and obligations under existing international agreements.  A complementary 
relationship between trade-related provisions of  environmental treaties and WTO law 
has been implied, and conflicts should be avoided through conciliatory interpretation.771 
However, in terms of  dispute resolution, similar to the clash of  the IHRs and the SPS 
                                                      
766 Article 15.3 Cartagena Protocol. 
767 Covelli, N. (2003) “The Health Regulation of  Biotech Foods under the WTO Agreements” 6(4) Journal 
of  International Economic Law 773.  
768 Article 5.7 SPS.  
769 Article 12 CPB.  
770 EC – Biotech, WT/DS 291, WT/DS292, WT/DS293, n373. 
771 Mackenzie/Eggers, n745. 
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Agreement, states of  these two legal regimes will also resort to the WTO for 
enforcement.  It is therefore proposed to harmonise the requirements of  the PA in the 
two organisations to avoid conflicts and contradiction in international public health law. 
 
Evidence shows that the PA has been widely practised in the regulation of  health risks 
arising from virus transmission and biotechnology in international public health law. 
Although being employed without a uniform name, prescriptive PAs have appeared in 
different guises of  risk management in contemporary society.  The IHRs772 incorporate 
the mechanism of  the adoption of  “additional health measures”773 which aims to 
prompt detection of  disease transmission; 774  the Codex Alimentarius 775  consists the 
structure of  “risk analysis” which focuses on managing the risk from food;776 the 
adoption of  “Safety factor” or “Additional safety factor”777 for the establishment of  a 
temporary ADI,778  and the Cartagena Protocol 779  includes an “Advance Informed 
Agreement” (AIA) system780 which attempts to monitor the transboundary movement 
of  GMO products.781 All the above devices are deemed as the employment of  a 









772 IHRs, n45.  
773 See section 3.1.2.4.  
774 See section 3.1.2.3. 
775 Codex Alimentarius, n36.  
776 See section 3.2.1. 
777 See section 3.1.3.2.  
778 See section 3.1.3.2.  
779 Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (CPB) n46.  
780 See section 3.2.1. Articles 7-12 CPB.  
781 See section 3.3.1. 
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3.3.2 Elements of  the precautionary approach in the 
international public health regime 
 
In summary, it can be concluded from the above discussions that a single approach 
which comprises a prescriptive, information disclosure and moderate version of  the PA is 
preferred in the international public health law regime.  A precautionary measure 
triggered by risk assessment is essential in this model, a need to restrain the use to avoid 
unnecessary interference to international trade and trafiic is identified, and the 
requirement of  information disclosure is recognised, albeit that the shift of  burden of  
proof  is to be determined on a case-to-case basis.  To conclude, the PA employed in 
international public health law comprises the following common features characteristics: 
 Scientific uncertainty or potential adverse impact to human health;782 
 Additional health measures or additional safety factors can be adopted;783 
 Risk assessment is suggested to be a trigger of  a health measure; if  scientific 
evidence is insufficient to carry out a full risk assessment, the health measure 
should be based on scientific principle, available pertinent information or 
suggestions from international organsiations;784 
 Duty to review the health measure within a reasonable period of  time;785 
 The health measure should be necessary , which means the health measure should 
be no more restrictive of  international trade and traffic than reasonably available 
alternatives;786 
 Other legitimate concerns including the protection of  consumers, fair trade, 
                                                      
782 See WHO Uncertainty Report n210; Article 1 IHRs; Codex Manual, n36 p77; Article 10.6 and 11.8 
CPB.  
783 See sections 3.1.2.4, 3.1.3.2 and 3.2.1.  
784 Article 43.2 IHRs; Statement of  Principle Concerning the Role of  Science in the Codex Decision-Making Process and 
the Extent to which other Factors are Taken into Account , Decision of  the 21st Session of  the Commission, 1995, 
See Appendix: General Decisions of  the Commission in Codex Manual, n36 p171; Article 5 CPB.  
785 Article 43.6 IHRs; Codex Manual, n36, p68 ; Article 12 CPB. 
786 Article 43.1 IHRs; Codex Manual, n36, p71; Article 16.2 CPB.  
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government domestic regulation, social-economic impact may also be taken into 
account.787 
 
It is noteworthy that the health measure should pay due respect to free trade and avoid 
creating unnecessary barriers to international trade.788 This has resonance with the WHO 
“Moderate Precaution”789 model which aims to reconcile health protection and global free 
trade.  It can therefore be assumed that a prescriptive, moderate model as well as an 
information disclosure model which has a special emphasis on the duty to review, could 
sit well in the trade word.  
 
In order to have a better grasp of  the operation of  the PA under the tension of  health 
and trade, we will proceed wth an exploration of  the PA in the WTO regime, which will 
be contrasted with the common features identified in the health sphere in this chapter.  
The differences will be further analysed and an argument for the preferred model of  the 
PA in the IP regime will be set out.  
                                                      
787 Article 26 CPB; Codex Manual, n36, p71; Statement of  Principle Concerning the Role of  Science in the Codex 
Decision-Making Process and the Extent to which other Factors are Taken into Account , Decision of  the 21st Session 
of  the Commission, 1995, See Appendix: General Decisions of  the Commission in Codex Manual, n36 
p171. 
788 See n784.  
789 See section 2.3.3.3.  
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4 The Precautionary Approach in Practice: International Economic 
Law 
 
The WTO has a very different mandate from the WHO, but it has become one of  the 
most important international organisations affecting international health issues due to its 
effective mechanism for dispute settlement.790  The winning party may be granted 
legitimate cause to issue trade sanction on the other party under the WTO DSB, as 
discussed in the previous chapter, Members of  different organisations will resort to the 
WTO for resolving health-related trade disputes.  
 
The WTO is the major institution that promotes global free trade.  Its aim is to 
minimise trade barriers among countries in oreder to progress maximum economic 
interests.791 Trade liberalism, global market access and the elimination of  tariffs as 
barriers to global trade and non-tariff  barriers are primary concerns of  the WTO.792 In 
order to preserve certain non-economic values including the protection of  human health 
and environment under global world trade, the WTO system creates specific rules 
exempting Members from compliance with the general rules of  its “free trade” 
principle.793  
 
The PA provides a safety margin and appears in the WTO as an exemption to free trade 
rules; however, this comes in different guises under different headings.  Each iteration 
of  the PA carries different weight in its legal instrument.  Some appear in the exception 
provisions; others are reflected in the excluding provisions as the so-called “conditional 
                                                      
790 Kelly, C.R. (2006) “Power, Linkage and Accommodation: The WTO as an International Actor and Its 
Influence on Other Actors and Regimes” 24 Berkley Journal of  International Law 79. See section 1.2.1.1.2.  
791 See relevant introduction of  the WTO in section 1.2.1. 
792 See section 1.2.1.1. 
793 See section 1.2.1.2. 
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794 See section 1.2.1.2 for the discussion of  “conditional rights” n118.  












Interpretation of  exception rules 
 
The understanding and interpretation of  a treaty or an agreement shall be referred to its 
objectives and purposed in goodwill throughout the legal structure.  According to 
“general rules of  interpretation” in the Vienna Convention, “A treaty shall be interpreted 
in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of  the 
treaty in their context and in the light of  its object and purpose”.796 In other words, the 
whole legal structure which should be taken into account including its preamble, annexes, 
further instruments, subsequent agreements, subsequent practice and any relevant rules 
                                                      















of  international law.  Moreover, when the textual approach referred to above still leaves 
the meaning ambiguous or obscure, then the preparatory work of  the treaty may be used 
as a further means for interpretation.797 
 
In this chapter, we will examine the PA in the WTO regime, specifically in the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),798 the Agreement on the Application of  
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement) 799  and the Agreement on 
Trade-Related Aspects of  Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement).800 We shall 
see that, in contrast to the examples in the previous chapter, the PA has an ambiguous 
appearance in the WTO regime, as it is not often recognised as being within the domain 
of  exceptions or exclusions to Members’ obligations.  However, the PA is found to have 
a more assertive presence in the SPS Agreement, while WTO Members’ determination to 
adopt a higher level of  health protection has been recognised as a “right” instead of  a 
“defence” in the trade world.  
 
In addition to examining current operation of  the PA as a means to protect international 
health, this chapter also considers the extent to which precaution should play a role in 
contemporary IP systems.  Similar to the approach taken in examining precaution in the 
GATT and SPS,801 this chapter will also visit the practice of  the PA in the IP regime by 
means of  scrutinising exemptions in TRIPS in the context of  risk and health 
management.802 The PA in TRIPS is also found to be ambiguous; yet the contour of  the 
                                                      
797 Brownlie, I. (2003) Principles of  Public International Law (6th edition) Oxford, p27 (Brownlie Principles) 
n132. Brownlie stated that, “legitimate interests may play a role in creating exceptions to existing rules and 
brings about the progressive development of  international law”.  
798 The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1947” or “GATT) n47. 
799 Agreement on the Application of  Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS) n39 
800 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of  Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), Annex 1C to WTO 
Agreement n1. 
801 See sections 4.1 and 4.2.  
802 See section 4.3.  
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PA can still be delineated by means of  analysing the legal status of  obligations and 
exemptions in the TRIPS. We will see that, instead of  seeking a new legal doctrine for 
addressing Members’ reluctance to rely on compulsory licensing on the grounds of  a 
public health emergency, a PA reading of  the existing text would significantly contribute 
to the enhanced use of  other existing tools and stronger political and/or ethical 
arguments of  this measure.803  
 
We will first introduce the PA in the GATT which appears in the context of  “health 
exception provision”804 and “security exception provision”805 in the General Agreement. 
 
 
4.1 Precaution in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
 
Precaution appears under the heading of  “exceptions” in the GATT.  Though the 
wording of  the GATT does not include explicit requirement of  the role of  science and 
precaution, it appears in the articles that WTO Members (Members) are left with 
sufficient space to employ precautionary measures to protect human life or health.806 
These include the health exception and the security exception;807 both are comprised of  
exemption to free trade and suggest the rationale of  risk management on health and 
security grounds.  Limited exceptions to general rules in the WTO regime are deemed 
legitimate while taking account of  the interests of  third parties.  
 
                                                      
803 For example, section 5.2.1.2 deals with the “like-product” analysis borrowed from the Asbestos case, 
and enables a new reading of  the discrimination/differential treatment disctinction made in the case with 
reference to TRIPS Article 27.1.  
804 GATT XX(b) n47. 
805 GATT XXI n47. 
806 Bernasconi-Osterwalder, N. et al. (2006) Environment and Trade: A Guide to WTO Jurisprudence, Earthscan, 
London, UK (Bernasconi-Osterwalder WTO) n720, p257. 
807 Article XX (b) and Article XXI GATT. 
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The role of  risk and precaution has been emerging as a topic of  contentious debate in 
relation to the health exception provision of  WTO law.  Prominent cases have arisen in 
recent years to test the clash of  free trade and health protection.808 The WTO appears to 
be willing to leave leeway for health protection under scientific uncertainty in the trade 
world. However, the application of  the PA on health and security grounds has been 
restrictive and limited for fear of  such use resulting in protectionism.  
 
According to the rationale of  the PA, health and security measures are expected to be 
promptly adopted to cope with uncertain risks before the advent of  the disaster.  
Though its argument appears to legitimise exemption under the rules of  free trade; 
however, if  being adopted arbitrarily without transparency, the PA is susceptible to the 
operation of  unilateral protectionism in international trade.  Hence its application has 
been hesitatant and fragmented in the WTO due to the lack of  a clear definition and a 
harmonised mechanism for invocation.809 
 
 
4.1.1 Health exception in GATT 
 
Article XX (b) concerns measures which are “necessary to protect human, animal or plant 
life or health”.  Members have the autonomy to adopt necessary precautionary 
measures to protect human, animal or plant life or health.  The Appellate Body has also 
                                                      
808 EC – Asbestos, EC – Hormones, Canada – Pharmaceutical patents, India – Pharmaceutical patents, EC – Biotech, 
and EC – Continued Suspension(Hormones II). European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and 
Asbestos-Containing Products (EC – Asbestos), WT/DS27/AB/R, adopted 25 September 1997; EC – Measures 
Concerning Meat and Meat Products (EC – Hormones), WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R, adopted 13 
February 1998; Canada – Patent Protection of  Pharmaceutical Products (Canada – Pharmaceutical Patents), 
WT/DS114/R, adopted 17 March 2000; India – Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical 
Products (India – Patents), WT/DS50/AB/R, adopted 16 January 1998; EC – Measures Affecting the Approval 
and Marketing of  Biotech Products (EC – Biotech), WT/DS291/R, WT/DS292/R, WT/DS293/R, adopted 29 
September 2006; United States – Continued Suspension of  Obligations in the EC – Hormones Dispute (Hormones II), 
WT/DS320/AB/R, adopted 16 October 2008. See section 2.2.2.2. 
809 See section 5.1.1.2.  
  187
ruled that some important principles developed from the SPS Agreement810are equally 
applicable under the health exception provision.811  
 
 
4.1.1.1 Purpose of  the health exception provision 
 
The policy objective pursued by the precautionary measure must be the protection of  life 
or health of  humans, animals or plants, and the said measure must be necessary to fulfill 
the policy objective.  The precautionary health measure inconsistent with the WTO 
obligations should be examined for its legitimate objectives within the interpretation of  
Article XX (b), and it should pass the necessity test and the proportionality test in order 
to prevent abuse of  this article.812  
 
 
4.1.1.2 Precautionary measures under the health exception 
provision 
 
Typical trade measures adopted to restrict free trade on health grounds include the 
banning or restrictions on imported products which may constitute a risk to human 
health.  Import bans or restrictions on products such as cigarettes, gasoline, asbestos, 
                                                      
810 SPS Agreement n39. See sections 2.2.2.2 and 4.2.  
811 WTO Appellate Body Report, EC – Asbestos, paras 167; 168; 178. Bernasconi-Osterwalder, N. et al. 
(2006) Environment and Trade: A Guide to WTO Jurisprudence, Earthscan, London, UK 
(Bernasconi-Osterwalder WTO) p257.  
812 In United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline (US – Gasoline), the Appellate Body 
stated: “In order the justifying protection of  Article XX may be extended to it, the measure at issue must 
not only come under one or another of  the particular exceptions – paragraphs (a) to (j) – listed under 
Article XX; it must also satisfy the requirements imposed by the opening clauses of  Article XX. The 
analysis is, in other words, two-tiered: first, provisional justification by reason of  characterization of  the 
measure under Article XX (g); second, further appraisal of  the same measure under the introduction of  
Article XX”. United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline (US – Gasoline), 
WT/DS2/AB/R, adopted 20 May 1996. The Appellate Body has further adopted a “weighing and 
balancing” process as a proportionality test to relax the necessity test after EC – Asbestos. European Communities – 
Measures Affecting Asbestos or Products Containing Asbestos (EC – Asbestos), WT/DS135R; WT/DS135/AB/R. 
For a more detailed introduction on the necessity test in the WTO regime, see: Kapterian, G. (2010) “A 
Critique of  the WTO Jurisprudence on ‘Necessity’” 59(1) International & Comparative Law Quarterly 89 
(Kapterian Necessity). 
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and retreaded tyres arguably fall within the scope of  “the protection of  life or health of  
humans”.  However, such trade measures are hardly regarded as legitimate after the 
strict scrutiny of  the necessity test and the proportionality test.  We will examine 
relevant cases respectively in the following sections in order to learn that only trade bans 
with scientific justification as well as without unnecessary intervention to trade will pass 
the scrutiny.  Hence the space for the PA is rather vague and narrow and depends 
greatly upon the Panel’s interpretation of  the necessity test.  
 
 
4.1.1.2.1 Thailand – Cigarettes  
 
In Thailand – Restrictions on Importation of  Internal Taxes on Cigarettes (Thailand – Cigarettes),813 
the US argued that Thailand’s quantitative restriction on the importation of  cigarettes 
was inconsistent with the General Agreement.  The Panel asked the WHO to comment 
on the health effects of  cigarette consumption while considering the legitimacy of  
Thailand’s restrictive measure.814 The Panel “accepted that smoking constituted a serious 
risk to human health and that consequently measures designed to reduce the 
consumption of  cigarettes fell within the scope of  Article XX (b)”.815 However, the 
Panel further concluded that there were other reasonable alternative measures consistent 





813 Thailand – Restrictions on Importation of  Internal Taxes on Cigarettes (Thailand – Cigarettes), GATT BISD 
37S/200, 7 November 1990. 
814 GATT Panel Report, Thailand – Restrictions on Importation of  and Internal Taxes on Cigarette, 7 November 
1990, BISD 37S/200, paras 50-57. 
815 GATT Panel Report, Thailand – Restrictions on Importation of  and Internal Taxes on Cigarette, 7 November 
1990, BISD 37S/200, paras 73 and 75. 
816 GATT Panel Report, Thailand – Restrictions on Importation of  and Internal Taxes on Cigarette, 7 November 
1990, BISD 37S/200, para 81. 
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4.1.1.2.2 US – Gasoline 
 
In United States – Standards for Reformatted and Conventional Gasoline (US – Gasoline),817 the 
Panel made an important clarification on the requirement of  necessity: it is not the 
necessity of  the policy objective to be examined, but the necessity of  the disputed 
measure at issue to be examined.  Consequently, the Panel examined whether there were 
reasonable alternative measures available which were “consistent or less inconsistent” 
with the General Agreement. 818  The Panel agreed the measure to decrease the 
consumption of  gasoline to reduce pollution, but the US failed to prove the necessity of  
the applied measure. Therefore the US Gasoline Rule was found to be inconsistent with 
the necessity requirement in the WTO.   
 
 
4.1.1.2.3 EC – Asbestos 
 
The EC – Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products Case (EC – Asbestos)819 
reaffirmed that a higher level of  health protection of  individual Member could be 
sustained by the PA in WTO law.820 Asbestos has been long known for causing 
significant threat to human health.  Exposure to chrysotile asbestos may increase the 
risk for asbestosis, lung cancer, mesothelioma or pneumocomiosis.  These negative 
effects are also identified in a study by the WHO.821  
                                                      
817 WT/DS2/R, Report of  the Panel, 29 January 1996; WT/DS2/AB/R, Reports of  the Appellate Body, 
29 April 1996. 
818 Panel Report, US – Gasoline, para 6.25. 
819  European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos or Products Containing Asbestos (EC – Asbestos), 
WT/DS135/R; WT/DS135/AB/R n110. 
820 EC – Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products (EC – Asbestos), WT/DS135/AB/R, n110. 
See also: Segger, M-C and Gehring, M.W. (2003) “The WTO and Precaution: Sustainable Development 
Implications of  the WTO Asbestos Dispute” 15 Journal of  Environmental Law 289; Ruessmann, L.A. (2002) 
“Putting the Precautionary Principle in Its Place: Parameters for the Proper Application of  a Precautionary 
Approach and the Implications for Developing Countries in Light of  the Doha WTO Ministerial” 17 
American University International Law Review 905 (Ruessmann). 
821 WHO International Programme on Chemical Safety (IPCS), Environmental Health Criteria 203 – Chrysotile 
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In EC – Asbestos, France banned the importation and sale of  asbestos from Canada for 
the reason of  public health protection.  France’s ban of  asbestos was proved without 
discrimination to both domestic and imported asbestos.  However, Canada argued that 
the asbestos it exported was a “like product” 822  to substitute products used in 
construction and thus it should receive no less favourable treatment under the National 
Treatment823 standard in GATT.824 Canada claimed that the measure was inconsistent 
with France’s obligations under WTO law, but France’s ban was proved legitimate after 
reasonable scientific evidence was provided on chrysotile-cement products to the DSB.  
 
In addition, the Appellate Body adopted a “weighing and balancing process” as the 
proportionality test to supplement the necessity test.825 In other words, the Appellate Body 
takes more factors into consideration in determining the necessity of  a measure.  
Besides “the difficulty of  implementation” of  the alternative measure, the Appellate 
Body also referred to two factors in the weighing and balancing process: “contribution 
of  the measure to the realisation of  the value pursued” and “importance of  the value 
pursued”.826 
 
Notably, the Appellate Body identified that several principles developed from the cases 
under the SPS Agreement were equally applicable under GATT XX.  These include: 
                                                                                                                                                           
Asbestos (1998), para 144.  
822 “Like product”, see section1.2.1.1.1 n110.  
823 See section 1.2.1.1.1.  
824 Howse, R. and Turk, E. “The WTO Impact on Internal Regulations: A Case Study of  the Canada – EC 
Asbestos Dispute” in Bermann, G.A. and Mavroidis, P.C. (eds) (2006) Trade and Human Health and Safety, 
Columbia Studies in WTO Law and Policy, Cambridge University Press, New York.  
825 The Appellate Body report of Korea – Beef was the first WTO ruling to introduce some relaxing 
elements into the necessity test.  Korea – Measures Affecting Imports of  Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef  (Korea – 
Beef), WT/DS169/AB/R, adopted 10 January 2001, para 161. 
826 Neumann, J. and Turk, E. (2003) “Necessity Revisited: Proportionality in World Trade Organization 
Law after Korea – Beef, EC – Asbestos and EC- Sardines” 37(1) Journal of  World Trade 199-233. 
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Members have the right to establish their appropriate level of  health protection;827 risks 
to human, animal or plant life or health must be assessed; risk assessment can be 
qualitative or quantitative; Members can rely on majority scientific opinions or minority 
opinions to adopt a trade measure.828 
 
 
4.1.1.2.4 Brazil – Retreaded Tyres  
 
Retreaded tyres are produced by reconditioning used tyres.  In Brazil – Measures Affecting 
Imports of  Retreaded Tyres (Brazil – Retreaded Tyres), 829  the EU challenged Brazil’s 
restrictions on imported retreaded tyres from the EU.  However, Brazil claimed that the 
ban was justified by Article XX(b) GATT, and argued that the import ban was aimed at 
reducing public health risks.  Brazil contended that the import ban was designed to 
reduce waste tyre volume to reduce the incidence of  dengue, cancer, environmental 
contamination, and other associated risks.830 Brazil argued that waste tyre accumulation 
threatened public health because it fuels mosquito-borne diseases and releases toxic 
chemicals into the environment.831 Brazil also submitted that it had suffered from 
epidemics of  dengue, which the WHO has identified as “a major international public 
health concern”.832 Brazil explained that the ban was necessary and played an important 
part in the reduction of  dengue.  It was claimed that, following the Panel’s statement in 
EC – Asbestos,833 the interests protected by the ban (the preservation of  human life and 
                                                      
827 See section 2.2.2.1. 
828 WTO Appellate Body Report, EC – Asbestos, paras 167; 168; 178; Bernasconi-Osterwalder, N. et al. 
(2006) Environment and Trade: A Guide to WTO Jurisprudence, Earthscan, London, UK 
(Bernasconi-Osterwalder WTO) n720 p257. 
829  Brazil – Measures Affecting Imports of  Retreaded Tyres (Brazil – Retreaded Tyres), WT/DS332/R 
WT/DS332/AB/R, adopted 3 December 2007.  
830 WTO Panel Report, Brazil – Retreaded Tyres, n829, para 4.11. 
831 WTO Panel Report, Brazil – Retreaded Tyres, n829 para 4.12. 
832 WTO Panel Report, Brazil – Retreaded Tyres, n829, para 4.28; WHO, Guidelines for Treatment of  Dengue 
Haemorrhagic Fever in Small Hospitals (ix) (1999). 
833 EC – Asbestos, n110.  
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health through the elimination, or reduction of  health risks) were “both vital and 
important in the highest degree”,834 and “they weigh substantially in favour of  the 
necessity of  the measure”.835 
 
On the other hand, the EU argued that the ban did not contribute to health and 
environmental protection.  The EU claimed that there were no “well-known and 
life-threatening health risks” posed by retreaded tyres,836 and the EU contested that the 
real aim of  the import ban was not the protection of  health but the protection of  
Brazil’s domestic industry.837 Though Brazil imposed a ban on imported tyres, the court 
still granted a number of  injunctions applied by local retreaders which was deemed by 
the Appellate Body as “being applied in a manner that constitutes arbitrary or 
unjustifiable discrimination”,838 and thus it was not able to prevent the continued 
importation of  used tyres.839 
 
In summary, the Panel and the Appellate Body found that the ban was necessary to 
protect human, animal, or plant life and health.840 However, the Panel also found that the 
quantity of  imports of  used tyres to local retreading industry still seriously undermined 
the purpose of  the ban,841 thus the ban was deemed to fail to meet the requirements of  
the Chapeau of  the GATT XX(b) and constituted arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination, or a 
disguised restriction to trade.842  
 
                                                      
834 WTO Panel Report, Brazil – Retreaded Tyres, para 4.16. 
835 WTO Panel Report, Brazil – Retreaded Tyres, para 4.44. 
836 WTO Panel Report, Brazil – Retreaded Tyres, para 4.18. 
837 WTO Panel Report, Brazil – Retreaded Tyres, para 4.19. 
838 WTO Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Retreaded Tyres, para 258.  
839 Epps, T. (2008) International Trade and Health Protection: A Critical Assessment of  the WTO’s SPS Agreement, 
Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham, UK, pp222-224 (Epps SPS) n325. 
840 WTO Panel Report, Brazil – Retreaded Tyres, para 7.215. 
841 WTO Panel Report, Brazil – Retreaded Tyres, para 7.355. 
842 WTO Panel Report, Brazil – Retreaded Tyres, para 7.356. 
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4.1.1.3 Rules and principles of  the precautionary approach 
in the health exception provision 
 
From the above discussion, the structure of  Article XX (b) includes the provision and 
the Chapeau.  The examination of  the disputed measure consists of  three steps: first, to 
review whether the objective of  the measure falls within the domain of  the protection of  
“human, animal or plant life or health”; second, the Chapeau requires that the applied 
measure should be least inconsistent with the obligations and be least restrictive to trade. The 
disputed measure should be applied in a non-discriminative way, and any disguised 
restriction on international trade is considered inconsistent with the Chapeau.  Third, an 
analysis of  weighing and balancing has been adopted by the Appellate Body to balance 
the values of  the protected objectives and the cost of  trade restriction.843 The Appellate 
Body started to take into account several other factors to relax the necessity test. 
Specifically, in Brazil – Retreaded Tyres, Brazil recalled the factors in determining the 
necessity of  a measure as follows:  
 
 The importance of  the interests protected by the measure;  
 The contribution of  the measure to the end pursued;  
 The trade impact of  the measure; and  
 The existence of  reasonably available alternative measures.844 
 
In other words, the applied measure will be accepted as legitimate if  it is considered least 
restrictive to free trade.  If  there exists an alternative measure that would achieve the same 
goal and is less restrictive to trade, then the alternative measure should be determined if  
                                                      
843 Weighing and balancing process, see n826. 
844 WTO Panel Report, Brazil – Retreaded Tyres, para 4.38. 
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it is reasonably available.845 Moreover, the Appellate Body has introduced a weighing and 
balancing process as a proportionality test into the necessity analysis.  Any trade 
restriction aimed at protecting human health has to be in proportion to the benefits 
arising from the protection of  human health.   
 
In summary, article XX(b) GATT appears to leave a fair space for Members’ discretion in 
adopting the precautionary health measures; however, after the interpretation of  the 
Appellate Body, the space of  the PA is rather narrow and rigid.  All of  the above cases 
except EC – Asbestos846 failed to pass the scrutiny of  “the necessity test”.  Though the 
necessity test has been relaxed after the introduction of  a weighing and balancing process 
for the proportionality test after EC – Asbestos; the necessity test including the 
proportionality test, still appears to be a relatively rigid and scientific-based approach to 
examine the legitimacy and validity of  a trade measure to avoid hidden protectionism.  
 
The PA in the health exception is also a prescriptive version; due to the strict scrutiny of  
the necessity test of  a precautionary measure, it could be deems as a weak PA.  The 
burden of  proof  remains on the adopting state: states who adopt the PA bear the onus 
to prove the necessity of  the precautionary measure.  Nevertheless, the interpretation 
of  this article has recourse to the rationale of  the SPS Agreement.  It can be suggested 
that the PA in the GATT is expected to be congruent to its application in the SPS 
Agreement.  
 
Attention will now be turned to the discussion of  the security exception provision in the 
GATT. 
                                                      
845 WTO Panel Report, Brazil – Retreaded Tyres, para 4.38. 




4.1.2 Security exception in GATT 
 
Contrary to the rigid application of  the health exception provision, the invocation of  the 
security exception provision appears to be rather broad and self-defining.  The security 
exception provision lacks a clear mechanism, thus WTO Members enjoy a broad range 
of  discretion in determining their “security interests”.  They are vested legitimate 
grounds to take actions which they consider necessary for the protection of  their essential 
security interests.  Consequently, the dispute settlement relies much on diplomatic 
pressure, which ultimately depends on the power of  the state. 
 
Provisions involve “national security” in the WTO laws including GATT XXI, GATS 
XIV bis (1),847 TRIPS 73(b) (iii), and Agreement on Government Procurement 23 (1). 
GATT XXI is a basic template for discussing “national security”, and considered more 
relevant to risk management and the PA in WTO law.  We will examine the mechanism 
of  the security exception in GATT, and visit current state practice in the following 
paragraphs.  
         
                                                                
4.1.2.1 Purpose of  the security exception provision 
 
Definition and Controversy 
 
Article XXI (b) GATT allows Members to adopt or maintain measures relating to 
                                                      
847  General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). Services from architecture to voice-mail 
telecommunications and to space transport are also included into the production of  most goods after 
Uruguay round of  negotiation. 
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fissionable materials; measures relating to trade in arms or in other materials, directly, for 
military use, and measures taken in time of  war or other emergencies in international 
relations which “it considers necessary of  the protection of  its essential security 
interests”. Unlike Article XX, Article XXI does not have a chapeau to prevent misuse of  
abuse of  the exceptions in Article XXI.848 Members can apply Article XXI to protect 
their essential interests as they considers necessary.849 The definitions of  the terms and 
criteria of  Article XXI deliberately remain vague in order to maintain flexibility which 
Members can resort to in times of  emergency.  This also implies that states are allowed 
to have a greater margin of  appreciation in exercising their precautionary entitlements to 
protect public interest of  security under emergency situations.850 It may be fair to say 
that states’ precautionary entitlements, or in Trouwborst words, states’ precautionary 
rights and duties,851 are deemed legitimate especially in a public health emergency.  
States’ discretion in granting a precautionary compulsory licence based on their 
precautionary entitlements in international law will be discussed in later chapters.852 
However, the uncertainties of  Article XXI have also resulted in obstacles and restrictions 
to trade which WTO Members may use for protectionism unilaterally.  
 
As Cann has noted: 
 
                                                      
848 Bossche, P. (2008) The Law and Policy of  the World Trade Organization - Text, Cases and Materials (2nd edition) 
Cambridge University Press, New York, US, pp664-669 (Bossche WTO) n109. 
849 The distinction between “necessary” and “it considers necessary” has been previously discussed by the 
International Court of  Justice (ICJ). In Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, the ICJ held 
that it did indeed have jurisdiction to determine whether the measures taken by the US fell within the the 
security exception, whether the measures proposed to protect those security interests were “not merely 
useful but ‘necessary’”. The Court recognised the distinction of  “necessary” and “it considers necessary”, 
and concluded that: “the issue of  whether a measure is necessary to protect the essential security interests 
of  a party is not…purely a question for the subjective judgment of  the party; the text does not refer to 
what the party ‘consider necessary’ for that purpose.” (emphasis added) Nicaragua v United States of  America, 
International Court of  Justice, 27 June 1986. 
850 See section 2.1.2. 
851 See section 2.1.2.  
852 See section 5.2.1.1.  
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… although Article XXI was not designed to create a “policy” exception, or to create a mechanism 
by which one nation could impose its social, political, or economic ideology on another, it is 
conceivable that Article XXI will be invoked for the wrong reasons.  More significantly, Article XXI 
will continue to serve as a generally unspoken basis for the unilateral imposition of  restrictive trade 
measures for non-economic purposes.  These measures, often imposed without identifiable 
standards and without any accountability or effective retaliatory remedy, undermine[ing] the 
cooperative integrative purposes of  the world trade system.853 
 
The lack of  clarity on the subjective phrasing of  “it considers necessary”; “essential 
security interests” and “other emergency in international relations” makes the 
interpretation of  this statue ambiguous.  Therefore, the concepts of  “security”, 
“diplomatic policy”, and “economic welfare” are often understood with confusion. 
However, Article XXI functions as a safety valve in the GATT.  Members will be 
unwilling to participate in this trade agreement if  it does not provide any flexibility 
reserved for exercising Members’ autonomy in times of  emergency.  
 
Hence, the security exception provision has been drafted without a clear mechanism on 
purpose.  Relevant cases of  the provision further indicate that the provision is adopted 
within a rather broad spectrum, and that the resolution of  disputes depends greatly on 
informal diplomatic negotiation.  The PA in the security exception provision therefore 





853 Cann, W.A. Jr. (2001) “Creating Standards and Accountability for the Use of  the WTO Security 
Exception: Reducing the Role of  Power-Based relations and Establishing a New Balance between 
Sovereignty and Multilateralism” 26 Yale Journal of  International Law (Cann). 
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4.1.2.2 Precautionary measures under the security 
exception provision 
4.1.2.2.1 Sweden – Import Restrictions on Certain 
Footwear 
 
In Sweden – Import Restrictions on Certain Footwear,854 the Swedish Government introduced a 
trade measure of  a global quota system for leather shoes, plastic shoes and rubber boots 
from 5 November 1975.855 The global quota system for shoes was introduced in order to 
allow time to “remedy the serious difficulties” that had arisen in this sector of  the shoe 
industry.856 The Swedish Government claimed that the continued decrease in domestic 
shoes production had become a critical threat to the emergency planning of  Sweden’s 
economic defence, and it felt “compelled to resort to temporary emergency measures to 
prevent a further deterioration of  the domestic production capacity of  shoes and rubber 
boots”.857  
 
Although GATT XIX provides regulations regarding emergency action on imports of  
particular products, many contracting parties questioned the legitimacy of  Sweden’s act 
to invoke Article XXI. In recognition of  international disapproval, Sweden promptly 
held negotiations and withdrew its measure of  its quota system on shoes.  This case 
demonstrates the importance of  diplomatic pressure on the process of  dispute 
settlement in Article XXI.  An economic emergency within a specific industry may not 




854 L/4250, 17 November 1975 
855 Although Sweden never formally invoked Article XXI, its position was supported by the exception.  
856 Notification by the Swedish Delegation, Introduction of  a Global Import Quota System for Leather 
Shoes, Plastic Shoes and Rubber Shoes, L/4250, p2. 
857 Notification by the Swedish Delegation, Introduction of  a Global Import Quota System for Leather 
Shoes, Plastic Shoes and Rubber Shoes, L/4250, p3. 
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4.1.2.2.2 Helms – Burton Act 
 
The dispute settlement between the US and the EU about the Helms-Burton Act858 also 
demonstrates that the judgements of  the WTO restrain Members from abusing the 
mechanism of  the national security exception.  
 
On 20 February 1996, Cuba shot down two civil unarmed airplanes that violated Cuban 
airspace, the US soon adopted the Helms-Burton Act to impose economic sanctions on an 
extraterritorial basis to certain companies in other countries who trade with or invest in 
Cuba as a diplomatic revenge.859  
 
The Helms-Burton Act is not consistent with Members’ commitment to the WTO because 
it is motivated by foreign policy objectives, which are against the underlying principles of  
trade liberalisation in the WTO trading system.  The Helms-Burton Act led to serious 
rejections from the US’ primary trading partners including the EU, Canada, and Mexico. 
The EU filed a complaint against the Helms-Burton Act to the DSB860 of  the WTO, and a 
Panel was held to settle this dispute.861 
 
The US claimed that the legislation of  the Helms-Burton Act was based on the ground of  
national security to invoke GATT XXI, and it asserted that it was not within the 
authority of  the WTO to decide the domain of  national security interests of  the US.862 
There were also fierce debates about whether Cuba could constitute a real threat to 
                                                      
858 Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of  1996 (Helms–Burton Act). 
859 Lindsay, P. (2003) “The Ambiguity of  GATT Article XXI: Subtle Success or Rampant Failure?” 52 
Duke Law Journal 1277 (Lindsay). 
860 Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), see section 1.2.1.1.2.  
861 WTO Panel Named in Helms–Burton Dispute; Dispute Settlement Body, Minutes of  Meeting, 
WTO/DSB/M/78.   
862 Guy de Jonquie’res, “US Dodges Brussels Onslaught: Washington Buys Time as Anti-Cuba Law 
Dispute Goes to World Trade Body” Financial Times (London), 21 February 1997, 6. 
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national security from both international and domestic critics.863 
 
It seemed that the US held back on this Act because it would possibly challenge its 
legitimacy on the application of  Article XXI by the DSB judgment, so the US negotiated 
with the EU and reached an agreement in April 1997.864 The EU promised to cease the 
procedure to the DSB Panel, and the US agreed to suspend the application of  Title III 
and IV of  the Helms-Burton Act.865 The case was closed due to the Panel being suspended 
for over twelve months.866 
 
The resolution of  the dispute on the Helms-Burton Act further demonstrates a peculiar 
approach to the dispute settlement in GATT XXI.  Disputes in the WTO system can be 
resolved by other means of  diplomatic negotiation as well as by the legal process in the 
DSB.867 This may well be true if  a dispute arises regarding the application of  a PA in this 
provision.  The trigger of  a PA appears to be lower due to the subjective standard “it 
considers necessary”, and without a proper risk assessment and a clear allocation of  
burden of  proof, the dispute settlement would inevitably depend greatly upon political 
means.  Resolutions using diplomatic approach indeed provide more flexibility in 
negotiations, and can be resolved more from a public point of  view which would be 
                                                      
863 Whether Cuba really represents a national security threat to the United States is an issue that is still 
being debated. At least one person suggests that perceptions of  Cuba’s threat linger from the Cold War 
and are maintained for political reasons (e.g., the common belief  that Florida is an important swing state). 
See Lindsay, P. (2003) “The Ambiguity of  GATT Article XXI: Subtle Success or Rampant Failure?” 52 
Duke Law Journal 1277 note149. 
864 Lindsay, n859. 
865 Under the Helms-Burton Act, the president has the authority to suspend application of  Title III for up to 
6 months if  he gives notice to the appropriate congressional committees and “[the ] suspension is 
necessary to the national interests of  the United States and will expedite a transition to democracy in 
Cuba”, 22 U.S.C.A. §6085(c) (West Supp.2002). The president may make additional suspensions as 
necessary. 
866 See WTO, Communication from the Chairman of  the Panel, United States – The Cuban Liberty and 
Democratic Solidarity Act, WT/DS38/5 (1997). 
867 For a discussion of  the argument for and against the legalism embodied in the WTO Dispute 
Settlement Understanding, see Movsesian, M.L. (1999) “Sovereignty, Compliance, and the World Trade 
Organization: Lessons from the History of  Supreme Court Review” 20 Michigan Journal of  International Law 
775,791-95. 
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more likely to reach mutual consensus.  The strengths of  the dispute settlement from 
diplomatic negotiations are not easily achieved by official judicial review.  However, 
diplomatic negotiation also depends greatly upon the power of  a state.  Therefore, a 
weak state is forced to give in under a powerful economic influence of  a strong state.   
 
 
4.1.2.3 Rules and principles of  the application of  the 
precautionary approach under the security exception 
 
From the experience of  the security exception in Article XXI GATT,868 we can see that a 
“one-size-fits-all” approach is not necessarily best for Members’ administration under a 
national emergency.  States prefer to have more flexibility in their interpretation of  
“national security” and “essential security interests” which also have ambiguous 
implications.869  
 
GATT XXI is used as leeway for states to exercise their authority when they think 
necessary under circumstances of  emergency.  This could be linked to the discussion of  
a state’s rights and duties above.870 When “national security” or “essential security 
interests” are threatened by a particular health risk, states are granted with more margin 
of  appreciation in the interpretation of  the PA that they adapt.   
 
In addition, a PA is only used as a policy tool in risk management while its application is 
to ensure that the concept of  “precaution” is employed under uncertainty.871 Hence, 
similar to the function as a safety valve of  GATT XXI in WTO, the vagueness also 
demonstrates that a PA may be applied with flexibility and a state’s margin of  discretion 
                                                      
868 GATT XXI is regarding the security exceptions to Members’ obligation in the GATT.   
869 See section 4.1.2.3.  
870 See section 2.3.1. 
871 Motaal Precaution, n437 pp483-501. 
  202
in risk management according to a state’s own particular policy objectives. 
 
The current situation of  a lack of  a uniform definition as well as an ambiguous legal 
status of  PAs does not deter the widespread application in risk management.  A 
one-size-fits-all approach of  the PA does not always satisfy the challenges of  the 
multi-dimension character of  risks.  Consequently, a tailor-made definition for a specific 
health risk will be proposed in Chapter 5 in order to facilitate further application and 
communication. 
 
GATT XXI is a highly controversial provision in the WTO regime due to its ambiguity 
of  interpretation.  Although its phrasing appears to be of  broad interpretation, in reality 
its application needs to pass political scrutiny found in international settings.  There are 
also follow-up discussions regarding the limitations of  this article.  For example, Hahn 
argues that this article was not designed to include the “socio-economic consequence” 
resulting from the operation of  GATT principles, nor was it designed to provide 
safeguards for “vital industries” or to allow for the use of  other protectionist measures.872 
He holds that Article XXI is not absolutely “self-defining”, and he suggested that 
Members should be required to provide the relevant facts and reasons with the proposed 
measure for protection of  their essential security interests.873  
 
In addition, in a later Decision which was adopted by Contracting Parties, the interests of  
third parties which may be affected was reckoned to be taken into consideration, and 
appropriate guidelines on the obligation to inform other affected contracting parties were 
established for its application.  The Contracting Parties decided that, “contracting 
                                                      
872 Hahn, M.J. (1991) “Vital Interests and the Law of  GATT: An Analysis of  GATT’s Security Exception” 
12 Michigan Journal of  International Law 558 (Hahn).  
873 Hahn, n872.  
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parties should be informed to the fullest extent possible of  trade measures taken under 
Article XXI”, and all contracting parties affected by such action should retain their full 
rights under the General Agreement.874  
 
The General Agreement acknowledges that the contracting party has the autonomy on 
the discretion of  measures which involve its own essential interests.  Nevertheless, the 
applied measure should be used as a last resort in order to prevent abuse of  the 
provision.875 Therefore it is imperative that a certain degree of  judicial review remains to 
safeguard the provision from being abused or used arbitrarily.  From case precedents 
and state practice of  the security exception provision, if  Members are to apply the PA 
under the national security provision, some clarifications about the ambiguity in the 
article can be demonstrated in the following analysis: 
 
 Members have the autonomy to invoke GATT XXI and apply certain measures to 
protect their essential security interests; 
 Members have the discretion to interpret their “essential security interest” while 
taking into account the requirements in GATT XXI; 
 Members are expected to avoid “broad interpretation” to prevent the abuse of  
GATT XXI, and conform to the jurisprudence of  “limited interpretation of  
exceptions” in WTO laws;876 
                                                      
874 Decision Concerning Article XXI of  the General Agreement, Decision of  30 November 1982, General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, L/5426, 2 December 1982. Available at: 
http://www.wto.org/gatt_docs/English/SULPDF/91000212.pdf . 
875 In the discussion on the complaint by Czechoslovakia against export restrictions imposed by the US, it 
is noted that: “…every country must be the judge in the last resort on questions relating to its own security. 
On the other hand, every contracting party should be cautious not to take any step which might have the 
effect of  undermining the General Agreement”. Corrigendum to the Summary Record of  the 
Twenty-second Meeting, Contracting Parties Third Session, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 
GATT/CP.3/SR.22, Corr.1, 20 June 1949, available at: 
http://www.wto.org/gatt_docs/English/SULPDF/90060101.pdf .  
876 McRae, D.M. “GATT Article XX and the WTO Appellate Body”, in Bronckers, M. and Quick, R. (eds) 
(2000) New Directions in International Economic Law, Kluwer Law International, The Hague, pp235-236. 
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 The adopted measure proposed under GATT XXI should be proportionate to 
the threat to Members’ essential interests; 
 Members are expected to inform other affected Members and the WTO; 
 Affected Members retain their full rights in WTO, such as the right to request a 
consultation and the process of  Dispute Settlement in the WTO;   
 The WTO has the authority to review the disputed measure proposed by GATT 
XXI, but the WTO is intrinsically not an appropriate mechanism to settle such 
highly political disputes.877  
 
Again, the PA in the security exception tends to be a prescriptive one which adopts a 
precautionary measure; it can also be understood as relevant to the information disclosure 
PA for it expects the invoking state to inform other affected states and the WTO.  In 
terms of  a strong, weak or moderate version, the vague and subjective trigger “it 
considers necessary” may initially indicate a relatively strong PA; however, evidence 
shows that the international political atmosphere indeed plays an important role in the 
moderation of  a strong PA.  In order to avoid international conflict, it may be fair to 
say that a moderate PA is more favourable than a strong PA.    
 
Basically, Members prefer to reserve the ambiguity and flexibility of  GATT XXI in order 
to exercise their autonomy and fulfil the needs of  national essential interests in the 
circumstances of  emergency.  Members are left with a greater margin of  appreciation in 
the exercise of  the PA under this heading.  Nevertheless, due to the intrinsic limitations 
of  an unclear mechanism for operation and the subjectivity of  interpretation, it will 
                                                      
877 Horng, D-C. (2005) “The Research Regarding National Security Exception in WTO” 17 The Chinese 
(Taiwan) Yearbook of  International Law and Affairs 165-211 (in Chinese: 洪德欽 “WTO 有關安全例外條款
之研究” 中國國際法與國際事務年報 第十七卷 頁 165-211). 
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inevitably depend more on the international political setting rather than the WTO DSB878 
to resolve such disputes. 
 
 
4.1.3 Interim conclusion: Principles of  the application of  the 
PA under WTO exception provisions 
 
The PA under the exception headings in the WTO system includes the health exception 
provision and the security provision.  Both are prescriptive versions of  the PA.  The 
interpretation of  the Appellate Body shows that the PA in the health exception appears 
to be a weak version, while it appears to be a relatively strong one in the security exception, 
albeit that some moderation from the international political settings exists.  Both have 
the prerequisite of  “necessary”: the definition of  “necessary” in the health exception rule 
is considered objective and requires scientific justification.  In contrast, the definition of  
“it considers necessary” in the security exception appears to be self-defining and leaves 
more flexibilities for Members’ discretion.  This is to say that the PA may enjoy broader 
employment in the security exception; however, the lack of  a transparent mechanism in 
the security exception provision inevitably results in controversies which may only be 
resolved through political negotiation.   
 
It has been stated previously that, exception rules in WTO law are expected to be applied 
strictly.  Though Members enjoy a certain degree of  autonomy to interpret the PA 
within the domain of  the security exception, they are still under pressure from the 
international political setting.  The application is also required to be “limited 
interpreted”879 and adopted as a last resort.880 The invoking Member bears the burden of  
                                                      
878 DSB, see section 1.2.1.1.2.  
879 See n876. 
880 See n875.  
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proof  and is expected to inform other affected Members to the fullest extent possible.881  
 
In addition to the limited application of  precaution in exception provisions in GATT, the 
SPS Agreement, which is considered as the most elaborate agreement on health issues in 
WTO law, is thought to embody the PA in the guise of  provisional SPS measures.  The 
Appellate Body has also indicated that the principles developed from the SPS Agreement 
are equally applicable under GATT XX.  It appears that different versions of  the PA 
operate within the WTO regime.  We now turn to the discussion of  relevant 




4.2 Precautionary entitlements in the SPS Agreement 
 
As mentioned above, the PA appears in the form of  the health exception operated in the 
WTO and is often limited and requires scientific justification.  However, in order to 
safeguard human health under the circumstances of  scientific uncertainty, the concept of  
precaution has been incorporated into the SPS Agreement as a right instead of  a mere 
exception to Members’ obligations by means of  the adoption of  provisional SPS 
measures.882 The PA in the SPS Agreement therefore enjoys higher legal status than in 
the GATT exceptions in WTO legal hierarchy. (See Diagram 4.2)  This is to say that 
Members are allowed to exercise their precautionary entitlements if  certain criteria are 
fulfilled.  The adoption of  provisional SPS measures to cope with uncertain threat to 
health is the main feature of  the PA in the SPS Agreement.883 
 
                                                      
881 See n874. 
882 For the precautionary rights of  states, see sections 2.2.2.2 and 2.2.2.2.2. 
































As different PAs exist in both exception provisions and excluding provisions in WTO law, 
they can be further distinguished in terms of  legal status.  The PA in exception 
provisions only acts as an affirmative defence with which the onus remains on the 
defendant; on the contrary, the PA in excluding provisions can also be understood as a 
“conditional right” in WTO which enjoys a shift of  the burden of  proof.  In other 
words, when the PA is identified as a “conditional right”, the burden of  proof  is reversed 
onto the complaining party.  For example, a precautionary measure in the health or 
security exception could only serve as a defence if  the defendant is able to prove the 
necessity of  the health measure; however, if  a precautionary SPS measure (or a 
provisional SPS measure)884 is deemed a conditional rights by the WTO, it enjoys a 
higher level of  legal status, and the complaining party bears the onus to prove that the 
adopted measure is inconsistent with Members’ obligations to the WTO.   
 
The SPS Agreement aims to help WTO Members set up a standard system of  risk 
management on imported food and produce.885 It also requires Members to conform to 
their obligations in WTO law to ensure that the principle of  non-discrimination is 
protected.886 In addition, to dealing with the situation of  scientific uncertainty, the PA is 
embodied in the SPS Agreement through the imposition of  a provisional SPS measure to 
manage uncertain health risks under a public health emergency.887 The WTO Appellate 
Body has identified the function of  provisional SPS measures as “a temporary ‘safety 
valve’ in situations where some evidence of  a risk exists but not enough to complete a 
full risk assessment under a health emergency”.888 It further stated that “In emergency 
                                                      
884 Article 5.7 SPS.  
885 See section 2.2.2.2.  
886 See para 1 of  the preamble SPS; section 1.2.1.1.1.   
887 Article 5.7 SPS. 
888 Appellate Body Report, United States – Continued Suspension of  Obligations in the EC – Hormones Dispute 
(Hormones II) n365 WT/DS320/AB/R, para 678. 
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situations, for example, a WTO Member will take a provisional SPS measure on the basis 
of  limited information”.889 Therefore, it can be argued that this version of  PA is closest 
to the version that exists in compulsory licensing on the grounds of  a public health 
emergency.   If  the legal status of  compulsory licensing is also a “conditional right” 
instead of  being an “affirmative defence”,890 the PA model in the SPS Agreement can 
then can be mapped in the compulsory licensing scenario.   
 
 
4.2.1 Purpose of  the SPS Agreement 
 
The purpose of  the SPS Agreement is to improve the human health, animal health and 
phytosanitary situation of  WTO Members, and also to ensure that the SPS measures are 
not applied in a manner which would constitute a means of  arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination between Members.891 The SPS Agreement was devised to introduce more 
elaborate rules for the application of  the health exception rules in GATT XX(b) which 
relates to the use of  sanitary or phytosanitary measures.892 There is potential overlap 
between GATT XX(b) and the SPS Agreement.  GATT XX(b) appears to cover general 
health measures that Members might adopt, while the SPS Agreement relates specific to 
sanitary and phytosanitary measures.  The SPS Agreement articulates that SPS measures 
which conform to the relevant provisions of  the SPS Agreement need to be in 
accordance with Members’ obligation under GATT XX(b).893 In other words, the SPS 




889 Appellate Body Report, United States – Continued Suspension of  Obligations in the EC – Hormones Dispute 
(Hormones II), n365 WT/DS320/AB/R, para 680. 
890 See sections 4.3.2.2.1 and 5.2.1.1.  
891 Para 1 Preamble SPS Agreement. 
892 Preamble of  the SPS Agreement. 
893 Article 2.4 SPS Agreement. 
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4.2.2 Precautionary SPS measures 
 
Under the SPS Agreement, a WTO Member is allowed to set its own health standard as 
long as the measure is applied by risk assessment based on scientific evidence.894 
Applications of  international standards of  health protection to the process of  risk 
management are encouraged.895 However, a higher standard of  protection than the 
international standard may also be accepted as a conditional right896 in conjunction with a 
valid risk assessment and scientific evidence. 897  Alternative measures can also be 
accepted as an equivalent if  Members can prove they provides the same standard of  
health protection and are least restrictive to trade.898 
 
Specifically, the Appellate Body suggested that the PA is reflected in three articles in the 
SPS Agreement:899  
 The sixth paragraph of  the Preamble: Members can retain their appropriate level of  
health protection;900 
 Article 3.3: Members can introduce a higher level of  health protection under 
scientific justification, and 
 Article 5.7: Members can adopt provisional SPS measures to manage health risks if  
scientific evidence is insufficient. 
 
These articles all recognise the rights of  Members to determine the appropriate level of  
public health protection in WTO law. 901  The Appellate Body has recognised the 
                                                      
894 Articles 2.2, 5.2 SPS Agreement. See section 2.2.2.1.  
895 Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.3 SPS Agreement. 
896 Conditional rights, see n118.  
897 Articles 3.3 and 5 SPS Agreement. 
898 Article 4 SPS Agreement. 
899 WTO Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones, para 124. 
900 See section 2.2.2.1.  
901 See also Appellate Body Report, EC – Asbestos, WT/DS135/AB/R, n110 para 168, “…we note that it 
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“autonomous right” of  a Member to establish a higher level of  health protection.902 
Under the scheme of  the SPS Agreement, Members can follow two tracks in order to 
adopt a SPS measure, track one is to follow available international standards; track two is 
at the discretion of  Members, if  Members wish to adopt a higher level of  health 
protection for their population, scientific justification must be satisfied with risk 
assessment and scientific evidence.  WTO Members are not prohibited from adopting a 
level of  zero risk.903 
 
In order to meet the requirements of  adopting a higher level of  health protection, 
Members need to take into account the objective of  minimising negative trade effects.904 
Members are obliged to avoid arbitrary or unjust discrimination in the determination of  
the appropriate levels of  health protection in different situations.905 Relevant economic 
factors should also be assessed: the potential loss of  production or sales in the event of  
the entry; the spread of  a pest or disease; the costs of  control for the importing Member, 
and the cost-effectiveness of  alternative approaches should be included.906  
 
Furthermore, the PA has been embodied in provisional SPS measures in the SPS 
Agreement to manage unknown risks to human health. Provisional SPS measures can be 
adopted with a lack of  scientific evidence in order to minimise the risk of  a public health 
threat.  
 
The mechanism of  provisional SPS measures was initially drafted to be used in 
                                                                                                                                                           
is undisputed that WTO Members have the right to determine the level of  protection of  health that they 
consider appropriate in a given situation”. See section 2.2.2.1.  
902 Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones, WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R, para 104 n247 錯誤! 
尚未定義書籤。. 
903 Appellate Body Report, Australia – Salmon, WT/DS18/AB/R, para 125 n515 
904 Articles 5.3 - 5.6 SPS Agreement. 
905 Article 5.5 SPS Agreement.  
906 Article 5.3 SPS Agreement.  
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emergency situations where, for example, the spread of  a disease has to be stopped 
urgently before it is feasible to complete a risk assessment.907 A Member may adopt 
provisional SPS measures on the basis of  available pertinent information.  In order to 
avoid misuse of  this article, after the adoption of  a provisional SPS measure, Members 
are still obliged to seek to obtain necessary additional information for a more objective 
risk assessment, and bear the duty to review the SPS measure within a reasonable period 
of  time.908  
 
 
4.2.3 Rules and principles of  the application of  the 
precautionary approach in the SPS Agreement 
 
As mentioned above, there are two tracks to adopting SPS measures, one is the general 
SPS measure, and the other is an expedient track for adopting provisional SPS measures. 
The SPS Agreement sets the basic rights and obligations of  Members,909 and affirms 
that Members “have the right” to take SPS measures “necessary to protect human, 
animal or plant life or health”.910 In order to meet the following requirements, general 
SPS measures must: 
 
 be applied “only to the extent necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or 
health”;911  
 be “based on scientific principle and …not maintained without sufficient scientific 
evidence”;912  
                                                      
907 Marceau, G. and Trachtman, J. “A Map of  the World Trade Organization Law of  Domestic Regulation 
of  Goods” in Bermann, J. and Mavroidis P. (eds) (2006) Trade and Human Health and Safety, Cambridge 
University Press, New York, USA. See also: section 2.2.2.2. 
908 Article 5.7 SPS. See section 2.2.2.2.  
909 Article 2 SPS Agreement.  
910 Article 2.1 SPS Agreement.  
911 Article 2.1 SPS Agreement. 
912 Article 2.2 SPS Agreement. 
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 not “arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate between Members where identical or 
similar conditions prevail”,913 and  
 not “be applied in a manner which would constitute a disguised restriction on 
international trade”.914  
 
Further, the SPS Agreement defines the necessity test in a way that any alternative 
measure: 
 
 must achieve “the appropriate level of  sanitary or phytosanitary protection”;  
 must be “reasonably available taking into account technical and economic 
feasibility”, and  
 is “significantly less restrictive to trade”.915  
 
Hence, the necessity test in the SPS Agreement is considered more flexible than that in 
GATT XX(b).916 It includes the consideration of  technical and economic feasibility of  
Members, and the alternative measures needs to be “significantly” less restrictive to 
trade.917 However, Members are obliged to base their SPS measures on certain risk 
assessments that indicate the necessity of  the measures to reach appropriate levels of  
health protection.918 
 
Again, the PA in the SPS Agreement is a prescriptive version, by which states can adopt 
provisional SPS measures.   It could also be understood as a moderate PA, for the 
                                                      
913 Article 2.3 SPS Agreement. 
914 Article 2.3 SPS Agreement. 
915 Footnote 3 SPS Agreement.  
916 See section 4.1.1.3.  
917 Footnote 3 SPS Agreement.  
918 Article 5.1 SPS. For a more detailed differentiation of  the necessity test in GATTXX(b) and the SPS 
Agreement, see Kapterian Necessity, n812. 
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necessity test is relatively more relaxed than it is in the health exception.   It is also akin 
to the information disclosure PA for an emphasis on the duty of  the adopting state to 
monitor and review the adopted measure is made.   It is noteworthy that due to the 
legal status of  a provisional SPS measure being within the domain of  “conditional 
rights” in the WTO, the burden of  proof  is therefore reversed to the complaining 
state.919   
 
The SPS Agreement articulates that SPS measures which conform to the relevant 
provisions of  the SPS Agreement shall be in accordance with Members’ obligations 
under GATT XX(b).920 Yet the allocation of  burden of  proof  in the SPS Agreement is 
different from that in the GATT XX(b) due to their different legal status.921 (See 
Diagrams 4.2 and 4.2.1)  The right to adopt SPS measures is deemed as an 
“autonomous right” by the WTO,922 while GATT XX(b) is deemed an exception to any 
existing rule.923 Under the current rule, the burden of  proof  lies with the defendant who 
invokes an exception, but the burden of  proof  is on the complainant who challenges the 
measure which is adopted following an autonomous right.  Therefore, the complaining 
party has to prove the adopted measure is not consistent with the SPS Agreement.  A 
SPS measure is assumed consistent with the SPS Agreement if  the complainant fails to 
prove otherwise.  
 
In sum, three versions of  PAs have been examined in the WTO context, which can be 
further distinguished by their legal status (see Table 4.2.3).   These are all prescriptive 
versions, while PAs in the exception provisions are only affirmative defences, but in the 
                                                      
919 See Diagram 4.2.1.  
920 Article 2.4 SPS. 
921 Grando, n118. 
922 Article 2.1 SPS Agreement. 
923 Charnovitz, n118, at 257.  
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SPS Agreement it is a conditional right.   WTO Members’ right to protect public health has 
been recognised and developed in the SPS Agreement, and thus the PA in the SPS 
Agreement is more concrete and sophisticated than others.   It appears that the PAs in 
WTO exceptions are at two extremes, and that the PA in the SPS Agreement appears to 



























      V            V        V  Moderate
 
 
It is also noteworthy that in order to avoid misuse and create unnecessary substantial 
barriers to trade, the invocation of  a provisional SPS measure is subject to a set of  
procedural requirements which aims to avoid disguised protectionism in international 
economic law.924 Whether this set of  procedural requirements could be accommodated 
into the IP regime will be explored further, especially through the application in 
                                                      
924 See section 2.2.2.2.  
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compulsory licensing in Chapter 5.925 
 
We now turn our attention to the PA in TRIPS. 
 
 
4.3 Precautionary entitlements in TRIPS 
 
The role of  science has been discussed in the context of  the granting of  patent rights; 
for example, the morality or patentability of  stem cell, human genome and biotechnology 
has been subject to great debate.926 However, the study from the view of  the PA or risk 
management after IP granting has seldom been carried out.  This section therefore aims 
to explore the PA in TRIPS with a special emphasis on compulsory licensing.  It is 
argued that a risk factor arising from the PA has a role to play in the IP regime, and 
particularly, and that in compulsory licensing of  pharmaceutical patents under a public 
health emergency it is essential and legitimate in contemporary society.927  
 
The TRIPS Agreement requires WTO Members to provide minimal standard of  IP 
protection on commodities including pharmaceutical products.  Though the TRIPS 
Agreement has created flexibilities in its mechanism in order to protect human health, 
the comprehensive protection of  IP has given rise to many ethical debates.  Notably, the 
issue of  the protection of  pharmaceutical patents has drawn commentators’ attention to 
                                                      
925 See section 5.3.  
926 See: MacQueen, H, Waelde, C. & Laurie, G., Brown, A. (2010) Contemporary Intellectual Property: Law and 
Policy (2nd edition) Oxford University Press, New York, United States, Chapter 12 n165; Laurie, G. (2004) 
“Patenting Stem Cells of  Human Origin” European Intellectual Property Review 59-66; Laurie, G.T. 
“Biotechnology and Intellectual Property: A Marriage of  Inconvenience?” in McLean, S. (ed) (1996) 
Contemporary Issues in Law, Medicine and Ethics, Chapter 12; Porter, G. et al.(2006) “The Patentability of  
Human Embryonic Stem Cells in Europe” 24 Nature Biotechnology 653-655; Koopman, J. “Human Rights 
Implications of  Patenting Biotechnological Knowledge” in Torremans, P. (ed) (2008) Intellectual Property and 
Human Rights: Enhanced Edition of  Copy Right and Human Rights, Kluwer Law International, The Netherlands. 
927 See section 5.3.  
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the interpretation of  the flexibilities of  the TRIPS mechanism.928 These flexibilities 
include compulsory licensing and parallel import.  Yet the international political 
atmosphere and the WTO retaliation mechanism929 have deterred Members from taking 
full advantage of  the flexibilities recognised in the TRIPS Agreement.  
 
In the following section, we will explore another guise of  precaution first by visiting the 
flexibilities in the TRIPS on health and security grounds.  Similarly to the PA in 
GATT930 and the SPS Agreement,931 in terms of  legal status, PAs in the TRIPS can be 
further distinguished into exceptions932 and exclusions933 to IP. (See Diagram 4.2) 
Exclusions enjoy a higher legal status than exceptions. (See Diagram 4.2.1)   Particularly, 
the granting of  a compulsory licence is argued to be exclusion to IP 934  and a 
precautionary entitlement of  states through the interpretation of  the Doha 
Declaration.935 This section also observes a trend to adopt the PA in recent state practice 
of  the employment in the mechanism of  compulsory licensing.936 First of  all, we will 







928 For interpretation of  TRIPS, see for example: Gervais, D.J. (ed)(2007) Intellectual Property, Trade and 
Development: Strategies to Optimize Economic Development in a TRIPS-Plus Era, Oxford University Press, New 
York, U.S. (Gervais IP); Gervais, D. (2003) The TRIPS Agreement: Drafting History and Analysis (2nd edition) 
Sweet & Maxwell, London, UK (Gervais TRIPS) n142; Carvalho, N.P. (2005) The TRIPS Regime of  Patent 
Rights (2nd edition) Kluwer Law International, The Hague, The Netherlands (Carvalho) n141; Malbon, J. 
and Lawson C. (eds) (2008) Interpreting and Implementing the TRIPS Agreement: Is it fair? Edward Elgar, 
Cheltenham, UK. 
929 See sections 1.2.1.1.2. and 1.3.3.1.  
930 See section 4.1. 
931 See section 4.2.  
932 See section 4.3.1. 
933 See section 4.3.2.  
934 See section 4.3.2.2. 
935  See section 4.3.2.2.1. Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health (Doha 
Declaration)  
936 See section 4.3.2.3.  
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4.3.1 Public health exceptions in TRIPS 
 
The understanding of  the exception rules in the TRIPS Agreement is essential to 
comprehend the limitations of  Members’ obligations in WTO law.  If  Members’ 
specific determination of  the level of  IP protection falls within the scope of  exceptions, 
it would not be deemed non-compliant to its obligations in the TRIPS. 
 
 
4.3.1.1 Exceptions to rights conferred 
 
TRIPS exceptions are applied with significant limitations.  Examples of  legitimate 
exceptions to patent rights include experimental use exceptions, research or teaching 
exceptions and the Bolar exception.937 While an experimental use exception aims for 
technology innovation, a research and teaching exception is for diffusion of  knowledge, 
the Bolar exception is created to promote competition and access to medicines in 
particular.  The interpretation of  the scope of  Article 30 TRIPS is in the WTO Panel 




4.3.1.1.1 Canada – Pharmaceutical Patents  
 
The WTO Panel had specifically discussed the interpretation of  the wording of  “limited 
exception” in Article 30 of  the TRIPS Agreement in Canada – Patent Protection of  
                                                      
937 The Bolar exception is also known as an “early working” exception which allow generic drug producers 
to initiate the process of  marketing approval of  generic drugs before the expiry date. It helps the 
consumers to obtain generic drugs at lower prices immediately thereafter. Bolar exception has been 
established in many countries to promote access to medicines and to support the development of  a generic 
pharmaceutical industry 
938 Canada - Patent Protection of  Pharmaceutical Products (Canada – Pharmaceutical Patents) WT/DS114/5, 
WT/DS114/R, 12 March 2000. 
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Pharmaceutical Products (Canada – Pharmaceutical Patents)939.  
 
On 11 November 1998, the EC and their Member States filed a complaint to the Dispute 
Settlement Body (DSB)940 of  the WTO against Canada’s Patent Act regarding the 
protection of  inventions in the area of  pharmaceuticals.  Canada’s Patent Act Section 
55.2 creates some exceptions to patent protections under certain circumstances.  The 
first paragraph of  Section 55.2 is known as the “Regulatory Exception”, which is  
regarding the exception of  users related to the development and submission of  
information required under domestic law, and the second paragraph is the “Stockpiling 
Exception”, which provides legitimate grounds for competitors in the market to 
manufacture and stockpile the patented product before its patent expires.  
 
In Canada – Pharmaceutical Patents, the examination of  exception to IP is subject to the 
“three-step test”.  Firstly, the exception needs to be limited; secondly, the exception 
needs “not unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation”; thirdly, the exception does 
“not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of  the right holder, taking account 
of  the legitimate interests of  third parties”.941 
 
The EC alleged that the exception violated Canada’s obligation under Article 28.1 with 
Article 33 of  the TRIPS Agreement.  Canada asserted that the word “exception” in 
TRIPS Article 30 should be interpreted according to the conventional dictionary 
definition, such as “confined with definite limits”, or “restrictive in scope, extent, 
                                                      
939 Correa, C.M. (2007) Trade Related Aspects of  Intellectual Property Rights: A Commentary on the TRIPS 
Agreement, Oxford University Press, New York, United States, p305 (Correa TRIPS) n154  
940 See section 1.2.1.1.2.  
941 Canada - Patent Protection of  Pharmaceutical Products (Canada – Pharmaceutical Patents) WT/DS114/5, 
WT/DS114/R, 12 March 2000, para 7.20. Exceptions to copyright are also limited by the “three-step test”. 
These are contained in Articles 13; 26(2), and 30 TRIPS. See Gervais, D. (2005) “Towards a New Core 
International Copyright Norm: The Reverse Three-Step Test” 9 Marquette Intellectual Property Law Review 1. 
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amount”.  However, the EC interpreted the word “limited” to connote a narrow 
exception, which could be described such as “narrow, small, minor, insignificant or 
restrictive”.942 The Panel agreed with the EC and adopted the narrow interpretation of  
the word “limited”.   The Panel concluded that the interpretation “should be justified 
in reading the text literally, and focusing on the extent to which legal rights have been 
curtailed, rather than the size or extent of  the economic impact”.943  
 
The Canada – Pharmaceutical Patents case indicates that the exception in TRIPS 30 should 
be interpreted in a restrictive manner, and the exception should not curtail substantial 
rights of  the patent holder.  This case shows that the PA in Article 30 TRIPS is a 
prescriptive but weak version.  The exception rule in the TRIPS, like its application in the 
General Agreement,944 is again required to be applied restrictively.  
  
 
4.3.1.2 Security exceptions in TRIPS 
 
Further to the above discussion with respect to the security exception in the GATT, it is 
observed that the concept of  “national security” has shifted from a purely military to a 
much broader concept, which Gross et al. argue encompasses almost all areas of  human 
endeavor.945 One of  the most important causes for the transition of  the concept of  
national security is the reality of  increasing global interdependence.  National security 
consideration constitutes one of  the general exceptions to international trade agreement 
in GATT Article XXI, and the language used has been described as “broad, self-defining, 
                                                      
942 WTO Panel Report, Canada – Pharmaceutical Patents, para 7.28. 
943 WTO Panel Report, Canada – Pharmaceutical Patents, para 7.31. 
944 See section 4.1.3.  
945 Gross, O. and Aolain, F.N. (2006) Law in Time of  Crisis: Emergency Power in Theory and Practice, Cambridge 




In the IP regime, Article 73 of  the TRIPS Agreement is another provision which allows 
Members to take action deemed necessary for the protection of  “essential security 
interests” in particular situations.  The provision states that the Agreement cannot be 
construed as preventing Members from taking action in pursuance of  a Member’s 
obligation under the UN Charter for the maintenance of  international peace and 
security.947 The wording of  this article echoes GATT XXI948 and thus the jurisprudence 
developed thereof  may be of  relevance for the interpretation of  Article 73 of  the TRIPS 
Agreement.  
 
According to the above discussion of  security exception in GATT XXI, Members are 
left with a considerable margin of  appreciation in the interpretation of  “national security 
interests”; however, their determination may not be exempt from the scrutiny of  the 
international political settings and the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB)949 of  the WTO. 
Further, as Correa maintains that “a health crisis or a natural disaster may justify the 
invocation of  such an exception”,950 a public health emergency of  international concern 
(PHEIC)951 thus may constitute legitimate grounds for security exception in WTO laws. 
In the context of  major human rights conventions, national security is also viewed as a 
legitimate ground for restricting certain rights and freedom.  Cases before the European 
Court of  Human Rights have demonstrated states’ wide discretion in the sphere of  
                                                      
946 See section 4.1.2. Jackson, J.H. (1997) The World Trading System: Law and Policy of  International Economic 
Relations (2nd edition) Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
947 Correa TRIPS, p520 n154. 
948 See section 4.1.2.  
949 See section 1.2.1.1.2. 
950 Correa TRIPS, p520, n154. 
951 See section 3.1.2.1. 
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national security as grounds for limiting human rights.952 It may also be argued that 
states are left with a broader margin of  appreciation in trimming IP in association with 
security concerns.  Following Sunstein’s theories of  “Anti-Catastrophe Principle” and 
the “Trimming exercise” as discussed in previous sections,953 IP protection may need to 
steer between the polar positions to minimise possible damages.   A safety margin is 
recommended to be adopted in the IP regime in times of  emergency.  
 
However, the PA adopted under an exception provision is still only deemed as an 
“affirmative defence” to the obligations in the TRIPS.954 Therefore, the burden of  proof  
lies with the defendant to prove the existence of  a public health emergency.955 The 
trimming measure of  IP in the security exception is assumed inconsistent with the 
obligations in the TRIPS unless the defendant can prove otherwise. 
 
PAs which are within the domain of  excluding provisions, namely the conditional rights in 
the IP regime are discussed below.  
 
 
4.3.2 Public health exclusions in TRIPS 
4.3.2.1 Exclusions of  patentable subject matter 
 
According to Article 27.2 of  the TRIPS, “Members may exclude from patentability 
inventions, the prevention within their territory of  the commercial exploitation of  which 
is necessary to protect ordre public or morality, including to protect human, animal or plant 
life or health or to avoid serious prejudice to the environment”.956 WTO Members may 
                                                      
952 Gross/Aolain, pp218-9 n945. 
953 See sections 2.3.2.1 and 2.3.2.2.  
954 See section 1.2.1.2. 
955 See section 1.2.1.2.  
956 See: Carvalho, N.P. (2005) The TRIPS Regime of  Patent Rights (2nd edition) Kluwer Law International, The 
Hague, The Netherlands (Carvalho), n141. Regarding the necessity test in this article, Carvalho suggests 
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choose to adopt precautionary exclusions to patentable subject matter based on morality, 
public order (or public policy), public health, and serious environmental harm.957 
Morality might simply be a principled objection to an invention; however, precaution 
implies a desire to eliminate or prevent a risk.   In other words, precautionary actions 
based on risk assessment or evaluation of  available pertinent information would appear 
to be a means of  risk management.  
 
“Human health” is considered as a sub-species of  ordre public.958 The European Patent 
Office (EPO) has distinguished “ordre public” relating to public interests from morality, 
which is referred to the physical integrity of  individuals.959 For example, the issues of  the 
patentability of  human genetics960 and software patent protection961 have recently drawn 
the debates on the legitimate exclusion to IP on morality grounds.   
 
It is observed by Correa that WTO Members enjoy a wide range of  discretion in 
                                                                                                                                                           
that the necessity test in Article 27.2 implies a two-step test, and needs to be applied with the criteria that 
are available in the WTO system. These includes considering Article 2.2 SPS Agreement and Article 2 of  
the WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (the TBT Agreement). See Carvalho, pp209-210. 
957 For the moral exceptions in WTO, see: Kolitch, S. “The Environmental and Public Health Impacts of  
US Patent Paw: Making the Law for Incorporation a Precautionary Principle” 36(1) Environmental Law 
221-256; Diebold, N. F. (2008) “The Morals and Order Exceptions in WTO Law: Balancing the Toothless 
Tiger and the Undermining Mole” 11(1) Journal of  International Economic Law 43.  
958 Correa TRIPS, p289 n154. 
959 Correa TRIPS, p288 n154. 
960 For the limitations on patent rights, see: MacQueen, H. , Waelde, C. and Laurie, G., Brwon, A. 
(2010)Contemporary Intellectual Property: Law and Policy (2nd edition) Oxford University Press, New 
York, United States, chapter 12 n165; see also: Brownsword, R. (2004) “Regulating Human Genetics: New 
Dilemma for A New Millennium” 12(14) Medical Law Review; Rowlandson, M. (2010) “The Order Public 
and Morality Exception and its Impact on the Patentability of  Human Embryonic Stem Cells” 67 European 
Intellectual Property Review.  
961 Leith, P. (2007) Software and Patents in Europe, Cambridge University Press, New York, United States; 
Leith, P. (2004) “Software Patents” JISC Briefing Paper, available at: 
http://www.jisclegal.ac.uk/Portals/12/Documents/PDFs/softpatentsleith.pdf ; Guadamuz, A. (2006) 
“The Software Patent Debate” 1(3) Journal of  Intellectual Property Law & Practice 196-206; Taylor, R. (2009) 
“In Practice: Legal Update: Hard Choice over Software” 3 Law Society Gazette; Grosche, A. (2006) 
“Software Patents, Boon or Bane for Europe?” 14 International Journal of  Law and Information Technology 257; 
Freedman, C.D. (2000) “Software and Computer-Related Business-Method Inventions: Must Europe 
Adopt American Patent Culture?” 8 International Journal of  Law and IT 285; Park, J.(2005) “Has Patentable 
Subject Matter Been Expanded?—A Comparative Study on Software Patent Practices in the European 
Patent Office, the United States Patent and Trademark Office and the Japanese Patent Office” 13 
International Journal of  Law and Information Technology 336. 
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determining the situation of  “ordre public” according to their particular values and social 
background that needs special protection.  Specifically, he argues that “a country 
devastated by an epidemic may consider that adopting measures to combat it may be a 
matter of  ‘ordre public’”.962 This is to say that states may have the autonomous right to 
employ health measures to contain virus transmission on “order public” grounds in times 
of  public health emergencies.  This echoes the argument of  the legitimacy of  a state’s 
trimming exercise of  IP under a pending threat to national security interests.963  
 
In addition, many nations have incorporated the PA to protect human health in their 
patent laws to varying degrees.964 For example, in the patent code of  India, a provision 
states: “an invention the primary or intended use of  which would be contrary to law or 
morality or injurious to public health”.965 It is also noteworthy that Brazilian patent law 
provides a number of  statutory exclusions from patentability, essentially limiting the 
definition of  patentable subject matter to exclude various categories of  inventions for 
policy reasons.966 Particularly, the National Health Vigilance Agency (ANVISA)967 is 
established as a unique scheme to deliberately trim IP protection prior to patent granting 
on public health grounds, which can be deemed as adopting a margin of  safety in the IP 
regime.968 The mechanism of  ANVISA will be addressed briefly in the following section. 
                                                      
962 Correa TRIPS, p288, n154. 
963 See section 4.3.1.2. 
964 See Patents Throughout the World (West 2004), Kolitch PP p245 note 156 n6.  
965 India Patent Act of  1970, chapter II, sec 3(b). Other nations whose patent laws are known to include a 
statutory public health exclusion are Costa Rica, Ghana, Iran, Japan, Kenya, South Korea, Mongolia, 
Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, Somali, Taiwan, Thailand, Trinidad 
and Tobago, Uruguay, and Vietnam. See Patents Throughout the World, West 2004. 
966  In Brazilian law, the following are not patentable: anything contrary to morals, standards of  
respectability and public security, order and health; substances, materials, mixtures, elements or products of  
any kind, as well as the modification of  their physical-chemical properties and the respective processes for 
obtainment or modification, when resulting from the transformation of  the atomic nucleus; and all or part 
of  living beings, except transgenic microorganisms that satisfy the three requirements of  
patentability-novelty, inventive step and industrial application-provided for in Article 8 and which are not 
mere discoveries. 
967 Available at: http://www.anvisa.gov.br/eng/index.htm.  




4.3.2.1.1 Brazil National Health Vigilance Agency 
 
Due to the highly prevalence rate of  HIV/AIDS in its population, Brazil has been 
proactive at the forefront of  advancing the “right to health” in international society.  It 
has adopted a series of  reforms in patent law to promote access to medicines.969 A 
self-invented scheme of  ANVISA is introduced to incorporate a role for the health 
agency into the process of  pharmaceutical patent granting.970 ANVISA has the veto 
power on patent granting when it considers the said patent is harmful to human health. 
This scheme is also regarded as an action to take full advantage of  the flexibilities in 
TRIPS on health and security considerations. 
 
Prior consent mechanism of  ANVISA as a precautionary action for 
the pre-grant exemptions  
 
The Brazilian exclusions to patentable subject matter are typical of  precautionary 
exclusions in the patent laws for WTO Members.  The ANVISA has included public 
health concerns to limit patent applications on public health grounds.  The aim of  this 
trimming exercise of  IP granting is to provide an additional safety factor in the IP regime,971 
thus it can be deemed as a precautionary measure.  According to the legislation, “the 
concession of  patents for pharmaceutical products and processes will depend on the 
prior approval of  ANVISA”.972 The prior consent mechanism of  “anuencia previa” 
                                                      
969 For example, Law 10196/2001 has introduced restrictive and amendments to Patent Law 9279/96. 
970 Chaves, G. C. (2007) “Case Study on the Use of  TRIPS Flexibilities in Brazil”, Access to Medicines, 
Human Rights and Trade Rules: Comparative and International Perspectives, Beijing, 29 October 2007. 
971 For the measure to adopting an “additional safety factor”, see the discussion of  the precautionary 
approach in Codex Alimentarius in section 3.1.3.2. 
972 Article 229-C of  Law 9.279/96. 
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(prior approval) from ANVISA has been adopted to examine substantive patentability 
criteria from 2003. 
 
In other words, the creation of  “anuencia previa” requires two government agencies, the 
National Institute for Intellectual Property (INPI) and ANVISA to work together in the 
examination and granting of  pharmaceutical patents.973 The significance of  the prior 
consent requirement is that it partly vests “the competence of  regulating pharmaceutical 
patent applications within ANVISA”.974 ANVISA has the veto power over the granting 
of  any pharmaceutical patent while considering the impact on societal interests relating 
to public health of  a pharmaceutical patent.975 The requirement of  “anuencia previa” 
has been a novel programme to differentiate pharmaceutical patent application from 
other patents, which can be seen as a precautionary measure to manage risk to human 
health.  “The prior approval” of  ANVISA was devised to suggest the unique and 
important implication of  pharmaceutical patents for society, and to ensure that the 
granting of  pharmaceutical patents receives special examination.  However, this 
consequently gives rise to a question: Is it acceptable in the WTO that pharmaceutical 
patents are not regarded as “like products” with other patents and receive differential 
market treatment?976  
 
                                                      
973  Murphy, B. (2005) “Brazil’s Anuencia Previa: How Brazil’s Unique Pharmaceutical Patent Law 
Illustrates that the United States and Brazil Continue to Disagree on TRIPS’ Flexibilities to Protect Access 
to Essential Medicines”. 
974 Rodrigues, E.B.Jr. and Murphy, B. (2006) “Brazil’s Prior Consent Law: A Dialogue between Brazil and 
the United States over where the TRIPS Agreement Currently Sets the Balance between the Protection of  
Pharmaceutical Patents and Access to Medicines”, 16 Albany Law Journal of  Science & Technology 423 
(Rodrigues/Murphy). 
975 Rodrigues/Murphy, n974. 
976 According to Article 27.1 TRIPS, which is related to the obligation of  non-discrimination, it requires 
that “patents shall be available and patent rights enjoyable without discrimination” as in the field of  
technology. The rationale of  the prior consent requirement is that it regards pharmaceutical inventions in 
relation to public health concerns as having a special impact on public interests, thus should not be deemed 
as “like products” with other technology inventions. See n110 section 2.2.2.2.3 for the more discussions 
on “like products”; see section 5.2.1.2 and below for the argument on the legitimacy of  differential 
treatment for health technologies associated with risks to human health.  
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Purpose and defect of  ANVISA 
 
The novel device of  ANVISA aims to pursue the harmonisation of  IP granting and 
public health by limiting pharmaceutical patentability when taking into account societal 
interests relating to public health of  a pharmaceutical patent from the notion of  risk 
management and precaution.  ANVISA has the veto power if  the granting of  a 
particular pharmaceutical patent is considered contrary to public health.  It appears to 
have wide discretion on the term of  “contrary to public health” while it adopts a strict 
standard in consenting to the patentability of  health-related inventions.  
 
However, there still exist some problems in the mechanism which also attract discussion 
and criticism.  In addition to the legitimacy issue on the distinction of  the “likeness” of  
pharmaceutical patents and other patents,977 the main conflict is the different mandates 
and responsibilities of  INPI and ANVISA which create tension in the process of  
granting patents.  INPI’s primary goal is to apply the norms of  Brazil’s Industrial 
Property Law, which is industry-oriented and adopts guidelines more similar to that of  
developed countries.  Yet, ANVISA’s purpose is “to protect the health of  the public” 
and “to control products and services that involve risk to the public health”. 978 
Consequently, the review of  ANVISA is based on a public health oriented guideline 
which adopts a stricter standard in consenting to the patentability of  inventions that 
meet higher standards of  non-obviousness and novelty.979 If  the two institutions have 
disagreements with a patent application, the process is blocked and results in a delay of  
the grant.  TRIPS requires that procedures concerning the enforcement of  IP rights 
                                                      
977 See further discussion in section 5.2.1.2.1  
978 Articles 6 and 8 Law N0 9782/99. 
979 Rodrigues/Murphy, n974.  
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shall not entail unwarranted delays,980 yet the conflicts of  INPI and ANVISA could have 
significant resultes in the delay of  granting in some applications.  Therefore it may 
cause “undue delay” to the market for a significant period.981 This results in a possible 
violation to the TRIPS.  
 
In summary, though the effectiveness and possible violations of  the TRIPS of  ANVISA 
remain to be explored, the reform of  pharmaceutical patenting in Brazil demonstrate 
that developing countries have strived to take full advantage of  the flexibilities in TRIPS.  
The prior consent requirement suggests ANVISA is a presecriptive PA.  The ANVISA 
scheme can be categories as a strong PA due to the wide discretion in consenting to the 
patentability of  inventions.  In addition, ANVISA also requires a manufacturer to 
present relevant documents in the registration process at ANVISA.982 It could then be 
understood that ANVISA reflects an Information Disclosure PA.   
 
In addition to the prior consent requirement of  ANVISA, which may be regarded as a 
trimming exercise983 in the application process of  IP on health grounds; the scheme of  
compulsory licensing could be regarded as another trimming exercise in IP protection 
after patent granting.  Attention now will be turned to the mechanism of  compulsory 







980 Article 41.2 TRIPS.  
981 See EC – Biotech for the discussion of  “undue delay” to market in section 2.2.2.2.3.  
982  Resolution – RDC n0 25, 9th December 1999.  Available at: 
http://www.anvisa.gov.br/legis/resol/25_99rdc_ing.htm   
983 See section 2.3.2.2.  
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4.3.2.2 Compulsory licensing 
 
TRIPS provide flexibilities for governments to fine-tune the exclusive protection granted 
in order to meet other social agendas.  It allows governments to evoke suspension on 
the exclusiveness of  patent holders’ rights during certain periods in national emergencies 
provided certain conditions are fulfilled.984 The relationship between TRIPS and public 
health has been widely discussed with regard to developing countries,985 but has hardly 
been explored in a developed country setting.  However, in recent years, the use of  
compulsory licensing to redress health concerns is increasing in developed countries due 
to the emergent PHEIC986 under globalisation.  For example, France has implemented 
an ex officio licence for national public health reasons in its patent act,987 and Belgium has 
proposed a special compulsory licence regime for national health reasons.988 
 
In the case of  “other use without authorisation of  the right holder” in Article 31 TRIPS, 
also known as “compulsory licensing”, the exclusiveness of  patent rights may be 
temporarily suspended to meet the needs of  public interest under a public health 
emergency.  Compulsory licensing can be regarded as a tool to limit IP protection in an 
                                                      
984 See section 1.3.2.  
985 For a discussion on asymmetrical power relations in international IP, see: Sell, S.K. (2004) “The Quest 
for Global Governance in Intellectual Property and Public Health: Structural, Discursive, and Institutional 
Dimensions” 77 Temple Law Review 363; Sell, S.K. (2002) “Post-TRIPS Developments: The Tension 
between Commercial and Social Agendas in the Context of  Intellectual Property” 14 Florida Journal of  
International Law 193 (Sell Post-TRIPS)n102; Helfer, L.R. (2004) “Regime Shifting: the TRIPS Agreement 
and New Dynamics of  International Intellectual Property Lawmaking” 29 Yale Journal of  International Law 1 
(Helfer TRIPS) n16. 
986 See section 3.1.2.1.  
987 Article L. 613-16 of  Law No. 92-597 of  July 1, 1992, on the Intellectual Property Code (as last 
amended by Law No. 96-1106 of  December 18, 1996): “Where the interests of  public health demand, 
patents granted for medicines or for processes for obtaining medicines, for products necessary in obtaining 
such medicines or for processes for manufacturing such products may be subject to ex officio licenses in 
accordance with Article L. 613-17 in the event of  such medicines being made available to the public in 
insufficient quantity or quality or at abnormally high prices, by order of  the Minister responsible for 
industrial property, at the request of  the Minister responsible for health”.  
988 Overwalle, G.V. “Reshaping Bio-patents: Measures to Restore Trust in the Patent System” in Somsen, 
H. (ed) (2007) The Regulatory Challenge of  Biotechnology: Human Genetics, Food and Patents, Edward Elgar 
Cheltenham UK. 
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attempt to achieve a better balance of  rights and obligations of  IP.989 From the lens of  
risk management, the provisional suspension of  the exclusiveness of  patent protection in 
a public health emergency can be regarded as a precautionary measure in IP.990 It has 
been adopted as a means to redress the dilemma of  “access to essential medicines” in a 
public health emergency, yet its operation has been highly controversial.991  
 
Taubman noted that the Doha Declaration has provided a political solution to these 
debates;992 however, it is still observed that, even with the interpretation of  the Doha 
Declaration, Members still tend to bypass this measure on the grounds of  public health 
emergency or other circumstances of  extreme urgency.993  The following section will 
review the Doha Declaration and the more recent development of  compulsory licensing 
in empirical studies.  This suggests that a PA reading of  the text would practically meet 
the need for stronger political and moral arguments for this measure, which is not only in 
line with the Doha Declaration, but also workable within the existing legal framework.   
 
 
Compulsory licensing as a precautionary action for the post-grant 
exemptions  
 
In view of  this, it can be argued that, under certain circumstances, compulsory licensing 
on pharmaceutical patents under a public health emergency can be regarded as a 
precautionary health measure as it is a provisional measure to suspend the exclusiveness 
                                                      
989 Article 7 TRIPS. 
990 See section 4.3.2.3.  
991 See sections 1.3.3, 1.3.3.1 and 1.3.3.2.  
992 Taubman, A (2010), A Practical Guide to Working with TRIPS, Oxford University Press, New York, US, 
pp48-49 n190   
993 See section 1.3.3 
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of  IP protection due to the greater need of  public health. 994  Similar to the 
abovementioned precautionary measures,995 the precautionary granting of  a compulsory 
licence is required to be accompanied by a series of  procedural requirements to restrain 
excessive abuse.996 Under current international law, states are free to determine their 
appropriate level of  health protection997  and thus have the discretion to strike a  
balance between public health and IP protection.  
 
The function of  compulsory licensing could also be understood from the 
above-mentioned concept of  “Trimming” proposed by Sunstein,998 which argues for a 
safety net in emergency situations.  In extreme situations, compulsory licensing may be 
chosen; states may be left with no other choice but to “trim” IP protection to safeguard 
public interests of  health and security.  Compulsory licensing thus offers a margin of  
safety under a public health emergency where the exclusiveness of  IP could be 
temporarily suspended to safeguard public health.  
 
It can be further argued that even in situations where there is a lack of  information, 
“being humble and uncertain about the right result”;999 it may still lead states to choose 
to trim IP protection to minimise possible damage to public health.  It can be suggested 
that in uncertainty of  extreme situations, it is appropriate to steer between the polar 
situations of  IP protection.  Questions arise that ask what kinds of  measures might be 
deployed in the trimming exercise?  What limits or flexibilities might be used to avoid 
polarisation?  Such concerns and the policy-making of  IP protection in a public health 
emergency will be further addressed in chapter 5.  
                                                      
994 See section 5.3 for the development of  this argument.  
995 See section 2.3.1.3. 
996 See sections 5.3.1, 5.3.2, 5.3.3, 5.2.4 and 5.3.5.  
997 See sections 2.2.2.1 and 2.2.3.1.  
998 See section 2.3.2.2.  
999 Sunstein Trimming, n466 p1061. 
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The conditions and procedures prior to the granting of  a compulsory licence are set out 
in Article 31 TRIPS.  For instance, the proposed user needs to obtain authorisation 
from the right holder on reasonable commercial terms and conditions unless a national 
emergency or other circumstances of  extreme urgency exist.  In situations of  national 
emergency or other circumstances of  extreme urgency, the right holder shall be notified 
as soon as is reasonably practicable.  The scope and duration of  such use needs to be 
limited to the purpose for which it was authorised; such use needs to be non-exclusive; it 
requires to be authorised primarily for the supply of  the domestic market, and adequate 
remuneration needs to be paid to the patent right holder.  Moreover, granting of  a 
compulsory licence is subject to judicial review or other independent review by a higher 
authority.    
 
As a general rule, it requires the competent authorities of  the WTO Members to decide 
each compulsory licensing case and establish conditions that are intended to prevent the 
granting of  sweeping compulsory licences across a broad range of  inventions.  For 
example, in subparagraph (b) of  Article 31, before an application may be considered, the 
proposed user must first obtain a voluntary licence on reasonable terms and conditions 
within a reasonable period of  time.  The requirement of  the obligation of  the proposed 
user to first make an effort to obtain authorisation from the right holder can be waived in 
cases of  national emergency or other circumstances of  extreme urgency, yet similar to 
the security exception in GATT, the condition of  “national emergency or other 
circumstances of  extreme urgency” is not clearly defined in TRIPS.  
 
In the later round of  negotiations in Doha in 2001, WTO ministers stressed that it is 
important to implement and interpret the TRIPS Agreement in a way that supports 
  233
public health.1000 It has emphasised that the TRIPS Agreement should not prevent 
member governments from acting to protect public health.  It also affirms 
governments’ right to use the agreement’s flexibilities, such as compulsory licensing. The 
Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health (Doha Declaration) will 
be introduced in the following section. 
 
 
4.3.2.2.1 Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement 
and Public Health  
 
In agreeing to launch a new round of  WTO trade negotiations, trade ministers adopted 
the “Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health” (Doha Declaration) on 14 
November 2001. 1001  The Declaration sought to alleviate developing countries’ 
dissatisfaction with the TRIPS regime.  It committed members to the interpreting and 
implementing of  the agreement to support public health and to promote access to 
medicines.1002 It also affirmed the right of  WTO Members to use the flexibilities in the 
TRIPS Agreement to promote these goals.1003  
 
                                                      
1000 Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health (Doha Declaration), adopted by the fourth 
Ministerial Conference of  the World Trade Organization in Doha, Qatar, on 14 November 2001. 
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2 of  20 November 2001 n27 
1001 WTO Document, Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, 14 
November 2001. See also: WHO Report, Implications of  the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public 
Health, Correa, C. M. (2002) , WHO/EDM/PAR/2002.3 (Correa WHO); Abbott, F.M. (2002) “The Doha 
Declaration on the Trips Agreement and Public Health: Lighting A Dark Corner at the WTO” 5(2) Journal 
of  International Economic Law 469; Sun, Haochen (2004) “The Road to Doha and Beyond: Some reflections 
on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health” 15 European Journal Of  International Law 123; Baker, B.K. 
(2004) “Arthritic Flexibilities for Accessing Medicines: Analysis of  WTO Action Regarding Paragraph 6 of  
the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health” 14 Indiana International and Comparative 
Law Review 613; Ansari, N. (2002) “International Patent Rights in a Post-Doha World” 11 WTR Currents: 
International Trade Law Journal 57; Attaran, A. (2002) “The Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and 
Public Health, Access to Pharmaceuticals, and Options under WTO Law” 12 Fordham Intellectual Property, 
Media and Entertainment Law Journal 859; Chang, S. W. (2007) “WTO for Trade and Development Post 
Doha” 10(3) Journal of  International Economic Law 553.  
1002 Para 4 Doha Declaration, n27. 
1003 Para 4 Doha Declaration, n27, see also: Fergusson, I. F. “The WTO, Intellectual Property Rights, and 
the Access to Medicines Controversy” CRS Report for Congress, available at: 
www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/crs/rs21609.pdf . 
  234
For example, the Doha Declaration which stresses WTO Members’ right to take 
advantage of  the flexibilities of  TRIPS has resonance with the flexibilities used to 
protect public health in Article 27.2 TRIPS:  
 
We agree that the TRIPS Agreement does not and should not prevent members from taking 
measures to protect public health.  Accordingly, while reiterating our commitment to the TRIPS 
Agreement, we affirm that the Agreement can and should be interpreted and implemented in a 
manner supportive of  WTO members’ right to protect public health and, in particular, to promote 
access to medicines for all. In this connection, we reaffirmed the rights of  WTO members to use, to 
the full, the provisions in the TRIPS Agreement, which provide flexibility for this purpose.1004 
 
The interpretation of  the Doha Declaration implies that Members’ right in deciding the 
appropriate level of  protection is an “autonomous right” and deciding the exclusion to 
patent rights is conferred.  On the one hand, from the view of  state sovereignty and 
national autonomy in international law, the Doha Declaration has reaffirmed that the 
granting of  a compulsory licence under a public health emergency falls within the scope 
of  domestic sovereignty.1005 State sovereignty has been adopted as a reason to limit 
Members’ obligations in the WTO.1006 On the other hand, this also has resonance with 
the argument of  state responsibility and the protection of  civilians when an unknown 
risk to human health is suspected.1007  
 
                                                      
1004 Para 4 Doha Declaration, n27. 
1005 For discussion on state sovereignty, see: Brownlie, I. (2003) Principle of  Public International Law (6th 
edition) Clarendon Press, Oxford, p287; Raustiala, K. (2003) “Rethinking the Sovereignty Debate in 
International Economic Law” 6 (4) Journal of  International Economic Law 842; Oesch, M. (2003) “Standards 
of  Review in WTO Dispute Resolution” 6 (3) Journal of  International Economic Law 635; Cottier, T. (1998) 
“The Relationship between World Trade Organisation Law, National and Regional Law” 1(1) Journal of  
International Economic Law 83; Condon, B.J. (2006) Environmental Sovereignty and the WTO: Trade Sanctions and 
International Law, Transnational Publishers, New York, United States (Condon Sovereignty) n132. 
1006 Condon Sovereignty, n132, p233. 
1007 See section 2.1.2 for the discussion of  “State responsibility”. 
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The Doha Declaration has stated that each WTO Member has the right to grant 
compulsory licences and the freedom to determine the grounds upon which such 
licences are granted;1008 each Member has the right to determine what constitutes a 
national emergency or other circumstances of  extreme urgency.  It articulates that 
public health crises, including those relating to HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria, and 
other epidemics, can represent a national emergency or other circumstances of  extreme 
urgency.1009 In view of  this, Carvalho notes that “WTO Members are entitled to rely on 
their own legal system and practices” to issue compulsory licences.1010  
 
In addition, WTO Members’ right to determine an appropriate level of  health protection 
has been reaffirmed.1011 Members are allowed to take a more cautious approach to health 
risk than the international standard.  Specifically through the interpretation of  the Doha 
Declaration, arguably, it can therefore be implied that the notion of  precaution has been 
incorporated, or at least accepted in TRIPS.  
 
The declaration also reminds Members to apply the customary rules of  interpretation of  
public international law: each provision of  the TRIPS Agreement needs be read in the 
light of  the objectives and principles of  the Agreement as stated in Articles 7 and 8 of  
the general provisions in the Agreement.1012 The objectives of  the TRIPS Agreement 
clearly state that the protection and enforcement of  IP should contribute to the mutual 
advantage of  producers and users and in a manner conducive to “social economic 
                                                      
1008 Para 5 (b) Doha Declaration.   
1009 Para 5 (c) Doha Declaration. 
1010 Carvalho, N.P. (2005) The TRIPS Regime of  Patent Rights (2nd edition) Kluwer Law International, The 
Hague, The Netherlands (Carvalho) n141, p151. 
1011 For example, the Appellate Body in EC – Asbestos stated that, “ …we note that it is undisputed that 
WTO Members have the right to determine the level of  protection of  health that they consider 
appropriate in a given situation”. Appellate Body Report, EC – Asbestos, WT/DS135/AB/R, para 168. See 
sections 2.2.2.1 and 2.2.3.1. 
1012 Para 5 (a) Doha Declaration. See section 1.3.1.1. 
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welfare”, and a balance of  rights and obligations.  In Article 8 regarding its principles, it 
stipulates that Members may adopt measures “necessary to protect public health”, and to 
promote the “public interest” in sectors of  vital importance to their socio-economic and 
technological development.  
 
Further, the principles of  the TRIPS Agreement states that Members may adopt 
measures “necessary to protect public health”, yet, according to the interpretation of  the 
Doha Declaration, the necessity test in Article 8.1 TRIPS has distinguished itself  from 
that of  GATT XX (b).1013 The interpretation of  paragraph 5(c) of  the Doha Declaration 
implies that the granting of  a compulsory licence is a conditional right,1014 or an “exclusion 
provision” in TRIPS, (See Diagram 4.3.2.2.1) which enjoys a higher legal status in the 
WTO legal hierarchy than “exception provisions”, the so-called “affirmative defence” in 
the general exception provision.1015 (See Diagram 4.3.2.2.1.1) 
 
In addition, Correa also argues that paragraph 5(c) of  the Doha Declaration shows an 
important and different implication from the GATT/WTO jurisprudence of  “the 
necessity test” outside of  the TRIPS context.1016 Likewise, Carvalho also notes that “the 
word ‘necessary’ seems to be redundant in Article 8.1 and … [has] no practical 
                                                      
1013 See section 4.1.1.3.  
1014 See n118 for conditional rights in the WTO.  
1015  The distinction between “excluding provision” (conditional rights) and “exception provision” 
(affirmative defence), see the introduction of  this chapter and Grando; Charnovitz n118. 
1016 Correa, C.M. (2002) “Implications of  the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public 
Health” Health Economics and Drugs, EDM Series No12, at 16-17 (Correa Implications). He also notes that: 
first, it clarifies that “public health crises” can represent “a national emergency or other circumstances of  
extreme urgency”, and exempt the proposed user of  prior negotiation with the patent holder in such 
conditions. Second, the reference to “HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics” indicates that 
the emergency could be a long-term situation. See section 4.1.1 for the discussion of  the “necessity test” 
in exception provisions. The necessity test of  the health exception rule outside the TRIPS context in WTO 
jurisprudence appears in GATTXX (b), which requires the adopting Member to bear the burden of  
proving the necessity of  the measure.  It should be examined by the objective of  the said health measure 
and the Chapeau of  the provision. Furthermore, the Appellate Body has introduced a balancing and 
weighing process as a proportionality test to supplement the necessity test.  
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meaning”.1017 From the above analysis, it can therefore be concluded that the burden of  
proof  of  such cases is reversed to the complaining Member of  compulsory licensing to 















1017 For discussion of  the health exception in GATT and Article 8 TRIPS, see: Carvalho, N.P. (2005) The 
TRIPS Regime of  Patent Rights (2nd edition) Kluwer Law International, The Hague, The Netherlands n141. 









     
 
In summary, the Doha Declaration has reaffirmed that a WTO Member has the right to 
determine the grounds to grant a compulsory licence.  The right to determine an 
appropriate level of  health protection is regarded as an “autonomous right” in WTO law 
which therefore requires the complainant to bear the burden of  proof  proving that the 
defendant does not fall under the emergency situation.  A Member who wants to file a 
complaint against the invoking Member bears the burden of  proof  under the 
interpretation of  this paragraph.1019 
 
                                                      
1019 For a further discussion of  allocation of  burden of  proof  in WTO laws, see Grando, M. (2006) 
“Allocating the Burden of  Proof  in WTO Disputes: A Critical Analysis” 9 Journal of  International Economic 














From this perspective, the WTO appears to open a door for public health concerns to 
legitimise the flexibilities which Members can apply to their discretion.1020  This also 
manifests in Members’ autonomy being paid due respect in the public health dimension 
of  international economic law.1021 In particular, Bloche argues that the WTO system has 
come to treat protection of  health as a de facto interpretative principle when disputes arise 
over Members’ treaty obligations.  He notes that especially after the global AIDS 
pandemic, world politics has pushed the WTO to identify an emerging pattern of  
deference to national autonomy when Members’ domestic health policies conflict with 
other values protected by trade agreements.1022 It is also noteworthy that the ongoing 
amendment of  Article 31(f) which introduces a notification system is also an attempt to 
embody the flexibilities in TRIPS.1023 It is in this context that this work has observed a 
trend of  promoting access to medicines and adopting the PA in compulsory licensing in 
state practice.  
 
In summary, in terms of  legal status, the PA in compulsory licensing is akin to the PA in 
the SPS Agreement:1024 both are exclusions to Members’ obligations to the WTO.   It 
can further be concluded that precautionary compulsory licensing is a prescriptive PA; it 
can also be categorised as an information disclosure PA for the adopting state needs to notify 
the right holder and also bears the responsibility to review the grant in due course.1025 
Further, in order to achieve a moderate PA, it is suggested that the template in the SPS 
                                                      
1020 Sherman, P. B. (2004) “Pandemics ad Panaceas: The World Trade Organization’s Efforts to Balance 
Pharmaceutical Patents and Access to AIDS Drugs” 41 American Business Law Journal 353.   
1021 Cf: See section 4.2.3 for WTO Members’ right to establish their level of  health protection. For 
example, the Appellate Body in EC – Hormones noted that, “…Article 3.3 recognizes the autonomous right 
of  a Member to establish such higher level of  protection” n247 錯誤! 尚未定義書籤。 Appellate Body 
Report, WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R, para 104. 
1022 Bloche, M. (2002) “WTO Deference to National Health Policy: Toward an Interpretive Principle” 
Journal of  International Economic Law 825-848 (Bloche Deference). 
1023 See WTO website: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/public_health_e.htm   
1024 See section 4.2.3.  
1025 Paras (b) (g) (i) of  Article 31 TRIPS.  
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Agreement is adapted in the application for a precautionary compulsory licence.   This 
will be explored in the following chapter.     
 
Attention will be paid to relevant cases where the PA has been accommodated into the 
IP regime in the following section. 
 
 
4.3.2.3 Trend of  compulsory licensing 
 
The implementation of  compulsory licensing seems to broaden its scope in states’ 
practice.  In recent years, it had been applied to cope with potential disease outbreaks 
under the threat of  Anthrax in the US and Canada,1026 as well as the avian flu in 
Taiwan.1027 Moreover, Thailand granted compulsory licensing on a heart disease drug by 
claiming that heart disease has resulted in a national financial emergency.1028 However, 
despite the interpretation of  the Doha Declaration, there is still no objective mechanism 
for the invocation of  a compulsory licence, thus such application still gives rise to 




4.3.2.3.1 United States and Canada 
 
In 2001, the US and Canada were threatened with a terrorist attack of  a particular strain 
of  anthrax that would be resistant to penicillin and other common antibiotics, but 
possibly treatable by ciprofloxacin, an antibiotic which is patented under a German 
                                                      
1026 See section 4.3.2.3.1.  
1027 See section 4.3.2.3.2.  
1028 See section 4.3.2.3.3.  
1029 See also sections 1.3.3.1. and 1.3.3.2.  
  241
company, Bayer Inc.  The recommended stockpiles for ciprofloxacin (Cipro) did not 
exist and the patent owner could not meet the demand for nearly two years.  In the fear 
of  an imminent outbreak, the US public health authorities considered calling off  the 
protection of  the Cipro patent under Bayer, but decided to wait rather than to buy 
readily available generics from outside the US.1030  
 
At the same time, under the threat of  a possible outbreak, the Canadian government also 
considered issuing a compulsory licence for the generic manufacture of  the antibiotic 
Cipro.1031 The conflict ceased when both the US and Canada reached an agreement with 
Bayer who promised a price reduction on the drug.1032 This anthrax case may imply that 
the threat to a possible pandemic outbreak is a legitimate ground for compulsory 





The WHO, on its website, has consistently warned that there has been a high possibility 
of  an avian flu outbreak since spring 2005, and should a serious outbreak happen, the 
high mortality rate of  avian flu H5N1 could result in millions of  deaths worldwide.1033 
The WHO considered the H5N1 outbreak to be a phase 3 “pandemic alert phase” in 
2005,1034 which means that a virus new to humans is causing infections, but does not 
spread easily from one person to another.1035 The WHO thus recommended that 
                                                      
1030  “America’s anthrax patent dilemma” BBC News, 23 October 2001, available at: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/1613410.stm . 
1031  “Ciprofloxacin: the Dispute over compulsory licenses”, CPTech website, available at: 
http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/cl/cipro/ . 
1032  Bayer press release on Cipro deal, 25 October 2001, available at : 
http://lists.essential.org/pipermail/ip-health/2001-October/002261.html  
1033 See WHO website: http://www.who.int/crs/disease/avian_influenza/en/index.html. 
1034 WHO “Pandemic Phase”, see section 3.2.3.4.2.  
1035 WHO (2005) “WHO global influenza preparedness plan: The role of  WHO and recommendations 
for national measures before and during pandemics”, Department of  Communicable Disease, Surveillance 
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countries should stockpile the appropriate antiviral at least sufficient for 10 percent of  
the population, to contain the virus spread.1036  
 
Tamiflu (Oseltamivir), the patented drug under Roche is regarded as the most effective 
antiviral treatment for H5N1, and was in short supply in 2005 when the WHO made its 
recommendation.  Roche, as the single manufacturer, was increasing its production 
capacity, but still could not meet the global demand in the world for several years.  
 
To secure sufficient stockpiling of  Tamiflu, after negotiations with Roche broke down, 
Taiwan’s Department of  Health (DOH) considered it necessary to obtain compulsory 
licensing on the antiviral to eliminate possible shortages in the stock of  the Tamiflu due 
to an outbreak or Roche’s failure to timeously supply the antiviral.  Consequently, the 
DOH filed the compulsory licensing application with the Taiwan Intellectual Property 
Office (TIPO).  According to the requirement of  Article 76 of  the Patent Act, TIPO 
granted compulsory licensing on Tamiflu on 25 November 2005, which was the first case 
of  compulsory licensing in the light of  a threat of  an avian flu pandemic.1037 The grant 
took effect immediately and operated until December 2007 unless there was some 
licensing agreement reached between Roche and DOH.1038  
 
                                                                                                                                                           
and Response, Global Influenza Programme, WHO/CDS/CSR/GIP/2005.5, p6.  
1036 WHO (2005) “WHO global influenza preparedness plan: The role of  WHO and recommendations 
for national measures before and during pandemics”, Department of  Communicable Disease, Surveillance 
and Response, Global Influenza Programme, WHO/CDS/CSR/GIP/2005.5. 
1037 TIPO Rule No. 09418601140, 8 December 2006. 
1038 There were several preconditions accompanied by this grant:  
 The grant shall take effect immediately and operate through 31 December 2007 to meet the needs 
and only the needs of  the national preparedness plan; 
 The antiviral made under the compulsory licensing must not be deployed until after the stock of  the 
Tamiflu which DOH procured from Roche is drawn in full;  
 The compulsory licensing may be terminated if  Roche agrees to release its patent on Tamiflu to 
Taiwan;  
 Taiwan’s drug firms can make Tamiflu for domestic use only, and  
 TIPO recommends that Roche and the DOH negotiate the remuneration under the compulsory 
licensing as soon as possible. 
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According to the WHO, the potential H5N1 outbreak was a phase 3 pandemic alert 
phase in 2005, which means that a virus new to humans is causing infections, but does 
not spread easily from one person to another.1039 The evolution of  mutation of  the virus 
to the next human-to-human phase is not predictable under current technology.  It is a 
complicated problem involving international IP, international economics, public health, 
and science.  Under such global risks, every government would face the dilemma of   
balancing the industrial development of  the pharmaceutical sector with public health 
needs.  
 
The issue is how to properly apply the concept of  “national emergency”1040 under 
international economic law, and how to validate the granting ofcompulsory licensing. 
Taiwan’s government claimed that the grant was based upon special consideration of  
scientific and non-scientific factors.  It was claimed that its special geographical location 
and diplomatic isolation were the main factors in rendering the grant.1041 
 
Since 2003, Taiwan did not have a bird flu outbreak unlike neighbouring Southeast Asian 
countries,1042 but it claimed that it was under high risk for surveillance of  the pandemic 
due to its special geographical location and not being a member state of  the WHO.  In 
the past event of  a SARS outbreak, Taiwan was excluded from the global disease 
surveillance system, and could not receive support from the WHO in the first place 
because it was not a member of  the WHO.1043 In light of  the past experience of  
isolation from the international surveillance network, Taiwan’s government considered 
                                                      
1039 See section 3.1.2.4.2 Current phase of  alert in the WHO global influenza preparedness plan, available 
at: http://www.who.int/csr/disease/avian_influenza/phase/en/  
1040 See section 4.1.2.  
1041 TIPO Rule No. 09418601140, 8 December 2006.  
1042 Bird flu broke out in Southeast Asia, the more deadly bird flu H5N1 had killed more than 109 people 
in Indonesia, Vietnam, Cambodia, Thailand, and China. See: 
http://www.who.int/crs/disease/avian_influenza/country/cases_table_2006_04_12/en/index.html. 
1043 Taiwan had been rejected as a member of  the WHO due to China’s opposition.  
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that the threat of  the possible outbreak constituted the condition of  “national 
emergency” and that it was necessary to take extra caution in preparation of  the 
upcoming outbreak of  avian influenza.  Taiwan claimed that its dilemma of  diplomatic 
and political isolation required extra protection for the preparation of  the disease 
outbreak.  In order to stockpile enough doses of  Tamiflu to prepare for a pending 
pandemic, the DOH insisted that the compulsory licensing of  Tamiflu was legitimate 
and necessary. 
 
The validity and legitimacy of  granting a compulsory licence for a potential public health 
threat requires further scrutiny, although the previous US and Canadian cases on Cipro 
seem to indicate that the absence of  a bird flu outbreak is not an excuse to prevent 
Taiwan from considering that this risk of  a potential outbreak constitutes a national 
emergency under TRIPS Article 31(b).  The above Cipro cases in consideration of  the 
granting of  a compulsory licence under the anthrax threat seem to suggest that the so 





Thailand is the first country to test the boundaries of  compulsory licensing on 
medications for chronic diseases.  On 25 January 2007, Thailand granted compulsory 
licences on patents for the heart disease drug, Plavix (Clopidogrel bisulfate).1045 Thailand 
                                                      
1044 See section 4.3.2.3.1.  
1045 It was under the following conditions:(1) The use of  the above Patent rights is effective from now 
until the patent expired or no essential need.(2) The use of  the provision of  generic drugs of  Clopidogrel 
is unlimited for patients covered under the National Health Security Act B.E.2545, Social Security Act 
B.E.2533 and Civil Servants and Government Employees Medical Benefit Scheme, but is under doctors’ 
judgment.(3) A loyalty fee of  the Government Pharmaceutical Organisation’s (GPO) total sale value will be 
paid to the patentee. “Facts and Evidences on the 10 Burning Issues Related to the Government Use of  
Patents on Three Patented Essential Drugs in Thailand”, Document to Support Strengthening of  Social 
Wisdom on the Issue of  Drug Patent, the Ministry of  Public Health & the National Health Security Office, 
Thailand, February 2007. ISBN 978-974-94591-5-7. 
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claimed that its act to grant a compulsory licence on Plavix was based on the provision 
of  “public non-commercial use”1046 rather than that of  “national emergency or other 
circumstances of  extreme urgency”1047 in TRIPS Article 31 (b).  Thailand argues that 
the production of  the generic Plavix by the government-owned Government 
Pharmaceutical Organisation (GPO) under compulsory licence constitutes a “public 
non-commercial use”.  Thailand also alleged that under TRIPS 31(b), the requirement 
of  prior negotiation was waived in cases of  public non-commercial use, and that this 
provision only obliged the government to inform the patentee promptly. 
 
On the one hand, civil society and the NGO have expressed support for Thailand’s move 
on compulsory licensing for chronic diseases treatment.1048 On the other hand, critics 
have confronted Thailand’s act of  compulsory licensing on Plavix as overstepping the 
appropriate application of  compulsory licensing.  
 
However, there was a consequence after the grant: The patent owner of  Plavix, Abbot 
Laboratories announced it would no longer market new pharmaceutical products in 
Thailand, and it withdrew seven registration applications for four new pharmaceutical 
products.1049 In April 2007, the US placed Thailand on its Special 301 Priority Watch List 
                                                      
1046 See sections 1.3.2.3 and 1.3.2.3.3.  
1047 See section 1.3.2.2. 
1048 For example, Knowledge Ecology International (KEI) applauds the decision by the Thailand’s 
Ministry of  Health, and they “expect that Thailand will issue other compulsory licence[s] on medicines in 
the future.”  The Joint Statement by 15 NGOs claims that the Minister for Public Health has acted 
accruing to the flexibilities laid out in Article 31(b) of  the TRIPS Agreement, and even the US has ever 
applied the flexibilities in the past. They called the attempt to attack the legitimacy of  the decision 
“insulting and mischievous”.  Knowledge Ecology International Statement on Thailand Compulsory 
Licenses, 21 January 2007; Joint Statement by 15 NGOs - Thai civil society supports the health ministers of  Thailand 
and Brazil and calls on pharmaceutical companies and lobbyists to stop abusing their power, available at: 
http://lists.essential.org/pipermail/ip-health/2007-May/011155.html ,10 May 2007. See also, Love, J. 
Recent Examples of  the Use of  Compulsory Licensed on Patents, KEI Research Note 2, 8 March 2007. 




which was deemed to be a trade sanction.1050  
 
The future of  compulsory licensing on chronic diseases still remains unclear.  Thailand 
gave the first shot at testing the threshold of  the provision, but it also experienced the 
backfire of  trade retaliation.  Trade sanctions and retaliations from drug companies may 
create chilling effects on the following governments’ acts of  compulsory licensing on 
pharmaceuticals.1051 The hidden pressure still shows that the pharmaceutical IP issue is 
intrinsically an international wrestle which involves enormous political power and 
economic profits.  
 
However, the above cases have shown a trend in adopting a PA into compulsory 
licensing.  The recent occurrence of  public health emergency also demonstrates that the 
employment of  compulsory licensing on pharmaceuticals is no longer limited to 
developing countries; developed countries could also face the dilemma of  patent right 
protection and the access to drugs debates under a public health emergency.  Both the 
United States and Canada threatened to issue compulsory licences on Cipro against at the 
time of  the Anthrax threat,1052 and Taiwan granted a compulsory licence on Tamiflu in 
preparation for a possible avian flu outbreak.1053 These cases also imply that the 
incorporation of  precaution in compulsory licensing has been a pragmatic option to 
tackle a public health emergency.  Moreover, from the perspective of  states’ duties and 
rights,1054 states may be obliged to take certain precautionary health measures to protect 
                                                      
1050 Special 301 Priority Watch List, see Sell Post-TRIPS, n102.  
1051 See: “Thailand Avoids Compulsory Licence on Cancer Drug; 3 More Drugs Undecided” Intellectual 
Property Watch, 31 January 2008, available at: 
http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/2008/01/31/thailand-avoids-compulsory-licence-on-cancer-drug-3-mor
e-drugs-undecided/ . 
1052 See section 4.3.2.3.1.  
1053 See section 4.3.2.3.2.  
1054 See sections 2.1.2 and 2.3.1.1 for a detailed discussion on “states’ precautionary rights and duties”. 
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their civilians under a public health threat, even if  there is not full scientific certainty.1055 
In order to minimise Members’ reluctance of  compulsory licensing, this work focuses on 
the enhanced use of  the existing tools and stronger political and ethical arguments for 
this measure rather than on the exploration of  a new legal doctrine.1056  
 
 
4.3.3 Comments to the precautionary approach in TRIPS 
 
Patent protection is like a two-edged sword, pharmaceutical patents are indeed vital to 
the innovation of  new technology on drug production, but how to strike the right 
balance between the right to health and patent protection is debatable.  International 
pharmaceutical industries strive to reduce the practice of  compulsory licensing by urging 
that the scope of  compulsory licensing should be limited to certain diseases.1057 They 
claim that the necessary investment in the research and development of  new drugs is the 
main reason for the high cost of  antivirus.1058 However, in most developing and 
under-developed countries, the enormous health burden appears to be too overwhelming 
to consider the protection of  IP.1059  
                                                      
1055 Ruessmann, L. (2002) “Putting the Precautionary Principle in its Place: Parameters for the Proper 
Application of  a Precautionary Approach and the Implications for Developing Countries in Light of  the 
Doha WTO Ministerial” 17 American University of  International Law Review 905-949 n820. 
1056 For example, chapter 5 deals with the justification of  the need for differential treatment for medical 
technology in compulsory licensing by establishing how the “like-product” analysis enable a new reading 
of  the discrimination/differential treatment distinction made in TRIPS Article 27.1.  
1057 In order to limit the scope of  granting compulsory licences, the EU and the US have attempted to 
negotiate a list of  diseases for which compulsory licences would be given.  See, for example, Outterson, K. 
(2008) “Should Access to Medicines and TRIPS Flexibilities be Limited to Specific Diseases?” 34 American 
Journal of  Law and Medicine 279; Communication from the European Communities and Their Members to the TRIPS 
Council Relating to Paragraph 6 of  the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health (2002) Brussels, 
20 June 2002.  
1058 For innovation of  new drugs, see: Love, J. and Hubbard, T. (2007) “The Big Idea: Prizes to Stimulate 
R&D for New Medicines” 82 Chicago-Kent Law Review 1519. 
1059 For “access to medicines” issues, see Nanda, N. and Lodha, R. (2002) “Making Essential Medicines 
Affordable to the Poor” 20 Wisconsin International Law Journal 581; Mercurio, B. (2006) “Resolving the 
Public Health Crisis in the Developing World: Problems and Barriers of  Access to Essential Medicines” 5 
Northwestern University Journal of  International Human Rights 1; Love, J. (2007) “Measures to Enhance Access 
to Medical Technologies, and New Methods of  Stimulating Medical R&D” 40 U.C. Davis Law Review 679; 




The controversy on the inclusion of  pharmaceutical products in the IP regime has raised 
huge ethical controversies.  From a historical perspective, many countries with the most 
innovative pharmaceutical industries did not provide pharmaceutical patents until the 
industries were established.1060 TRIPS is the first international agreement that provides 
patent protection on pharmaceutical products, and it has been challenged by the 
developing world for offering excessive patent protection for life-saving drugs which has 
led to the putting off  of  efficient therapy for the resource-poor patients. 
 
It is in this context that the scheme of  compulsory licensing has been devised in order to 
resolve the dilemma between human rights to health and IP.  However, in empirical 
studies, it has been scarcely used, especially on the grounds of  “national emergency or 
other circumstances of  extreme urgency”.1061  Instead of  serving as an objective and 
transparent mechanism to redress the imbalance of  IP, compulsory licensing has been 
constantly used as a diplomatic threatening tool for drug price reduction in many 
countries.1062 Therefore the consequences of  its application rely much on power play in 
international settings.1063 
 
From the above analysis based on the distinction of  “excluding provisions” and 
“exception provisions” in WTO law,1064 the mechanism of  compulsory licensing can be 
                                                      
1060 For example, France, Germany, Italy, Sweden and Switzerland had resisted providing patents on 
pharmaceutical products for a long time before their industries had grown to a significant size. Alsegard, E. 
(2004) “Global Pharmaceutical Patents after the Doha Declaration – What Lies in the Future” 1(1) 
SCRIPT-ed. See sections 5.2.1.2 and 5.2.1.2.1.  
1061 See sections 1.3.3, 1.3.3.1 and 1.3.3.2.  
1062 Including South Africa, Brazil, Thailand, US and Canada. See: Abbott, F. and Reichman, J. (2007) “The 
Doha Round’s Public Health Legacy: Strategies for the Production and Diffusion of  Patented Medicines 
under the Amended TRIPS Provisions” 10 Journal of  International Economic Law 921. 
1063 See section 1.3.3.1.  
1064 See section 1.2.1.2, Diagram 1.2.1.2 and Diagram 1.2.1.2.1.   
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considered an exclusion to IP, which is deemed as Members’ “conditional right”1065 in 
the WTO regime.1066 Members are entitled to exercise this right to establish their 
appropriate level of  protection by means of  compulsory licensing if  certain conditions 
are satisfied.  The question of  how best to achieve Members’ appropriate level of  
protection by compulsory licensing then arises.  
 
The Doha Declaration has clarified and interpreted on the terms of  compulsory 
licensing.  It has reaffirmed Members’ autonomy in determining the appropriate level 
of  health protection under a public health emergency, such as AIDS/HIV, tuberculosis, 
malaria, and other epidemics.  Paragraph 5(c) of  the Declaration indicates that the 
device of  compulsory licensing has an important and different implication from the 
WTO jurisprudence of  “the necessity test”.  It also implies that Article 31 is as an 
“excluding provision”, which excludes other provisions in the TRIPS Agreement.  It 
suggests that the right to grant compulsory licences is an “autonomous right” in the 
WTO.  Charnovitz et al. have described an excluding provision (also called conditional 
right) standing in a mutually exclusive manner with the general rule.1067 In view of  the 
principles of  exception rules applied in the WTO system, a Member is required to prove 
that the adopted health measure is necessary in order to eliminate public health risk 
through scientific justification.  However, compulsory licensing can be deemed as an 
“excluding provision”, thus the burden of  proof  is laid on the complainant who needs to 
provide evidence that a public health emergency does not exist.  In this analogy,  
compulsory licensing is deemed in compliance with the obligation of  the TRIPS 
Agreement unless the complainant proves otherwise. 
 
                                                      
1065 Conditional rights, see n118.  
1066 See section 4.3.2.2.1, Diagram 4.3.2.2.1 and Diagram 4.3.2.2.1.1.  
1067 Charnovitz, p257, n118. 
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However, application of  compulsory licensing on pharmaceuticals has always been 
controversial in international fora due to its lack of  a clear threshold for invocation. 
Resourced-poor states are hesitant and reluctant to invoke the provision in fear of  trade 
retaliation from developed states.  In order to promote a balanced trimming exercise of  
IP and restrain a sweeping use of  the PA in compulsory licensing, an objective and 
transparent mechanism is required to prevent its abuse.  Relevant conditions to restrict 





The WTO has arisen to play an important role in international organisations with respect 
to world health due to its effective enforcement mechanism.1069 Members of  different 
international organisations choose to resort to the WTO for dispute settlement on 
international health issues.  The rationale of  the PA is particularly related to risk 
management under globalisation, which appears under different headings in WTO law.  
This chapter has examined the relevant WTO instruments of  the PA in the GATT,1070 
the SPS Agreement,1071 and the TRIPS Agreement;1072 and concludes that the concept 
of  precaution has been incorporated into human health protection in WTO law.  Yet its 
application is somewhat fragmented with different weights given to different headings.1073  
 
There are two forms of  operation of  the PA according to its legal status in the WTO 
regime: one is in the guise of  exception provisions, and the other excluding provisions.1074 
                                                      
1068 See section 5.3.  
1069 See section 1.2.1.1.2.  
1070 See sections 4.1.1 and 4.1.2.  
1071 See sections 4.2.2 and 4.2.3.  
1072 See section 4.3.3. 
1073 See section 5.1.1.2.  
1074 See section 1.2.1.2. 
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The PA appearing as an excluding provision enjoys higher legal status than that of  an 
exception provision. 
 
It has been observed that the PA appears as an exception in the GATT,1075 while the 
application of  a health exception is rigid and subject to scientific justification;1076 the 
exercise of  the security exception is broad and self-defining.1077 Both provisions are 
vague in the embodiment of  the PA; lack an objective mechanism for operation, and are 
restricted by their limited legal status.1078 On the contrary, the PA in the SPS Agreement 
is accepted as a right or a conditional right of  WTO Members,1079 which is equipped with a 
more sophisticated operation to accommodate precaution and enjoys higher legal status 
than the GATT instruments in the trade world.1080  
 
Similarly, the PA in TRIPS can also be divided into exception provisions and excluding 
provisions. 1081  Particularly, this chapter scrutinises the mechanism of  compulsory 
licensing and argues that the concept of  precaution has been incorporated into 
compulsory licensing after the specific interpretation of  the Doha Declaration.1082 The 
Doha Declaration has indicated the flexibilities of  compulsory licensing which may have 
implications for the PA in health risk management in TRIPS.  It is argued that WTO 
Members have the precautionary entitlement to grant a compulsory license under a 
public health emergency.  In addition, recent state practice has also demonstrated a 
trend towards the employment of  the PA which broadens the scope of  compulsory 
                                                      
1075 See sections 4.1.1. and 4.1.2.  
1076 GATT XX(b), see section 4.1.1.3. 
1077 GATT XXI (b), see section 4.1.2.3. 
1078 See section 4.2, Diagram 4.2 and Diagram 4.2.1. 
1079 Conditional rights, see n118, section 4.2.3. 
1080 See section 4.2, Diagram 4.2 and Diagram 4.2.1.  
1081 See section 4.3.2.2.1, Diagrams 4.3.2.2.1 and 4.3.2.2.1.1. 
1082 See section 4.3.2.2.1. 
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licensing in promoting access to medicines.1083 Hence, it is therefore important to apply 
the scheme of  compulsory licensing in a way that differs from the traditional approach 
of  “the necessity test” in other WTO exception rules.1084  
 
Specifically, the schemes of  provisional SPS measures and a precautionary grant of  
compulsory licensing share the common characteristics of  risk management in WTO law. 
They are both provisional health measures adopted under a public health emergency 
within the domain of  scientific uncertainty.  These two instruments can be regarded as 
the excluding provisions in WTO law;1085 both enjoy a higher legal status than the 
exception provisions. 1086  States’ domestic sovereignty and flexibilities in discretion 
should be paid due respect when confronting a public health emergency.   
 
In summary, the mechanism of  compulsory licensing on pharmaceutical patents under a 
public health emergency can be considered related more to the scheme of  the 
provisional SPS measures due to their legal status and common characteristics of  the 
rationale of  risk management in a public health emergency.  Accordingly, WTO 
Members may argue for a precautionary entitlement to trim IP through compulsory 
licensing in a public health emergency.  The mechanism of  provisional SPS measures is 
suggested to be adapted into the precautionary granting of  a compulsory licence.  In 
view of  this, further recommendations to refine and to embody the PA in TRIPS will be 
made in the following chapter to accommodate the PA into compulsory licensing.     
                                                      
1083 See sections 4.3.2.3.1, 4.3.2.3.2 and 4.3.2.3.3. 
1084 See n1017 and n1018. 
1085 See Diagrams 4.2 and 4.3.2.2.1.  
1086 See Diagrams 4.2.1 and 4.3.2.2.1.1. 
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Part 3: Recommendations 
 
5 The Precautionary Approach in Intellectual Property 
5.1 Redefining the precautionary approach in international 
public health 
 
After examining current practice of  the precautionary approach (PA) in the international 
public health and the WTO regimes, a model of  the PA adopted in the mechanism of  
compulsory licensing will be developed in this chapter.  
 
The focus of  this chapter is to argue for an adequate margin of  safety in the 
contemporary IP regime.  It is suggested that technologies or products associated with 
risks to human life or health should be granted differential treatment, particularly in 
compulsory licensing in TRIPS.  The differential treatment is justified by the rationale 
of  precaution and risk management in WTO law.  
 
This distinction of  “differential treatment” and “discrimination” in WTO law is based on 
the legitimate factor of  safety and the PA;1087 therefore we will also explore the extent to 
which the adoption of  the PA of  pharmaceutical technology should be granted 
legitimate “differential treatment” in the trade world.  It is further argued that a fast track 
to compulsory licensing can be employed when the said technology is strongly associated 
with the elimination of significant / serious / irreversible damage to human life or health.  
 
This chapter is divided into three parts.  First, in view of  the current limitations of  
being subordinated to free trade and regimes conflict in international law which have 
been addressed in previous chapters,1088 a tailored model of  the PA will be proposed. 
                                                      
1087 See section 1.2.1.1.1 for the discussion of  the principle of  non-discrimination in WTO law. 
1088 See sections 2.2.4.1. and 3.3.1.  
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Second, the proposed model of  the PA will be applied in the IP regime to redefine the 
compulsory licensing provision in TRIPS.  It is argued that pharmaceutical technology 
should receive differential treatment by adopting the PA into compulsory licensing on 
the rationale of  precaution and risk management.  Lastly, an expedient track of  
compulsory licensing on pharmaceutical patents based on the PA is also developed with 
sub-conditions in order to prevent abuse of  this article.  
 
In order to facilitate future application of  the PA in the IP regime, a redefinition of  the 
PA will be developed in this context to build a common ground for an objective 
implementation in the following section.1089 This redefinition will be further recast into 
the IP regime by means of  adopting a margin of  safety in the mechanism of  compulsory 





As our discussion suggests, the PA is not opposed to science and evidence; rather it 
supplements the blind spot or ignorance of  science.1091 It is used as a policy tool in risk 
management while its application is to ensure the concept of  a “safety factor” employed 
in circumstances of  scientific uncertainty or insufficiency in scientific evidence.  In 
other words, the PA is supposed to stand side by side with science and evidence; both act 




1089 See section 5.1.2.  
1090 See section 5.2.  
1091 See section 2.1.1.   
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To avoid possible controversies on the applications of  the PA which may amount to 
discrimination1092 in free trade, I propose to develop a structural mechanism for a 
systematic application which starts with a scientific evaluation of  risk.1093 
Moreover, from the previous analysis,1094 the definition of  the PA in the international 
public health law regime tends to be a prescriptive one,1095 which requires specific public 
health measures to be instituted to regulate the unknown risks to human life or health. 
An information disclosure version could also shed some light on our model with regard to its 
mandate for the introducing party of  a new product or technology to monitor and 
disclose any risk to the public.  We also favour a moderate version1096 as a strong version 
of  the PA tends to opt for intervention regardless of  potential costs and a weak version 
does not require any action for intervention.  A moderate version would therefore 
reconcile both extremes, and it is in favour of  adopting the least restrictive measure 
(LRM) to free trade,1097 given that globalisation has risen to play an important role in 
international health.1098   
 
Consequently, a revised formulation based on Sandin’s prescriptive version can be further 




1092 See section 1.2.1.1.1.  
1093 As the EC Communication has suggested, this mechanism should also includes the sub-principles of  
proportionality, non-discriminatory, consistency, review, and transparency. Communication from the Commission 
on the Precautionary Principle, Commission of  the European Communities, Brussels, COM/2000/1, 2 
February 2002, n299.  
1094 See section 2.4.1. 
1095 See section 2.3.1.  
1096 See section 2.3.3.3. 
1097 See section 5.3.2.2.1.  
1098 See section 1.1.1.2.   
1099 According to Sandin’s formulation of  Prescriptive Precautionary Principle, which is consist of  four 
common elements: (1) a threat, which is (2) uncertain, then (3) some kind of  action (4) is mandatory.  











Moreover, the requirement for minimising restriction to international traffic and trade 
can also be accommodated into the formula.  Thus this refined version of  the PA from 




When  confronted with  significant  threats of harm  to human health,  scientific 
uncertainty should not postpone the adoption of a precautionary public health 
measure  for  an  appropriate  level  of  public  health  protection  while  avoiding 
unnecessary interference to international trade.   
 
I suggest that the PA should be triggered once the unknown risk is identified as passing 
the significant threshold.1100 States have the precautionary entitlement1101 to adopt health 
measures to achieve their appropriate level of  public health protection.1102 However, 
considering the possible adverse effects of  interference to international trade, I also 
suggest that the health measure be a least restrictive approach to trade.1103 It is suggested 
                                                      
1100 See section 2.3.1.1.1.  
1101 See section 2.1.2.  
1102 Appropriate level of  protection (ALOP), see sections 2.2.2.1 and 2.2.3.1.  
1103 See section 5.3.2.2.1. 
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that applications of  the PA in international public health can be recast using this formula.  
Some additional conditions including the duty to review, cost-benefit analysis, public 
engagement and the burden of  proof  may be imposed respectively according to the 
various characteristics of  individual health risk.  Specifically, the examination of  




5.2 Redefining the precautionary approach in intellectual 
property 
 
The Doha Declaration has reaffirmed Members’ conditional rights1105 to determine the 
appropriate level of  health protection in the IP regime, which therefore appears to 
accommodate the concept of  precaution into the TRIPS Agreement.1106 WTO Members 
have the conditional rights to show more caution when adopting a higher level of  health 
protection than international standards suggest.  Particularly, after the interpretation of  
the Doha Declaration,1107 it can be argued that the scheme of  compulsory licensing can 








1104 See section 5.3.  
1105 Conditional rights, see n118. 
1106 See section 4.3.2.2.1. 
1107 Doha Declaration, see section 4.3.2.2.1 n27.  
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Diagram  5.2  Redefinition  of  compulsory  licensing  through  the  lens  of  states’ 
precautionary entitlements 
When  confronted  with  a  public  health  emergency,  on  the  basis  of  the  best 
information available, there are reasonable grounds for concern that significant 
harm  to  human  life  and  health may  occur,  scientific  uncertainty  should  not 
prevent  states’  precautionary  entitlements  from  adopting  a  temporary 
limitation on the exclusiveness of pharmaceutical patents to prevent/abate this 





In other words, the PA could enable states to adopt a safety margin in compulsory 
licensing when the harm has crossed the significant threshold,1108 but the scientific 
evidence is not yet fully established.1109 The PA model adapted in compulsory licensing 
which introduces a more objective mechanism to trigger the grant and would boost 
states’ confidence in granting a compulsory licence in the preparatory stage of  a public 
health emergency.  
 
 
5.2.1 A PA reading of  compulsory licensing 
 
A PA reading of  compulsory licensing would make ample allowance for safety in the IP 
regime in times of  emergency.  The precautionary action of  adopting “additional 
                                                      
1108 See section 2.3.1.1.1.  
1109 See section 2.3.1.2.  
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conservatism” is regarded as the embodiment of  the PA in the structure of  risk 
analysis.1110  
 
In order to examine the legitimacy of  adopting the PA and the structure of risk analysis in 
compulsory licensing, the legal status of  this provision will first be reviewed.1111 We will 
then be able to explore to what extent WTO Members can exercise their precautionary 
entitlements in the determination of  granting a compulsory licence in a public health 
emergency.  
 
We will also need to discuss whether the adoption of  the PA and the structure of risk 
analysis in this provision will constitute “discrimination” in the WTO regime.1112 If  the 
adoption can demonstrate legitimate differential treatment, it will then not be seen as 
“discrimination” by the WTO.  In order to identify whether the impact of  adoption 
results in “discrimination” or “differential treatment”, we need to introduce the existing 
tool of  the “like-product” analysis to distinguish both concepts in WTO law. 1113 
Furthermore, we would also need to discuss the legitimacy of  differential treatment for 
pharmaceutical technologies associated with significant risks to human life or health by 
means of  the examination of  the impact of  health technologies for society.1114   
 
Finally, the following sections also address the fact that a sound framework for the PA in 
compulsory licensing should be accompanied by a set of  sub-conditions based on the 
elements we developed from previous chapters.  These requirements aim to prevent 
                                                      
1110 Goldstein, B. and Carruth, R.S. (2004) “The Precautionary Principle and/or Risk Assessment in World 
Trade Organization Decisions: A Possible Role for Risk Perception” 24(2) Risk Analysis 491-499, at 492. 
For example, this application is employed as a typical adoption of  an “additional safety factor” in the 
Codex Alimentarius. See section 3.1.3.2. 
1111 See section 5.2.1.1.  
1112 See section 1.2.1.1.1 for the discussion of  the principle of  non-discrimination in WTO. 
1113 See section 5.2.1.2.1.  
1114 See section 5.2.1.1.2.  
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possible abuse of  this provision and minimise conflicts in international trade.  
 
 
5.2.1.1 Compulsory licensing as a state’s conditional right in 
TRIPS 
 
As we have discussed in the previous chapter,1115 through the clarification of  the Doha 
Declaration,1116 compulsory licensing falls within the rights of  WTO Members; put  
more specifically, it is identified as a conditional right in WTO jurisprudence.1117 This is to 
say that states have sovereignty in the determination of  compulsory licensing once certain 
conditions are satisfied.  These sub-conditions will be further addressed in the following 
paragraphs.1118 
 
In addition, it is also argued in the previous chapter that compulsory licensing can at 
times be deemed to be a form of  precautionary measure which serves to constrain 
private IP protection in times of  public health emergency.  It is articulated in TRIPS 
that in the case of  “a national emergency or other circumstances of  extreme urgency”, 
individual patent protection may be provisionally limted for the greater needs of  the 
public.1119 This is to say that compulsory licensing can serve as a means for a state to 
achieve the nation’s appropriate or acceptable level of  health protection (ALOP).1120 By 
adopting the PA and the structure of  risk analysis in compulsory licensing, this work 
would embody the flexibilities in TRIPS and boost states’ confidence in granting a 
compulsory licence in a public health emergency.   Based on the argument of  
                                                      
1115 See section 4.3.2.2.1.  
1116 Doha Declaration, see section 4.3.2.2.1 n27.  
1117  See section 4.3.2.2.1, section 1.2.1.2, Diagrams 1.2.1.2 and 1.2.1.2.1 for the discussion of  
conditional rights, n118. 
1118 See section 5.3 and below. 
1119 Article 31 (b) and (c) TRIPS. See section 1.3.1.1 for the discussion of  the role of  public interest in IP. 
1120 Appropriate level of  protection (ALOP), see sections 2.2.2.1 and 2.2.3.1. 
  261
“precautionary entitlements of  states”,1121 states may choose to grant a compulsory licence 
when the risk of  harm to public health is identified as passing the “signifiant” 
threshold.1122  
 
Besides, in terms of  “State responsibility” in international law as well as their obligations 
in the IHRs,1123 every government has responsibilities to safeguard the global virus 
surveillance network by sharing viruses or specimens and protecting its civilians from 
virus attack by securing an essential drug supply under the threat of  a potential public 
health emergency.1124 Specifically, the WHO has advised states to start the stockpiling of  
essential medicines and vaccines during the preparation period of  a disease outbreak;1125 
it would then be necessary to resort to compulsory licensing to ensure sufficient drug 
supplies within a limited period of  time prior to an actual pandemic outbreak.  
Therefore, it would be of  vital importance to invoke the PA and adopt a safety margin in 
compulsory licensing in the preparedness for a public health emergency.  
 
 
5.2.1.2 Legitimacy of  differential treatment for health 
technologies associated with risks of  significant 
damage to human life or health 
 
According to Article 27.1 TRIPS, “patents shall be available and patent rights enjoyable 
without discrimination as to the place of  invention, the field of  technology”.  The 
disctinction of  discrimination and differential treatment was discussed in the Canada – 
                                                      
1121 See section 2.3.1. 
1122 See section 2.3.1.1.2.  
1123 See section 2.1.2 and section 3.1.2.2.1 for the discussions of  states’ duties in the IHRs.  
1124 See sections 3.1.2.2.1 IHRs; WHO Ethical Considerations in Developing a Public Health Response to Pandemic 
Influenza (WHO Ethical Considerations) pp17-19.   
1125 WHO Global Influenza Preparedness Plan: The Role of  WHO and Recommendations for National Measures before 
and during Pandemics (WHO Preparedness), WHO report, WHO/CDS/CSR/GIP/2005.5, pp22-39. 
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Pharmaceutical Patents Case, where the Panel expressly indicated that these two terms are 
different concepts.1126 We will examine whether adopting the PA for health technologies 
in compulsory licensing will constitute discrimination in WTO law.1127 In other words, if  
the differential treatment of  health technologies in compulsory licensing can be justified 
on the basis of  the PA and the rationale of  risk management in the WTO, it would not 
be deemed as “discrimination” to other technologies in the trade world.  
 
 
5.2.1.2.1 Differential treatment and discrimination in 
international trade 
 
“Discrimination” is illustrated in the context of  “like-product” analysis as follows in the 
WTO system:  
 
The products of  the territory of  any contracting party imported into the territory of  any other 
contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than that accorded to like products of  
national origin in respect of  all laws, regulation and requirements affecting their internal sale, 
offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use. (italics added)1128 
 
Under the non-discrimination principle, if  two products are treated as “like products”,1129 
then the foreign like products should not receive less advantageous treatment than the 
domestic products.  In other words, any “differential treatment” to market will only be 
legitimised if  the two products are categorised as “unlike” products.  
 
                                                      
1126 Canada – Pharmaceutical Patents, n941, para 7.94 
1127 See section 1.2.1.1.1 for the discussion of  the principle of  non-discrimination in WTO law. 
1128 GATT III:4 n47. 
1129 See section 1.2.1.1.1 n110 for the discussion of  the “like product” analysis. 
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Yet Howse notes that the non-discrimination provisions in Article 27.1 TRIPS are very 
different from those typically found in other WTO treaties.1130 Article 27.1 TRIPS bans 
the discrimination with regard to the “fields of  technology”, while typical 
non-discrimination provisions in other WTO treaties are with respect to the prohibition 
of  discrimination between domestic and foreign products.  Howse states that:  
 
based on legitimate social and economic objectives, a Member may well wish to limit intellectual 
property rights in one particular industrial sector – generic medicines is of  course a classic example.  
The importance of health concerns in this sector might well argue in favour of  limits that it would be 
inappropriate to impose across the board on all sectors.1131 (italic added) 
 
Hence, Howse argues that a WTO Member may enjoy regulatory autonomy in the 
limitation of  IP with regard to issues of  health concerns.  It is also noted on the 
Trans-Atlantic Consumer Dialogue that  
 
Article 27.1 should not be interpreted as requiring a ‘one size fits all’ patent law. The language in 
Article 27.1 …should not be interpreted as preventing countries from addressing public interest 
concerns in patents, when provisions to address those public interest concerns are consistent with 
the TRIPs framework.  Article 30 of  the TRIPs regarding exceptions to patent rights should be 
interpreted to permit countries to address public interest concerns, including those specifically 
related to fields of  technology.1132 
 
                                                      
1130 Howse, R (2000) “The Canadian Generic Medicines Panel: A Dangerous Precedent in Dangerous 
Times” 3(4) Journal of  World Intellectual Property 493-508 (Howse Generic Medicines). 
1131 Howse Generic Medicines, n1130 p505. 
1132 Trans-Atlantic Consumer Dialogue, Recommendations on Health Care and Intellectual Property, Doc No 
Health-4-00, Early Working of  Patents and Research Exceptions, February 2000. (Trans-Atlantic Consumer 
Dialogue) Available at: 
http://tacd.org/index.php?option=com_docman&task=cat_view&gid=76&Itemid=40  
  264
It is suggested that the policy-making of  IP and fields of  technology is within Members’ 
regulatory autonomy.  Health technologies, which are stongly associated with risk to 
human life and health, would contribute to legitimate social and economic objectives.  
 
For example, in Canada – Pharmaceutical Patents, Cuba as a third party, presented 
arguments in favour of  differential treatment of  pharmaceutical product inventions by 
noting that: “The subject of  patent protection for pharmaceutical products had always 
warranted special attention from the legislative and doctrinal point of  view, a fact easily 
attributed to the nature of  the products involved and their social impact”.1133 It also 
restated the Panel’s observation of  the complex issues concerning the scope of  patent 
protection of  pharmaceutical products in India – Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and 
Agricultural Chemical Products.1134  Moreover, Cuba identified the “particularity” of  the 
pharmaceutical sector by recognising its fundamental role for research; the 
“vulnerability” to imitation; the unique market and competition model, and its subjection 
to strict control by the public authorities.1135   
 
Thus, based on the above arguments and the “like-product” analysis in the Asbestos 
case,1136 a health/risk factor could as well legitimately distinguish fields of  technology.  
Regrettably, the Panel did not consider whether measures limited to a particular area of  
techonology are “discriminatory”, or whether “under certain circumstances they may be 
justified as special measures needed to restore equality of  treatment to the area of  
technology in question”.1137 There appears to be certain scope for the distinction of  
discrminination and justifiable differential treatment.  Therefore, I propose to adopt the 
                                                      
1133 Canada – Pharmaceutical Patents, n938, para 5.18. 
1134 India – Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products (India – Pharmaceutical Patents), 
WT/DS50/R, 5 September 1997, para 8.29.  
1135 Canada – Pharmaceutical Patents, n938 , para 5.18.  
1136 EC – Asbestos, n110  
1137 Canada – Pharmaceutical Patents, fn439, n938 . 
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“like-product analysis” as an objective threshold device to differentiate the “unlikeness” 
of  health technologies and other technologies in order to explore the extent to which 
health technologies could be granted legitimate differential treatment in compulsory 
licensing.   
 
 
5.2.1.2.1.1 Health risks as a legitimate factor of  the 
like-product analysis 
 
In order to establish the legitimacy of  differential treatment of  technologies referred in 
Canada – Pharmaceutical Patents,1138 the WTO Appellate Body’s examination of  “like 
products” can shed some light on the standards of  the distinction between “differential 
treatment” and “discrimination”.1139   
 
The Appellate Body in the Asbestos Case interpreted “like products” as “products [that] 
share a number of  identical or similar characteristics or qualities”.1140 It also suggested 
“similar” or “identical” as a synonym of  “like”.  The Appellate Body described a 
determination of  “likeness” as “a determination about the nature and extent of  a 
competitive relationship between and among products” (italic added).1141 The Appellate Body 
also identified the following four criteria to analyse the “likeness” of  products: 
 
 The properties, nature and quality of  the products; 
 The end-uses; 
 Consumers’ tastes and habits – more comprehensively termed “consumers’ 
perception and behaviour – in respect of  the products”, and 
                                                      
1138 Canada – Pharmaceutical Patents, n941. 
1139 EC – Asbestos, n110. 
1140 EC – Asbestos, para 91. 
1141 EC – Asbestos, para 99. 
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 The tariff  classification of  the products.1142 
 
Particularly, the Appellate Body took into account “health risk” factors relating to the 
product while considering the “physical properties” and “consumers’ perception and 
behaviour” of  the product.  It stated that “We are very much of  the view that evidence 
relating to the health risks associated with a product may be pertinent in an examination of  
‘likeness’ under Article III:4 of  the GATT 1994” (emphasis added).1143 Therefore, the 
Appellate Body took the carcinogenicity or toxicity as a highly significant physical 
difference in examining the physical properties of  a product.1144 It is suggested that the 
product associated with health risks to human life and health is deemed “physically very 
different” from other products which have no such health implications.1145 Products 
which are associated with health risks to human health thus are regarded “unlike” 
products to other products which are not associated with such risks.  The 
carcinogenicity or toxicity of  a product thus serves as a legitimate ground to differentiate 
products in the trade world. 
 
Further, in the recent Philippines – Taxes on Distilled Spirits Case (Philippines – Spirits),1146 the 
Appellate Body reminded us that competitveness is the key to the “likeness” analysis by 
saying that:  
 
We understand that products that have very similar physical characteristics may not be “like”, within 
the meaning of  Article III:2, if  their competitveness or substitutability is low, while products that 
present certain physical differences may still be considered “like” if  such physical differences have a 
                                                      
1142 WTO Appellate Body Report, EC – Asbestos, para 85. 
1143 WTO Appellate Body Report, EC – Asbestos, para 113. 
1144 WTO Appellate Body Report, EC – Asbestos, para 114. 
1145 WTO Appellate Body Report, EC – Asbestos, paras 121-122. 
1146 Philippines – Taxes on Distilled Spirits (Philippines – Spirits), WT/DS396/AB/R, WT/DS403/AB/R, 
adopted 21 December 2011.  
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limited impact on the competitive relationship and among the products.1147 
 
Using this analogy, it could well be suggested that if  the competitivenss or substitutability 
between technologies is low, even if  they have very similar physical characteristics, they 
may not be “like” in WTO/GATT jurisprudence.  
 
 
5.2.1.2.1.2 Differential treatment v Discrimination 
 
The Appellate Body in Canada – Parmaceutical Patents suggested that “differential 
treatment” needs to be discerned from “discrimination”.  It stated: 
 
The primary TRIPS provisions that deal with discrimination, such as the national treatment and 
most-favoured-nation provisions of  Article 3 and 4, do not use the term “discrimination”.  They 
speak in more precise terms.  The ordinary meaning of  the word “discriminate” is potentially 
broader than these more specific definitions.  It certainly extends beyond the concept of  
differential treatment.  It is a normative term, pejorative in connotation, referring to results of the 
unjustified imposition of  differentially disadvantageous treatment….The standards by which the justification for 
differential treatment is measured are a subject of  infinite complexity.  “Discrimination” is a term to be 
avoided whenever more precise standards are available, and, when employed, it is a term to be 
interpreted with caution, and with care to add no more precision than the concept contains. (Italics 
added)1148 
 
It also noted that “Article 27 [TRIPS] prohibits only discrimination as to the place of  
invention, the field of  technology, and whether products are imported or produced 
                                                      
1147 Philippines – Spirits, n1146 , para 120.  
1148 WTO Panel Report, Canada – Pharmaceutical Patents, para 7.94.  
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locally. Article 27 does not prohibit bona fide exceptions to deal with problems that may 
exist only in certain product areas”.1149 The Appellate Body articulated that the standards 
to distinguish “differential treatment” and “discrimination” are a matter of  complexity, 
which may suggest that multiple factors are involved in the determination of  the 
boundaries between these two concepts.  It also stressed that the term “discrimination” 
needs to be avoided if  the “differential treatment” of  a particular technology is justified 
with a precise and legitimate factor.   
 
For example, the health impact on society of  a health technology may serve as a 
legitimate factor for the differentiation of  technologies.  A product or a technology 
which is associated with significant health risks in terms of  either introducing or 
eliminating health risks could be granted differential treatment in international trade.  
Following on from the Doha consensus where the Ministers explicitly stated that no 
country should be prevented from taking measures for the protection of  health at the 
levels it considers appropriate;1150 the Doha Declaration again articulated that TRIPS 
should be interpreted and implemented in a manner supportive of  Members’ rights to 
protect public health.1151 Members retain the right to determine the appropriate level of  
health protection; matters of  public health concerns are legitimately within the domain 
of  Members’ regulatory authority.  
 
With regard to pre-grant issues, the “like-product” analysis developed from 
WTO/GATT jurisprudence may enable a new reading of  the discrimination/differential 
treatment distinction in TRIPS Article 27.1.  Differential treatment of  health 
                                                      
1149 WTO Panel Report, Canada – Pharmaceutical Patents, para 7.92. 
1150 Doha Ministerial Declaration, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 20 November 2001, para 6, n143 
1151 Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health (Doha Declaration), adopted by the fourth 
Ministerial Conference of  the World Trade Organization in Doha, Qatar, on 14 November 2001. 
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2 of  20 November 2001, para 4..  
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technology which is strongly associated with risk will not amount to discrimination to the 
field of  technology, when these technologies have low competitiveness or 
substitutability.1152 In order to improve clarity, it is suggested that the text of  Article 27.1 
TRIPS be revised as follows to afford a sophisticated distinction of  dirscrimination and 
differential treatment:  
 
…., patents shall be available and patent rights enjoyable without unjustifiable discrimination as to the 
place of  invention, the field of  technology and whether products are imported or locally produced.  
 
In other words, though patents are to be granted to all fields of  technology, Members 
could still enjoy their regulatory sovereignty to differentiate between technologies on 
legitimate grounds in accordance to their particular needs.  By the same token, in 
post-grant exemptions, specifically in compulsory licensing, it may be suggested that 
medical technology could also receive justifiable differential treatment and that the 
exclusiveness of  pharmaceutical patents would be temporarily limited on the legitimate 
grounds of  eliminating health risks to the public.      
 
 
5.2.1.2.2 Different implications of  health technologies 
associated with risks to human life or health  
 
The principle of  national treatment requires that imported like products should receive 
no less favourable market treatment than domestic products.1153 However, if  a particular 
technology cannot be treated as “alike” other technologies based on certain legitimate 
factor, for example, public health, then the differential treatment of  the said technology 
will not amount to discrimination.  
                                                      
1152 See section 5.2.1.1.1.1; n1147  
1153 Article III: 4 GATT, see section 1.2.1.1.1. 
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It is therefore contended in this work that when health technologies associated with risks 
of  significant impact to the maintenance of  human life or health, the unique association 
of  the health risks and the said technology then consists of  very different physical 
properties from other technologies.   We now consider the Appellant Body’s like-product 
analysis as a threshold device to distinguish health technologies which are strongly 




5.2.1.2.2.1 Like-product analysis 
 
When health risk is regarded as a legitimate factor in the “like product” analysis in the 
Appellate Body’s ruling,1155 it can further be argued that health technologies strongly 
associated with the elimination of  risks to human life or health can be distinguished from 
other technologies in the same “likeness” analysis.1156 If  two products are deemed 
“unlike” following the likeness analysis, differential treatments of  these products are 
subsequently legitimate.  Likewise, if  two technologies are identified “unlike” after the 
examination of  the likeness analysis, differential treatment of  these technologies would 
be legitimate.  For example, if  a certain pharmaceutical technology, which acts as a vital 
instrument to control or eliminate the spread of  an acute infectious disease, could be 
categorised as “unlike” information technology; the differential treatment of  the given 
pharmaceutical technology in the context of  compulsory licensing would then not  
amount to discrimination.   
                                                      
1154 See sections 1.2.1.1.1 and 5.2.1.2.1.1 for the discussion of  the likeness analysis, n110. 
1155 There are four criteria to scrutinise the likeness of  products. See section 5.2.1.2.1.1, n1154.  
1156 See section 1.2.1.1.1 for the discussion of  the likeness analysis. 
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In view of  this, the likeness analysis can demonstrate the “unlikeness” of  health 
technologies associated with the elimination of  significant risks to human life and health 
and other technologies which are not directly relevant to health and security.  Given its 
immense impacts on human life or health, it can therefore be argued that the PA granted 
on the said health technologies could constitute legitimate differential treatment rather 
than discrimination in international trade.  
 
 
5.2.1.2.2.2 High level of  health protection 
 
As we mentioned earlier, states are free to achieve their appropriate level of  protection 
(ALOP) in international law.1157 In a contemporary society confronted by various risks 
arising from new technologies or the mutation of  diseases, states have the responsibility 
to pursue a high level of  health protection in their risk regulatory frameworks in order to 
cope with uncertain threats to human life and health.  The protection of  human health 
is given the highest priority in certain international legal instruments.  For example, the 
UN International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) 
articulates that states need to “recognize the right of  everyone to the enjoyment of  the 
highest attainable standard of  physical and mental health” (italics added). 1158  More 
specifically, EU institutions are required to seek to achieve a high level of  security,1159 
public health protection1160 and consumer protection,1161 and the WTO recognises 
                                                      
1157 See sections 2.2.2.1 and 2.2.3.1.  
1158 Article 12 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted and opened for signature 
by the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2200A (XXI) on 16 December 1966, entered into 
force 3 January 1976 (ICESCR) 
1159 Article 67.3 Consolidated Versions of  the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of  the 
European Union (TFEU) n408  
1160 Articles 114.3 and 168.1 TFEU. 
1161 Articles 114.3 and 169.1 TFEU. 
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Members’ policy to pursue “zero risk” health protection.1162  
 
Regarding domestic risk regulations, the highest French administrative court also took a 
PA concerning AIDS-contaminated blood.  It was concluded by Commissaire du 
Gouvernement Legal that: “In a situation of  risk, a hypothesis that has not been invalidated 
should provisionally be considered valid, even if  it has not been formally 
demonstrated”.1163 In other words, when risks to human life or health are involved, a 
government may be legitimate in taking extra caution before a full scientific assessment 
of  the risks has been carried out. 
 
It is also noteworthy that historically speaking, Section 41 of  the UK Patent Act 1949 
distinguished foods, medicines, and surgical devices from other patented products to 
ensure a favourable use of  compulsory licensing.1164 It was articulated that those patents 
concerning foods, medicines, and surgical devices should be “available to the public at 
the lowest prices consistent with the patentees’ deriving a reasonable advantage from 
their patent rights”.1165 However, after the accession to the WTO, the UK Patent Act was 
amended to abolish those provisions which singled out foods, medicines, and surgical 
devices patents for a strong presumption in favour of  compulsory licensing.1166  
 
Nevertheless, it can still be observed that the value of  the distinction of  “foods, 
medicines, and surgical patents” from other patents is that it recognises that these 
                                                      
1162 WTO Appellate Body Report, Australia – Salmon, n515 para 125; EC – Asbestos, n1100 paras 168, 174. 
1163 Quoted from De Sandeleer, N (2002) Environmental Principles: From Political Slogan to Legal Rules, Oxford 
University Press, New York, United States, p131 (De Sandeleer) n54. 
1164 See section 1.3.2.3.1. Cornish, W. and Llewelyn, D. (2007) IP: Patents, Copyright, Trade Marks and Allied 
Rights (6th edition) London Sweet & Maxwell, p295 (Cornish/Llewelyn) n166; Scherer, F. M. and Watal, J. 
(2002) “Post-TRIPS Options for Access to Patented Medicines in Developing Nations” 5(4) Journal of  
International Economic Law 913-939, p918 (Scherer/Watal). 
1165 See Scherer/Watal, n1164 p918. 
1166 Scherer/Watal, n1164 p918. Medical methods and the treatment of  humans or animals may still be 
excluded from patentability. See Article 27.3 TRIPS. 
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products are highly associated with public and national security interests which are 
concerned with the population’s health and are essential interests of  a nation.  
Regrettably, the unique properties of  those products have been overshadowed by the 
“non-discrimination” umbrella after accession to the WTO,1167 and their relevance to 
public policy has been made indistinct.  
 
Paradoxically, under the free trade blanket, humans are even more vulnerable to health 
risks arising from globalisation including increasing international disease transmission, 
bioterrorism, and unknown risks accompanied with emergent technologies,1168 for the 
new arising risks are often constantly evolving and difficult to predict or track down.  
 
Further, though public health exclusions are not explicitly articulated or reflected in the 
compulsory licensing provision, the health exclusions in the patentability clauses do 
indicate the unique properties of  health technologies in the IP regime.  Public health 
exclusions from patent protection are still articulated in the patentability clauses in TRIPS. 
WTO Members may exclude from patentability inventions which are deemed “necessary 
to protect ordre public or morality, including to protect human, animal or plant life or 
health” and “diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods for the treatment of  human or 
animals”.1169 Accordingly, in view of  a harmonious interpretation of  TRIPS, health 
technologies associated with the elimination of  significant risks to human health could 
also be distinguished from other technologies in compulsory licensing. 
 
                                                      
1167 See section 1.2.1.1.1 for the discussion of  the principle of  non-discrimination.  
1168 For example, a wide range of  fears and uncertainties about the potential consequences of  novel 
technologies including nuclear accident, Genetically Modified Foods, BSE, and nanotechnologies have 
been the subject of  academic debates. See n335 n555; see also the special edition of  “Nanotechnologies, 
Risk and Society” (2007) 9(2) Health, Risk & Society; (2002) 13 Risk: Health, Safety & Environment; Mehta, 
Michael D. (2001)”Public Perceptions of  Genetically Engineered Foods: Playing God or Trusting Science” 
12 Risk: Health, Safety & Environment 205.  
1169 Articles 27.2 and 27.3 TRIPS. 
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It is therefore appropriate to restore the incommensurable value of  human life and 
health in the global trade net.  More specifically in the IP regime, the employment of  
the PA to adopt a margin of  safety would facilitate the balance of  public and private 
interests.  In terms of  the objective to protect human life or health, which is no longer 
limited to the legal status of  exception to trade, but has officially evolved and been 
recognised as a right or a conditional right in the world trade system.1170 Moreover, based on 
the rationale of  state responsibility and state stewardship of  safeguarding public 
health,1171 states may be obliged to seek a high level of  health protection as well as to 
protect the population from pending health threats in international law.  They are free 
to exercise their precautionary entitlements to safeguard their civilians when confronted by 
unknown risks, 1172  of  which the damages are identified as crossing the significant 
threshold.1173  
 
Based on the above analysis, different technologies indeed have various implications for   
society.  For example, Abbott contends that “Inventions are not neutral with respect to 
field of  technology”, he suggests that technologies associated with public interests and 
security including education, health, nutrition, defence, environment, and energy play an 
important role in IP which are not restricted to trade purposes.1174 Therefore, inventions 
which have fundamentally different implications for public health may be distinguished 
from other inventions based on the differentiation of  technologies. 
 
Hence, in order to protect the public interests of  health, technologies which have a direct 
                                                      
1170 See n118. The adoption of  SPS measures to achieve an appropriate level of  health protection is also 
considered a conditional right of  states. See section 4.2.2 for the adoption of  SPS measures. 
1171 See section 2.1.2. 
1172 See section 2.1.2 for the discussion of  precautionary rights and duties of  states 
1173 See section 2.3.1.1 for the trigger threshold of  the precautionary approach. 
1174 Abbott, F. A. (2005) “Toward a New Era of  Objective Assessment in the Field of  TRIPS and Variable 
Geometry for the Preservation of  Multilateralism” 8 (1) Journal of  International Economic Law 77 (Abbott 
Multilateralism) n132 
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impact on reducing significant risks to human life or health can be argued to be granted 
legitimate differential treatment based on the rationale of  the PA and risk analysis in the 
trade context.1175 Precaution and risk management can serve as legitimate grounds in the 
differentiation of  health technologies in the IP regime.  This is to say that by adopting 
the PA in the health-related trade measure, human life or health can still be safeguarded 
under unknown risks to human life or health.  After all, health is an indispensible and 
vital element to the sustainability of  a human being; the value of  human health and 
security is too profound to be overshadowed by free trade.  By adopting the PA as a 
safety factor in the trade regime, we will be able to redefine different social and economic 
implications of  a public health emergency, and ultimately, the trade rules in a 





I argue that when a particular technology is associated with the elimination of  significant 
risks to human health, the differential treatment can be justified considering its unique 
physical properties and consumers’ perceptions and behaviour.  
 
The current mechanism of  compulsory licensing in redressing the access to medicines 
issues has been criticised as unsatisfactory,1176 and that the provision has been acting as a 
bargaining tool in states’ power play instead of  providing a clear structure for invocation 
in the international economic law regime.1177 Therefore, in order to reflect the unique 
properties of  health technologies for enhancing the access to medicines, as well as to 
                                                      
1175 See section 3.1.3.1 for the discussion of  the structure of  risk analysis. 
1176 See section 1.3.3.  
1177 See section 1.3.3.1. 
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have a coherent interpretation and application of  the PA in international law, it is 
suggested that the PA should be incorporated into the framework of  compulsory 
licensing.  We will apply this argument by adopting differential treatment of  the PA on 
health technologies in compulsory licensing in the following sections. 
 
 
5.3 Differential treatment of  adopting the precautionary 
approach in compulsory licensing of  pharmaceutical patents 
 
The differential treatment in international trade can be demonstrated by the adoption of  
the PA in risk regulation.  It is argued in this work that the adoption of  a differential track 
of  compulsory licensing on pharmaceutical patents in a public health emergency can be 















In this diagram, I demonstrate that the PA can be incorporated in compulsory licensing 
by establishing a differential track dealing with technologies strongly associated with the 
elimination of  significant risks to human life and health.  In short, I argue that the 
protection of  public health and security can serve as a legitimate factor for differential 
treatment in compulsory licensing.  
 
Based on the proposed model of  the PA in chapter 2, I will proceed to establish a 
framework of  the PA in compulsory licensing in the following paragraphs.  First of  all, 
the trigger threshold, or the domain to invoke the PA in compulsory licensing needs to 
be considered as follows.  
 
 
5.3.1 Trigger threshold  
 
As we have discussed above, the application of  the PA should be based on uncertain 
risks which are real, tangible rather than hypothetic, minor, or trivial.1178 The PA is 
suggested to be invoked when the threat of  harm passing the “significant” threshold.   
 
 
5.3.1.1 Trigger threshold of  the precautionary approach in 
“Pandemic Phase” 
 
The imposition of  public health measures involves significant costs, and policy-makers 
need to ensure that a cost-benefit option is made available regardless of  limited resources 
in the event of  a pandemic.  According to the WHO, “Because little may be known 
about the virulence and transmissibility of  the next influenza pandemic virus until it has 
                                                      
1178 See section 2.3.1.2 and Figure 2.3.1.2. See also: Gostin, L.O. (2000) Public Health Law: Power, Duty, 
Restraint, California University Press. Chapter 4, “Public Health Regulation”. 
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started spreading widely, judgments about the likely effectiveness and benefits of  public 
health measures will often be difficult and may change over time”.1179 It is therefore 
necessary that an evidence-based approach following the WHO’s guidance plays an 
essential role in the battle against global transient virus mutation.  States can follow the 
WHO’s recommendation at any specific pandemic phase and make their best decisions 
on health measures based on available pertinent evidence.1180  
 
However, if  it is a condition that a state can only act after scientific justification or full 
materialisation of  a potential disease outbreak, it may be too late to respond to the 
immediate threat.  An evidence-based approach in international health protection may 
be central to public health strategies, but it has been identified as insufficient in order to 
cope with emergent and re-emergent public health risks.1181  
 
In times of  rapid virus transmission, sufficient time to prepare and respond is the key to 
successful technical surveillance and stockpiling of  vaccines and medicines.  Therefore 
the PA is considered essential to risk management of  a public health emergency.  For 
example, the WHO has given specific instructions and advice regarding particular public 
health objectives at each pandemic phase.1182  
 
The recommendation of  stockpiling antiviral drugs sufficient for a state’s population has 
                                                      
1179 WHO Report (2007) “Ethical Consideration in Developing Public Health Response to Pandemic 
Influenza” (WHO Ethical Consideration) n1124 p3.  
1180  Current WHO Phase of  Pandemic Alert, available at: 
http://www.who.int/csr/disease/avian_influenza/phase/en/index.html. See section 1.5.2.2; “WHO 
Global Influenza Preparedness Plan: the Role of  WHO and Recommendations for National Measures 
before and during Pandemics” (WHO Influenza Preparedness), WHO/CDS/CSR/GIP/2005.5 n1125. 
1181 See section 2.1.  
1182 WHO Report (2005) “WHO Global Influenza Preparedness Plan – The Role of  WHO and 
Recommendations for National Measures before and during Pandemics” (WHO Influenza Preparedness) 
WHO/CDS/CSR/GIP/2005.5 n1125. The WHO global influenza preparedness plan includes six phases 
in a pandemic scale, divided into three periods: the inter-pandemic period, the pandemic alert period, and 
the pandemic period (Table 3.1.2.4.2).  Current Pandemic Phase Alert is also posted on the WHO 
website. http://www.who.int/csr/disease/avian_influenza/phase/en/.  
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been on the WHO’s main agenda.  Specifically, from phase 3 of  a pandemic alert period 
onwards, the major objective regarding antiviral drugs is to coordinate positioning of  a 
possible global stockpile; from phase 4 of  a pandemic alert period, one of  the national 
objectives is to assess and facilitate wider usage of  antivirus and vaccines in later 
phases.1183 States are recommended to prepare sufficient stockpiles of  antiviral drugs and 
vaccines as a precaution.   
 
In order to keep alert to the evolution of  new influenza virus strains and to build a 
surveillance network, the WHO has developed the website “Global Outbreak Alert & 
Response Network” (GOARN) to keep track of  the virus activities globally. 1184 
Guidance has been issued on the preparedness for the influenza virus outbreak for states 
to follow since 2005.1185 A table of  pandemic phases is published by the WHO which 
divides the pandemic phases into six stages (see Table 5.3.1.1).  The table of  pandemic 
phase is used as a tool to inform states of  the updated threat of  the virus.  Each 
designation of  phases is determined by the Director-General of  the WHO.1186   
 
According to the hierarchy of  risks,1187 the risks in the “Inter-pandemic phase” are 
residual risks, the risks in the “Pandemic alert” phase are uncertain risks, and the risks in 
the “Pandemic” phase are certain risks.  The PA is applied under the stage of  scientific 
                                                      
1183 WHO Guidance Document  “Pandemic Influenza Preparedness and Response: A WHO Guidance 
Document”  Global Influenza Programme, April 2009 (WHO influenza Guidance), p38, at: 
http://www.who.int/csr/disease/influenza/pipguidance2009/en/index.html ; WHO Report (2005) 
“WHO Global Influenza Preparedness Plan – The Role of  WHO and Recommendations for National 
Measures before and during Pandemics” WHO/CDS/CSR/GIP/2005.5. See n1125 pp23-27. 
1184  Global Outbreak & Response Network (GOARN), WHO, available at : 
http://www.who.int/crs/outbreaknetwork/en/  
1185 WHO Global Influenza Preparedness Plan, WHO/CDS/CRS/GIP/2005.5. 
1186 WHO/CDS/CSR/GIP/2005.5. The distinction between phase 1 and phase 2 is based on the risk of  
human infection or disease resulting from circulating strains in animals.  The distinction between phase 3, 
phase 4 and phase 5 is based on an assessment of  the risk of  a pandemic.  The factors for consideration 
include current scientific knowledge of  the “rate of  transmission; geographical location and spread; 
severity of  illness; presence of  genes from human strains; other information from the viral genome; 
and/or other scientific information”. 
1187 See De Sadeleer, n54 p157. See section 2.3.1.2 for the discussion of  the risk hierarchy. 
  280
uncertainty or insufficiency of  scientific evidence when the risks to human life or health 
are identified as crossing the significant threshold.1188 I suggest that the PA should be 
triggered in the “Pandemic alert” phase when risks are uncertain, but a possibility of  
human-to-human transmission has been identified as increasing.  
 
Hence, the PA would be triggered between phases 4 to 5 where scientific certainty of  a 
disease outbreak is not inevitable, but there is increased evidence of  human-to-human 
transmission.  At both phases 4 and 5, the WHO and states should have started 
stockpiling sufficient medications for the population to combat the virus spread.1189  
 
It is also noteworthy that the WHO also issued a “Checklist for influenza pandemic 
preparedness planning” and recommended that states should devote time to preparing 
for an emergency in different pandemic phases.1190 The aim of  this checklist is to equip 
states with sufficient capacity of  virus surveillance and secure adequate medical 
treatment.1191 For example, to increase and deploy the vaccine supply is one of  the 
objectives of  phase 4 of  the pandemic phase.1192 It may be legitimate to say that the 
precautionary granting of  a compulsory licence could be triggered from phase 4 
onwards.  
                                                      
1188 See section 2.    
1189  WHO/CDS/CSR/GIP/2005.5. For example, the WHO needs to review and update 
recommendations for pandemic vaccine use strategies with partners; States need to review and assess 
vaccine use strategy following the recommendations. 
1190 “WHO Checklist for Influenza Pandemic Preparedness Planning” Epidemic Alert & Response, 
Department of  Communicable Disease, Surveillance and Response, Global Influenza Programme (WHO 
Influenza Checklist), WHO/CDS/CSR/GIP/2005.4, 2005.  
1191 WHO/CDS/CSR/GIP/2005.5, WHO global influenza preparedness plan-the role of  the WHO and 
recommendations for national measures before and during pandemics, March 2005. 
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5.3.1.2 Based on risk assessment or available pertinent 
information 
 
According to the rationale of  risk analysis, a scientific evaluation of  the risk is suggested 
to be accompanied by the invocation of  a precautionary grant. 1193  If  a full risk 
                                                      
1193 See sections 2.4.2, 3.3 and 4.2.3. For example, more specifically in the SPS Agreement, the evaluation 
of  the risk for a provisional SPS measure should be conducted in either two aspects: “the likelihood of  
entry, establishment or spread of  a pest or disease” or “the potential for adverse effects on human or 
animal health arising from the presence of  additives, contaminants, toxins or disease-causing organisms in 
food, beverages or feedstuffs”. In the CPB, the importer’s decision on whether to approve the import 
should be based on a risk assessment. In the IHRs, the adoption of  an additional public health measure 
should consider scientific principles, available scientific evidence of  a risk to human health, available 
information and special guidance from the WHO. These both demonstrate that the trigger of  the 




assessment cannot be produced due to time constraints or insufficiency of  scientific 
evidence, relevant available information should also be taken into account.  Therefore 
the implementation of  the PA should start with a risk assessment or a valuation based on 
available pertinent information in order to identify the degree of  scientific uncertainty at 
each stage.  
 
In the circumstances of  a public health emergency, the provisional granting of  
compulsory licensing can still be adopted prior to the completion of  a full risk 
assessment, but it is expected to be subject to a limited duration and timeous review.1194 
If  a full risk assessment cannot be carried out due to incomplete scientific evidence, then 
the decision should be triggered by available pertinent information from international 
organisations, for example, the recommendations from the WHO.  Therefore, the 
objective suggestions from international organisations play a vital role when disputes 
arise.  
 
If  the time restraint is urgent and it is not possible to conduct an evaluation of  risk, I 
also suggest that the state officially announces a public health emergency to prove the 
said risks exist. 1195  In most cases when states are reluctant to declare a national 
emergency due to other considerations,1196 in order to increase transparency, I suggest 
that they can publish government statements about their objectives in adopting the 
measure of  granting a compulsory licence.1197  
                                                                                                                                                           
an “ascertainable risk”. 
SPS Agreement, Annex A. 4; CPB, Article 15.2; IHRs, Article 43.2; WTO Appellate Body Report, US – 
Continued Suspension (Hormones II), n365 para 530. 
1194 See section 5.3.3. 
1195  For example, the WHO recommended that African states declared HIV/AIDS “a national 
emergency” in 1999.  
1196 See section 1.3.3.2.  
1197 Such considerations were taken into account in Canada – Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals for the 
purpose of  showing that imported split-run and domestic non-split-run magazines were substitutable. 
WT/DS31/AB/R, AB-1997-2, 30 June 1997. 
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5.3.2 The precautionary action 
 
Governments have a duty and right to protect public health in an emergency.  On the 
one hand, under the rationale of  “States’ responsibility/stewardship”,1198 states have a 
duty to “take whatever steps are necessary to ensure that everyone has access to health facilities, 
goods and services so that they can enjoy…the highest attainable standard of  physical 
and mental health”. (emphasis added)1199  The WHO also identified a government’s 
leadership in the responsibility of  national preparedness and response.1200  
 
On the other hand, states are also granted a margin of  discretion within their sovereignty 
in determining the appropriate method to achieve the highest level of  attainable health 
protection.1201 Further, the UN General Comment sets out states’ rights and obligations 
in the realisation of  people’s right to health in the following paragraph: 
 
The most appropriate feasible measures to implement the right to health will vary significantly from 
one State to another. Every State has a margin of  discretion in assessing which measures are most 
suitable to meet its specific circumstances. (emphasis added)1202 
 
In other words, under the rationale of  international law, states have the responsibility to 
protect the public interest of  health as well as to enjoy their autonomy in the 
                                                      
1198 See section 2.1.2.  
1199 Para 53 UN document, “General Comment No 14: the Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of  
Health (Article 12 of  the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights)”, adopted by 
the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural rights on 11 May 2000, E/C.12/2000/4, 11 August 2000, 
(General Comment No 14) 
1200 WHO Guidance Document “Pandemic Influenza Preparedness and Response: A WHO Guidance 
Document” Global Influenza Programme, April 2009 (WHO influenza Guidance) n1183, pp16-17. 
1201 See sections 2.2.2.1 and 2.2.3.1.  
1202 Para 53 UN document, “General Comment No 14: the Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of  
Health (Article 12 of  the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights)”, adopted by 
the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural rights on 11 May 2000, E/C.12/2000/4, 11 August 2000, 
(General Comment No 14) n1199. 
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determination of  adopting health measures.  This also has resonance with the Doha 
Declaration which has reaffirmed that “Each Member has the right to grant compulsory 




5.3.2.1 The precautionary entitlements of  states’ on 
compulsory licensing 
 
Once the threat of  harm is identified as significant; states enjoy the conditional rights to 
grant a compulsory licence in order to achieve an appropriate level of  health protection.  
In order to avoid abuse of  this mechanism, the compulsory licensing grant still needs to 
be examined by the necessity test in the WTO context.  
 
 
5.3.2.2 The necessity test 
 
The interpretation of  the necessity test in the WTO exists in the necessity provisions in 
different WTO agreements. 1204  Considering the necessity test in the GATT, the 
Appellate Body adopted the three-step necessity test to examine if  the health measure is 
necessary in the public health exception provision.1205 Comparatively, the necessity test in 
the SPS Agreement has slightly different phrasing: Members need to ensure that their 
SPS measure is applied only to the extent necessary to protect human, animal or plant life and 
health.1206 Members also need to ensure that such measures are not more trade-restrictive 
                                                      
1203 Para 5(b) Doha Declaration section 4.3.2.2.1 n27.  
1204 Kapterian, G (2010) “A Critique of  the WTO Jurisprudence on ‘Necessity’” 59(1) International & 
Comparative Law Quarterly 89-127. 
1205 See section 4.1.1.3. Examining whether the goal of  the measure falls within the protection of  human 
health; examining if  the measure constitute discrimination to international trade; the weighing and 
balancing test of  the interests furthered by the challenged measure. 
1206 Article 2.2 SPS. 
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than required to achieve their appropriate level of  SPS protection, taking into account 
technical and economic feasibility.1207 
 
In addition, the WTO Appellate Body noted that the more important the protected 
interests are; the easier a measure designed as an enforcement instrument would be 
accepted as necessary.1208 It was stated that the value of  “the preservation of  human life 
and health” is “vital and important in the highest degree”1209, and it also indicated that in 
situations where risk of  irreversible damage to human life and health are concerned,1210 
the threshold to apply the PA will be more relaxed.  This suggests that the necessity test 
in issues dealing with life-threatening or life-terminating situations does not follow the 
typical necessity test in the GATT. 
 
Further, scholars contend the necessity test in TRIPS has an important and different 
implication from the typical necessity test outside the TRIPS context.1211 Consequently, I 
suggest the necessity test of  a compulsory licence dealing with a public health emergency 
does not follow the typical necessity test in the GATT.  Considering its legal status as a 
conditional right in the WTO, which is similar to the provisional SPS measures,1212 I 
suggest that the grant of  compulsory licensing, following the requirement of  of  a SPS 
measure being “not more trade-restrictive than required” would still need to be examined 
through the least restrictive measure (LRM) test in order to prove the necessity of  the 
said grant. 
                                                      
1207 Article 5.6 SPS.  
1208 WTO Appellate Body Report, Korea – Measures Affecting Imports of  Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef (Korea – 
Beef) WT/DS161/AB/R, adopted 11 December 2000 n825, para 162. 
1209 WTO Appellate Body Report, EC – Asbestos, para 172, n110. 
1210 WTO Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones, para 124 n247.  
1211 See section 4.3.2.2.1 for the comments from Correa and Carvalho. Correa, C.M. (2002) “Implications 
of  the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health” Health Economics and Drugs, EDM 
Series No. 12, at 16-17 (Correa Implications); Carvalho, N.P. (2005) The TRIPS Regime of  Patent Rights (2nd  
edition) Kluwer Law International, The Hague, The Netherlands. See n141. 
1212 See sections 4.2.3 and 4.4.   
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5.3.2.2.1 Least restrictive to international trade 
 
Given that compulsory licensing and SPS measures share the legal status of  Members’ 
conditional rights in the WTO;1213 we can interpret the necessity of  a compulsory licence 
in view of  the necessity test in the SPS Agreement.  A Member’s SPS measure is 
deemed necessary until the complainant proves otherwise through the least restrictive 
measure (LRM) test.1214 A compulsory licence is deemed necessary until the complaining 
party proves otherwise through the least restrictive measure (LRM) test.  This is to say 
that the adopted health measure should be least trade restrictive, and no other alternative 
measure exists to achieve the appropriate level of  health protection.1215  
 
Accordingly, in order to examine if  the compulsory licence is the least restrictive measure, 
the complaining party needs to prove a reasonable available alternative measure existed. Such 
reasonable available alternative measure must: (1) achieve the appropriate level of  public 
health protection, (2) be significantly less restrictive to trade and (3) be technically and 
economically feasible.1216 
 
In summary, we need to remember that the value of  human life or health is of  vital 
interests to the highest degree, and that the necessity test is more relaxed when human 
health or safety is a concern.  A compulsory licence is deemed necessary unless the 




1213 See n118. 
1214 Kapterian, G (2010) “A Critique of  the WTO Jurisprudence on ‘Necessity’” 59(1) International & 
Comparative Law Quarterly 89-127. 
1215 See footnote 3 of  Article 5.6 SPS Agreement n39. 
1216 See section 4.2.3.  
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5.3.3 Duty to review 
 
The granting of  a precautionary compulsory licence is an expedient action that is only 
justifiable when the scientific evidence about a risk remains unclear or insufficient.  It is 
suggested that at the time of  adoption how often the measure should be subject to 
review should be specified.1217  
 
 
5.3.3.1 The grant should be provisional 
 
The precautionary measure should not be adopted once and for all, and the provisional 
approach reflects the nature of  precautionary measures.1218 Its function is similar to the 
issuing of  preliminary injunctions in environmental cases, which could be issued before a 
full environmental impact assessment is completed in order to prevent further irreparable 
damage.1219 
 
De Sadeleer notes that: “Precaution is seen as a temporary measure pending further 
scientific information”.1220 Sandin also contends that “the time factor” is associated with 
the duty to review which plays an important role in the PA.1221  He argues that 
“precaution is warranted only when information about the possible threat is lacking”, 
and that information changes over time.  Due to the special characteristics of  transient 
mutation of  a virus in a pandemic, the time factor is vital in the preparedness for a public 
                                                      
1217 See Japan – Varietals and EC – Hormones II in sections 2.2.2.2.1 and 2.2.2.2.2.  
1218 The provisional nature of  the precautionary approach, see sections 2.4.2 and 4.2.3.  
1219 Sunstein Irreversiblity, n756. For example, the UNCLOS recognised the adoption of  provisional 
measures as an employment of  the precautionary approach, and the WTO SPS Agreement also articulates 
that “a Member may provisionally adopt SPS measures on the basis of  available pertinent information”. 
(emphasis added) See: section 2.2.1.1.2. Southern Bluefin Tuna Case; Article 5.7 SPS Agreement. 
1220 De Sadeleer, n54, p110. 
1221 Sandin, P. (2006) “A Paradox out of  Context: Harris and Holm on the Precautionary Principle” 15(2) 
Cambridge Quarterly of  Health Care Ethics 175.  
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health emergency.  
 
 
5.3.3.1.1 Transient mutation of  virus 
 
Speed and time play a dominant role when humans compete with the unpredictable 
mutation of  a novel influenza virus strain.1222 The mutation of  the influenza virus is the 
core challenge to the containment of  a pandemic.  The influenza virus has been 
difficult to control due to its multitude of  virus makeup.1223 The evolution and potential 
damage of  the new type of  virus strain is unpredictable, and there may be a significant 
period of  time to stay on guard and prepare for the next outbreak.1224 One flu virus can 
easily swap genetic information with another, and changes in their genetic makeup would 
make them more deadly.1225  
 
Hence, “the time factor” of  a potential disease outbreak should be taken into account in 
risk management.  Further, provisional public health measures should be subject to 




1222 In order to secure the timeous supply of  the vaccine and antivirus once the disease occurs, the WHO 
works on keeping track of  the latest information on viruses and aims to have a better grasp of  the virus 
through close monitoring and assessment of  the threat globally. For example, the WHO has developed an 
“Influenza virus tracking system” after the Convention of  “Intergovernmental meeting on Pandemic 
Influenza Preparedness: Sharing of  influenza viruses and access to vaccine[s] and other benefits” on 21-23 
November 2007. The tracking system is an interim electronic system for WHO members, which offers the 
latest indications of  the H5N1 virus and relevant information on vaccines. The Influenza Virus Tracking 
System, WHO, http://www.who.int/fluvirus_tracker.  
1223 The term H5N1, H1N1 and so on refer to a virus’ ability to enter and leave host cells. H and N are the 
virus’s surface proteins haemagglutinin and neuraminidase. Each H and N is quite distinct, and immunity 
to one strain is not carried to another. See: “The Predictable Pandemic”, New Scientist, 2 May 2009, p6; 
“Pandemic’s Progress: We Saw it Coming” New Statesman, 4 May 2009, pp14-15. 
1224 The duty to review within a reasonable period of  time becomes essential when facing an unpredictable 
and transient health threat, such as in health measures which aim to contain a rapid virus outbreak in the 
IHRs and the SPS Agreement.  
1225 “More Than 2 Billion People Worldwide Could Get it. Thousands of  Schools May Shut down. And 
Millions Will Need to Be Vaccinated – Twice: Inside the Fight against a Flu Pandemic” Time, 24 August 
2009, pp15-19. 
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5.3.3.2 Ongoing duty of  monitor and review 
 
A precautionary measure should be provisional; by the same token, it requires constant 
review to reassure that the measure is up to date and remains legitimate and 
proportionate.  Under the circumstances of  scientific uncertainty of  a health threat, the 
precautionary granting of  compulsory licensing devised for a higher level of  protection 
is required for timeous review. 1226  Sunstein’s notion on the Information Disclosure 
Precautionary Principle (IDPP) also puts emphasis on the disclosure and distribution of  
knowledge of  the risk before the specification of  public policies.1227 The Commission 
for the European Union also acknowledges the principle of  “examination of  scientific 
developments” which highlight the time factor and the development of  scientific 
knowledge.1228 Consequently, a timeous review with the latest scientific evidence or 
scientific information is considered essential during a public health emergency. 
 
Before the actual outbreak of  a public health emergency, the cumulative scientific 
information can indicate the proper response on every pandemic phase.  After the 
granting of  a precautionary compulsory licence at pandemic phases 4-5,1229 the WHO 
                                                      
1226 For example, a provisional SPS measure is subject to a review within a reasonable period of  time; an 
additional public health measure in the IHRs should be reviewed within three months. However, the duty 
of  review in the CPB appears to be less demanding as it does not designate a specific time span for review 
and is only subject to the exporter’s request. The WTO Appellate Body also confirmed that the temporal 
issue should proceed on a case by case basis which includes the consideration of  the difficulty in obtaining 
the additional information and the characteristics of  the measure. It may be interpreted that the duty to 
review can be imposed according to the characteristics of  the health risk and government’s policy 
objectives. See: Article 5.7 SPS Agreement; Article 43 IHRs.; Scott, J. The WTO Agreement on Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures: A Commentary (2009) Oxford University Press. New York, p123 (Scott SPS). WTO 
Appellate Body Report, Japan – Measures Affecting Agricultural Products (Japan – Agricultural Products II), 
WT/DS76/AB/R, adopted on 19 March 1999, para 93. 
1227 Sunstein PP, p118, n333. 
1228 Communication from the Commission on the Precautionary Principle, Commission of  the European 
Communities (EC Communication), Brussels, 2 February 2000. The EC Communication on the 
precautionary principle addresses the importance of  advancement on scientific findings by expressing that 
health measures need to be “modified or abolished by a particular deadline, in the light of  new scientific 
findings”. It is also noted that “However, this is not always linked to the time factor, but to the 
development of  scientific knowledge”. 
1229 See section 5.3.1. 
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and states shall still review and update information at each pandemic phase.1230 
 
According to TRIPS, the duration of  the compulsory licensing should be limited, and it 
should be subject to judicial review or other independent review by a “distinct higher 
authority” within the Member. 1231  Consequently, for a transparent and systematic 
application, it is suggested that the precautionary grant should be subject to review along 
with the latest knowledge and development on the new virus strain, and a scientific 
evaluation should be carried out at pandemic phases 4 and 5 in order to identify the 
degree of  scientific uncertainty and to reassure the legitimacy of  the grant.  It would 
become an ordinary grant once the risks have been proved certain; on the contrary, it 
would need to be revoked or terminated if  the threat of  harm was proved to be below 





1230  WHO/CDS/CSR/GIP/2005.5. For example, the WHO needs to review and update 
recommendations for pandemic vaccine use strategies with partners; states need to review and assess 
vaccine use strategy following the recommendations. 











5.3.4 Other non-scientific factors 
 
The value of  the PA is that it leaves a margin of  safety and provides a channel for 
present and future generations to get involved with the decision making of  risk policies. 
It recognises the limitations of  science, and incorporates other non-scientific factors in 
risk management, such as, public opinions as supporting evidence in the regulation of  
risks.  The objective of  risk management also aims to engage the lay public to increase 
transparency in the decision making process.1232 The public engagement of  policy 
making also reflects the value of  respect and democracy in contemporary society.  It 
empowers the lay public to make a collective informed decision on their vital interests of  
health and security.1233  
 
However, in a public health emergency bound by the intrinsic limitation of  time restraint, 
it is somehow unimaginable to carry out proper public engagement for pandemic 
preparedness, and public engagement could only come at a rather late stage as a form of  
“Amicus Briefs” after a dispute has arisen.1234 Given the limited time of  granting a 
precautionary compulsory licence, it is still noteworthy that the granting needs to take 
non-scientific factors into consideration in different social contexts.  This would include 
the respect of  patients as main consumers of  pharmaceuticals1235 and civilians’ special 
social and cultural preferences.1236  
 
                                                      
1232 A WHO draft stated that: “By involving a wide range of  stakeholders in the process, the Precautionary 
Framework requires clarification of  stakeholder interests as well as transparency in the way decisions are 
made”. “Stakeholders’ engagement” is deemed as a core element of  the WHO “Risk Management 
Framework for Uncertain Risks” and the “Precautionary Framework for Public Health Protection” of  the 
draft, 2 May 2003, (WHO Precautionary Framework). Available at:  
http://www.who.int/peh-emf/meetings/archive/Precaution_Draft_2May.pdf  
1233 See section 2.3.2.3.  
1234 See section 5.3.4.3.  
1235 See section 5.3.4.4.1.  
1236 See section 5.3.4.2.  
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5.3.4.1 Consumers’ perception and behaviour 
 
The WTO Appellate Body highlighted that consumers’ tastes and habits are “very likely 
to be shaped by the health risks associated with a product which is known to be highly 
carcinogenic”.1237 Thus the health effects of  a product play an important role in 
distinguishing the likeness of  products.1238 In addition, based on the above like-products 
analysis, health risks associated with a given product would influence consumer 
behavior.1239 It is particularly noted by the Appellate Body that: “If  the risks posed by a 
particular product are sufficiently great, the ultimate consumer may simply cease to buy 
this product”.1240  
 
The Appellate Body seems to subsume the health effect factor within the physical 
property and consumers’ perception and behaviour criteria in the “likeness” analysis.1241  
In the consideration of  the health effect and consumers’ perception of  the precautionary 
granting of  a compulsory licence, we would first need to take patients’ perspectives into 
account in policy making.  
 
 
5.3.4.1.1 Patients as main consumers of  
pharmaceuticals 
 
Patients are a unique group of  consumers who are much more vulnerable and sensitive 
to pharmaceutical products than other customers of  certain products.  Pharmaceuticals 
are indispensable, and most of  the time irreplaceable to patients unless they choose to 
                                                      
1237 WTO Appellate Body Report, EC – Asbestos, n110, para 122. 
1238 See section 5.2.1.2.1.1.  
1239 See sections 5.2.1.2.1.1 and 5.2.1.2.2.1.  
1240 WTO Appellate Body Report, EC – Asbestos, para 122. 
1241 Bernasconi-Osterwalder, N. et al. Environment and Trade, n720, p13. 
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give up their fight for life.  The consumers of  pharmaceuticals are the patients inflicted by 
certain diseases, who are apparently distinctive from other ordinary groups of  customers on 
the market.  Therefore, patients’ perspectives need to be taken into account in the 
transaction of  pharmaceuticals through the interpretation of  international trade rules.  
 
In other words, the transaction of  pharmaceuticals cannot be seen as an ordinary 
carefree pleasure of  open-market shopping behaviour; patients need to be diagnosed first 
to get prescriptions from professional healthcare providers before having access to drugs. 
They have no other available alternatives but to survive on these prescriptions in order to 
maintain fundamental wellbeing.  This threshold to access and the characteristic of  
indispensableness can also be regarded as unique physical properties of  pharmaceutical 
products.  This also indicates the given drugs’ predominant position on the market, 
through which they enjoys exclusive patent protection for over 20 years, and most of  the 
time, do not share a competitive relationship with other generic drugs.1242   
 
Hence, considering the vulnerable position of  patients and the non-competitiveness of  
patented drugs on the market, governments should be able to distinguish the 
“unlikeness” of  pharmaceutical patents and other patents. A precautionary track for 
compulsory licensing on pharmaceutical patents would not amount to discrimination in 






1242 See EC – Asbestos, para 99. “Thus, a determination of  ‘likeness’ under Article III:4 is, fundamentally, a 
determination about the nature and extent of  a competitive relationship between and among products”. 
  294
5.3.4.2 Civilians’ social and cultural preferences 
 
Risk assessment can be used as a means to assess health risks as well as to provide a form 
of  reasoning in a regulatory system,1243 but as Gostin notes: “policy in the real world is 
confounded by scientific uncertainties, human values, and political compromises”.1244 
Hence, it is difficult to fully understand the risk posed to the community’s health.  He 
also notes that scientists understand risk according to probabilistic assessment, but the 
lay public’s understanding of  risk “includes personal, social, and cultural values”.1245  
 
Consequently, the public’s view arises to complement the limitations and possible blind 
spot in science.  As Breyer questions whether the risk policy tends to regulate low risks, 
but fails to regulate more serious health threats,1246 there may be gaps among the risks 
identified by scientists and the real existing threats to human health.  Besides, Sunstein’s 
argument of  “deliberative democracy” in the process of  risk management also implies 
that citizens are not merely consumers; the regulatory choices should respect and be 
made after citizens’ preferences and values.1247 However, as time restraint is a vital 
feature of  an “emergency”, it may not be realistic to expect a proper consultation on the 
public’s perception of  the evidence.  Such consideration, therefore, is inevitably beyond 
the context of  risk management.  
 
                                                      
1243 Gostin, L.O. (ed) (2002) Public Health Law and Ethic: A Reader, University of  California Press, Berkeley 
and Los Angeles, California, US, London, England, pp127-130, (Gostin Reader). He identifies 
philosophical inquiry, risk assessment and cost-benefit analysis as criteria to assess the worth of  public 
health intervention. 
1244 Gostin, L.O. (ed) (2002) Public Health Law and Ethic: A Reader, University of  California Press, Berkeley 
and Los Angeles, California, US, London, England, p139 (Gostin Reader). 
1245 Gostin, L.O. (ed) (2002) Public Health Law and Ethic: A Reader, University of  California Press, Berkeley 
and Los Angeles, California, US, London, England, p128 (Gostin Reader). 
1246 Breyer, S. “Breaking the Vicious Circle: Toward Effective Risk Regulation” in Gostin, L.O. (ed) (2002) 
Public Health Law and Ethic: A Reader, University of  California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, California, 
US, London, England, pp140-144, at 143 (Gostin Reader). 
1247 Sunstein PP, n333.  
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Indeed, risks have their unique cultural implications that are deeply rooted in specific 
social, historical and geographical contexts.  A WHO Report has stated that: “once 
people frame a risk issue, it is very difficult to change their mind; therefore, technical risk 
assessments are largely irrelevant to people”.1248 Perceptions of  risks vary from region to 
region, and variations should be allowed to reflect the diversity in different cultural 
contexts.  Such variations would play an important role in deliberation when disputes 
arise in international trade. 
 
Moreover, Button observes that: “Many cultures have particular practices that may seem 
irrational to the outsider”.1249 Due to different cultural backgrounds, some cultures are 
better prepared to overlook some risks, and some are more cautious in response to other 
risks due to inherent vulnerabilities.  Various factors of  civilians’ social and cultural 
preferences would include individual state public policies in national IP and social welfare 
system, the provision of  healthcare and national health insurance.  
 
In summary, due to special social and cultural backgrounds, states may need to adopt a 
broader margin of  safety based on their preferred policies of  risk management in IP 
protection within the flexibilities of  TRIPS.1250 Moreover, it is specifically argued by 
Correa that “a country devastated by an epidemic may consider that adopting measures 
to combat it may be a matter of  ‘order public’”.1251 Developing countries may exercise 
domestic sovereignty and conditional rights1252 in the WTO system to trim/limit certain 
IP protection in their legal system in order to safeguard their essential security interest in 
                                                      
1248 WHO Report “Precautionary Policies and Health Protection: Principles and Applications” Report on 
a WHO Workshop, Rome, Italy, 28-29 May 2001, EUR/02/5027100, (WHO Applications), p10. 
1249 Button, C. (2004) The Power to Protect: Trade, Health and Uncertainty in the WTO, Studies in International 
Trade law, Hart Publishing, Oregon USA (Button) n325 pp107-108. 
1250 TRIPS, n1. 
1251 Correa TRIPS, p288, n154. 
1252 Conditional rights, see n118.  
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public health.1253 This view also has resonance with the Doha debate which implies that 
states enjoy the entitlements to determine the grounds to issue a compulsory licence in a 
health emergency.1254 Consequently, in disease-stricken areas such as Southeast Asian and 
South Sahara African countries, a state’s particular geographical or political situation 
under an acute disease trans-border transmission may constitute a legitimate cause of  the 
precautionary granting of  compulsory licensing.1255  
 
Non-scientific factor after a dispute has arisen 
 
5.3.4.3 Amicus Briefs in WTO dispute settlement 
 
While the unknown risks are not acute, for example, where public health risks are posed 
by biotechnologies or nanotechnologies; government could provide channels for public 
participation to express their concerns and perspective toward the unknown risks.1256 
However, in situations of  a health emergency, for example, during the rapid virus 
transmission phase, there may not be sufficient time to engage the public in achieving a 
decisional communication.  Accordingly, public participation of  compulsory licensing in 
a public health emergency would come at a rather late stage after the licence was issued 
and a dispute has arisen.  The system of  Amicus Briefs 1257  in the WTO dispute 
                                                      
1253 See section 4.3.2.1.1 for the discussion of  Brazilian Agency of  Sanitary Vigilance (ANVISA). See also 
Carvalho, p151, n141.  
1254 Doha Declaration, see section 4.3.2.2.1 n27.  
1255 See sections 3.1.2.1.3 and 4.3.2.3.2 for discussions of  Swine Flu outbreak in the US and Mexico, and 
Bird Flu warnings in Taiwan and Southeast Asian countries. 
1256 Bruce, A. “The Public domain: Ideology vs. Interest” in Waelde, C. and MacQueen, H. (2007) 
Intellectual Property: The Many Faces of  the Public Domain, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK n138. Public 
participation involves the following three dimensions: public participation in decisions on specific activities, 
public participation concerning plans, programmes and policies, and public participation during the 
preparation of  executive regulations and generally applicable legally binding normative instruments. Public 
participation involves the following three dimensions: public participation in decisions on specific activities, 
public participation concerning plans, programmes and policies, and public participation during the 
preparation of  executive regulations and generally applicable legally binding normative instruments. See: 
Articles 6, 7 and 8 Aarhus Convention, n546. 
1257 Bernasconi-Osterwalder, N. et al. (2006) Environment and Trade: A Guide to WTO Jurisprudence, Earthscan, 
London, UK, Chapter 8 (Bernasconi-Osterwalder) n720. 
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settlement process1258 would serve as a means to engage the public opinions on the 
interpretation of  the trade rules of  IP; however, the WTO dispute settlement body has 
the discretionary power to accept this information.1259 
  
WTO Members have a legal right to participate as parties or third parties in a certain 
dispute.  The submission of  amicus briefs in WTO dispute settlement system thus 
provides the rout of  public engagement of  compulsory licensing.  Further, both WTO 
Members and non-Members could submit amicus curiae (friend of  the court) briefs to the 
dispute settlement body (DSB) over the dispute of  a compulsory licence. 
 
An amicus brief  is a written document, submitted by WTO Members and non-Members 
including businesses, civil society groups and individuals as an interested non-party of  
the dispute.  It can be a document or simply a letter to the DSB.1260 This provides the 
only approach for non-government organisations to have a say in a particular dispute in 
the world trade forum.  
 
The WTO Panel has the discretionary power to seek information and technical advice 
from any individual or body which it deems appropriate.1261 The communication with 
the Members for information is also addressed in the working procedures of  the 
Appellate Body.1262 It is further provided in the Working Procedures for Appellate 
Review that:  
                                                      
1258 WTO Dispute Settlement Body, see section 1.2.1.1.2. 
1259 Bernasconi-Osterwalder, N. et al. (2006) Environment and Trade: A Guide to WTO Jurisprudence, Earthscan, 
London, UK, (Bernasconi-Osterwalder), pp317-319. See WTO Appellate Body Report, United States – 
Imposition of  Countervailing Duties on Certain Hot-Rolled Lead and Bismuth Carbon Steel Products Originating in the 
United Kingdom (US – Lead and Bismuth Carbon Steel) WT/DS138/AB/R, adopted 10 May 2000, paras 40-41. 
1260 Bernasconi-Osterwalder, p318, n720. 
1261 Article 13 of  the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of  Disputes, The 
World Trade Organization Agreements, Annex 2 (DSU). 
1262 Article 17.9 DSU. 
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In the interests of  fairness and orderly procedure in the conduct of  an appeal, where a procedural 
question arises that is not covered by these Rules, a division may adopt an appropriate procedure for 
the purposes of  that appeal only, provided that it is not inconsistent with the DSU, the other covered 
agreements and these Rules.1263 
 
Hence, the Appellate Body is also free to choose “whether or not to accept and consider 
any information [in an amicus brief] that is pertinent and useful in an appeal”.1264 When 
a dispute arises on the legitimacy of  compulsory licensing of  particular drug in a public 
health emergency, non-state actors could also submit their amicus briefs as an interested 
non-party of  the dispute.  It can be anticipated that not only the civil society but also 
non-state actors such as the WHO, the WIPO, the World Medical Association and 
Medicines Sans Frontieres will have a say in promoting access to medicines in such 
disputes.1265 In summary, the system of  amicus briefs only plays a supplementary role in 
the interpretation of  compulsory licensing which is aimed at increasing transparency in 
the dispute settlement process of  a grant, but the Panel and Appellate Body have the 
final discretionary power to accept and consider amicus briefs attached to a party or 
third-party’s submission.1266 
 
In short, the incorporation of  non-scientific factors in the granting of  a precautionary 
                                                      
1263 Rule 16(1) Working Procedures for Appellate Review, World Trade Organization, WT/AB/WP/5, 4 
January 2005.  
1264 Appellate Body Report, United States – Imposition of  Countervailing Duties on Certain Hot-Rolled Lead and 
Bismuth Carbon Steel Products Originating in the United Kingdom (US –Lead and Bismuth Carbon Steel), 
WT/DS138/AB/R, adopted 10 May 2000, para 39. Cases relevant to Amicus Briefs include EC – Hormones, 
para 155-156; US – Shrimp/Turtle I, paras 7-10, 79-91; Japan – Varietals, paras 118-131; Australia – Salmon, 
paras 7.8-7.9; EC – Asbestos, paras 6.1-6.4, 8.12-8.14, 50-57. See Bernasconi-Osterwalder, N. et al. (2006) 
Environment and Trade: A Guide to WTO Jurisprudence, Earthscan, London, UK, Chapter 8 
(Bernasconi-Osterwalder), pp317-362. 
1265 See section I.2.2 for the discussion of  non-state actors in the access to medicines campaign. 
1266 Bernasconi-Osterwalder, n720 p323. 
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compulsory licence under a public health emergency is still vague.   Governments may 
not have sufficient time to gather the public perceptions of  evidence due to the time 
constraints.   However, policy makers should bear in mind that the different transaction 
model implies a very distinct feature of  drugs from other products on the market; the 
non-competitiveness of  a patented drug could also be a legitmate factor in granting 
differential treatment in the interpretation of  IP rules.   In addition, civilians’ special 
social, geographical and cultural preferences should also be taken into account in the 
decision-making of  a precautionary compulsory licence.   Lastly, the public can still 
submit their perceptions to the WTO dispute settlement body after a dispute on the 





This chapter has demonstrated that the PA can be accommodated into compulsory 
licensinge within the current flexibilities in TRIPS.  It is argued in this chapter that in an 
extreme situation, the precautionary granting of  compulsory licensing may offer a margin 
of  safety to promote public health protection by means of  provisional limitation on IP.  
IP policy making may choose to “trim” the exclusive patent protection in extreme 
situations such as a public health emergency.  
  
This chapter has also argued that, from the rationale of  risk analysis and the PA, health 
technologies associated with significant risk to human life or health may receive 
differential treatment in the IP regime.  Such ethical differentiation of  granting an 
expedient track of  compulsory licensing on health technologies would not constitute 
discrimination and could be justified on the rationale of  risk management in WTO law.  
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The elements of  the PA in compulsory licensing can be demonstrated as follows:   
 The Trigger threshold: The invocation of  a precautionary compulsory licence 
should be between phases 4-5 at the WHO’s pandemic phases when the risk has 
passed the “significant” threshold, and should be based on risk assessment or 
available pertinent information.  
 The granting of  a precautionary compulsory licence as a precautionary action: The 
precautionary granting of  a compulsory licence is a state’s conditional right in WTO, 
but it still has to be least restrictive to international trade.   In other words, it 
should be used as a last resort; there should be no other available alternatives to 
relieve the burden of  disease. 
 Duty to review: The adopting state bears the ongoing duty to monitor the risk and 
review the grant.   The grant should be abolished after the risk has been identified 
as non-significant.  
 Other non-scientific factors: The role of  public engagement in a public health 
emergency is limited due to time constraints.  However, Governments should bear 
in mind that differential treatment of  a patented drug may be legitimate due to its 
non-competitiveness on the market.  Civil society can still submit their opinions to 
the WTO dispute settlement body after a dispute has arisen.    
 
Lastly, given the precautionary grant of  a compulsory licence is within the domain of  
conditional rights of  WTO Members, the burden of  proof  would be reversed to the 
complaining party to prove that the public health emergency does not exist in the 
invoking state and the grant is not least restrictive to trade.  The precautionary grant of  
a compulsory licence should be presumed legitimate unless the complaining party proves 
otherwise.  
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Part 4: Conclusion 
 
6 Conclusion 
6.1 Thesis overview 
 
This work has developed a means to encourage states in taking advantage of  the 




6.1.1 Problem and solution 
 
This work began with a discussion of  the malfunction of  the compulsory licensing 
provision between the tension of  international health and international trade, especially 
in the context of  IP.1267  Compulsory licensing indeed has a positive impact on the 
moderation of  public and private interests in IP protection,1268 yet some unsatisfactory 
implications on the condition of  “national emergency or other circumstances of  extreme 
urgency” has been identified due to the inherent limitations of  the WTO and the 
international political settings.1269 Compulsory licensing has failed to meet the proper 
needs to promote access to medicines in circumstances of  a public health emergency. 
Though the Doha Declaration in 2001 has reaffirmed states’ right to grant a compulsory 
licence, developing countries are still deterred from resorting to this mechanism due to 
possible trade retaliation from developed countries.  This work therefore adopts the PA 
and the structure of  risk analysis as a means to help states embody the flexibilities of  IP 
in the Doha Declaration.  This mechanism will also serve as a foundation to boost 
states’ confidence in granting a compulsory licence in a public health emergency.   
                                                      
1267 See sections 1.3.3-1.3.3.2.  
1268 See sections 1.3.2-1.3.2.3.3.  
1269 See sections 1.3.3.1 and 1.3.3.2.  
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After the Doha Declaration, the world has experienced a series of  pandemic attacks 
which force us to contemplate the significance of  the PA and risk management in a risk 
society.  This also implies that risk management based on the rationale of  the PA has a 
role to play in the interface of  international health and IP.  This work, therefore, 
proposes to incorporate the structure of  risk analysis into the IP regime in order to 
accommodate sufficient margin of  safety in a risk society.1270  Particularly, the PA has 
thus been adopted to supplement the gap in scientific evidence and to serve as a safety 
valve in compulsory licensing in the preparedness for a public health emergency.1271  
 
The WHO has also suggested that states take full advantage of  the flexibilities in the 
TRIPS Agreement in order to promote access to medicines, yet empirical studies show 
that states are still hesitant to grant a compulsory licence based on the condition of  
“national emergency or other circumstances of  extreme urgency”.1272  They prefer to 
use other tracks such as “anti-competitiveness”1273 and “public non-commercial use”1274 
to avoid conflicts in international trade.  Hence, this work has attempted to redefine the 
condition of  “national emergency or other circumstances of  extreme urgency” through 
the lens of  precaution and risk management,1275 and to reaffirm states’ precautionary 
entitlements to grant a compulsory licence as part of  a preparedness plan following the 
WHO’s recommendation in a public health emergency.1276 Instead of  pursuing stronger 
legal arguments, this work focuses on a PA analysis which would bolster the political 
and/or moral basis for compulsory licensing in a public health emergency.  
                                                      
1270 See sections 5.2 and 5.2.1.   
1271 See sections 5.3-5.3.5.  
1272 See sections 1.3.2.2.1, 1.3.2.3.2 and 1.3.2.32.3.  
1273 See section 1.3.2.1.  
1274 See section 1.3.2.3.  
1275 See section 5.1.2.  




6.1.2 Approach adopted 
 
In pursuing this solution, we started with the review of  the PA from the perspective of  
“State responsibility” in international law, and particularly, we also found that the “State 
stewardship” model of  public health policy-making has been developed at the domestic 
level.1277 With respect to these, we have also looked at the international level in the 
context of  the different legal instruments available to examine the current practice of  the 
PA.1278 By means of  a philosophical review of  the PA,1279 we have also developed a 
moderate model of  this approach in the domain of  our research.1280    
 
This work has reviewed the PA employed in international public health 1281  and 
international trade.1282 It was noted that the PA has been widely practised in the realm of  
human health and safety.  International legal instruments have adopted the PA and the 
structure of  risk analysis to safeguard human health and safety.   Yet we also found 
regimes conflict and inconsistencies in relation to the PA in different legal regimes,1283 
particularly in the WTO regime, that the legal status of  the PA has been an issue of  
debate.1284 This is even more ambiguous in TRIPS.  Thus our work has focused on the 
extent to which the PA could be incorporated into the IP regime in relation to human 
health and security with an emphasis on the compulsory licensing provision.    
 
In developing this solution, this work has analysed the legal status of  the PA in different 
                                                      
1277 See section 2.1.2.  
1278 See sections 2.2-2.2.3.2.2.  
1279 See sections 2.3-2.3.3.3.  
1280 See section 2.3.3.3.  
1281 See chapter 3.  
1282 See chapter 4.  
1283 See section 3.1.1.  
1284 See section 2.1.3 n252.  
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WTO instruments, especially in the GATT and the SPS Agreement.1285 We have also 
explored the possible interpretation of  compulsory licensing regarding “national 
emergency and other circumstances of  extreme urgency” by means of  the lens of  
precautionary entitlements in the WTO regime.1286 We have also proposed a comparative 
study of  exemptions in the WTO obligations,1287 which also have resonance with 
exemptions to the TRIPS obligations in terms of  legal status.1288  
 
This approach has also been examined to reaffirm states’ precautionary entitlement to grant a 
compulsory licence through the interpretation of  existing international instruments.  It 
aims to act as an underpinning to states’ act of  compulsory licensing when states adopt 
the precautionary granting of  a compulsory licence following the conditions developed 
in chapter 5.      
 
 
6.1.3 Proposals and arguments developed 
 
First, this work noted that states enjoy the precautionary entitlement to take measures to  
achieve their appropriate level of  public health protection.1289 Secondly, I developed a 
moderate and prescriptive version 1290  of  the PA delineating the trigger threshold of  
significant risk of  harm,1291 uncertainty,1292 and action1293 along with other non-scientific 
factors1294 for future application in the context of  my research.  I argued that this 
model of  the PA could be recast into various risks with minor alterations of  the 
                                                      
1285 See section 4.2, Diagrams 4.2 and 4.2.1.  
1286 See section 5.2.  
1287 See section 4.2, Diagrams 4.2 and 4.2.1.  
1288 See section 4.3.2.2.1, Diagrams 4.3.2.2.1 and 4.3.2.2.1.1.  
1289 See sections 2.1.2, 2.2.2.1 and 2.2.3.1.  
1290 See sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.3.3.  
1291 See sections 2.3.1.1-2.3.1.1.2.  
1292 See section 2.3.1.2.  
1293 See section 2.3.1.3.  
1294 See sections 2.3.2-2.3.2.3.  
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sub-conditions depending on different characteristics of  each given risk.   
 
I also noted that states have precautionary rights and duties in international law to safeguard 
public health in the examination of  the legal instruments of  the IHRs,1295 the Codex 
Alimentaius, 1296  and the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety. 1297   Following the 
examination of  instruments in relation to the PA in the WTO, it was noted that the PA in 
the SPS Agreement enjoys a higher legal status, namely the excluding 
provision/conditional rights in the WTO legal hierarchy, than in the exception provisions 
in GATT.1298 Thirdly, I therefore argue that WTO Members enjoy precautionary 
entitlements in exercising their conditional rights1299 in achieving an appropriate level of  
public health protection.  
 
I have also borrowed the WTO legal hierarchy to illustrate exemptions to IP in 
TRIPS.1300 Considering the legal status of  compulsory licensing, I have looked into the 
interpretation of  the Doha Declaration and the principles and goals of  TRIPS.1301  
Fourthly, therefore, it was argued that compulsory licensing, like the provisional SPS 
measures, enjoys a higher legal status as an excluding provision, which can be deemed as 
a conditional right of  WTO Members’.1302 Then I argue that a compulsory licence 
granted under specific conditions would be considered in compliance with Members’ 
obligations in TRIPS unless a complaining Member proves otherwise.1303   
 
                                                      
1295 See section 3.1.2.2.  
1296 See section 3.1.3.2.  
1297 See section 3.2.1.  
1298 See section 4.2, Diagrams 4.2 and 4.2.1.  
1299 Conditional rights, see n118.  
1300 See section 4.3.2.2.1 and Diagram 4.3.2.2.1.  
1301 See section 4.3.2.2.1 and Diagram 4.3.2.2.1.1.  
1302 See section 5.2.1.1.  
1303 See section 5.3.5.  
  306
This work has also examined whether the adoption of  the PA in compulsory licensing 
would constitute discrimination in TRIPS.  It was then stressed that the risk factor 
could legitimise differential treatment in WTO law.1304 Fifthly, I have therefore argued 
that the risk factor could legitimise differential treatment in the adoption of  the PA in 
compulsory licensing of  a pharmaceutical patent with regard to taking an expedient 
trigger to invoke “national emergency or other circumstances of  extreme urgency”.1305  
Finally, I also took compulsory licensing in pandemic preparedness as an example to 
examine the precautionary model I developed in the previous chapters.  Following a risk 
assessment or an objective evaluation of  a pandemic based on the WHO’s 
recommendations,1306 I have concluded that under certain conditions,1307 states can 
invoke compulsory licensing in a pandemic preparedness plan to exercise their 




6.2 Some challenges and responses 
6.2.1 A better approach than the Doha Declaration? 
 
The Doha Declaration1308 indeed sought to relieve the disease burden of  developing 
countries by means of  providing a signpost in the access to medicines debates, yet due to 
political restraints in international settings, this declaration nevertheless fails to realise the 
goal it had promised.  Most developing countries are still deterred from seeking the 
flexibilities in TRIPS fearing that trade retaliation would follow.1309  This work has thus 
proposed a means to embody the flexibilities in the Doha Declaration in relation to its 
                                                      
1304 See sections 5.2.1.2.1.1 and 5.2.1.2.2.  
1305 See section 5.3.  
1306 See sections 5.3.1 and 5.3.1.1.  
1307 See sections 5.3.2-5.3.5.  
1308 Doha Declaration, see section 4.3.2.2.1 n27.   
1309 See sections 1.3.3-1.3.3.2.  
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interpretation of  “national emergency or other circumstances of  extreme urgency” in 
compulsory licensing.  
 
This work has also equipped states with a model to embody their precautionary entitlements 
in order to claim their conditional rights to compulsory licensing in a public health 
emergency.  However, it is beyond the content of  this work to address the political 
reasons underlying a state’s decision to grant a compulsory licence.  This work has only 
provided a policy tool for states to realise their conditional rights in the WTO/TRIPS 
regime.  It would ultimately depend on individual state’s policy-making in IP and risk 
management, taking all factors into consideration, to decide if  this approach would be 
best adopted in a preparedness plan for a public health emergency.  
 
 
6.2.2 Non-scientific factors? 
 
This work has suggested that states trigger the precautionary granting of  a compulsory 
licence with a scientific risk assessment or scientific information, yet other non-scientific 
factors in their IP/risk policy-making exist.  For example, a state’s particular value and 
social background,1310 political and geographic context1311 may render the said state to 
also base its decision upon civilians’ social and cultural preferences.  
 
Unlike other unknown risks which may be regulated along with public engagement, an 
acute public health emergency technically could not afford proper public engagement 
due to time restraints.  Hence, public engagement comes at a rather late stage in the 
form of  amicus briefs to the WTO DSS1312 after a dispute is filed.  Yet, it is fair to say 
                                                      
1310 Correa TRIPS, p288, n154. 
1311 See section 4.3.2.3.2.  
1312 WTO Dispute Settlement System (DSS) or Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), see section 1.2.1.1.2.  
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that governments would still need to take the comments of  the civil society,1313 particular 
from patients’ perspectives,1314 into consideration in its IP/risk policy-making. It may 
also be further explored whether “anticipatory engagement” is possible in a public health 
emergency.   
 
 
6.3 Beyond this work 
 
This work has argued for an expedient trigger threshold of  compulsory licensing when 
dealing with a preparedness plan for an acute public health emergency.  In order to 
examine if  a different trigger threshold of  the said compulsory licence would constitute 
discrimination in TRIPS, this work has also explored the legitimate differentiation of  
health technologies from other technologies.  I have adapted the “like-product” analysis 
from the WTO DSS as a threshold device into the discussion of  the differentiation of  
pharmaceutical technologies.  However, the question of  the PA still exists in the case of  
chronical disease, for example, the Thai Government’s compulsory licence of  heart 
disease drugs.1315 There may be arguably more room to engage the public in the debates 
of  compulsory licensing on non-acute conditions, but it is beyond the domain of  this 
work.  Regarding the compulsory licensing on acute disease drugs, new questions will 
arise in interpreting the legitimate differentiation of  health technologies.  
 
For example, I have argued that a differentiation should be made when health 
technologies are strongly associated with significant risks to human life and health.  Yet, 
next question moves to the identification and interpretation of  the concept of  “strongly 
                                                      
1313 See section 5.3.4.1.  
1314 See section 5.3.4.1.1.  
1315 See section 4.3.2.3.3.  
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associated with significant risks to human life and health”.  Again, this should be based 
on scientific evidence or pertinent scientific information, which is carried out by 
convincing organisations, to increase transparency and objectivity.    
 
Our discussion in the context of  TRIPS and the Doha Declaration has concluded that 
this proposal may be found to be consistent with the obligations of  a state under the 
TRIPS/WTO framework.  If  a Member makes a complaint to the WTO DSS with 
regard to a compulsory licence, he needs to prove that the public health emergency did 
not exist in the invoking state as well as that the granting of  a compulsory licence was 
not a least-restrictive measure.  The invoking party may submit their objective risk 
assessment or relevant information/recommendations from the WHO regarding the 
public health emergency to defend their cause.    
 
In addition to compulsory licensing, this work could serve as a foundation to further 
explore the extent to which the PA would be better accommodated in the IP regime, for 
example, other exception and excluding provisions in TRIPS in order to enhance access 
to essential medicines.  It can be anticipated that the employment of  the PA in the IP 
regime would serve to promote a balance in the rights and obligations of  patent holders, 
and legitimise a safety factor in the trade world.  Hopefully, we would then be equipped 
to distinguish technologies which are associated with public interest and security and 
have fundamentally different implications to society from other technologies in IP.1316  
 
Finally, moving beyond our discussion of  the health technology, the contribution of  this 
                                                      
1316 Abbott, F. A. (2005) “Toward a New Era of  Objective Assessment in the Field of  TRIPS and Variable 




work could also be explored in relation to other technologies associated with the 
reduction or elimination of  risks to the environment or technologies which aim to 
redress climate change and other environmental concerns.  This would then require 
more detailed investigation of  the “significant implications” of  environmental 
technologies and the strength of  the link between the said technology and the risk.   
 
 
6.4 Closing thought 
 
This work has developed a solution based on the PA in order to revisit public health 
emergency in TRIPS when national policy-makers are in a position to resort to the 
granting of  a compulsory licence in an acute emergency situation.  Throughout, this 
work has drawn upon philosophical and legal implications of  the PA, as well as used 
existing international legal instruments with regard to health and security to illustrate that 
the PA and the rationale of  risk management could be incorporated into the IP regime in 
order to take the full advantage of  the TRIPS flexibilities. 
 
The final message is straightforward:  a safety factor based on the PA is strongly 
recommended to be accommodated into the compulsory licensing mechanism.  This 
work has reviewed the rationale of  this approach, the objectives and the principles, as 
well as exemptions to obligations in the TRIPS Agreement, hence, it has concluded that 
the granting of  a compulsory licence in a public health emergency falls within the 
domain of  conditional rights in the WTO framework, compulsory licensing is deemed 
consistent with a state’s obligations under TRIPS unless a complaining Member proves 
otherwise.  A model of  the PA has been developed which is fit for purpose in its 
chosen realm of  application and which could serve to ensure that two worlds – trade and 
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exclusion of patentable subject matter and the interpretation of the Doha Declaration.
In addition, state practice in recent years also demonstrates that precaution has been
implemented into the application of compulsory licensing under a public health
emergency. This paper scrutinises the health exceptions in World Trade Organization
laws and suggests that the device of compulsory licensing is related to the scheme of
provisional sanitary and phytosanitary measures which reflects the spirit of precaution.
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require scientific justification. For example, health measures of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS
Agreement) are deemed legitimate on the basis of scientific evidence. However, in order to
safeguard human health under the circumstances of scientific uncertainty, the concept of
precaution has been incorporated into the SPS Agreement by means of the mechanism
of provisional SPS measures which reflects the precautionary approach. Moreover, the
Doha Declaration on the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)
Agreement and Public Health (Doha Declaration) has reaffirmed WTO Members’ (hence-
forth Member refers to WTO Member) sovereignty on health protection under a public
health emergency, and thus the precautionary approach is arguably implied in compulsory
licensing. Article 5.7 SPS was initially drafted to be used in emergency situations where, for
example, the spread of disease had to be stopped urgently before it may be feasible to com-
plete a risk assessment.1 While being developed as an expedient tool under an emergency,
Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement shares similar characteristics with the jurisprudence of the
mechanism of compulsory licensing under a public health emergency. The paper observes
that the scheme of provisional SPS measures and the mechanism of compulsory licensing
are both health measures devised to deal with public health risks in emergency conditions,
and thus proposes a comparative study of the two devices from the perspective of
precaution.
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The TRIPS Agreement provides flexibility for governments to fine-tune the exclusive pro-
tection granted in order to meet other social goals. It allows governments to make excep-
tions to patent holders’ rights such as in national emergencies, anti-competitive practices,
or if the right holder does not supply the invention, provided certain conditions are fulfilled.
In the case of ‘other use without authorisation of the right holder’, which is understood as
‘compulsory licensing’, the protection of the exclusive rights may be suspended under
certain conditions. For instance, the pharmaceutical patent protection can be suspended
during a limited period of time to meet the needs of public interests under a public
health emergency.
Compulsory licensing can be regarded as Members’ autonomous right and exclusion to
the IP regime which aims at the balance of rights and obligations of intellectual property
(IP) protection. It has been applied as a means to redress the dilemma of ‘access to essential
medicines’ and pharmaceutical patent protection in a public health emergency, yet its oper-
ation has been highly controversial. It is therefore suggested that the notion of precaution in
health exceptions in WTO laws can shed some light on the operation of compulsory
licensing.
1.1. Mechanism in TRIPS
The supplementary conditions and procedures in prior to grant compulsory licence are
detailed in Article 31 – TRIPS. For instance, the proposed user needs to make an effort
to obtain authorisation from the right holder on reasonable commercial terms and con-
ditions unless in the case of a national emergency of other circumstances of extreme
urgency. In situations of national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency,
the right holder shall be notified as soon as reasonably practicable. The scope and duration
of such use shall be limited to the purpose for which it was authorised; such use shall be
non-exclusive; it shall be authorised primarily for the supply of the domestic market, and
adequate remuneration shall be paid to the patent right holder. The compulsory licence is
subject to judicial review or other independent review by a higher authority.
As a general rule, it requires the competent authorities in the Member country to decide
each compulsory licensing case and establishes conditions that are intended to prevent the
granting of sweeping compulsory licences across a broad range of inventions. In subpar-
agraph (b), before an application may be considered, the proposed user must first seek
to obtain a voluntary licence on reasonable terms and conditions within a reasonable
period of time. The requirement of the obligation of the proposed user to first make an
effort to obtain authorisation from the rights holder in case of national emergency can
be waived under Article 31(b) of the TRIPS Agreement, but the condition of ‘national
emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency’ is not clearly defined in the
TRIPS Agreement. In the later round of negotiations in Doha in 2001, ministers stressed
that it is important to implement and interpret the TRIPS Agreement in a way that supports
public health – by promoting both access to existing medicines and the creation of new
medicines.2 It emphasises that the TRIPS Agreement should not prevent Member govern-
ments from acting to protect public health. It affirms governments’ right to use the agree-
ment’s flexibilities, such as compulsory licensing and parallel importing. After the Doha
Declaration and following international state practice, it is suggested that there is a

































































In agreeing to launch a new round of trade negotiations, trade ministers adopted a ‘Declara-
tion on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health’ (Doha Declaration) on 14 November
2001. The Declaration sought to alleviate developing-country dissatisfaction with the
TRIPS regime. It committed Members to interpret and implement the agreement to
support public health and to promote access to medicines for all. It also affirmed the
right of Members to use the flexibilities in the TRIPS agreement to promote these goals.
The interpretation of the Doha Declaration suggests that a Member’s right in deciding
appropriate level of protection is an ‘autonomous right’. The Appellate Body in EC –
Asbestos also stated that, ‘ . . . we note that it is undisputed that Members have the right
to determine the level of protection of health that they consider appropriate in a given situ-
ation’.4 The Doha Declaration states that each Member has the right to grant compulsory
licences and the freedom to determine the grounds upon which such licences are
granted; each Member has the right to determine what constitutes a national emergency
or other circumstances of extreme urgency. It articulates that public health crises, including
those relating to human immunodeficiency virus (HIV)/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and
other epidemics, can represent a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme
urgency. It also reminds Members in applying the customary rules of interpretation of
public international law, each provision of the TRIPS Agreement shall be read in the
light of the objectives and principles of the Agreement. While the TRIPS Agreement
aims at the protection of intellectual property rights in order to promote the technology
innovation, it also recognises the flexibilities of the standard of protection in order to
balance rights and obligations of patent holders.
The Doha Declaration has reaffirmed that a Member has the right to determine the
grounds to grant a compulsory licence, and thus a Member can be more cautious about
their chosen level of health protection. The right to determine an appropriate level of
health protection is regarded as an ‘autonomous right’ in WTO law. From this perspective,
the WTO seems willing to open a door for public health concerns and legitimate the flex-
ibilities that Members can apply at their discretion. This also manifests that Members’
autonomy has been paid due respect in the public health dimension of the international
economic law regime. After the global auto-immune disease syndrome (AIDS) pandemic,
world politics has pushed the WTO to identify an emerging pattern of deference to national
autonomy when Members’ domestic health policies conflict with other values protected by
trade agreements.
2. Precaution and health exception in WTO
Trade liberalism, global market access and the elimination of tariffs as barriers to global
trade and non-tariff barriers are the primary concerns of WTO. In order to balance different
interests, WTO provides limited exceptions allowing Members to take account of certain
values that compete or conflict with free trade, but the application to the exception rules
are usually strictly restricted. However, there still exist health risks under scientific uncer-
tainty, and the device of a provisional SPS measure offers leeway for Members’ discretion
under the scientific uncertainty. From the perspective of flexibilities in the free trade regime,
this paper observes that the interpretation of the Doha Declaration appears to indicate that
the application of compulsory licensing is more related to the model of a provisional SPS
measure than the mechanism in GATT Article XX (b). We now turn our attention to the
application of GATT Article XX (b).






























































2.1. GATT XX (b)
Article XX (b) concerns measures which are ‘necessary to protect human, animal or plant
life or health’. Members can adopt necessary public health measures to protect human,
animal or plant life or health. In order to prevent abuse of exception rules, Article XX
sets out a two-tier test for determining whether a measure applied is necessary to the
policy which the Member attempts to protect. The Appellate Body has further adopted a
‘weighing and balancing’ process in the necessity test after EC – Asbestos.
2.1.1. Purpose
The policy objective pursued by the measure must be the protection of life or health of
humans, animals or plants, and the measure must be necessary to fulfill the policy objective.
A public health measure inconsistent with the WTO obligations should be examined for its
legitimate objectives within the interpretation of Article XX (b), and it should pass the
necessity test. For example, in Thailand – Restrictions on Importation of Internal Taxes
on Cigarettes,5 the Panel ‘accepted that smoking constituted a serious risk to human
health and that consequently measures designed to reduce the consumption of cigarettes
fell within the scope of Article XX (b)’. The Panel noted this provision allowed the
Contracting Parties to give priority to health over trade liberalisation, but the Panel
further concluded that the applied measure needed to be necessary.
2.1.2. Measures
In Thailand – Cigarettes, the USA accused that Thailand’s prohibition on the importation
of cigarettes was inconsistent with the General Agreement on Tarrifs and Trade (GATT).
The Panel concluded that the restrictive measure failed to meet the necessity test.
In European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing
Products: France banned the importation and sales of asbestos for the reason of public
health protection. Canada accused that the measure was inconsistent with the WTO law,
but France’s banning was proved legitimate after providing reasonable scientific evidence
on chrysotile-cement products to the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB). The Appellate Body
adopted the ‘weighing and balancing process’ as the proportionality test to supplement the
necessity test. Besides ‘the difficulty of implementation’, the Appellate Body also referred
to two factors in the balancing process: ‘contribution of the measure to the realisation of
the value pursued’ and ‘importance of the value pursued’.6
In Brazil – Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres,7 The EU challenged
Brazil’s restrictions on imported retreaded tyres from the EU. Although Brazil argued
that the import ban was aimed at reducing public health risks, the EU accused that the
ban was not contributing to health and environmental protection. The Appellate Body
held that the ban failed to meet the requirement of the Chapeau of the GATT XX and
constituted arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination, or a disguised restriction to trade.
2.1.3. Rules and principles
The structure of Article XX (b) includes the provision and the Chapeau. The examination of
the disputed measure consists of three steps: first to review whether the objective of the
measure falls within the domain of the statute; second, the requirements in the Chapeau































































with the obligations and be least restrictive to trade. The disputed measure should be
applied in a non-discriminative way and any disguised restriction on international trade
is considered inconsistent with the Chapeau. Third, an analysis has been adopted by the
Appellate Body to balance the values of the protected objectives and the cost of the
trade restriction. The Appellate Body started to take into account several other factors to
relax the necessity test. The factor to relax the necessity test in a health exception includes:
the difficulty of implementation, contribution of the measure to the realisation of health
protection, and importance of the health pursued.
In other words, the applied measure will be accepted as legitimate if it is considered the
least restrictive to free trade. If there existing an alternative measure that would achieve the
same goal and is less restrictive to trade, then the alternative measure should be determined
if it is ‘reasonable available’. Moreover, the Appellate Body has introduced a weighing and
balancing process into the necessity analysis. Any trade restriction aimed at protecting
human health has to be in proportion to the benefits arising from the protection of
human health.
In sum, all the above cases except EC – Asbestos related to public health exception in
GATT XX (b) have failed to pass the scrutiny of ‘the necessity test’. The necessity test has
been relaxed after the introduction of a weighing and balancing process of the proportion-
ality test after EC – Asbestos. However, the necessity test including the proportionality test,
is deemed as a relatively rigid and scientifically based approach to examine the legitimacy
and validity of an international trade measure. Members do not enjoy a significant margin
of appreciation in determining the appropriate level of health protection under the
necessity test.
The application of Article XX (b) has been restrictive and requires an objective standard
to pass the necessity test. Among the above WTO cases only the Asbestos case passed the
examination for France’s provision of scientific justification. Moreover, the examination of
the applied measure has been influenced by mechanism of the SPS Agreement which sets
out more detailed requirements of a health measure. The SPS Agreement requires health
measures to be under scientific justification except for the imposition of the provisional
SPS measures which accepts measures on the basis of scientific uncertainty. The implemen-
tation of provisional SPS measures is deemed more flexible with States’ discretion.
2.2. SPS
The SPS Agreement aims at helping Members set up a standard system of risk management
on imported food and produce, but the agreement also requires Members to conform to its
obligations in WTO law to ensure the spirit of non-discrimination is protected. While adopt-
ing a SPS measure, a Member country has the obligation to ensure that the measure applied
should be in a non-discriminatory way. In addition, to deal with the condition of scientific
uncertainty in the process of risk management, the precautionary principle is incorporated
into the SPS Agreement through the imposition of a provisional SPS measure in Article 5.7
to accommodate health risks under emergency. The Appellate Body has identified the func-
tion of provisional SPS measures under a health emergency.
2.2.1. Purpose
The purpose of the SPS Agreement is to improve the human health, animal health and
phytosanitary situation in Member countries, and also to ensure the SPS measures are
not applied in a manner that would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable






























































discrimination between Members. The SPS Agreement was devised to introduce more
elaborate rules for the application of the GATT XX (b) which relates to the use of sanitary
or phytosanitary measures. There is potential overlap between GATT XX and the SPS
Agreement. GATT XX appears to cover general health measures that Member countries
might adopt, while the SPS Agreement relates specificly to sanitary and phytosanitary
measures. Article 2.4 of the SPS Agreement articulates that SPS measures which
conform to the relevant provisions of the SPS Agreement shall be in accordance with
Member countries’ obligations under GATT XX (b).
2.2.2. Measures
Under the SPS Agreement, Members are allowed to set their own health standards as long
as the measures are applied by risk assessment based on scientific evidence. International
standards are encouraged to be applied to the process of risk management. However, a
higher standard of protection than the international standard may also be accepted with
risk assessment and scientific evidence. The measure applied should be least restrictive
to international trade. Members are required to notify other Members about any change
or new SPS measures. Alternative measures can be accepted as equivalent if Members
can prove it provides the same standard of health protection and is proved least restrictive
to trade.
From the abovementioned statutes, the rights of Members to determine the appropriate
level of public health protection are recognised. Members can have two tracks to adopt an
SPS measure: track one is to follow available international standards; track two is at the dis-
cretion of Members, if Members wish to adopt a higher level of public health protection for
their population, scientific justification must be satisfied with risk assessment and scientific
evidence. The Appellate Body has recognised the ‘autonomous right’ of a Member to estab-
lish a higher level of health protection in Article 3.3. According to the requirements of
Article 5.3–5.6, Members should take into the account the objective of minimising nega-
tive trade effects while achieving the appropriate level of SPS protection. Members shall
also avoid arbitrary or unjust discrimination at the levels to be considered appropriate in
different situations.
In order to minimise the risk of a public health threat, relevant SPS measures can also be
adopted even in lack of scientific evidence. The mechanism of provisional SPS measures is
regulated in Article 5.7. The mechanism of provisional SPS measures was initially drafted
to be used in emergency situations where, for example, the spread of a disease had to be
stopped urgently before it may be feasible to complete a risk assessment. In cases where
relevant scientific evidence is insufficient, Members may adopt provisional SPS measures
on the basis of available pertinent information. After the adoption of a provisional SPS
measure, Members are obliged to seek to obtain necessary additional information for a
more objective risk assessment, and bear the duty to review the SPS measure within a
reasonable period of time. Thus, the spirit of the precautionary principle is considered to
be included in the WTO regime with the statute of the provisional SPS measure.
2.2.3. Rules and principles
There are two tracks to adopt SPS measures, one is for adopting general SPS measures, and
the other is an expedient track for adopting provisional SPS measures. Article 2 of the SPS
Agreement sets out the basic rights and obligations of Members. It affirms Members ‘have































































In particular, general SPS measures should meet the following requirements: they must
(1) be applied ‘only to the extent necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or
health’; (2) be ‘based on scientific principle and . . . not maintained without sufficient
scientific evidence’; (3) not ‘arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate between Members
where identical or similar conditions prevail’, and (4) not ‘be applied in a manner which
would constitute a disguised restriction on international trade’. Members are obliged to
base their SPS measures on certain risk assessments that indicate the necessity of the
measures to reach appropriate level of health protection.
The requirements of adopting provisional SPS measures are set out in Article 5.7. The
rulings of WTO also interpret the ambiguity of the provision. The imposition of provisional
SPS measures is limited within the domain of ‘insufficiency of scientific evidence’. There
are further preconditions in adopting a provisional SPS measure. In Japan – Measures
Affecting Agricultural Products II,8 the Appellate Body found that Article 5.7 is available
subject to the satisfaction of four cumulative requirements: (1) relevant scientific evidence
is insufficient; (2) the measure is adopted on the basis of available pertinent information; (3)
the Member seeks to obtain the additional necessary information for a more objective risk
assessment, and (4) the Member reviews the measure accordingly within a reasonable
period of time. After the adoption of a provisional SPS measure, Members are obliged to
obtain more information for a risk assessment and for reviewing the measure in a period
of time. If scientific evidence is sufficient to carry out a full risk assessment, the provisional
SPS measure is bound to be either abolished or made permanent.
2.2.4. Precaution in SPS
The precautionary approach or the precautionary principle has been developed from inter-
national environmental protection. Despite of its widespread application in environmental
protection, its definition is nonetheless universal. Paragraph 15 of the Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development provides the most well-known definition of the principle,
which reads
where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall
not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental
degradation.9
The precautionary principle emphasises that when there is a possibility of serious or irre-
versible harm to the environment, protective action should be taken in advance of scien-
tific proof of harm. Governments may be obliged to act to avoid irreversible damage even
under the circumstances of scientific uncertainty. The WTO Appellate Body has indi-
cated that the precautionary principle finds its reflection in the SPS Agreement.10 In par-
ticular, Article 5.7 SPS is seemed to incorporate the precautionary approach through the
introduction of provisional health measures under the circumstances of insufficient scien-
tific evidence. The acceptance of the precautionary principle in the WTO laws remains
limited at the time being, but it can serve as a means of risk management to explore
the political relationships between the various perspectives and competing interests in
society.
3. Precaution in TRIPS
The TRIPS Agreement is the most comprehensive multilateral agreement on IP. It is a
minimum standards agreement, which allows Members to provide more extensive






























































protection of IP. Members are left free to determine the appropriate method of implementing
the provisions of the Agreement within their own legal system and practice. Articles 30 and
31 TRIPS are typical exclusions to the patent protection for public interests or other social
agenda.
3.1. Article 30
Under the current TRIPS mechanism, there is still some exclusion from patentability which
is necessary to protect ordre public or morality, including to protect human, animal or plant
life or health or to avoid serious prejudice to the environment. Many nations incorporate
precautionary measures in their patent laws to varying degrees. For example, Brazilian
patent law provides a number of statutory exclusions from patentability, essentially limiting
the definition of patentable subject matter to exclude various categories of inventions for
policy reasons. The Brazilian exclusions to patentable subject matter are typical of precau-
tionary exclusions in the patent laws of WTO Member states. In general, Member states
have adopted precautionary exclusions to patentable subject matter based on five criteria:
morality, public policy (or public order), legality, public health and environmental harm.
For example, in the patent code of India, a provision states: ‘an invention the primary or
intended use of which would be contrary to law or morality or injurious to public
health’. Exclusions to patentability can be regarded as typical applications of the precau-
tionary approach in the TRIPS Agreement.
3.2. Article 31
The mechanism of compulsory licensing in the TRIPS Agreement can also be considered an
exclusion to IP in the world trade system, but the application of compulsory licensing on
pharmaceuticals has caused great debates in the international legal forum as a result of
its lack of a clear threshold for invocation. The Doha Declaration has interpreted and clari-
fied the specific terms of compulsory licensing. It has reaffirmed Member states’ autonomy
in determining the appropriate level of health protection under a public health emergency,
such as AIDS/HIV, tuberculosis, malaria, or other serious epidemics. It implies Article 31
as an excluding provision, which excludes other provisions within the TRIPS Agreement. It
further suggests that the right to grant compulsory licences is an ‘autonomous right’ of
WTO Members. The Doha Declaration has reaffirmed Members’ rights to determine the
level of health protection, which therefore implies the concept of precaution in the
TRIPS Agreement. It can be argued that the scheme of compulsory licensing can be
rephrased as: ‘When confronted with public health emergency, scientific uncertainty
should not prevent the implementation of compulsory licensing for an appropriate level
of health protection’.
In view of the principles of the exception rules applied in the WTO system, a Member
state is required to prove that the applied public health measure is necessary to eliminate the
public health risk through scientific justification. The SPS, along with the health exception
rule of GATT XX (b), the public health measure applied should pass the ‘necessity test’,
which is regarded as an objective standard. The SPS Agreement expects international stan-
dards or higher standards of public health protection with scientific justification to be
applied among Members, while it also provides the mechanism on provisional measures
under the circumstances of uncertainty in scientific evidence. The Doha Declaration
demonstrates that the invocation of compulsory licensing is different from the jurisprudence































































device of compulsory licensing has an important and different implication from the WTO
jurisprudence of ‘the necessity test’.11 Therefore, the burden of proof is laid on the
complainant who needs to provide evidence that the public health emergency does not
exist. The compulsory licensing is deemed compliant with the TRIPS Agreement unless
the complainant proves otherwise.
From the above observation, the implementation of compulsory licensing can be argued
to be more related to the device of provisional SPS measures than other general health
measures in WTO law. Provisional SPS measures that introduce health measures under
emergencies echo the essential needs of compulsory licensing under a public health
emergency. This paper therefore suggests that compulsory licensing, similar to the provi-
sional SPS measures, can be interpreted to reflect the spirit of the precautionary approach.
It can be further argued that the precautionary approach has been implied in the TRIPS
Agreement through the mechanism of compulsory licensing after the interpretation of the
Doha Declaration.
4. Conclusion
The device of compulsory licensing aims at redressing the dysfunction of IP protection. It
can be applied to promote access to medicines under a public health emergency. This paper
scrutinises the mechanism through the interpretation of the Doha Declaration and argues
that the concept of precaution has been incorporated into the TRIPS Agreement. It is there-
fore important to apply the scheme in a way that is different from the traditional approach of
‘the necessity test’ in other WTO jurisprudence areas. The standard of applying GATT
Article XX (b) and the general health measures in the SPS Agreement requires scientific
justification, and its application is highly limited. In contrast, the right to grant a compulsory
licence is implied as a Member’s ‘autonomous right’ through the interpretation of the Doha
Declaration. It has been distinguished from other general health exception rules in WTO
law. The implementation of compulsory licensing, which respects states’ sovereignty and
flexibilities in discretion, is thus more related to the device of provisional SPS measures.
The Doha Declaration has indicated that the flexibilities of compulsory licensing imply a
precautionary approach in health risk management in the TRIPS Agreement. However,
the invocation of compulsory licensing still requires a clear trigger threshold and often
gives rise to controversies on the legitimacy of the grant; therefore the interpretation and
further exploration of the precautionary approach in the TRIPS Agreement is desired to
prevent potential conflicts in international law.
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